THE

HISTORY

OF

ANCIENT GREECE,

ITS COLONIES, AND CONQUESTS;

From the earliest Accounts till the

Division of the Macedonian Empire in the East.

INCLUDING THE HISTORY OF

LITERATURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE FINE ARTS.

By JOHN GILLIES, LL.D.

F.R.S. AND A.S. LONDON, F.R.S. EDINBURGH,
AND HISTORIOGRAPHER TO HIS MAJESTY FOR SCOTLAND.

Εκ μεν τοινυν της απαντων προς αλληλα συμπλοκης και παραθεσεως, ετι δε ομοιοτητος και διαφορας, μονως αν τις εφικοιτο και συνθεση κατοπτευσας, αμα και το χρησιμον και το τερπνον εκ της ιστοριας λαβειν. POLYBIUS, l.i. c. v.

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THE beginning of the fifth century before Chriſt forms the moſt glorious æra in the hiſtory of Greece. While the republics of Athens and Sparta humbled the pride of Aſia, the flouriſhing ſettlements on the Helleſpont and

State of Greece. Olymp. lxxv. 1. A.C. 480.

 the

CHAP. XI. the Hadriatic overawed the fierce Barbarians of Europe [1]; and the ſouthern colony of Cyrené reſtrained, within their native limits, the ſavage ferocity of the Lybians [2]. The north, ſouth, and eaſt thus acknowledging the aſcendant of the Grecian valour and genius, Rome ſtill contended in the weſt, with the obſtinacy of the Volſci [3], for the rude villages of Latium: yet on this ſide, from which the ſtream of conqueſt was deſtined, in a future age, to flow over the world, the Greeks had already moſt danger to apprehend, and moſt laurels to acquire; not however from Rome, but from the implacable [4] enemy of the Roman name.

The foundation and growth of Carthage,

The foundation and growth of Carthage, which have been ſo ſucceſsfully adorned by poetical fiction, are very imperfectly explained in hiſtory. It is known, that at leaſt eight hundred and ninety years [5] before the Chriſtian æra, a Phœnician colony ſettled on that fertile projecture of the African coaſt, which boldly advances into the Mediterranean, to meet, as it were, and to defy the ſhores of Sicily and Italy, planted in the following century by

[1] Herodot. l. vi. Thucydid. l. i.

[2] Strabo, l. xvii. [3] Diodor. l. xi.

[4] With what energy does Virgil expreſs the eternal enmity between Rome and Carthage!

Littora littoribus contraria, fluctibus undas,
Imprecor, arma armis; pugnent ipſique nepotes. Æneid. l. iv.

[5] B. C. 891. Petav. de Doctr. Temporum. Yet, as there is a gap in the Carthaginian hiſtory of ſeveral centuries, every man of taſte will be deſirous of extending the duration of this dark and unknown period, to have the pleaſure of believing that Æneas and Dido were contemporaries: an opinion more probable than that of Sir Iſaac Newton, who would bring down the time of Æneas and the æra of the Trojan war to the age of Dido and the foundation of Carthage.

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Greeks, with whom the republic of Carthage, long before the age of her great Hannibal, waged many cruel and bloody wars. For three centuries after their eſtabliſhment, the Carthaginians ſeem to have ſilently, but ſucceſsfully, availed themſelves of the natural fertility of their ſoil, the conveniency of their harbours, the ſkill and dexterity of their artiſans, the adventurous ſpirit of their mariners; above all, of the profound wiſdom of their government, which had been eſtabliſhed on ſuch admirable principles, that from the foundation of their city till the age of the philoſopher Ariſtotle [6], no tyrant had oppreſſed the freedom, no ſedition had diſturbed the tranquillity of Carthage [7].

which oppoſes the naval enterpriſes of the Greeks.

From this peaceful and happy obſcurity the Carthaginians firſt emerged into notice in conſequence of their oppoſition to the naval enterpriſes of the Aſiatic Greeks, who, about the middle of the ſixth century before Chriſt, flying the oppreſſive domination of Perſia, threw themſelves on the weſtern ſhores and iſlands of the Mediterranean. As a maritime and enterpriſing nation the Greeks were naturally rivals to the Carthaginians; and the Phocæans, who had left the coaſt of Ionia to avoid the cruel tyranny of the ſatrap Harpagus, had landed

[6] Ariſtot. de Repub. l. ii. c. xi.

[7] If Dido laid the foundation of ſo much proſperity and happineſs, ſhe might boaſt, with becoming dignity, of having ſecured immortal fame:

Vixi, & quem dederat curſum fortuna peregi,
Urbem præclaram ſtatui, mea mœnia vidi:
Et nunc magna mei ſub terris ibit imago. VIRGIL, ibid.

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at, or perhaps founded, Aleria in the iſle of Corſica, before they finally ſettled at Velia [8] in Italy, and Marſeilles in Gaul [9]. The Carthaginians, who had already formed eſtabliſhments in Corſica, regarded the whole iſland as a dependency of their republic, and ſet themſelves to oppoſe with vigour the Græcian invaders. Their commercial allies [10], the Tuſcans, reinforced their fleet; and the moſt ancient naval engagement, diſtinctly recorded in hiſtory, was fought in the Sardinian ſea, between the Phocæans with ſixty ſail on the one ſide, againſt the Tuſcans and Carthaginians with double that number on the other [11]. The Greeks had the whole glory of the battle; they deſtroyed forty of the enemy's ſhips, and compelled the reſt to fly. But the ſmallneſs of their numbers, greatly diminiſhed by their deſperate efforts in defending the honour of their nation againſt a ſuperior force, obliged them to abandon the project of ſettling in Corſica.

Hinders them from ſettling in Corſica.

Though the iſſue of this memorable ſea-fight tends to diſpel the cloud of fiction concerning the remote voyages and ancient naval power of the Carthaginians, yet it cannot be doubted, that in the beginning of the following century, and before the invaſion of Xerxes, they were the moſt powerful commercial nation in the world. The proud centre of their empire was ſurrounded by a cluſter of colonies and tributary cities, which extended

Power and ſplendour of Carthage. Olymp. lxx. 1. A. C. 500.

[8] Diodor. l. v. and Cluverius Sicil. Ant. p. 507.

[9] Thucydid. l. i.

[10] Ariſtot. Politic. l. iii.

[11] Id. ibid. & Herodot. l. vi.

above

above a thouſand miles [11] along the coaſt of Africa. They were maſters of Sardinia and the northen coaſt of Sicily [12]. They had eſtabliſhed colonies not only in Corſica, but in Malta and the Balearian iſles. They often viſited the Caſſeterides [13]. They probably firſt diſcovered the Canaries, whoſe equable and happy temperature entiled them to the epithet of Fortunate. They had appropriated the gold mines of Spain, the Peru and Mexico of the ancient world [14]; and all theſe advantages being directed by the prudent enterpriſe of the magiſtrates, conſiſting chiefly of merchants [15], and improved by the patient induſtry

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[11] From the weſtern boundary of Cyrenaica to the Straits of Gibraltar, Shaw reckons 1420 geographical miles; but this was the extent of the Carthaginian dominion in the greateſt ſplendour of the republic. Shaw's Travels, p. 150.

[12] Polyb. l. iii. c. xxii.

[13] Plin. Nat. Hiſt. l. vi. c. 37.

[14] Auctor. apud Hendreich Reſpub. Carthag. l. i.

[15] In this reſpect the government of Carthage was every different from that of Crete, and particularly of Sparta, with both which Ariſtotle compares it. Iſocrates (ad Nicoclem) ſays, that in civil affairs the Carthaginian government was ariſtocratical; in military, royal: this probably was the caſe in the earlieſt times. The chief magiſtrates were called Suffetes, which, in the Hebrew language, ſignifies judges (Bochart, Cannan), and might therefore be naturally tranſlated by the word βασιλεις, in Greek. But it appears from Ariſtotle, that theſe judges or kings, two in number, were nothing more than annual magiſtrates, who convoked the ſenate, and preſided in that aſſembly. When the ſenate and the ſuffetes were of one mind, the people had no vote in the management of public affairs; but when their opinions differed, it belonged to the people to decide. Ariſtotle regards this as an imperfection in their conſtitution; and time juſtified his opinion. In a commercial republic, where the people gradually become more rich and more licentious, ſuch a regulation naturally tended to throw too much power into their hands. During the century which elaſped from Ariſtotle to Hannibal, the

duſtry of the people, who knew that by gaining wealth they muſt attain reſpect, rendered Carthage the centre of general commerce. From Egypt they imported linen and the papyrus; the coaſts of the Red Sea furniſhed them with ſpices, perfumes, gold, pearls, and precious ſtones [16]. The rich carpets of Perſia adorned the palaces of the Carthaginian magiſtrates. From Spain they drew the precious metals neceſſary to facilitate their commerce; and from Britain and other provinces of the north, they derived iron, lead, tin, and copper, equally neceſſary to ſecond all the efforts of their induſtry. The Carthaginian exports conſiſted partly in the produce of their fertile ſoil, but chiefly in the ingenious labours of their artificers; grains, fruits, honey, leather, and flax of a ſuperior kind [17]; naval ſtores, particularly ropes made of a ſpecies of broom called ſpartum; houſehold furniture, toys, and the materials of the highly valued *Puniceau* colour. Their mechanic arts had attained a degree of perfection which was acknowledged and admired by their enemies [18]; but the liberal arts, and particularly poetry and eloquence [19], ſeem never to

people of Carthage became more powerful than the ſenate; at Rome the ſenate continued more powerful than the people; and to theſe circumſtances chiefly, the moſt judicious author of antiquity aſcribes the very different fortune of the two nations in the ever memorable wars between them. POLYB. l. vi.

[16] Pliny, l. xxxviii. c. 7, tells us that carbuncles were ſo common in Carthage, that they were generally diſtinguiſhed by the epithet, Carthaginian.

[17] Xenophon, de Venatione.

[18] Cato de Re Ruſtica, & Valerius Maximus, l. vii.

[19] The great Hannibal was a lover of Greek learning, and compoſed ſeveral books in that language. Cornelius Nepos in Hannibal. Silenus,

to have flourished or taken root in their republic; a circumstance more fatal to the renown of Carthage than all the destructive ravages of the Romans, whose immortal hate would have found it more difficult to abolish the elegant productions of genius, than to extinguish the most splendid monuments of wealth and grandeur.

The ambitious and jealous spirit of that republic.

Few individuals are able to enjoy, without abusing, the gifts of fortune; and no nation ever possessed power, without aspiring at conquest. But the commercial ambition of the Carthaginians was degraded by an exclusive and jealous spirit, which sought to stifle the activity and improvements of every people that might ever become their rival [20]. In the end of the sixth century before Christ, and twenty-eight years before the invasion of Xerxes, they concluded a treaty with Rome, recently delivered from the tyranny of its kings, which marks the utmost solicitude to prevent the new republic from ever entering into correspondence, or ever gaining acquaintance [21], with the dependencies of Carthage. The Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily,

Silenus, another Carthaginian, wrote history in Greek. Cicer. de Divinat. Sallust speaks of *Punic books* in his history of the Jugurthine war; and we know that Mago's Treatise of Rural Oeconomy in 28 books, was translated by order of the Roman senate, although the elder Cato had previously treated that important subject. I mention not the doubtful voyage of Hanno, (See Dodwell, Dissert. in Hannon. Perip. Montesq. Esprit des Loix, l. xxi. c. 8. & Bougainville, Mem. de l'. Acad. t. xxvi.) since better proofs of the Carthaginian literature may be found in the second and eighteenth books of Pliny. But two observations naturally present themselves, which justify what is said in the text; first, that the Carthaginians wrote rather on the useful than ornamental arts; and secondly, that their greatest writers preferred the Greek to the Punic language.

[20] Strabo, l. iii. p. 265. & l. xviii. p. 1154.

[21] Polyb. l. iii. c. xxii.

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The prosperity of Greece alarms the Carthaginians,

which, within the course of sixty years, had (for reasons that will immediately be explained) received such accessions of strength and splendour as entitled those countries to the appellation of Magna Græcia [22], more justly alarmed the jealousy, and provoked the envious resentment of the Carthaginian magistrates. The Greeks were already masters of the eastern isles and shores of the Mediterranean. They were not only a warlike, but an ingenious and commercial nation. The naval force of the Phocæans alone had defied and disgraced the united fleets of the Tuscans and Carthaginians. The latter therefore beheld, with the utmost satisfaction, the continual sparks of hostility that flashed between the Greeks and Persians. They learned, with admiration and delight, the mighty preparations of Xerxes; but were still more delighted when the great King, who had been accustomed to receive the presents and the adulation of the tributary princes of Asia, condescended to demand an equal alliance with their republic; probably granted them subsidies to raise troops in Spain, Gaul, and the northern parts of Italy; and only required them to join their efforts with his own, to punish, and, if possible, to extirpate the natural enemies of both. The crafty Africans greedily accepted propositions, seemingly so favourable to their interest; and, after three years' preparations, had collected an armament of two thousand ships of war, and three thousand transports, to convey an army of three hundred thousand men into Magna Græcia [23]. It was

who enter into an alliance with Xerxes.

[22] Strabo, l. viii. p. 389.

[23] Herodot. l. vii. & Diodor. l. xi.

deter-

determined between the confederates, that while Xerxes poured his millions into the centre of Greece and rooted out the original ſtock of the devoted nation, the Carthaginians ſhould cut off its flouriſhing branches in Italy and Sicily. The terms of the agreement were carefully obſerved; the combined attack was made at the time appointed; and Europe is intereſted in knowing to what particular cauſes muſt be aſcribed the failure of expeditions, which, if ſucceſsful, would have inverted her deſtiny, and intercepted that boaſted ſuperiority which ſhe thenceforth maintained over the other quarters of the world.

Their views in adopting this meaſure.

Whoever has obſerved the deſolate barbarity of Calabria, or reflected on the narrow extent and preſent weakneſs of Sicily, cannot hear, without a mixture of ſurpriſe and incredulity, that five centuries before Chriſt, thoſe countries contained above twenty warlike communities, ſeveral of whom could ſend into the field an hundred thouſand fighting men. The haſty glance of impatient ignorance will confidently reject, on this ſubject, the evidence of antiquity, as contrary to probability and experience; the contemplative viſionary will admit the fact, and deduce from it many gloomy reflections on the old age and decay of the world; but the more practical philoſopher will attempt to diſcover the cauſes of the ancient and actual ſtate of Magna Græcia, in the hiſtory and inſtitutions of that country during the reſpective periods of time which are the objects of his reſearch.

The flouriſhing condition of Magna Grecia.

The

C. H. S. P. XI.

History of the colonization of that country.

The establishment of Eubœan Cumæ, the mother of Parthenope, or Naples, and the foundation of a few other Grecian cities in Italy and Sicily, remounts, as already mentioned, to the heroic ages; but by far the greater number of Greek colonies in those parts were planted during the eighth century before the Christian æra[24], and chiefly, 1. by the Eubœans, whose principal city, Chalcis, usually furnishing the conductor of the colony, gave the epithet of Chalcidian to the new settlement; 2. by the Achæans of Peloponnesus, who were of the Eolian tongue and lineage; and, 3. by the Dorian states of that peninsula, especially Corinth; to which city may be applied the observation of ancient republicans concerning the fathers of Cato and Brutus, that as children often derived lustre from the merit of their parents, so Corinth acquired renown from the splendour and prosperity of its children. Besides their powerful colonies in Corcyra, Leucas, Anactorium, Ambracia, whose transactions form such an important part of the history of ancient Greece, the Corinthians founded Syracuse, which soon became and long continued, the capital of Sicily. Seventy years after their establishment there, the inhabitants of Syracuse built Acras, and afterwards, at an equal distance of time, Camerina. Many other cities of less note owed existence to the same metropolis; so that in the sixth century before Christ, the Syracusans had extended their settlements over

The Dorian colonies most powerful in Sicily. Olymp. xi. 2. A. C. 729.

[24] Between the 10th and 30th Olympiads, and the years 777 and 737 B. C.

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all the ſouthern coaſt of the iſland[25]. We had already an opportunity to mention on what occaſion the Lacedæmonians founded the city of Tarentum in Italy; thirty-nine years afterwards, Rhegium was built by the Meſſenians and Chalcidians, the former of whom (as we have related above) had already ſettled at Meſſené, on the oppoſite ſhore of Sicily. The citizens of Tarentum founded Heraclea, ſituated on the Tarentine gulph, and perhaps gave an acceſſion of inhabitants to Locri, which, though originally planted by the Eolians, ſeems early to have uſed the Doric dialect. The Rhodians, who were alſo of the Doric race, built the city of Gela in Sicily, forty-five years after the foundation of Syracuſe[26]; and Gela planted the flouriſhing colony of Agrigentum, which ſoon ſurpaſſed the ſplendour of its metropolis, and became the ſecond city in the iſland.

Olymp. viii. 2. A. C. 707.

Olymp. xlix. 3. A. C. 582.

By means of theſe powerful eſtabliſhments, the *Dorians* acquired, and always maintained, an aſcendant in Sicily; but the Achæan colonies, who were of the *Eolian* blood and language[27], commanded the Italian ſhore. Crotona, the moſt conſiderable city of the Achæans, and of all Italy, in ancient times, was built ſeven hundred and ten years before Chriſt[28]. Sybaris, its rival, was founded about the ſame time, and by the ſame nation. The former ſent colonies to Tirina, Cato-

The Eolian, in Italy.

[25] Scymnus, v. 293. Thucydid. l. vi. & Herodot. l. vii.

[26] Thucydid. l. vi.

[27] Strabo, l. viii. p. 513. aſſures us of the latter circumſtance, which is of more importance than the uncertain genealogy of the ancient Grecian tribes.

[28] Dionyſ. Halicarn. l. ii.

Ionia,

CHAP. Ionia, and Pandoſia; the latter built Laus, Metapontum, and Poſidonia, or Pæſtum[29], whoſe admired ruins atteſt the ancient wealth and grandeur of the Greek cities of Italy.

The Ionian the weakeſt in both countries.

In this deduction, had we followed the order of time, we ought to have mentioned, firſt of all, the Ionian colonies, who came from the iſle of Eubœa. The inhabitants of that iſland built Naxus in Sicily, a year before the foundation of Syracuſe[30]; but neither that nor their ſettlements at Catana, Segeſta, Leontium, ever attained conſiderable populouſneſs or ſplendour. And it deſerves to be particularly remarked, that, for reaſons which will appear in the ſequel of this work, the Ionians, who ſettled chiefly upon the caſtern ſhore of Sicily, never rivalled the power and fame of their Dorian and Eolian neighbours, but fell ſhort of thoſe nations in Magna Græcia, as much as they ſurpaſſed them on the ſhores and iſlands of Aſia.

General cauſes of the wealth and populouſneſs of all theſe colonies.

Inſtead of fatiguing the memory of our readers with the names of leſs conſiderable ſtates or cities, which had little influence on the general affairs of the whole country [31], it is of more importance to

[29] Scymnus. v. 245. [30] Thucyd. l. vi.

[31] The Magna Græcia, which I always uſe in the ſenſe of Strabo, cited above, to denote the Greek ſettlements in Sicily as well as Italy, being the moſt accurate part of the Grecian dominions, has been more fully deſcribed by the moderns than any other. The immenſe collection of the Theſaurus Siculus, and particularly vols. i. iv. vii. viii. and xiii. afford uſeful materials, as well as Cluverii Sicil. Antiqua, and Fazellus de Rebus Siculis, and the excellent work of Gio. Batt. Caruſo, Memorie iſtoriche di quanto é accaduto in Sicilia dal tempo dé ſuoi primi habitanti fino ai Normanni.

examine

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examine the circumſtances to which the inhabitants of Magna Græcia owed their flouriſhing ſituation at the period of time of which we write, when (it may be boldly affirmed) theſe colonies equalled, and ſurpaſſed, the wealth and power of the mother-country. We ſhall not inſiſt on the well-known phyſical and moral cauſes which uſually contribute to the rapid growth of newly-eſtabliſhed colonies. It is evident, that amidſt the equality of fortune, and ſimplicity of manners, which commonly prevail in ſuch communities, men who have a wide country before them muſt naturally multiply far beyond the proportion of nations corrupted and weakened by the vices of wealth, luxury, and above all, of vanity, which perhaps is the greateſt enemy to the increaſe of the human ſpecies. It is ſufficient barely to mention the natural fertility of Magna Græcia, and particularly of Sicily, which, in the language of antiquity, reſtored an hundred fold [32]. The Greeks who ſailed thither from Peloponneſus, carried with them the knowledge and practice of agriculture, which had early attained an high degree of perfection in their peninſula; and the exuberant ſoil of Sicily, improved by cultivation, ſoon exhibited a picture of that rich abundance, which, in later times, made that beautiful iſland be entitled the granary of Rome [33].

Olymp. lxx. 1. A. C. 500.

The peculiar ſituation of the Achæans and Dorians, from whom, chiefly, the colonies in Magna Græcia derived their origin, had a conſiderable

Particular cauſes. The Achæan laws.

[32] Strabo, l. viii. [33] Diodorus, l. xvi.

influence

CHAP. XI. influence in accelerating the population and grandeur of these new establishments. The Achæans, whose republic became so famous in later times, and that through circumstances and causes which it is necessary at present to explain, originally inhabited a long but narrow strip of ground, not more fertile than extensive, along the Corinthian gulph, whose rocky shores were destitute of good harbours[34]. But the impartial and generous spirit of the Achæan laws early compensated the natural defects of their territory. They were the first and long the only republic of Greece, who admitted strangers into their community on equal terms with the ancient citizens[35]. In *their* truly free country, no powerful capital, like Thebes in Bœotia, or Athens in Attica, domineered over the inferior towns and villages. Twelve cities, which had common laws and institutions, and afterwards common weights and measures[36], sent deputies to Helicé, which is distinguished by Homer[37] as the most considerable town of Achaia. That place being destroyed by an earthquake[38] three hundred and seventy-three years before Christ, Ægæ became the seat of the general congress, which regulated public affairs, and appointed annual magi-

[34] Plutarch, in Arato, p. 1031. [35] Polybius, l. ii. p. 178.

[36] Polybius, ibid. mentions this circumstance, to shew how desirous they were to have every thing common and equal among them.

[37] Il. ii. in the catalogue.

[38] Strabo, l. viii. p. 589. says, the earthquake happened two years before the battle of Leuctra, which was fought 371 years before Christ.

strates

ſtrates and generals to execute their reſolutions, who were reſponſible to the congreſs, or council, as the members of the council themſelves were accountable to the cities by which they had been named and conſtituted [39]. This excellent ſyſtem of government, which checked the ambition, while it maintained the independence of Achaia [40], defended that fortunate country againſt the convulſions which ſhook and overwhelmed the moſt powerful republics of Greece. It was then that the Achæans, who during many ages had enjoyed their equitable laws in ſilence, emerged from obſcurity; and communicating their government on equal terms to the neighbouring cities of Peloponneſus, preſerved the feeble ſpark of liberty, every where extinguiſhed around them, for one hundred and thirty-ſix years, till they finally yielded to the power and policy of Rome [41]. This ſhort period of war and tumult has been minutely deſcribed in hiſtory, while the many happy centuries that preceded it are but occaſionally glanced at by ancient writers: and were it not for the defeats and calamities which the Achæans ſuffered in later times, we ſhould, perhaps, be ignorant that their anceſtors anciently enjoyed an equitable and generous policy, which, being tranſported with them into Magna Græcia, could not fail to promote the happineſs and proſperity of that delightful country [42].

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A. C. 282.

A. C. 146.

The

[39] Polybius, l. ii. p. 178.

[40] Schoock. Achaia, apud Gronov. Theſ. t. v.

[41] Polyb. Excerp. Legat. & Titus Livius, l. xxxviii. & xxxix.

[42] Xenophon, in his Greek hiſtory, ſpeaks of the excellence of the Achæan laws, in treating a paſſage of hiſtory which will be related

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The ſtate of the Dorians at the time of their emigration to Magna Græcia.

The condition of the Dorians, at the time when they planted colonies in Italy and Sicily, is not leſs worthy of remark. The Dorian ſtates of Peloponneſus were then univerſally ſubject to the gentle government of limited but hereditary princes, or to magiſtrates choſen from the deſcendants of the ancient royal families[43], and who, thus adorned by birth, were ſometimes ſtill more ennobled by wiſdom and virtue[44]. It is the nature of colonies to obſerve with affectionate reſpect the inſtitutions of their mother-country, which often improve by tranſplantation, and thrive and flouriſh in foreign lands, when they have withered and periſhed in the ſoil which originally produced and propagated them. Time and accident, and the various cauſes which have been explained in the courſe of this hiſtory, tended to change the ancient conſtitution, and to diminiſh the ſtrength of the Grecian ſtates on both ſides the Corinthian Iſthmus. While fierce and frequent wars exhauſted their population, the excluſive ſpirit of republican jealouſy, which ſternly refuſed ſtrangers any participation in their government, or any

Circumſtances favourable to the new ſettlers in that country.

lated in the ſequel. Polybius was evidently engaged to enter deeply into this ſubject, through the reaſon aſſigned in the text.

[43] Theſe were properly the only nobility in Greece; they were called ευπατριδαι, and long held ſway in all the Grecian ſtates. S. Petitus has collected the moſt important paſſages concerning them in his commentary on the ancient Athenian law, "Τους Ευπατριδας γινωσκειν τα θεια, και παρεχειν αρχοντας, και νομων διδασκαλους ειναι, και ὁσιων και ἱερων εξηγητας." "That the Eupatridæ, or nobility, adminiſter the rites of religion, fill the offices of magiſtracy, interpret the laws, and explain all ſacred and divine matters."

[44] Thucydid. l. i.

protection

protection from their laws, naturally repreſſed their vigour and ſtunted their growth. The colonies in Magna Græcia, enjoying a wide territory before them, had not the ſame interference of intereſt, and found ſufficient employment in ſubduing the original inhabitants of that country, without commencing hoſtilities againſt each other. Nor were they more ambitious to ſubdue the barbarous natives, than ſolicitous to incorporate them into their own communities. The kings, or nobility, of Magna Græcia, ſecure of their own pre-eminence, felt [43] nothing of the republican jealouſies which prevailed in the mother-country. They received with pleaſure new citizens, or rather ſubjects, from whatever quarter they might come. The Barbarians adopted the language and manners of the nation to whom they were aſſociated; their children received a Grecian education; and the ſtates of Italy and Sicily thus increaſing by degrees, could ſoon boaſt, the former of Crotona, Tarentum, Sybaris, Rhegium; the latter of Syracuſe, Agrigentum, Meſſené, Himera, and ſeveral other cities, which rivalled or ſurpaſſed the wealth of Athens or Corinth, and the populouſneſs of Thebes, Argos, or Sparta.

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The wars, conqueſts, or oppreſſions, but above all, the civil diſſenſions, which in the ſixth century before Chriſt diſturbed and deformed the coaſt of

The oppreſſion of the Aſiatic Greeks brought

[43] The ſame policy was practiſed by Macedon; and, as we ſhall have occaſion to ſhow, was the primary cauſe of the Macedonian greatneſs.

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new inhabitants to Italy and Sicily;

Ionia, and the other Grecian colonies in the iſlands and continent of Aſia, brought frequent acceſſions of inhabitants to the ſhores of Magna Græcia. In that age the Aſiatic Greeks had attained greater proficiency, both in the uſeful and in the agreeable arts, than any other portion of the Grecian name; but they had alſo ſunk deeper in voluptuouſneſs and luxury. Their poetry, which ſtill remains, alike atteſts the refinement of their taſte, and the corruption of their morals. The effeminate vices, for which the Ionians were thenceforth in all ages infamous [44], ſeem to have taken deep root in that century; and it is probable, that along with their poetry, muſic, and painting, they communicated alſo their diſſolute manners and artificial appetites to the Greeks of Italy and Sicily.

who improved arts, and corrupted manners;

But whether this be admitted, or whether we ſuppoſe that, according to the ordinary courſe of events, the inhabitants of Magna Græcia having attained opulence by induſtry, were ſtimulated by riches to licence; it is acknowledged by all writers on this part of hiſtory, that the Greek cities of Italy, and particularly Sybaris and Crotona, had degenerated from their ancient maxims, and fallen a prey to the moſt dangerous errors and vices, when Pythagoras came to their relief, about five hundred and fifty years before the Chriſtian æra.

which are reformed by Pythagoras.

The philoſophy of Pythagoras forms an important object in the hiſtory of the human mi

[44] Motus doceri gaudet *Ionicos*
Matura virgo, & fingitur artibus,
Jam nunc, & inceſtos amores
De tenero meditatur ungue. HORACE.

and

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and if we admit the concurring teſtimony of ancient authors[45], the philoſophy, or rather the legiſlation, of this extraordinary man, reformed and improved the inſtitutions and policy of Magna Græcia, and contributed in an eminent degree, not only to the quiet and happineſs, but to the induſtry, power, and ſplendour, of that celebrated country. Leſt this influence ſhould appear too great, and even incredible, in a ſtranger who is known to have ſtudiouſly declined all public offices and authority, the occaſion requires that we ſhould explain the means by which ſuch extraordinary effects were produced.

Hiſtory of that philoſopher. Olymp. xlv. 1. A. C. 600.

Pythagoras was born at Samos[46], when Samos was the richeſt and moſt flouriſhing of all the Grecian iſles. His father, Mneſarchus, being a perſon of diſtinction in his country[47], the promiſing youth was carefully inſtructed in the learning known or valued in that early age. Muſic, poetry, and the gymnaſtic exerciſes, formed the principal part of his education; but the young philoſopher, if we may anticipate that name, was not[48] indifferent

His education.

[45] Particularly Ariſtoxenus, the learned diſciple of Ariſtotle (apud Stobæum, Serm. xli.); various ancient authors cited by Jamblichus and Porphyry, as well as by Diogenes Laertius, l. viii.; to which add Juſtin, l. xx. and Cicero, Tuſc. Quæſt. de Amicitia, & de Oratore. "Pythagoras exornavit eam Græciam quæ Magna dicta eſt, & privatim & publice, præſtantiſſimis & inſtitutis & artibus." Cicero de Amicitia.

[46] Iſocrates in Buſiri. Titus Livius, l. i. c. xviii. Lucian. Lexiphanes. To theſe authorities we may add, that Pythagoras is repreſented on ſeveral Samian coins. Fabric. Bibl. Græca, t. i. p. 455.

[47] Mneſarchus was ſent from Samos to conſult the oracle of Delphi, probably on ſome public occaſion. Jam. in Vit. Pythag.

[48] Apollon. apud Jamblichum.

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to the diſcoveries of Thales, the firſt Grecian who nearly calculated an eclipſe of the ſun; and he early ſet himſelf to rival the Mileſian ſage in his favourite ſtudies. It is recorded, that he learned eloquence from Pherecydes of Syros [49], who reſided a conſiderable time in the iſle of Samos, and who is famous in the literary hiſtory of Greece, as the firſt author in proſe [50]. Pittacus of Leſbos, Bias of Priené, and the other ſophiſts, or wiſe men (as they were emphatically ſtyled by their contemporaries) who then flouriſhed in Aſiatic Greece, and whoſe abilities and virtue had raiſed them, in troubled times, to the head of the ſeveral communities of which they were reſpectively members, excited the kindred ambition of Pythagoras, who appears to have been early animated with the deſire of acquiring juſt renown, by promoting public happineſs. In his eighteenth year he viſited the continent of Greece, and gained the prize of wreſtling at the Olympic games [51], where his vigour, addreſs, and beauty, were beheld with admiration by the multitude; while the opening virtues of his mind were ſtill more admired by men of ſenſe and diſcernment. In conformity with the practice of an age when the feeble rays of knowledge were ſcattered over a wide ſurface, and much pains were requiſite to collect them, he withdrew himſelf from the applauſes of his countrymen, and for a longer time than was uſual with the Grecian

Travels.

[49] Diogenes apud Porph.

[50] Plin. N. H. l. vii. c. 56.

[51] Jambl. Porph. &c.

travellers.

travellers. This circumſtance gave occaſion to many fables concerning the extent and variety of his voyages[52]. But it is certain that he reſided CHAP. XI.

[52] The travels of the Greek philoſopher were ſpoken of in vague terms, and magnified even by great writers. *Ultimas* terras luſtrâſſe Pythagoram, Democritum, Platonem accepimus. Cicero de Finibus, l. iv. c. 19. We may well believe, then, that ſuch men as Hermippus (apud Joſeph. adverſ. Apionem), Apollonius, Jamblichus, &c. would carry their exaggerations to the higheſt degree of extravagance on this fertile ſubject. The chief ſource of theſe fables, and of the ſuppoſed learning of the Magi, Chaldæans, Indians, &c. may be found in the credulous or lying writers who accompanied Alexander in his eaſtern expedition. At their return to Greece, they magnified the learning, as well as the power and wealth, of the nations conquered by their patron; they were ſolicitous to perſuade their countrymen, that their anceſtors had learned their philoſophy from people whoſe names they had never before heard; and their own vanity was flattered by having viſited, and familiarly known thoſe fancied inſtructors of mankind. Clearchus, Oneſicritus, and Calliſthenes, were the moſt celebrated of theſe writers, of whom Diogenes Laertius, or rather a far ſuperior man whom he cites, ſays, Λανθανεσι δε αυτους τα των Ελληνων καταρθωματα Βαρβαροις προσαπτοντες. "They are miſtaken when they refer the Grecian diſcoveries to the Barbarians." It was natural for the eaſtern nations, when they had adopted the language and learning of the Greeks, to avail themſelves of Grecian authorities, to prove how much that celebrated nation owed to people whom they proudly denominated Barbarians. Hence the fables of Beroſus the Chaldæan, of Manetho the Egyptian, of Sanchonithon the Phœnician. We except from this claſs of fabuliſts the Jew, Joſephus, the antiquity of whoſe nation reſts on evidence which it would be irreverent to name in ſuch company. Had Pythagoras or Thales been acquainted with the Jewiſh religion, they would have learned far nobler notions of the Deity, than thoſe which it appears they entertained. Anaxagoras, ſurnamed ὁ νους, the preceptor of the great Pericles, was the firſt Grecian philoſopher who ſaw, by the light of reaſon, the natural and moral attributes of God, ſo ſublimely deſcribed in the Pſalms of David. Yet it never was ſaid that Anaxagoras had ſeen the Pſalms, the Books of Moſes, or any part of the ſacred writings; and it may be remarked, that Joſephus himſelf, in his firſt book (cont. Appion.), however zealous to prove, that the Greeks derived their knowledge from the Eaſt, can cite no author in favour of this opinion, who lived before the age of Alexander.

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several years in the ancient kingdom of Egypt[52], which had been long familiarly known to the Grecian mariners, and where the son of Mnesarchus might probably enjoy the protection of many hereditary friends. In that country he probably made some additions to his knowledge in arithmetic and geometry; he certainly learned many traditions concerning the gods, and the human soul; but what particularly deserved his attention

[52] There is a famous passage in Isocrates's panegyric of Busiris, which might seem to contradict what is said in the preceding note, if we did not reflect, that the rules of panegyric require not always a strict adherence to historical truth. In speaking of the ancient wisdom and piety of the Egyptians, and particularly of the sacerdotal order, he says, that he himself is not the first who perceived and acknowledged their merit; that many philosophers had done this before him, and particularly Pythagoras the Samian. Ὃς ἀφικομενος εις Αιγυπτον, και μαθητης εκεινων γενομενος, την τε αλλην φιλοσοφιαν πρωτος εις τους Ελληνας εκομισε, καὶ τα περι τας θυσιας τε και τας αγιστειας τας εν τοις ἱεροις επιφανεστερον των αλλων εσπουδασεν· ηγουμενος, ει και μηδεν αυτῳ δια ταυτα πλειον γιγνοιτο παρα των θεων, αλλα παρα γε τοις ανθρωποις εκ τουτων μαλιστα αν ευδοκιμησειν· ὁπερ αυτῳ και συνεβη. Τοσουτον γαρ ευδοξια της αλλης ἁπαντας υπερβαλεν, ὡστε και τους νεωτερους ἁπαντας επιθυμειν αυτου μαθητας ειναι, και τους πρεσβυτερους ἡδιον ὁρᾶν παιδας αυτων εκεινῳ συγγιγνομενους η των οικειων επιμελουμενους. "Who coming to Egypt, and being instructed by the priests of that country, first introduced other kinds of learning into Greece, and particularly a more accurate knowledge of religious rites and ceremonies," (I have generalised the expression θυσιας και ἁγιστειας εν τοις ἱεροις) "of which he was a careful observer, thinking that although he were entitled to no peculiar favour on that account from the gods, he would thereby at least procure esteem among men, which also happened to him; for he so far eclipsed the glory of all other philosophers, that all the young desired to become his disciples, and the old were better pleased to see their sons in the company of Pythagoras, than engaged in the most lucrative pursuits." If what is said in my account of the life and writings of Isocrates be considered with attention, this passage will only serve to confirm the observations in the text.

was

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was, the ſecret ſymbolic writing of the prieſts, and the ſingular inſtitutions and policy of the ſacerdotal order, by which that body of men had long been enabled to govern prince and people[54]. At his return from Egypt and the eaſt, Pythagoras found his native country governed, or rather inſulted, by the artful and long fortunate Polycrates; a tyrant whoſe power ſeemed ſo firmly eſtabliſhed, that there remained no hopes of ſubverting it, and under whoſe jealous eye the ſon of Mneſarchus could neither diſplay his talents, nor enjoy perſonal ſecurity: he therefore returned to European Greece, and again aſſiſted at the Olympic games; where, being ſaluted by the then honoured name of Sophiſt, he modeſtly declined that diſtinction for the humbler title of Philoſopher; and when aſked what he preciſely meant by this new appellation, he is ſaid to have replied, "That, in the ſame manner as at the Olympic aſſembly, ſome men came to contend for crowns and honours, others to ſell their merchandiſe, and a third claſs merely to ſee and examine every thing which paſſed in that celebrated convention; ſo, on the greater theatre of the world, while many ſtruggled for the glory of a name, and many for the advantages of fortune; a few, and but a few, neither covetous of money, nor ambitious of fame, were contented with beholding the wonders of ſo magnificent a ſpectacle[55]." This definition has been

Olymp. lvi. A. C. 560.

[54] Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus, paſſim; and Strabo, l. x. p. 482.

[55] Cicero (Tuſc. Queſt. v. 3.) has tranſlated a paſſage to this purpoſe from Heraclides Ponticus, the ſcholar of Plato; and

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been often cited, becauſe it well agrees with the contemplative notions generally aſcribed to the Pythagorean ſchool; but it will appear in the ſequel, that the philoſophy of Pythagoras was of a more practical kind.

From Olympia and the republic of Elis, he travelled to the neighbouring territory of Sparta [56], and ſpent a conſiderable time in that capital, diligently ſtudying the laws of Lycurgus, and obſerving the manners and genius of the beſt governed, moſt virtuous, and moſt proſperous of all the Grecian ſtates. Here he beheld a conſtitution of government (the wiſdom of which had been long approved by experience) founded on a ſyſtem of education; and combining, in his clear capacious mind, the Spartan laws and diſcipline with a mixture of the Egyptian craft and policy, he framed that ſublime plan of legiſlation, which was to be far more extenſive than the inſtitutions of Lycurgus; and which, at firſt fixing its root in a ſmall ſect at Crotona, was deſtined, in twenty or thirty years, to diffuſe its flouriſhing branches over Italy and Sicily.

Cauſes of his authority in Italy.

Pythagoras arrived at the capital of Italian Greece in his fortieth year, in the full vigour of mind and body [57]. His fame, doubtleſs, preceded him; ſince, whoever had honourably diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the general convention at Olympia, was ſpeedily

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the original paſſage of Heraclitus is ſtill preſerved in Jamblichus.

[56] Porphy. Jambli. & Juſtin. l. xx.

[57] Ariſtoxen apud Jambl.

known

known and celebrated in the remoteſt provinces of Greece. His perſonal acquaintances among the Italian Greeks, whoſe eſteem, or rather reſpect, he had acquired in that auguſt aſſembly, would naturally be loud in his praiſes; and the manners of the age, in which men lived together in crowds, and enjoyed their paſtimes, or tranſacted their ſerious buſineſs with undiſguiſed freedom, in temples and gymnaſia, contributed to the rapid increaſe of his friends and admirers. Upon his arrival at Crotona, he appeared in the public places, diſplaying his dexterity in thoſe exerciſes and accompliſhments, which were the faſhionable objects of purſuit, and the principal ſources of honour. His ſkill in muſic and medicine, ſciences which were far better underſtood in his native country than in Magna Græcia, procured him particular regard; nor can we heſitate to believe, that his mathematical and natural knowledge would be highly admired by the Greeks of Italy, who, having recently received the firſt tincture of arts and ſciences from the Aſiatics, cultivated them with that ardour which novelty inſpires; and who ſeem hitherto to have gained in point of knowledge and civility, in proportion as they had loſt in purity of life and manners, by an acquaintance with their Eaſtern brethren.

His ſuperior talents.

Neither the voluptuouſneſs nor the refinement of the inhabitants of Magna Græcia, were incompatible with the hopes and fears of the moſt puerile ſuperſtition; and Pythagoras, who had ſeen and examined the rites and ceremonies employed by

His manner of life.

remote

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remote nations, celebrated for their antiquity and their wiſdom, to avert the diſpleaſure, or to gain the good-will of their inviſible protectors, called forth the whole force of this powerful, yet dangerous inſtrument of policy, to excite reſpect for his perſon, and reverence for his inſtructions. He carefully frequented, at an early hour, the temples of the gods; his regular purifications and ſacrifices announced ſuperior ſanctity of character; his food was of the pureſt kind, that no corporeal ſtain might interrupt the fancied communication with his celeſtial friends; and he was clothed in the linen of Egypt, which formed the dreſs [58] of the ſacerdotal order in that native land of ſuperſtition, as well as of the Athenian magiſtrates and nobles, in the early and pious times of their republic [59]. The reſpect excited by ſuch artifices (if we may degrade by that name the means uſed to deceive men into their duty and happineſs) was enhanced by the high renown, the long travels, the venerable aſpect, the harmonious voice, the animated and affecting eloquence, of the Samian philoſopher. His hearers ſometimes amounted to two thouſand of the principal citizens of Crotona; and the magiſtrates of that republic erected, ſoon after his arrival among them, an elegant and ſpacious edifice, which was appropriated to the virtuous leſſons of this admired ſtranger, who pleaſed their taſte, and gratified their fancy, while he condemned their manners, and reproached their vices. Equally rapid and aſtoniſhing, and

The happy revolution which he produced at Crotona.

[58] Diodorus. [59] Thucyd. L. i.

not

not more aſtoniſhing than advantageous, if we may credit the general voice of antiquity, was the reformation produced at Crotona in perſons of every age, and of either ſex, by this ſingular man. The women laid aſide their ornaments, and reſumed their modeſty; the youth preferred their duty to their pleaſures; the old improved their underſtanding, and almoſt neglected to improve their fortunes. CHAP. XI.

His ſchool.

Yet this revolution of manners was not ſurely ſo inſtantaneous, as the concurring exaggerations of wonder and credulity were naturally inclined to repreſent it. The ſame writers, who would thus magnify the fame of Pythagoras, acknowledge, that ſoon after coming to Crotona, he choſe a ſelect number of his moſt aſſiduous diſciples, and thoſe chiefly perſons of weight in the republic, whoſe temper, character, and views, beſt ſuited his own. Theſe were formed into a diſtinct aſſociation or brotherhood, into which none were admitted who poſſeſſed not qualities and endowments worthy of that honour. In order to confirm this aſſociation, as well as to obtain the purpoſes for which it had been inſtituted, Pythagoras employed the cypher, or ſymbolic writing, and other ſecrets, which he had learned from the wiſdom, or rather cunning, of the Egyptian prieſts: his ſcholars were taught certain ſigns or words, by which they might know each other; they could correſpond, when ſeparated by place, in an unknown character; and ſtrangers of all countries, Greeks and Barbarians, were promiſcuouſly admitted into the ſociety, after undergoing

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going a due probation as to their diſpoſitions and underſtanding. In a few years, three hundred men, all Pythagoreans, held the ſovereignty of Crotona; the influence of the new ſect extended with rapidity over Locri, Rhegium, Catana, and other cities of Italy and Sicily; the diſciples of Pythagoras were diffuſed over ancient Greece, and the iſles of the Ægæan ſea; and it ſeemed as if the ſage of Samos, whoſe nobler ambition declined and diſdained any particular office of power and dignity, had conceived the ſublime idea of forming a ſchool of enlightened ſtateſmen, who might govern the world, while they were themſelves governed by wiſdom and virtue.

Its influence on affairs of ſtate.

Olymp. lvij. 3. A. C. 550.

His great views.

His politics.

Pythagoras was deeply perſuaded, that the happineſs of nations depends chiefly on the government under which they live; and the experience of his own times, and of his own iſland in particular, might teach him the dangerous tendency of democratic turbulence on the one hand, and jealous tyranny on the other [60]. He preferred, therefore, to

[60] A ſtriking example of this appeared at that time in Sicily, if we credit Jamblichus, who places the reign of Phalaris, at Agrigentum, in the age of Pythagoras. The doubtful, or rather incredible, hiſtory of this tyrant, may be compriſed in few words. His reign, of about ſixteen years, was diſtinguiſhed by intolerable atrocities. He burned his enemies in a brazen bull; and, as luſt or cruelty happened to direct, ſometimes abuſed, and ſometimes eat, boys. Phalaris, together with his mother and friends, (could ſuch a monſter have friends?) were burned, by the long-injured Agrigentines, in his own bull. This is the abominable tyrant, whoſe ſpurious letters furniſhed an opportunity for Dr. Bentley to diſplay his profound erudition (ſee his Diſſert. upon Phalaris). But that very learned man ſeems not to ſuſpect, that the popular hiſtory of Phalaris is as ſpurious as his epiſtles. It was a common artifice among the Greek poets and orators

to all governments, a moderate ariſtocracy; which ſeems, without exception, to have been the well-founded opinion of the greateſt men of antiquity, ſince, under the adminiſtration of ſenates, the republics of Greece, of Rome, and of Carthage, attained their higheſt proſperity and ſplendour. Yet he was extremely averſe to arbitrary power, CHAP. XI.

orators (ſee, in vol. i. p. 367. the ſpeech of Soſicles the Corinthian), to exaggerate the vices of bad princes. Of this we ſhall find many examples in the following parts of this work. This practice began early; for Pindar ſays,

Τον δε ταυρῳ χαλκεῳ καυτηρα νηλεα γεον
Εχθρα Φαλαριν κατεχει ταυτα φατις.

PYTH. i. Επωδ. κ. λ. ις.

Ariſtotle mentions, Το περι Φαλαριν λεγομενον, the hearſay about Phalaris, which Aſpaſius explains, Ὁ δε Φαλαρις, λεγεται φαγειν τον ἑαυτου παιδα Phalaris is ſaid to have eaten his own ſon. In the ſame chapter (c. v. l. 6. Ethic. Nicom.), ſpeaking of brutal paſſions, Ariſtotle inſtances Phalaris ſometimes devouring boys, ſometimes uſing them as the inſtruments of an abſurd venereal pleaſure: Προς αφροδισιων ατοπον ἡδονην The philoſopher does not ſay, that he believes theſe monſtrous fictions, any more than Cicero, "Ille nobilis taurus, quem crudeliſſimus omnium tyrannorum Phalaris *habuiſſe dicitur*;" l. iv. in Verrem, c. 33. Timæus, the hiſtorian of Sicily, who was more likely than any other writer to be well informed concerning the tranſactions in his own iſland, repreſents the ſtory of Philaris's bull as a mere fable. Polyb. Excerp. ver. 3. p. 47. Polybius, indeed, attempts to refute Timæus, but I think, as to the main point, with little ſucceſs. Nor is it ſurpriſing that this judicious writer ſhould be carried along by the torrent. The republicans of Greece and Rome delighted in blackening the characters of tyrants; Τραγωδουντες δε την ωμοτητα των τροπων, και την ασεβειαν των πραξεων; "exaggerating, after the manner of tragedians, the fierceneſs of their manners, and the impiety of their actions." For this reaſon, the abſurd fictions concerning Dionyſius of Syracuſe, Alexander of Pheræ, &c. are related by many reſpectable writers. For this reaſon Hieronymus was deſcribed in the blackeſt colours, vide Excerp. ex Polyb. l. vii. p. 10. And for this reaſon the enormous cruelties of Phalaris, which no nation, and far leſs the Sicilians in that age, could have tolerated, receive countenance from ſome of the higheſt authorities of antiquity.

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whatever ſhape it might aſſume; and the main aim of his inſtitution was, to prevent oppreſſion in the magiſtrates and licentiouſneſs in the people. The dead letter of the law could never, he thought, effect that ſalutary purpoſe, until men were ſo trained by education and diſcipline, as to regard the great duties of life as its moſt agreeable amuſement, and to conſider the eſteem of their fellow-citizens, and their own, as the chief ſource of their enjoyment. Magiſtrates, thus formed, would command a willing obedience, and the inhabitants of Magna Græcia muſt ſoon attain the moſt perfect ſtate of which political ſociety is ſuſceptible.

Morality.

To explain at large the ſyſtem of Pythagoras, would be to write a treatiſe of ſublime, yet practical morality, ſince his concluſions are ſtrictly founded on the nature of man. Beſides the propenſities common to us with inferior natures, and beſides the ſelfiſh and artificial paſſions of avarice and ambition, he found in the human breaſt the ſeeds of nobler faculties, fitted to yield an incomparably more durable, more perfect, and more certain gratification. The chief happineſs of the mind muſt be ſought in itſelf, in the enjoyment of intellectual and moral pleaſure. Our reflex thoughts are ever, and intimately preſent with us; and although the buſtle of external objects, and the tumult of paſſion may ſometimes divert their current, they can never exhauſt their ſource. The reflections on our own conduct will be continually occurring to our fancy, whatever pains we may take to exclude them; nor can voluptuous enjoyment, or ambitious activity,

ever

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ever so totally occupy the mind of a Persian satrap, or a Grecian demagogue, but that their principal happiness or misery, in the whole course of life, must chiefly depend upon their contemplations of the past, and upon their hopes and fears about futurity. To strengthen this great ground-work of morality, Pythagoras employed the whole force of education and habit. Rules were laid down, to which the members of his respected order bound themselves to conform, and from which none could swerve, without exclusion from a society of which they proved themselves unworthy. The different periods of life had each its appropriated employment. The youth were carefully instructed in the gymnastic exercises, in literature [61], and in science, and especially in the laws and constitution of their country. Their time was so diversified by successive study, exercise, and repose, that no leisure remained for the premature growth of dangerous passions; and it was an important maxim of the Pythagorean school, that many things

[61] So I have translated Εν γραμμασι και τοις αλλοις μαθημασι, of Aristoxenus apud Stobæum, Serm. xli. The learned reader will perceive, that I comprehend under the name of youth, the two different periods of life, or ἡλικιαι, which the Greeks denoted by the words παις and μειρακιος, boy, and young man. I have done this, because it was not the intention of Aristoxenus, to say that the young men were not still to be employed in literature and science, or that the boys were to be kept ignorant of the laws and constitution. The rules of the Pythagorean school, and the laws of Lycurgus, often explain each other. See vol. i. p. 129, & seqq. It may be worthy of remark, that Jean Jaques Rousseau has borrowed what is rational and practical in his system of education from these two great sources, as illustrated by Plutarch's tract on the subject.

were

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were beſt learned late [62], eſpecially love; from which, if poſſible, the youth ſhould be reſtrained till their twentieth year, and after that period ſhould rarely, and with many precautions, indulge a paſſion, always hurtful to the weak, and which, when intemperately indulged, enfeebled the moſt vigorous. He required in thoſe who had attained the age of manhood, that they ſhould no longer live for themſelves, but for the buſineſs of the community of which they were members. They were to employ the greateſt part of the day in the duties of public ſpirit and patriotiſm; in the laborious or dangerous offices committed to their charge; and to derive their chief reward from reading in the eyes of their admiring countrymen, the hiſtory of their generous exploits; and from beholding all around them, the happy effects of their probity, beneficence, and fortitude.

Rules for the conduct of his diſciples.

The Pythagoreans were ſtrictly enjoined, as their earlieſt and lateſt work, to review the actions of the paſt, and, if time permitted, of many preceding days. In the morning they repaired alone to the temples, to ſolitary mountains and foreſts; and after there converſing with themſelves, joined in the converſation of their friends, with whom they aſſembled, in ſmall companies, to an early and frugal meal, diſcuſſed different ſubjects of philoſophy or politics, regulated their conduct for the enſuing day, and by the mutual ſtrength and encourage-

[62] Ariſtoxen. apud Stobæum, Serm. lxix. This is the great principle of Rouſſeau in his *Emile*. The paſſage of Ariſtoxenus concerning love, is almoſt literally tranſlated in that ingenious but fanciful work.

ment

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ment acquired in this ſelect ſociety, prepared for the tumultuous buſtle of the world, and the contentions of active life. The evening was ſpent as the morning, with this difference, that they then indulged in the moderate uſe of fleſh and wine, from which they rigidly abſtained during the day; and the whole concluded with that ſelf-examination which was the fundamental maxim of the Pythagorean ſchool.

which coincide with the inſtitutions of Lycurgus.

To enter more fully into the principles of this aſſociation, would be repeating what has been formerly obſerved concerning the laws of Lycurgus. It is ſufficient barely to mention, that, like the legiſlator of Sparta, Pythagoras enjoined the higheſt reſpect for age; that, like him, he raiſed the weaker ſex from that ſtate of inferiority in which they were ungenerouſly kept in all other countries of Greece; that he enured his diſciples to temperance and ſobriety through the ſame means employed by Lycurgus; and that both theſe great men regarded health and vigour of body as the main principle and ſpring of mental energy; that the probationary ſilence of the Pythagoreans, which credulity has ſo much exaggerated, was nothing more than that prudent, recollected behaviour, required by Lycurgus, who prized higher the caution of ſilence than the readineſs[63] of ſpeech; and that the intimacy of the Spartan and Pythagorean friendſhips, and almoſt the community of goods, naturally flowed from the general ſpirit and genius of their reſpective ſyſtems[64]: ſo that the rules of the Pythagorean order

[63] Plut in Lycurg.

[64] See vol. i. p. 135.

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were little more than a tranſcript of the Spartan laws, as theſe laws themſelves were only a refinement on the generous and manly inſtitutions of the heroic ages[65].

Origin of the fictions concerning Pythagoras.

In the hiſtory of a man who entertained ſuch juſt notions of human life, as did the founder of the Pythagorean ſect, we may at once reject, as fabulous, the tales related by the vain, lying Greeks, who lived in and after the age of Alexander, when their nation ſeems to have loſt the love of truth along with its liberty, as well as the ridiculous wonders of the later Platoniſts, thoſe contemplative viſionaries, who, during the firſt centuries of the Chriſtian æra, degraded ancient philoſophers, by deſcribing *their* active and uſeful lives, as if they had reſembled their own ſcholaſtic tranquillity. Yet, after all, ſhould the leaſt extraordinary account of the Pythagorean order ſtill ſeem incredible, it need only be obſerved, that modern hiſtory, and even our own obſervation, may have made us acquainted with orders of another kind, of which the rules are more difficult to be obſerved than t of the Pythagoreans: and it is equally unreaſo and ungenerous to ſuppoſe, that what our own experience teaches us may be done by the illiberal ſpirit of ſuperſtition, could not in a happier age, be effected by the love of glory, of virtue, and of mankind.

War between Crotona and Sybaris.

The concurring teſtimony of hiſtorians aſſures us, that the ſchool of Pythagoras had flouriſhed above forty years, to the unſpeakable benefit of

[65] Diodor. l. xii. p. 77, &c.

Magna

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Magna Græcia, when a war aroſe between Crotona and Sybaris, the latter of which had ever contemptuouſly rejected the Pythagorean inſtitutions. The city of Sybaris was founded (as above mentioned) by the Achæans, on the confluence of the river Sybaris, from which the city derives its name, and the winding ſtream of Crathis, which deſcends from the Lucanian mountains. The fertility of the ſoil, the happy temperature of the climate, the reſources of fiſhing, navigation, manufactures, and commerce, conſpired, with the ſalutary effects of the Achæan laws, wonderfully to augment, in the courſe of two centuries, the ſtrength and populouſneſs of Sybaris, which was ſurrounded by walls nine miles in extent, commanded twenty-five ſubordinate cities, and, could we credit the evidence of writers often prone to exaggeration, brought three hundred thouſand men into the field[67]. Riches and luxury proved fatal to the Sybarites, whoſe effeminacy paſſed into a proverb[68], which has been tranſmitted to modern times. In a deciſive battle, they were defeated by the citizens of Crotona under the command of Milo, a favourite diſciple of Pythagoras, who had already obtained univerſal renown by his Olympic victories[69].

The Sybarites conquered by Milo the Pythagorean. Olymp. lxvii. 4. A. C. 509.

But the deſtruction of Sybaris was almoſt alike fatal to Crotona. The inferior ranks of men in that city, intoxicated with proſperity, and inſtigated by the artful and ambitious Cylon, whoſe turbulent

Sedition in Cr

[67] Strabo, l. vi. p. 263. Diodor. ibid
[68] Athenæus, l. xii. p. 518.
[69] Strabo, ibid. Pauſanias, l. vi. p. 369.

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manners had excluded him from the order of Pythagoras, into which he had repeatedly attempted to enter, became clamorous for an equal partition of the conquered territory of Sybaris; which being denied as inconſiſtent with the nature of ariſtocratical government, they ſecretly conſpired againſt their magiſtrates, attacked them by ſurpriſe in the ſenate-houſe, put many to death, and drove the reſt from their country. Pythagoras himſelf died ſoon afterwards, in extreme old age, at Metapontum in Lucania [70]. His diſciples were ſcattered over Magna Græcia, and particularly Sicily, which, at the time of the Carthaginian invaſion, was governed by men who had imbibed the ſublime ſpirit of their illuſtrious maſter.

Proves fatal to the Pythagoreans there.

Gelon, who, eleven years before that event, had mounted the throne of Syracuſe, was entitled, by the unanimous ſuffrage of his ſubjects, to the glorious, though often proſtituted appellation, of Father of his country [71]. The mildneſs of his government reſtored the felicity of the heroic ages, whoſe equitable inſtitutions had much affinity (as above obſerved) with the political ſyſtem of Pythagoras. This virtuous prince had cemented an alliance with Theron, King of Agrigentum, by taking his daughter in marriage; and the confederacy of the two principle ſtates of Sicily ſeemed to have diffuſed ſecurity and happineſs over the whole iſland, when the immenſe armament of Carthage was beheld off the northern coaſt. Though

The Carthaginians invade Sicily. Olymp. lxxv. 1. A. C. 480.

[70] Ariſtoxenus.

[71] Ælian. Var. Hiſt. l. xiii. c. xxxvii. Plut. in Timol.

not

not abſolutely deſtitute of naval ſtrength, the Sici- CHAP. XI.
lians had nothing by which they could oppoſe a fleet of two thouſand gallies. The enemy landed without oppoſition in the ſpacious harbour, or rather bay, of Panormus, whoſe name may be ſtill recognized in the modern capital Palermo, where the Carthaginians had planted one of their moſt ancient colonies. Their forces were commanded by Hamilcar, who was deemed a brave and experienced leader. The firſt care of this general was to fortify two camps; the one deſtined for his fleet, which, according to the practice of that age, was drawn on ſhore; the other intended as a ſafe retreat for his army, which immediately prepared to form the ſiege of Himera. Theron uſed proper meaſures to defend the ſecond city in his dominions, until his ſon-in-law, the interpid Gelon, ſhould arrive to his aſſiſtance at the head of an army of fifty thouſand foot and five thouſand horſe. While this numerous army advanced by rapid marches, towards Himera, they rencountered a foraging party of the enemy, and made ten thouſand priſoners. But what appeared a ſtill more important booty to the diſcernment of Gelon, they ſeized a meſſenger from Selinus, a city in the neighbourhood of Agrigentum, which had entered into a treacherous correſpondence with the Carthaginians. The priſoner conveyed a letter to Hamilcar, acquainting him, that the Selinuntines would not fail to ſend the cavalry demanded from them at the appointed time, which was likewiſe particularly ſpecified. Upon this diſcovery, Gelon founded a ſtratagem, not more daring

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daring than ſucceſsful. He commanded a choſen body of troops to advance in the night towards the Carthaginian camp, and by day-break to preſent themſelves to Hamilcar, as his Selinuntine auxiliaries; and when admitted by this artifice, within the rampart, to aſſaſſinate the general and ſet fire to the fleet [72].

Defeated by a ſtratagem.

It happened on the fatal day, that Hamilcar offered a ſolemn ſacrifice to the cruel divinity of Carthage, who delighted in human victims. While he performed this abominable rite, the ſoldiers ſurrounded him unarmed, in the gloomy ſilence of their deteſted ſuperſtition, with which their minds were totally penetrated. The Sicilian cavalry, being admitted without ſuſpicion, thus found no difficulty to execute their audacious deſign. Hamilcar, while he ſacrificed an innocent and noble youth to his blood-thirſty God, was himſelf diſpatched with a dagger; and, next moment, the Carthaginian ſhips were in a blaze. A chain of Sicilian centinels, poſted on the neighbouring eminences, intimated to Gelon the happy ſucceſs of his ſtratagem; of which, in order fully to avail himſelf, that gallant commander immediately conducted the main body of his troops to the Carthaginian army, while it was yet agitated by ſurpriſe and terror at the ſudden conflagration.

Their diſaſters.

The furious onſet of the Sicilians made a dreadful havoc among the aſtoniſhed Barbarians, who recovering, however, their faculties, began to defend

[72] Diodor. l. ix. ſect. 25. & ſeq. Polyæn. l. i. c. xxvii.

themſelves

themſelves with vigour; when the melancholy tidings, that their ſhips were all burnt, and their general ſlain, drove them to diſpair and flight. Gelon commanded his troops not to give quarter to an enemy, who, though defeated, ſtill ſeemed formidable by their numbers. It is reported, that an hundred and fifty thouſand periſhed in the battle, and the purſuit. The remainder ſeized an eminence, where they could not long maintain themſelves, for want of water and proviſions. In the language of an ancient hiſtorian, all Africa ſeemed to be taken captive in Sicily. Gelon diſtributed the priſoners among the Sicilian cities, in proportion to the contingents of troops which they had reſpectively raiſed for this memorable ſervice. The greater part falling to the ſhare of Syracuſe and Agrigentum, were employed in beautifying and enlarging thoſe capitals[73], whoſe magnificent monuments, ſtill conſpicuous in their ruins, are ſuppoſed, with great probability, to be productions of Carthaginian labour.

Treaty of peace between Gelon and the Carthaginians.

The melancholy tidings affected Carthage with conſternation and deſpair. The inhabitants of that city, ever ſhamefully depreſſed by bad fortune in proportion as they were immoderately elated by the deceitful gifts of proſperity, dreaded every moment to behold the victorious enemy in their harbour. To ward off this calamity, their ambaſſadors were ſent to crave a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities on any terms the victorious Greeks might think

[73] Cicero, Orat. iv. in Verrem.

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proper to impoſe. Gelon received them with ſuch moderation as marked the ſuperiority of his character, and told them, that he would deſiſt from every purpoſe of revenge, on condition that the Carthaginians paid two thouſand talents of ſilver, to be diſtributed among the cities of Sicily, which had incurred trouble and expence by the war; that they henceforth abſtained from the abominable practice of inſulting the gods by human victims; that they erected two temples, one in Carthage, another in Syracuſe, to preſerve the memory of the war, and the articles of the peace [74].

Olymp. lxxxii. A. C. 449.

This honourable treaty was a prelude to that ſtill more famous, concluded thirty years afterwards between the Athenians and Perſians. It marked a nation ſuperior to its enemies not only in valour but in humanity, and conferred more true glory than could be acquired by the moſt ſplendid ſeries of victories. It might be expected, however, and ſeems much to have been deſired, that a people ſo advantageouſly diſtinguiſhed as were the Greeks during that age in arts and arms; a people who had repelled, defeated, and diſgraced the moſt populous and powerful nations, and who were alike prompted by ambition and revenge, to the attainment of diſtant conqueſt, ſhould have united their efforts againſt the enemies who ſtill made war on them, and, advancing in a rapid career of victory, have diffuſed, along with their dominion, their manners, knowledge, and civility over the

A. C. 504.

[74] Diodor. Sicul. ibid.

eaſtern

eaſtern world. But various events and cauſes, which we ſhall have occaſion afterwards to explain, tended to detach the colonies of Magna Græcia from the intereſts of the mother-country, as well as to diſunite the two moſt powerful republics of that country by inteſtine diſcord.

While the fortune of Athens raiſed her to ſuch power as threatened the liberty of Sicily and Greece, the Kings of Syracuſe and Agrigentum contented themſelves with the humbler glory of embelliſhing their capitals with barbaric ſpoils, and producing thoſe wonders of art, which, in the time of Cicero and Verres, were eſteemed among the moſt precious monuments of antiquity [75]. The golden medals of Gelon, ſtill preſerved and of the higheſt beauty [76], juſtify the glowing expreſſions of the Roman orator.

Decay of Magna Græcia, and deſtruction of the Pythagoreans.

In Italy, the citizens of Crotona had too ſoon cauſe to lament their inſurrection againſt their magiſtrates, and their dereliction of the diſcipline of Pythagoras. They who had hitherto defeated ſuperior numbers, who had furniſhed ſo many victors in the Olympic conteſt, and whoſe country was diſtinguiſhed by the epithet of healthy, on a ſuppoſition that the vigorous bodies of its inhabitants proceeded from an effect of the climate, were now totally routed and put to flight at the river Sagra, with an army of an hundred and thirty thouſand men, by the Locrians and Rhegians,

[75] Cicero in Verrem, paſſim.

[76] Mem. de Trevoux, l'an 1727, p. 1449.

whoſe

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whoſe forces were far leſs numerous. The other Greek cities of Italy, which are ſaid to have imitated the fatal example of Crotona, were harraſſed by wars againſt each other, or againſt their barbarous neighbours. In conſequence of theſe misfortunes, the Pythagoreans again recovered their credit; and about ſixty years after the death of the great founder of their order, Zaleucus and Charondas, the firſt in Locri, the ſecond in Thurium, endeavoured to revive the Pythagorean inſtitutions, which, perhaps, were too perfect for the condition of the times. In leſs than forty years a new perſecution entirely drove the Pythagoreans from Italy, and completed, according to Polybius, the confuſion and miſery of that once happy country[77].

[77] Polybius, ii. 392.

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Glory of Athens.—Military Succeſs of the Confederates.—Athens rebuilt and fortified. — Extent of its Walls and Harbours. — The Confederates take Byzantium. — Conſpiracy of Pauſanias. — Baniſhment of Themiſtocles.—Virtue of Ariſtides. —Cimon aſſumes the Command. — His illuſtrious Merits and Succeſs. — Revolt of Egypt. — War in Cyprus. — Peace with Perſia. — Domeſtic Tranſactions of Greece. — The Athenian Greatneſs. — Envy of Sparta, Thebes, and Argos. — Earthquake in Sparta. — Revolt of the Helots. — War between the Eliens and Piſans. — The Temple and Statue of Olympian Jupiter. — Diſſenſions in Argolis.—Revolt in Baotia.—Truce of Thirty Years. — Character of Pericles.—Subjection of the Athenian Allies and Colonies.—Spirit of the Athenian Government.

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The glory of Athens; A. C. 479—431.

FROM the battles of Mycalé and Platæa, to the memorable war of Peloponneſus, elapſed half a century, the moſt illuſtrious in the Grecian annals. A ſingle republic, one of ſixteen ſtates, whoſe united poſſeſſions hardly equalled the extent of Scotland, and whoſe particular territory is ſcarcely viſible in a map of the world, carried on an offenſive war againſt the Perſian empire, and, though ſurrounded by jealous allies or open enemies, proſecuted

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ſecuted this extraordinary enterpriſe with unexampled ſucceſs; at length, granting ſuch conditions of peace as the pride of victory may dictate, and the weight of accumulated diſaſters condeſcend to ſolicit or accept. In that narrow ſpace of time the ſame republic erected, on the feeble baſis of her ſcanty population and diminutive territory, a mighty maſs of empire; eſtabliſhed and confirmed her authority over the extent of a thouſand miles of the Aſiatic coaſt, from Cyprus to the Thracian Boſphorus; took poſſeſſion of forty intermediate iſlands [1], together with the important ſtraits which join the Euxine and the Ægæan; conquered and colonized the winding ſhores of Macedon and Thrace; commanded the coaſt of the Euxine from Pontus to the Cherſoneſus Taurica, or Crim Tartary; and, overawing the barbarous natives by the experienced terrors of her fleet [2], protected againſt *their* injuſtice and violence, but at the ſame time converted to the purpoſes of her own ambition and intereſt, the numerous but ſcattered colonies which Miletus, and other Greek cities of Aſia, had at various times eſtabliſhed in thoſe remote regions [3]. Our wonder will be juſtly encreaſed, if we conſider that Athens obtained thoſe immortal trophies, not over ignorant ſavages or effeminate ſlaves, but over men who had the ſame language and laws, the ſame

in arms;

[1] Several of theſe iſlands had been formerly conquered by Athenian commanders, particularly Miltiades, as we have related above; but having rebelled againſt the ſevere government of Athens, they were finally ſubdued by Pericles.

[2] Plut. in Pericle. [3] Strabo, Geograph. paſſim.

blood

blood and lineage, the ſame arts and arms, in ſhort, every thing common with the victors but their audacity and fortune.

in arts;

But it is the peculiar glory of the Athenians that, during this rapid career of military and naval triumphs, they cultivated, with a generous enthuſiaſm, the arts which adorn alike war and peace, and improved thoſe decorations of poliſhed life into ſuch perfection as few nations have attempted to imitate, and none aſpired to ſurpaſs. During the adminiſtration of a ſingle man, more works of elegance and ſplendour, more magnificent temples, theatres, porticoes, and gymnaſia were erected within the walls of Athens, than could be raiſed during many centuries in Rome, though miſtreſs of the world, by the wealth and labour of tributary provinces [4]. In the ſame period of time ſculpture attained a ſublimity, from which that noble art could never afterwards but deſcend and degenerate; and a republic hitherto inferior in works of invention and genius to ſeveral of her neighbours, and even of her own colonies, produced, in the ſingle lifetime of Pericles, thoſe ineſtimable models of poetry, eloquence, and philoſophy [5], which, in every ſucceeding age, the enlightened portion of mankind hath invariably regarded as the beſt ſtandards, not merely of compoſition and ſtyle,

[4] Plutarch. in Pericle.

[5] Pericles may be conſidered as the contemporary of Socrates, Sophocles, Euripides, Thucydides, &c. ſince, although he died before them of the plague, theſe and other great men flouriſhed during his adminiſtration.

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but of taſte and reaſon. The name of Greek ſeemed thenceforth to be loſt into that of Athenian; Athenian writers are our ſureſt and almoſt only guides in relating the ſubſequent tranſactions of the whole nation [6]; and from them we learn what is yet the moſt extraordinary circumſtance reſpecting the Athenian empire, that it had been built on ſuch ſtable foundations, and reared with ſuch art and ſkill, as might have long defied the hoſtile jealouſy of Greece and Perſia, confederate in arms and reſentment, if various cauſes, which human prudence could neither foreſee nor prevent, had not ſhaken its firmneſs, and precipitated its downfal [7].

Such is the ſubject which I have undertaken to treat in this and the two following Chapters; a ſubject worthy to animate the diligence, and call forth the vigour of an hiſtorian: but, if he truly deſerves that reſpected name, he will remember that it is leſs his duty to amuſe the fancy by general deſcription, than to explain, with preciſion and perſpicuity, the various tranſactions of this intereſting and ſplendid theme; to give the reader a full and diſtinct view of the complicated matter which it involves; and to remove every adventitious circumſtance that might diſtract or dazzle the attention, as aſtronomers, in viewing the ſun, are careful to ward off its ſurrounding ſplendour.

[6] I mean Thucydides and Xenophon, together with the Athenian orators, philoſophers, and poets.

[7] Thucydid. l. vii. & viii. paſſim.

The

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The military ſucceſs of the Athenians [8] (which naturally forms the firſt branch of the ſubject, becauſe it not only ſupplied the materials of future improvements, but awakened that energy requiſite to cultivate and complete them) includes three ſeparate actions which were carried on at the ſame time, and conſpired to the ſame end, yet cannot be related in one perpetual narrative, without occaſioning ſome confuſion of ideas, alike deſtructive of the pleaſure and of the uſe of hiſtory. While we endeavour to keep each ſeries of events unbroken and diſtinct, we muſt be careful to point out its influence on the ſimultaneous or ſucceeding tranſactions of the times, that our relation may be at once ſatisfactory and faithful. In ſuch a delineation the trophies of the Perſian war juſtly claim the firſt and moſt conſpicuous place; the hoſtile animoſity of rival ſtates, which continually envied and oppoſed, but for reaſons that will be fully explained, could neither prevent nor retard the growing ſuperiority of Athens, ſhall occupy the middle of the picture; and we ſhall throw into the back ground the ſucceſſive uſurpations of that fortunate republic over her allies, colonies, and neighbours.

Military ſucceſs of that republic.

Diviſion of the ſubject.

[8] The chief materials for this portion of hiſtory conſiſt in the firſt and ſecond books of Thucydides; the eleventh and twelfth of Diodorus Siculus; Plutarch's lives of Themiſtocles, Ariſtides, Cimon, Pericles; Pauſanias's Deſcription of Greece, and Pliny's Natural Hiſtory: ſcattered facts are ſupplied by other ancient writers, whoſe works will be carefully cited.

The

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The Athenians take Seſtos. Olymp. lxxv. 2. A. C. 479.

The common fears which, notwithſtanding innumerable ſources of animoſity, had formed, and hitherto upheld a partial confederacy of the Greeks, were removed by the deciſive victories of Platæa and Mycalé. After theſe memorable events, it was the firſt care of the Athenians to bring home their wives, children, and moſt valuable effects from the iſles of Ægina and Salamis. In the latter iſland they celebrated their good fortune by a national ſolemnity. The ſublime Sophocles joined in the chorus of boys which danced in exultation, around the Barbarian ſpoils [9]; the valour of his predeceſſor, Æſchylus, had contributed to the victories by which they were obtained; and his rival, the tender Euripides was born in the iſle of Salamis [10], on that important day, which proved alike glorious to Greece, and fatal to Perſia. - But an attention to domeſtic concerns prevented not the Athenians from puſhing the war with vigour, though deſerted by the Spartans and other Peloponneſians, who ſailed home before winter. The Aſiatic colonies, animated by the recent recovery of freedom, ſeconded the Athenian ardour; and the confederates having ſucceſsfully infeſted the territories of the Great King, beſieged and took the rich city of Seſtos in the Cherſoneſus of Thrace, the only place of ſtrength which adhered to the Perſian intereſt in that fertile peninſula [11].

[9] Athenæus, l. i.
[10] Vitæ Euripid.
[11] Herodot. l. ix. c. cvi. Diodor. l. xi. c. xxxvii.

During

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During the two following years the war languiſhed abroad, while the ſymptoms of jealouſy and diſcord, which had already appeared in the ſeparation of the Athenian and Spartan fleets, broke out with more virulence at home. The Athenians began the laborious talk of rebuilding their ruined city, which the Perſian ſpoils might contribute to enrich with uncommon magnificence, and which an acquaintance gained in the courſe of the war with the graceful forms of Ionic and Doric architecture, might enable them to adorn with more beauty and elegance than had yet been diſplayed in Europe. But the weighty advice of Themiſtocles prevailed on them to ſuſpend this noble undertaking, and engaged them, inſtead of decorating their capital with temples, theatres, and gymnaſia, to fortify it by walls of ſuch ſtrength and ſolidity as might thenceforth bid defiance to every enemy, whether foreign or domeſtic. In an age when the art of attack was ſo rude and imperfect, that the ſmalleſt fortreſs formed an object of importance, ſuch a deſign could not fail of exciting jealouſy in the neighbouring republics. The meaſure was ſcarcely determined when an embaſſy arrived from Sparta, remonſtrating againſt a deſign peculiarly dangerous and alarming to thoſe who owed their ſafety to the weakneſs of their cities. "If the Greeks," it was ſaid, "had poſſeſſed any town of impregnable ſtrength, they muſt have found it impoſſible to expel the Barbarians from

Athens rebuilt and fortified. Olymp. lxxv. 3, 4. A. C. 478. & 477.

Jealouſy of Sparta,

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their country. The Athenians therefore, who had hitherto ſo generouſly maintained the cauſe of the confederacy, ought not only to deſiſt from raiſing walls and fortifications, but even to interrupt a ſimilar deſign in any republic beyond the iſthmus; the Peloponneſus was alone ſufficient to afford, in time of danger, a ſecure refuge to the whole Grecian name."

diſcovered by Themiſtocles;

Themiſtocles eaſily unveiled the ſuſpicion and hatred concealed under this ſpecious maſk of public utility, and encouraged his countrymen to elude the Spartan artifice by ſimilar addreſs. The ſenate of the five hundred, who gave audience to foreign ambaſſadors, declared that Athens would adopt no meaſure inconſiſtent with the public intereſt, and promiſed ſpeedily to ſend an embaſſy, in their turn, which ſhould remove all groundleſs apprehenſions entertained on that ſubject. The Lacedæmonians having returned with this temporiſing anſwer, Themiſtocles was immediately diſpatched to Sparta, and expected, as he had previouſly concerted matters with his countrymen [12], to be followed, at a proper time, by Ariſtides, the moſt reſpected character of his age; and by Liſicles, an able orator in the ſenate and aſſembly. Meanwhile the Athenian walls aroſe with unexampled celerity. Not only ſlaves, profeſſed artificers, and the poorer claſſes of citizens, but magiſtrates of the

[12] Idem ibid. & in Themiſt. Lyſias Orat. Funeb. & cont. Alcib.

firſt

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firſt rank, the venerable fathers of the republic, wrought with their own hands, and with unceaſing induſtry. The feeble efforts of women and children contributed to the uſeful labour. The moſt ſuperſtitious of men neglected their accuſtomed ſolemnities, and no longer acknowledged the diſtinction of days or ſeaſons: nor did even the ſilent tranquillity of night abate the ardour of their diligence. The ruins of their city happily ſupplied them with a rich variety of materials: no edifice was ſpared, public or private, ſacred or profane; the rude ſculpture of ancient temples, even the mutilated tombs of their anceſtors, were confounded in the common maſs: and, at the diſtance of near a century, the ſingular appearance of the wall, compoſed of ſtones rough and unpoliſhed, of various colours and unequal ſize, atteſted the rapid exertions by which the work had been conſtructed [13].

and its effects eluded by his addreſs.

Themiſtocles had hitherto, under various pretences, avoided declaring his commiſſion before the Spartan ſenate. When urged to this meaſure by ſome of the magiſtrates who began to ſuſpect his ſilence, he ſtill alleged the abſence of his colleagues as a ſufficient reaſon for delay. But a company of travellers, who had recently viſited Athens, gave intelligence of the extraordinary works carrying on in that city. This information, and the reſentment of the Spartans which it occaſioned, muſt have diſconcerted a man who poſſeſſed leſs cool

[13] Thucydid. l. i. c. lxxxix. & ſeqq.

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boldneſs than the commander at Salamis and Artemiſium. But Themiſtocles, with the addreſs congenial to his character, aſſerted, that it was unworthy the gravity of Sparta to regard the vague rumours of obſcure men; and that, before lightly ſuſpecting the approved fidelity of their allies, ſhe ought to beſtow ſome pains in diſcovering the truth. This declaration was enforced, it is ſaid, by ſeaſonable bribes to the moſt popular of the Ephori; ſo that the Spartans, deluded or corrupted, agreed to diſpatch a ſecond embaſſy to Athens, conſiſting of ſome of their moſt reſpectable citizens. Theſe men had no ſooner arrived at their deſtination, than they were taken into cuſtody, as pledges for the ſafe return of Themiſtocles and his colleagues, who by this time had brought him the welcome news, that the walls were completed. The Athenian ambaſſadors were now prepared to throw off the maſk. They appeared in the Lacedæmonian aſſembly; and Themiſtocles, ſpeaking for the reſt, declared, that his countrymen needed not to learn from their confiderates, what meaſures were honourable to themſelves, and beneficial to the common cauſe; that, by his advice, they had firmly defended their city againſt the aſſaults of open enemies and jealous friends; and that, if Sparta entertained any reſentment of this meaſure, which was evidently not leſs conducive to the public intereſt, than, perhaps, diſpleaſing to private ambition, her anger would be equally unjuſt and impotent, ſince her own citizens muſt remain as hoſtages at Athens till his colleagues and himſelf ſhould be reſtored

reſtored in ſafety to their country [14]. Whatever ſecret indignation this ſpeech might excite, the Spartans thought proper to diſguiſe their animoſity. They allowed the ambaſſadors to return home; but the conduct of Themiſtocles laid the foundation of that relentleſs hatred with which he was perſecuted by Sparta, whoſe intrigues engaged all Greece, not excepting Athens herſelf, in the deſtruction of this illuſtrious citizen. Yet his eminent ſervices, before they were interrupted by this ſtorm of perſecution, aggravates the ſhame of his country, and diſplays more fully her ſignal ingratitude [15].

Themiſtocles builds the Piræus. Olymp. lxxv. 4. A. C. 477.

The ancient Athenian harbour of Phalericum was ſmall, narrow, and inconveinent. To ſupply its defects, Themiſtocles, even before the Perſian invaſion, had recommended the Piræus, a place five miles diſtant from the citadel, furniſhed with three natural baſons, which, if properly fortified, might form a far more commodious and ſecure ſtation for the Athenian navy. The foundations were laid, and the walls began to riſe, when the cruel ravages of the Barbarians interrupted the undertaking. Having in the preceding year fortified the city Themiſtocles thought the preſent a proper time to finiſh the new harbour [16]. His addreſs, his eloquence, and his bribes, were ſeaſonably applied to divert the reſentment of Sparta, who, though thenceforth leſs jealous of the naval than military power of her rival, threatened, on this oc-

[14] Plut &c. ibid. [15] Diodor. l. xi. p. 437.
[16] Thucydid. l. i. c. xciii. Plut. in Themiſt. Diodor. xi. 436.

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caſion, to enter Attica with an armed force. But the artful Athenian found means to convince the Spartans and their allies, that the conſtruction of a ſtrong and capacious harbour was a matter eſſentially requiſite to the common intereſt of the Grecian confederacy. The work, meantime, was carried on at Athens with much ſpirit and activity, and, in leſs than a twelvemonth, brought to ſuch a proſperous concluſion as could ſcarcely be credited, but on the teſtimony of a contemporary hiſtorian of the moſt approved diligence and fidelity [17]. The new walls were ſufficiently broad to admit two carriages abreaſt; the ſtones compoſing them were of an immenſe ſize, ſtrongly united by bars of iron, which were faſtened by melted lead. The Piræus ſoon grew into a town, containing many thouſand inhabitants. It was joined to the city by walls begun by Cimon, but finiſhed by Pericles, twenty years after the harbour itſelf had been conſtructed.

A. C. 457. The new buildings of Cimon and Pericles are often mentioned in hiſtory under the name of the Long Walls. They extended forty ſtadia on either ſide; and when added to the circumference of the ancient city (about ſixty ſtadia), give us for the whole circuit of the Athenian fortifications an extent of nearly eighteen Engliſh miles [18].

The war againſt Perſia continued by the confederates;

The altercations and animoſities excited by ſuch undertakings among the confederates at home, prevented not their united arms from aſſaulting the

[17] Thucydid. ubi ſupra.

[18] Pauſanias, p. 20, & ſeq. Strabo, p. 391, & ſeq. Plut. in Cimon.

domi-

dominions of the great King. Thirty Athenian, and fifty Peloponneſian ſhips, had been employed to expel the Perſian garriſons from the ſea-ports which they ſtill occupied in the Helleſpont, the Propontis, and the Ægæan iſles. The European fleet, being ſeaſonably joined by various ſquadrons from the Greek cities of Aſia, ſcoured the eaſtern ſhores of the Mediterranean, and delivered from oppreſſion the long enſlaved iſland of Cyprus. Their next operation muſt have been at a conſiderable diſtance of time, ſince they had to return near two hundred leagues weſtward, and then to proceed almoſt as far towards the north and the Boſporus of Thrace. At the entrance of this celebrated canal, which joins the Euxine and Propontis, the city of Byzantium, deſtined in future ages to become the ſeat of empire, and long to remain the chief emporium of Europe and of Aſia, had been firſt founded by a feeble colony of Megareans, which had gradually become populous, flouriſhing, and independent, but which was actually commanded and inſulted by armed Barbarians. It is not probable that Xerxes, or his miniſters, perceived the peculiar ſecurity of Byzantium, ſituate between the Boſporus and the Helleſpont, two ſtraits, which it might occaſionally ſhut to an hoſtile navy, or open to the fleets of commerce. But had they been ſenſible of this advantage, the misfortunes, hitherto attending all their maritime enterpriſes, muſt have rendered it impoſſible to encourage their ſeamen to reſiſt a victorious enemy. They diſcovered, however, more than their uſual

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who take Byzantium. Olymp. 1. lxxvi. 1. A.C. 476.

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vigour, in defending by land, a place which they regarded as the center of very valuable poſſeſſion. The adjacent coaſt of Thrace forms a ſtriking contraſt with the inland parts of that country. Inſtead of bleak heaths and ſnowy mountains, which deform the inhoſpitable regions of Hæmus and Rhodopé, the maritime provinces produce in abundance, vines, olives, the moſt neceſſary grains, and the moſt delicious fruits. The climate vies with the delightful ſoftneſs of the Aſiatic plains; and the ſoil had been long cultivated by Greek colonies, who had widely extended themſelves on both ſides of Byzantium. The Barbarians ſtrengthened the garriſon of the place, which was well ſupplied with proviſions, and commanded by Perſians of the firſt diſtinction, among whom were ſeveral kinſmen of the great King. The ſiege was obſtinate, but the events of it are not deſcribed in hiſtory. It is only known, that the walls were ſtormed, and that an immenſe booty, together with many Perſian princes and nobles, fell into the hands of the victors [19].

The conſpiracy of Pauſanias;

Here ends the glory of Pauſanias, who ſtill commanded the forces of the confederacy; a man whoſe fame would rival the moſt illuſtrious names of antiquity, had he fallen in the ſiege of Byzantium. The rich ſpoils of Platæa, of which the tenth was allotted to him as general, raiſed him above the equality required by the republican inſtitutions of his country. His recent conqueſt ſtill farther augmented his wealth and inflamed his ambition: a

[19] Plut. in Ariſtid. Thucydid l. i. 95, & ſeqq. Diodor. l. xi. 44—46.

continual

continual flow of proſperity, which is apt to ſtagger the beſt regulated minds, overſet the towering pride of Pauſanias. As he conceived himſelf too great to remain a ſubject, he was willing to become a ſovereign, through the aſſiſtance of Xerxes, the inveterate enemy of his country. To this prince he made application, by means of Gongylus the Eretrian, a fit inſtrument for any kind of villany. To ſuch an aſſociate Pauſanias had entruſted the noble Perſians taken in Byzantium. This man eſcaped with his priſoners acroſs the Boſporus, and conveyed a letter to the great King, in which the Spartan general having mentioned, as an indubitable proof of his ſincerity, the reſtoring his captive kinſmen, propoſed to enter into ſtrict amity with Xerxes, to take his daughter in marriage, to ſecond his efforts in conquering Greece, and to hold that country as a dependent province of the Perſian empire. The Perſian is ſaid to have highly reliſhed theſe propoſals, the ſubjugation of Greece being the great object of his reign. It is certain that he ſpeedily ſent Artabazus, a nobleman of confidence, to confer and co-operate with the traitor.

ill conducted

But Pauſanias himſelf acted with the precipitancy and inconſiſtency of a man, who had either been deluded into treaſon by bad advice, or totally intoxicated by the dangerous vapours of ambition that floated in his diſtempered brain. Inſtead of diſſembling his deſigns until they were ripe for execution, he aſſumed at once the tone of a maſter and the manners of a tyrant. He became difficult

of

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of acceſs to his colleagues in command; diſdained their advice in concerting meaſures which they were ordered to execute; he was ſurrounded by guards, choſen from the conquered Barbarians; and he puniſhed the ſlighteſt offence in the allied troops with a rigour hitherto unknown to the Grecian diſcipline. He ſtill managed, indeed, the fierce ſpirits of the Spartans, but without any degree of prudence, ſince the diſtinctions which he demanded for *them*, tended only to irritate and inflame their confederates, who were not allowed to forage, to draw water, to cut down ſtraw for their beds, until the countrymen of Pauſanias had been previouſly furniſhed with all theſe articles.

The allies reject his authority; Olymp. lxxvi. 1. A. C. 476.

This intolerable inſolence diſguſted and provoked the army in general, but eſpecially the Ionians, who lamented that they had been no ſooner delivered from the ſhackles of Perſian deſpotiſm, than they were bent under the ſeverer and more odious yoke of Sparta. By common conſent, they repaired to the Athenian Ariſtides, and his colleague Cimon, the ſon of Miltiades, a youth of the faireſt hopes, who had ſignalized his patriotiſm and valour in all the glorious ſcenes of the war. Their deſigns being approved by theſe Athenian commanders Uliades and Antagoras, reſpectively entruſted with the fleets of Samos and Chios, the braveſt of all the maritime allies, ſeized the firſt opportunity to inſult the galley of Pauſanias: and when reproached and threatened by the Spartan, they deſired him to thank Fortune, who had favoured him at Platæa, the memory of which victory alone ſaved him from

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the immediate punishment of his arrogance and cruelty. These words speedily re-echoed through the whole fleet, and served, as soon as they were heard, for the signal of general revolt. The different squadrons of Asia and the Hellespont sailed from their stations, joined the ships of Uliades and Antagoras, loudly declared against the insolent ambition of Pausanias, abjured the proud tyranny of Sparta, and for ever ranged themselves under the victorious colours of Athens, whose generous magnanimity seemed best fitted to command the willing obedience of freemen [20].

and submit to the Athenians.

This revolution had immediate and important effects, which we shall proceed to explain, when we have punished and dismissed the unworthy Pausanias. Apprised of his malversation and treachery, the Spartan senate recalled him, to stand trial for his life. But his immense wealth enabling him to corrupt the integrity of his judges, he escaped without farther punishment than degradation from his office, and paying a heavy fine. In his stead, the Spartans substituted not one admiral, but several captains, with divided authority, thereby to remove the odium and resentment which the insolence of unlimited command had excited among their confederates. Pausanias, though divested of his public character, having accompanied these officers to the Hellespont, in a vessel fitted out at his private expence, began to display more arrogance than ever. He disdained not only the manners and be-

Pausanias recalled by the Spartans. Olymp. lxxvi. 2. A. C. 475.

Returns to the east;

[20] Nepos in Pausan. Plutarch. in Aristid.

haviour,

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haviour, but the dreſs and appearance of a Greek; carried on, almoſt openly, his treacherous correſpondence with Artabazus; increaſed the number of his Barbarian guards and attendants; trampled with contempt on the moſt revered inſtitutions of his country; and diſplayed that provoking pomp of power, and that offenſive oſtentation of vice, which diſgraced the profligate lives of the Perſian ſatraps [21].

recalled by the ſcytalé;

When the Spartan magiſtrates received a full account of his pride and folly, they were apprehenſive leſt he might refuſe to return home on an ordinary ſummons, and therefore employed the form of the ſcytale, a form reſerved for the moſt ſolemn occaſions. The ſcytalé (for opinion can give importance to any thing) was only a narrow ſcroll of parchment, which had been rolled on a piece of wood, and then ſtamped with the decree of the republic. Every Spartan inveſted with authority at home or abroad, poſſeſſed a tally exactly correſponding to the rod on which the parchment had been firſt rolled. By applying his tally, the words of the ſcytalé neceſſarily arranged themſelves in their original form, and atteſted the authentic command of the magiſtrate. As tutor to the infant King of Sparta, Pauſanias had been furniſhed with an inſtrument of this kind; and ſuch is the effect of legal formality, that a man who would probably have deſpiſed the injunction of a ſimple letter, returned without delay to a country which he had

[21] Thucydid. i. 95. & 128.

betrayed,

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betrayed, when his recall was accompanied with this frivolous, but reſpected ceremony.

and puniſhed.

The external profeſſions, and hypocritical pedantry of Spartan virtue, were moſt ſhamefully detected and expoſed in the whole affair of Pauſanias. Though convicted of the moſt odious tyranny, extortion, and profligacy, he was ſtill allowed to enjoy the benefit of perſonal freedom; to correſpond by frequent meſſages with his accomplice Artabazus; and, at length, to tamper with the Helots and Meſſenians, thoſe oppreſſed ſlaves, who were ever ready to rebel againſt imperious and cruel maſters. But as it exceeded even the opulence and effrontery of Pauſanias, to corrupt and influence the whole republic, thoſe who had either eſcaped the general contagion of venality, or who were offended at not ſharing his bribes, accuſed him, a third time, of treaſon to Greece, in conſequence of an event which enabled them in the fulleſt manner to make good the charge. An unhappy youth, who lived with Pauſanias as the wretched inſtrument of his pleaſure, was deſtined by that monſter to become the victim of his ambition. He was charged with a letter from his maſter to Artabazus, in which, after explaining the actual ſtate of his affairs, Pauſanias hinted to him, as had been his uſual practice, to deſtroy the bearer. The ſuſpicious youth, who had obſerved that none of thoſe ſent on ſuch errands ever returned to their country, broke open the letter, and read his own fate. Fired with reſentment, he inſtantly carried the writing to the enemies of Pauſanias, who pru-

dently

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dently adviſed the meſſenger to take refuge in the temple of Neptune, expecting that his maſter would ſoon follow him. Meanwhile they practiſed a concealment in the wall of the temple, and having acquainted the Ephori, and other chief magiſtrates, with their contrivance for convicting the traitor by his own words, they obtained a deputation to accompany them, to remain concealed with them in the temple, and to overhear the mutual reproaches between Pauſanias and his meſſenger. Yet the ſuperſtition of the Spartans permitted them not to ſeize the criminal in that ſacred edifice. He was allowed to retire in ſafety; and when the ſenate had at length determined to lay hold of him, he was privately admoniſhed of his danger by ſome members of that venal aſſembly. Upon this intelligence, he took refuge in the temple of Minerva, from which it being unlawful to drag him, that aſylum was ſurrounded by guards; all neceſſaries were denied the priſoner, and he thus periſhed by hunger [22].

Ariſtides entruſted with the finances of the confederates. Olymp. lxxvi. 2. A. C. 475.

The late puniſhment of this deteſtable traitor could not repair the ruinous effects of his miſconduct and villany. Not only the Ionians, who had firſt begun the revolt, but the foreign confederates in general, loudly rejected the pretenſions of Dorcis and other captains whom the Spartans appointed to command them. A few communities of Peloponneſus ſtill followed the Lacedæmonian

[22] Thucyd. l. i. c. cxxviii. & ſeqq. Diodor. l. xi. c. xliv. & Nepos in Pauſan.

ſtandard;

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ſtandard; but the iſlanders and Aſiatics unanimouſly applied to Ariſtides, to whoſe approved wiſdom and virtue they not only entruſted the operations of the combined armament, but voluntarily ſubmitted their more particular concerns: and experience ſoon juſtified their prudent choice. Pay was not yet introduced into the Grecian ſervice, becauſe the character of *ſoldier* was not ſeparated from that of *citizen*. It had been uſual, however, to raiſe annually a certain proportion of ſupplies among the ſeveral confederates, in order to purchaſe arms, to equip and victual the gallies, and to provide ſuch engines of war as ſeemed requiſite in ſtorming the fortified towns belonging to the common enemy[23]. By unanimous ſuffrage, Ariſtides was appointed to new model and apply this neceſſary tax, which had been impoſed and exacted by the Spartans without ſufficient attention to the reſpective faculties of the contributaries. The honeſt Athenian executed this delicate office with no leſs judgment than equity. The whole annual impoſition amounted to four hundred and ſixty talents, about ninety thouſand pounds ſterling; which was proportioned with ſuch nice accuracy, that no ſtate found the ſmalleſt reaſon to complain of any unjuſt partiality. The common treaſure was kept in the central and ſacred iſland of Delos; and, though entruſted to the perſonal diſcretion of the Athenian commander, was ſoon conceived to lie at the diſpoſition of his republic[24].

Their amount.

[23] Plut. in Ariſtid. p. 532, & ſeqq.

[24] Ibid. p. 534. Thucydid. l. i. c. xcvi. Diodor. p. 440.

While

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Merit and perſecution of Themiſtocles.

While the merit of Ariſtides thus procured his countrymen the management of the national treaſure of Greece, Themiſtocles was equally ſucceſsful in improving the internal reſources of the ſtate. By yielding more protection to ſtrangers than they enjoyed in neighbouring cities, he augmented not only the populouſneſs, but the wealth of Athens, as that deſcription of men paid an annual contribution in return for their ſecurity [25]. This, together with other branches of the revenue, he employed in building annually about ſixty gallies, the addition of which to the Athenian navy abundantly compenſated ſuch loſſes as were ſuſtained by the accidents of the ſea in foreign parts. Notwithſtanding the envy and malice of worthleſs demagogues, who infeſted the Athenian aſſembly and courts of juſtice, Themiſtocles was faſt advancing to the attainment of the ſame authority at home, which Ariſtides enjoyed abroad, when complaints arrived from Sparta, that he had conſpired with Pauſanias to betray the public liberty. The known reſentment of the Spartans againſt this extraordinary man, ſufficiently explains the reaſon why they, who were ſo dilatory in their proceedings againſt Pauſanias himſelf, ſhould be ſo eager to bring to puniſhment his ſuppoſed accomplice. But it is not eaſy to conceive, how the Athenians could admit ſuch an accuſation againſt a citizen, whoſe ſingular valour and conduct had gained the deciſive victory at Salamis; whoſe counſels and addreſs

[25] Lyſias adv. Philon.

had

had fortified their city with impregnable ſtrength; whoſe foreſight and activity had procured them a fleet which no nation in the world could reſiſt; and whoſe abilities and patriotiſm had not only ſaved his country from the moſt formidable invaſion recorded in hiſtory, and which was principally directed againſt Athens, but amidſt the terrors of this invaſion, the treachery of falſe friends, and the violence of open enemies, had ſo eminently contributed to raiſe his republic to the firſt rank in the Grecian confederacy. Yet ſuch, on the one hand, was the effect of that envy which, in republics, always accompanies excellence; and ſuch, on the other, the influence of Spartan bribery and intrigues that Themiſtocles was baniſhed by the oſtraciſm, a puniſhment inflicted on men whoſe aſpiring ambition ſeemed dangerous to freedom, which required not the proof of any particular delinquency, and which had effect only during a term of years [26].

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His death and character. Olymp. lxxvi. 4. A. C. 473.

It is probable, that the illuſtrious exile would have been recalled before the expiration of the appointed time; but the perſecution of Sparta allowed not his countrymen leiſure to repent of their ſeverity. Having puniſhed Pauſanias, they acquainted the Athenians, "That from the papers of this notorious traitor, complete evidence appeared of the guilt of Themiſtocles; that it was not ſufficient, therefore, to have expelled him for a few years from Athens, by an indulgent decree, which the aſſembly

[26] Diodor. p. 445, & ſeqq. Plut. ibid.

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might revoke at pleaſure; that crimes againſt the general confederacy of Greece ought to be judged by the Amphictyonic council, and puniſhed by death, or perpetual baniſhment." The Athenians ſhamefully complied with this demand. It appeared, indeed, that Themiſtocles had correſponded with Pauſanias, and been privy to his deſigns; but he perſiſted in affirming that he never had approved them. The rivalſhip and enmity ſubſiſting between Sparta and Argos, had induced him to chooſe the latter as the place of his retreat. There he received the news of his condemnation; after which, not thinking himſelf ſecure in any city of Peloponneſus, he ſailed to Corcyra. But his enemies ſtill continuing to perſecute him, he fled to the oppoſite coaſt of Epirus, and ſought refuge among the barbarous Moloſſians. Soon afterwards he eſcaped into Perſia, where his wonderful verſatility of genius, in acquiring the language and manners of that country, recommended him to the new King Artaxerxes, who had lately ſucceeded the unfortunate invader of Greece. The ſuſpicion of treaſon throws a dark ſhade on the eminent luſtre of his abilities; nor does the diſintereſtedneſs of his private character tend to remove the imputation. Though he carried with him to Perſia his moſt valuable effects, yet the eſtimate of the property which he left behind in Athens, amounted to an hundred talents (above twenty thouſand pounds ſterling), an immenſe ſum, when eſtimated by the value of money in that age. The whole was confiſcated to the exchequer; and the eagerneſs of

Olymp. lxxvii. 1. A. C. 472.

the

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the populace to ſeize this rich booty, ſerves to explain the alacrity with which all parties concurred in his deſtruction. A report prevailed in Greece, that Themiſtocles could never forgive the ingratitude of the Athenians, which he had determined to revenge at the head of a powerful army, raiſed by Artaxerxes. But perceiving the unexampled ſucceſs of Cimon on the Aſiatic coaſt, he deſpaired of being able to accompliſh his deſign; and, in a melancholy hour, ended his life by poiſon at the age of ſixty-five, in Magneſia, a town of Lydia, which had been beſtowed on him by the liberality of the Perſian monarch [27].

Death of Ariſtides. Olymp. lxxvii. 2. A. C. 471.

It is worthy of obſervation, that the three great commanders who had reſiſted and diſgraced the arms of Xerxes, quitted the ſcene almoſt at the ſame time. While Pauſanias and Themiſtocles ſuffered the puniſhment of their real or pretended crimes, Ariſtides died of old age, univerſally regretted by the affectionate admiration of his country. He, who had long managed the common treaſury of Greece, left not a ſufficient ſum to defray the expence of his funeral. His ſon Lyſimachus received a preſent of three hundred pounds from the public, to enable him to purſue and finiſh his education. His daughters were maintained and portioned at the expence of the treaſury. This honourable poverty well correſponded with the manly elevation of his character, whoſe pure and unſullied

His character.

[27] Plut. & Nepos in Themiſt. Diodor. l. xi. c. liv—lix. Thucyd. i. 135, & ſeqq.

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ſplendour, in the opinion of a good judge of merit [28], far eclipſes the doubtful fame of his dazzling, but unfortunate rival.

Elevation of Cimon to the command.

By the death of Ariſtides, the conduct of the Perſian war devolved on his colleague Cimon, who united the integrity of that great man to the valour of Miltiades and the deciſive boldneſs of Themiſtocles. But as he felt an ambition for eminence which diſdains bare imitation, he not only reflected the moſt diſtinguiſhed excellencies of his predeceſſors, but improved and adorned them by an elegant liberality of manners, an indulgent humanity, and candid condeſcenſion; virtues which long ſecured him the affections of his fellow-citizens, while his military talents and authority, always directed by moderation and juſtice, maintained an abſolute aſcendant over the allies of the republic.

He reduces the coaſt of Thrace. Olymp. lxxvii. 2. A. C. 471.

His firſt operations were employed againſt the coaſt of Thrace, which the taking of Byzantium ſeemed to render an eaſy conqueſt. The only places in that country fitted to make an obſtinate reſiſtance were the towns of Eion and Amphipolis, both ſituate on the river Strymon; the former near its junction with the Strymonic gulph, the latter more remote from the ſhore, but entirely ſurrounded by an arm of the gulph, and the principal branches of that copious river. Amphipolis, however, was taken, and planted by a numerous colony of Athenians. But Eion ſtill oppoſed a vigorous reſiſtance; Boges the Perſian governor, having de-

[28] Plato apud Plutarch. in Ariſtid.

termined

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termined rather to periſh than ſurrender. After long baffling the efforts of the beſiegers, by ſuch perſevering courage and activity as none of his countrymen had diſplayed in the courſe of the war, this fierce Barbarian was at length not tamed, but exaſperated by hunger. His companions and attendants, equally deſperate with their leader, followed his intrepid example; and mounting the ramparts with one accord, threw into the middle ſtream of the Strymon their gold, ſilver, and other precious effects. After thus atteſting their implacable hatered to the aſſailants, they calmly deſcended, lighted a funeral pile, butchered their wives and children, and again mounting the walls, precipitated themſelves with fury into the thickeſt of the flames[29].

Purſues the enemy into Aſia. Olymp. lxxvii. 3. A. C. 470.

With this ſignal act of deſpair ended the Perſian dominion over the coaſt of Europe, which finally ſubmitted to the victorious arms of Cimon; a general, who knew alike how to conquer, and how to uſe the victory. The Athenians were eager to prolong the authority of a man, who ſeemed ambitious to acquire wealth by valour, only that by wealth he might purchaſe the public eſteem; and whoſe affable kindneſs, and winning liberality, continually increaſed his fame and his influence both at home and abroad. The reinforcements with which he was ſpeedily furniſhed by the republic, enabled him to purſue the enemy into Aſia, without allowing them time to breathe, or recover ſtrength, after their repeated defeats. The inter-

[29] Plut. in Cimon. Diodor. l. xi.

CHAP. XII. mediate iſlands ambitiouſly courted his protection and friendſhip; and *their* feeble aid, together with the more powerful aſſiſtance of the Ionian coaſt, ſpeedily increaſed his fleet to the number of three hundred ſail.

His rapid ſucceſs in Caria and Lycia.

With this formidable armament he ſtretched towards the coaſt of Caria, where his approach ſerved for the ſignal of liberty to the numerous Greek cities in that rich province. Seconded by the ardour of the natives, he ſucceſſively beſieged and reduced the walled towns and fortreſſes, ſeveral of which were defended with powerful garriſons; and, in the courſe of a few months, totally expelled the Perſians from all their ſtrong holds in Caria. The victorious armament then proceeded eaſtward to Lycia, and received the ſubmiſſion of that valuable coaſt. The citizens of Phaſelis alone, defended by ſtrong walls, and a numerous garriſon, refuſed to admit the Grecian fleet, or to betray their Perſian maſter. Their reſiſtance was the more formidable, becauſe their ancient connection with the Chians, who actually ſerved under the colours of Cimon, enabled them to enter into a treacherous correſpondence with the enemy. After other means of intercourſe had been cut off, the Chians ſtill ſhot arrows over the walls, and thus conveyed intelligence into the place of all the meaſures adopted by the aſſailants. Wherever the attack was made, the townſmen and garriſon were prepared to reſiſt; the beſiegers were long baffled in all their attempts; but the perſeverance of Cimon finally overca[illegible] the [illegible] Their vigoro[illegible] reſiſtance

He takes Phaſelis.

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reſiſtance was not diſtinguiſhed by any memorable puniſhment; the mediation of the Chians, who were juſtly eſteemed among the beſt ſailors in the Athenian fleet, eaſily prevailing on the lenity of Cimon to grant them a capitulation, on condition that they immediately paid ten talents, and augmented the Grecian armament by their whole naval ſtrength [30].

The Perſians prepare for defence:

The diſtracted ſtate of Perſia, the intrigues of the court, the diſcord of the palace, and the civil wars which raiſed to the throne of Xerxes his third ſon Artaxerxes, diſtinguiſhed by the epithet of Longimanus, prevented that vaſt but unwieldy empire from making any vigorous effort to reſiſt the European invaſion. But after Artaxerxes had at length cruſhed the unfortunate ambition of his competitors, and acquired firm poſſeſſion of the reins of government, which he continued to hold for half a century [31], he naturally concerted proper meaſures to defend his remaining dominions in Aſia Minor. Having re-eſtabliſhed the Perſian authority in the iſle of Cyprus, he conſidered that Pamphylia, being the next province to Lycia, would probably receive a ſpeedy viſit from the victorious Greeks. That he might meet them there with becoming vigour, he aſſembled a powerful army on the fertile banks of the Eurymedon. A fleet likewiſe, of four hundred ſail, was collected,

A. C. 473—425.

[30] Plut. & Diodor. ibid.

[31] Compare Thucydid l. i. c. cxxxvii. and Uſher Chronol. See alſo Petav. de Doctrin. Templ. l. x. c. xxv. who endeavours to reconcile the chronological differences between Thucydides and Plutarch in Themiſt.

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chiefly from Cilicia and Phœnicia, and was commanded to rendezvous near the mouth of that river.

Are defeated at ſea. Olymp. lxxvii. A. C. 470.

The Greeks, conducted by the activity of Cimon, delayed not to undertake the enterpriſe which the prudence of Artaxerxes had foreſeen. Their fleet, amounting to two hundred and fifty gallies, fell in with the Perſian ſquadrons off the coaſt of Cyprus. The Barbarians, vainly confident in their ſuperior numbers, did not decline the engagement, which was obſtinate, fierce, and bloody. Many of their ſhips were ſunk; an hundred were taken; the reſt fled in diſorder towards the ſhore of Cyprus; but, being ſpeedily purſued by a powerful detachment of the Grecian fleet, were abandoned by the terror of their crews, to the victors; and thus the mighty preparations, which the Great King had raiſed with ſuch flattering hopes, ſtrengthened in one day, with about three hundred ſail, the hoſtile navy of Greece [32].

Cimon's valour and conduct.

The vigorous mind of Cimon, inſtead of being intoxicated with this flow of proſperity, was leſs elevated with good fortune, than ſolicitous to improve it. The captured veſſels contained above twenty thouſand Perſians. The ſoldiers encamped on the Eurymedon were ſtill ignorant of the ſea-fight. Theſe circumſtances inſtantly ſuggeſted to the quick diſcernment of Cimon a ſtratagem for ſurpriſing the Perſian camp, which was executed on the evening of the ſame glorious day with admirable

[32] Thucydid. Plut. Diodor. ibid.

admirable ſucceſs. The priſoners were ſtripped of their eaſtern attire; the braveſt of the Greeks condeſcended to aſſume the tiara and ſcymitar, and thus diſguiſed, embarked in the Perſian ſhips, and ſailed up the river Eurymedon with a favourable gale. The unſuſpecting Barbarians received them with open arms into their camp, as their long-expected companions. But the Greeks had no ſooner been admitted within the gates, than on a given ſignal at once drawing their ſwords, they attacked, with the concert of diciplined valour, the defenceleſs ſecurity of their now aſtoniſhed and trembling adverſaries. Before the Perſians recovered from their ſurpriſe, Cimon had advanced to the tent of their general. Conſternation and deſpair ſeized this numerous but unwarlike hoſt. The few who were leaſt overcome by the impreſſions of fear and amazement, betook themſelves to flight; a panic terror ſuſpended the powers of the reſt; they remained, and fell, unarmed and unreſiſting, by the hands of an unknown enemy.

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Gains the deciſive victory of Eurymedon.

The rich ſpoils of the Barbarian camp rewarded the enterpriſe and celerity of the Greeks, who, loaded with wealth and glory, returned home during winter, and piouſly dedicated to Apollo a tenth of the plunder acquired by theſe ever memorable atchievements. A conſiderable portion of the remainder was employed (as mentioned above) in ſtrengthening the fortifications of Athens. Agreeably to the Grecian cuſtom, the general was entitled to a valuable ſhare. Cimon received it as a teſtimony of the public eſteem, and expended it for the

The ſpoil, how employed.

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the public uſe; embelliſhing Athens his beloved birth-place with ſhady walks, gardens, porticoes, ſchools of exerciſe, and other works of general pleaſure and utility [33].

The Athenians proſecute the war; Olymp. lxxvii. 4. A. C. 469.

After theſe deciſive victories, the Greeks, headed by the Athenians, carried on the war during twenty-one years, rather for plunder than glory. The manifeſt ſuperiority which they enjoyed on all the eaſtern ſhores of the Mediterranean, might have rendered their maritime allies ſufficiently ſecure. But the people of Athens, whoſe councils began about this time to be governed by the magnanimous ambition and profound policy of Pericles, had the addreſs to perſuade their confederates that naval preparations and enterpriſes were ſtill as neceſſary as ever. At length, however, moſt of thoſe ſcattered iſlands and ſea-ports, which ranged under the colours of Athens, grew weary of perpetual hoſtilities, of which *they* ſhared the toil and the danger, while their lofty leaders alone reaped the advantage and the glory, and became continually more anxious to enjoy the benefits of public peace, and the undiſturbed comforts of domeſtic tranquillity. The Athenians availed themſelves of this diſpoſition, to engage ſuch ſtates as appeared moſt backward in raiſing their contingents for the common armament, to compound for perſonal ſervice on ſhipboard, by an annual ſupply of money, which might enable Athens continually to keep in readineſs a fleet of obſervation, to watch and check

take money inſtead of ſhips from the allies;

[33] Idem, ibid. & Nepos in Cimon. & Thucydid. l. i.

the motions of the common enemy. This, at firſt voluntary, contribution ſoon amounted to the value of an hundred thouſand pounds. It was gradually augmented; and, at length, raiſed by Pericles to three times the original ſum [34]; an immenſe income, conſidering that the proportional value of money to labour was then ten times higher than at preſent; and conſidering alſo the very limited revenues of the greateſt monarchs of antiquity; ſince, from all the various provinces of the Perſian empire, ſcarcely four millions ſterling entered the royal treaſury [35].

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prepare to undertake an expedition againſt Cyprus. Olymp. lxxvii. 3. A. C. 466.

In their eaſtern expeditions, the Greeks had an opportunity of viſiting the large and beautiful iſland of Cyprus, which, though delivered by their valour from *ſome* Perſian garriſons, either ſtill continued, or again became, ſubject to that empire. The ſtriking advantages [36] of a delightful territory, four hundred miles in circumference, producing in great abundance wine, oil, with the moſt delicious fruits, and deemed invaluable in ancient times on account of its rich mines of braſs, naturally tempted the ambition of an enterpriſing nation. The conqueſt of Cyprus was ſtill farther recommended to the Athenians, as the ſea-coaſt had been peopled by a Grecian colony under the heroic Teucer, who built there a city called Salamis from the name of

[34] Thucydid. ibid. & Plut. in Perici.

[35] Herodot. iii. 95. In modern times the precious metals have ſo much increaſed in quantity and diminiſhed in value, that in 1660 the revenue of Hindooſtan amounted to thirty-two millions ſterling.

[36] Strabo, p. 648.

his

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his native country [37], which, from the earlieſt antiquity, had been regarded as a dependence of Attica. The Grecian inhabitants of Cyprus had hitherto attained neither power nor ſplendour; their ſettlements had been ſucceſſively reduced by the Phœnicians and the Great King; and they actually languiſhed in a condition of debility which threatened their total ruin [38]. Honour prompted the Athenians to relieve their diſtreſſed brethren; intereſt incited them to acquire poſſeſſion of a valuable iſland. With two hundred ſhips of war they prepared to undertake this important enterpriſe, when an object ſtill more dazzling gave a new direction to their arms.

Diverted from that meaſure by the revolt of Egypt. Olymp. lxxviii. 4. A. C. 465.

Amidſt the troubles which attended the eſtabliſhment of Artaxerxes on the Perſian throne, the Egyptians ſought an opportunity to withdraw themſelves from the yoke of a nation whoſe tyranny they had long felt and lamented. A leader only was wanting to head the rebellion. This alſo was at length diſcovered in Inarus, a bold Lybian chief, to whoſe ſtandard the malcontents aſſembling from all quarters, gradually grew into an army, which attacked and defeated the Perſian mercenaries, expelled the garriſons, baniſhed or put to death the governors and officers of the revenue, and traverſing the kingdom without controul or reſiſtance, every where proclaimed the Egyptians a free and independent nation. Nor was this the capricious revolt of ſhort-ſighted Barbarians. Inarus maintained his conqueſt with valour and policy; and in

[37] Iſocrat. in Evagor. [38] Iſocrat. ibid.

order

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order to ſtrengthen his intereſt by foreign alliance, diſpatched an embaſſy to Athens, craving the aſſiſtance of that victorious republic againſt its moſt odious and inveterate enemy [39].

The Athenian armament ſails thither: Olymp. lxxix. 2. A. C. 463.

The negotiation was ſucceſsful; the Athenians burned with deſire to ſhare the ſpoils of Perſia, and commanded the ſhips, deſtined for Cyprus, to ſail to Egypt. They had ſcarcely arrived in that kingdom, when a Perſian army of three hundred thouſand men, commanded by Achæmenes, encamped on the banks of the Nile. A battle ſpeedily enſued, in which the inſurgents obtained a complete victory, chiefly through the valour and diſcipline of their Grecian auxiliaries. The vanquiſhed ſought refuge within the walls of Memphis; that capital was inveſted; and after becoming maſters of two diviſions of the city, the Athenians puſhed with vigour the ſiege of the third, called, from the colour of its fortifications, the White Wall. Artaxerxes, meanwhile, neglected no poſſible effort for breaking, or eluding, a tempeſt, that threatened to diſmember his dominions. While Perſian nobles of diſtinction conveyed immenſe ſums of gold and ſilver into Greece, to rouſe, by ſeaſonable bribes, the hoſtility of rival ſtates againſt the audacity of Athens, a new army was collected, ſtill more numerous than the former, and entruſted to Megabazus, the braveſt general in the Eaſt. Such, at leaſt, he was deemed by his countrymen; yet we cannot perceive any very illuſtrious merit in forcing the Greeks to raiſe

is victorious;

beſieges Memphis.

[39] Thucydid. l. i. & Diodor. l. xi. p. 279.

the

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the ſiege of Memphis, the ſoldiers being already worn out by the fatigues of hard ſervice, and probably enfeebled by diſeaſes in a far diſtant climate, much differing from their own.

Misfortunes of the Athenians in Egypt. Olymp. lxxx. 4. A. C. 467.

Megabazus, however, had the glory of firſt turning againſt the Greeks that current of ſucceſs which had run for many years ſo ſtrongly in their favour. They and the revolted Egyptians were now beſieged, in their turn, in a ſmall iſland of the Nile called Proſopis, along the coaſt of which the Athenians had anchored their ſhips. By diverting the courſe of the river, Magabazus left them on dry land. The operation ſo much confounded the Egyptians that they immediately laid down their arms: but their wonted magnanimity did not forſake the Greeks: with their own hands they ſet fire to their fleet, and exhorting each other to ſuffer nothing unworthy of their former fame, determined with one accord, to reſiſt the aſſailants, and, although they could not expect victory, to purchaſe an honourable tomb. Megabazus, intimidated by their countenance and reſolution, and unwilling to expoſe his men to the efforts of a dangerous deſpair, granted them a capitulation, and what ſeems more extraordinary in a Perſian commander, allowed them to retire in ſafety. They endeavoured to penetrate through Lybia to the Grecian colonies in Cyrenaica, from which they hoped to be tranſported by ſea to their native country. But the greater part periſhed through fatigue or diſeaſe in the inhoſpitable deſerts of Africa, and only a miſerable remnant of men, whoſe memory deſerved a better fate,

fate, reviſited the ſhores of Greece. To complete the diſaſter, a reinforcement of ſixty ſhips, which the Athenians had ſent to Egypt, was attacked, ſurrounded, and totally deſtroyed by the Phœnicians [40]. CHAP. XII.

The Athenians renew their deſigns againſt Cyprus. Olymp. lxxxii. 3. A. C. 450.

Theſe repeated misfortunes, together with the growing troubles in Greece, which we ſhall ſpeedily have occaſion to deſcribe, prevented the Athenians, during ſeven years, from reſuming their deſign againſt Cyprus. A fleet of two hundred ſail was at length entruſted to Cimon, who enjoyed a proſperous voyage to the Cyprian coaſt. The towns of Malos and Citium oppoſed a feeble reſiſtance, and the ſingular humanity with which Cimon treated his priſoners, would have facilitated more important conqueſts: but the Phœnician and Sicilian fleets had again put to ſea, and Cimon wiſely determined to attack them as they approached the iſland, rather than wait their arrival, his countrymen being ſuperior to their enemies, ſtill more in naval than in military proweſs. In the battle which ſoon followed, he took above an hundred gallies; the number of thoſe ſunk or deſtroyed is unknown; the remainder fled to the coaſt of Cilicia, in hopes of protection from the great army of Megabazus, encamped in that province; but this ſlow unwieldy body was unable to afford them any ſeaſonable or effectual relief. The Greeks, having purſued them on ſhore, totally deſtroyed *them*, as well as the Perſian detachments which came to their ſuccour,

Their ſucceſs in the iſland.

[40] Iſocrat. de Pace & Panegyr. & Thucydid. & Diodor. ibid.

and

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and returned loaded with ſpoil to Cyprus. The Athenian general then prepared to form the ſiege of Salamis, which, though defended by a numerous Perſian garriſon, and well provided with all the neceſſaries of defence, muſt have ſoon yielded to his ſkill and valour, had not ſickneſs, in conſequence of a wound received before the walls of Citium, prevented him from exerting his uſual activity.

The Perſian monarch ſolicits peace. Olymp. lxxxii. 4. A. C. 449.

Meanwhile Artaxerxes, who perceived that the acquiſition of Salamis would naturally draw after it the conqueſt of the whole iſland, and who had been continually diſappointed in expecting to prepare fleets and armies able to contend with the Athenians, eagerly ſolicited peace from that people, almoſt on their own terms. His ambaſſadors were favourably heard in the Athenian aſſembly by thoſe who were more ſolicitous about confirming their uſurpations over their allies and colonies, than ambitious of extending their Aſiatic conqueſts. Cimon, who invariably maintained the contrary ſyſtem, was now no more. A peace, therefore, was concluded on the following conditions[41]: That all the Greek colonies in Lower Aſia ſhould be declared independent of the Perſian empire; that the armies of the Great King ſhould not approach within three days' journey of the weſtern coaſt; and that no Perſian veſſel ſhould appear between the Cyanean rocks and the Chelidonian iſles, that is, in the wide extent of the Ægæan and Mediterranean ſeas, between the northern extremity of the Thracian

Motives which determined the Athenians to compliance.

[41] Thucydid. Plutarch. Diodor. Iſocrat. &c.

Boſpo-

Bosporus and the south-eastern promontory of Lycia. On such terms the Athenians and their allies stipulated to withdraw their armament from Cyprus, and to abstain thenceforward from molesting the territories of the King of Persia. Such was the conclusion of this memorable war, which, since the burning of Sardis, the first decisive act of hostility, had been carried on, with little intermission, during fifty-one years. The same magnanimous republic, which first ventured to oppose the pretensions of Persia, dictated to that haughty empire the most humiliating conditions of peace; an important and illustrious æra in Grecian history, which was often celebrated with pompous panegyric during the declining ages of Athenian glory. CHAP. XII.

Although, for reasons which will be explained hereafter, peace was alike necessary to both parties, yet the reader, who feels a warm interest in the cause of civilization and humanity, cannot but regret that, after disgracing the arms of Persia, and breaking the power of Carthage, the Greeks had not combined in one powerful exertion, and extended their victories and their improvements over the ancient world. But the internal defects in her political constitution, which stunted the growth of Greece, and prevented her manhood and maturity from corresponding to the blooming vigour of her youth, rendered impossible this most desirable union, which, could it have taken place, would probably have left little room for the brilliant conquests of Alexander, or the more permanent glory Obstacles to a general or lasting confederacy in Greece.

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of the Roman arms. Inſtead of theſe imagined trophies, the ſubſequent hiſtory of Greece exhibits a melancholy picture of inteſtine diſcord.

Its ſubſequent hiſtory peculiarly intereſting.

During an hundred and eleven years, which elapſed between the glorious peace with Perſia, in which the Athenians, at the head of their allies, ſeemed for ever to have repreſſed the ambition of that aſpiring power, and the fatal defeat at Chæronæa, in which the ſame people, with their unfortunate auxiliaries, ſubmitted to the valour and activity of Philip, Greece, with ſhort variations of domeſtic quiet and foreign hoſtility, carried on bloody wars, and obtained deſtructive victories, in which her own citizens, not the enemies of the confederacy, were the unhappy objects of her inglorious triumph. Yet the tranſactions of this diſtracted and miſerable period, however immaterial in the hiſtory of empire, are peculiarly intereſting in the ſtill more inſtructive hiſtory of human nature. A confederacy of ſoldiers and freemen, extending their dominion over ignorant ſavages, or effeminate ſlaves, muſt continually exhibit the unequal combat of power, courage, and conduct on the one ſide, againſt weakneſs ignorance, and timidity on the other. But amidſt the domeſtic diſſenſions of Greece, the advantages of the contending parties were nicely balanced and accurately adjuſted. Force was reſiſted by force, valour oppoſed by valour, and art encountered or eluded by ſimilar addreſs. The active powers of man, excited by emulation, inflamed by oppoſition, nouriſhed by intereſt, and at once ſtrengthened and elevated by

a ſenſe

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a ſenſe of perſonal honour and the hope of immortal fame, operated in every direction with awakened energy, and were diſplayed in the boldeſt exertions of the voice and arm. In every field where glory might be won, men recogniſed the proper objects of their ambition, and aſpired to the higheſt honours of their kind; and although the prizes were often ſmall, and the victory always indeciſive, yet the pertinacious efforts of the combatants (great beyond example, and almoſt beyond belief) furniſh the moſt intereſting ſpectacle that hiſtory can preſent to the rational wonder of poſterity.

Sparta, Thebes, and Argos, hoſtile to Athens.

The powerful cities of Sparta, Thebes, and Argos, which had long rivalled Athens and each other, could not behold, without much diſſatisfaction and anxiety, the rapid growth of a republic which already eclipſed their ſplendour, and might ſome time endanger their ſafety. The Spartans had particular cauſes of diſguſt. The glorious victories of Cimon made them deeply regret that *they*, who had ſhared the firſt and ſevereſt toils of the war, had too haſtily withdrawn from a field of action that afforded ſo many laurels. They were provoked at being denied the command of the maritime allies, and not leſs offended at being overreached by Themiſtocles. All theſe reaſons had determined them, above twenty years before the peace with Perſia, to make war on the Athenians, expecting to be ſeconded in this deſign by the fears of the weak, and the jealouſy of the more powerful, ſtates, on both ſides the Corinthian iſthmus.

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Earthquake in Sparta; Olymp. lxxvii. 4. A. C. 469.

But their animosity, before it broke out into action, was diverted by a calamity equally sudden and unforeseen. In the year four hundred and sixty-nine before Christ, Sparta was overwhelmed by an earthquake[41]. Taygetus and the neighbouring mountains were shaken to the foundation, and twenty thousand Lacedæmonian citizens or subjects perished in this dreadful disaster. But, amidst the ruins of Sparta, one description of men beheld the public misfortunes not only without sympathy, but with a secret satisfaction.

followed by the revolt of the Helots and Messenians;

The oppressed Spartan slaves, known by the appellations of Helots and Messenians, assembled in crowds from the villages in which they were confined, and took measures for delivering themselves, during the cruelty of the elements, from the not less inexorable cruelty of their unfeeling tyrants. The prudent dispositions of King Archidamus, who, foreseeing the revolt, had summoned the citizens to arms, prevented them from getting immediate possession of the capital; but they rendered themselves masters of the ancient and strong fortress Ithomé, from which they continued many years to infest the Lacedæmonian territories. The Spartans in vain exerted their utmost endeavours to expel this dangerous intestine enemy; and in the third year of the war (for this revolt is dignified in history by the name of the Third Messenian War), they had recourse to the Athenians, who, of all the Greeks, were deemed the most skilful in sieges. The Athenians, either not sufficiently acquainted with the

[41] Thucyd. lib. i. cap. 101. & seqq. Diodor. lib. xi. cap. lxiii.

secret

ſecret hoſtility of Sparta, or willing to diſſemble their knowledge of it, as they were then totally bent on other projects and enterpriſes, ſent them the required aſſiſtance. The beſiegers, however, met with ſo little ſucceſs, that the Spartans diſmiſſed their Athenian auxiliaries, on pretence indeed that their help was no longer neceſſary; but, in reality, from a ſuſpicion that they favoured the intereſt of the rebels; and, as they retained the troops of all the other allies, the Athenians were juſtly provoked by this inſtance of diſtruſt [a]. Meanwhile the inhabitants of Piſa, who, for a reaſon that will be immediately explained, were highly incenſed againſt Sparta, gave vigorous aſſiſtance to the beſieged.

The place thus held out ten years: many ſallies were made, ſeveral battles were fought with the fury that might be expected from the cruelty of tyrants chaſtiſing the inſolence of ſlaves. Both parties muſt have been reduced to extremity, ſince the Helots and Meſſenians, though obliged to ſurrender the place, obtained from the weakneſs, a condition which they would have vainly ſolicited from the mercy, of Sparta, "that they ſhould be allowed, with their wives, children, and effects, to depart, unmoleſted, from the Peloponneſus." The Athenians, deeply reſenting the affront of ſuſpected fidelity, determined to mortify the Spartans by kindly receiving theſe needy fugitives, whom they finally eſtabliſhed in Naupactus, a ſea-port on the Criſſean gulph, which their arms had recently wreſted from the Locri Ozolæ, a cruel barbarous

part of whom are ſettled in Naupactus by the Athenians. Olymp. lxxx. 2. A. C. 459.

[a] Thucydid. lib. cap. ci.

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people, whoſe ſavage manners and rapacity diſgraced their Grecian extraction. The Helots and Meſſenians repaid, by ſignal gratitude, the humane protection of Athens. During the long courſe of the Peloponneſian war, while their neighbours on every ſide eſpouſed the oppoſite intereſt, the inhabitants of Naupactus alone invariably exerted themſelves, with zeal and vigour, in defence of the declining power of their magnanimous confederate and ancient benefactor.

Their ſignal gratitude.

The cauſe above alluded to, which had incenſed the Piſans againſt Sparta, dated beyond a century [45]. That people had long contended with Elis, the capital of their province, for the right of ſuperintending the Olympic games. The Spartans enabled the Eleans to prevail in the conteſt, who continued without oppoſition to direct that auguſt ſolemnity, until the earthquake and ſubſequent calamities of Sparta emboldened the inſolent and wealthy Piſans to renew their pretenſions [46]. Their attempts, however, to maintain this bold claim, eſpecially after the removal of the Helots and Meſſenians, appear to have been alike feeble and unfortunate. Piſa was taken, plundered, and ſo thoroughly demoliſhed that not a veſtige, and ſcarcely the name, remained.

The war between the Elians and Piſans.

Sack of Piſa. Olymp. lxxi 1. A. C. 456.

With the valuable booty acquired in this warfare, the Eleans executed a memorable undertaking; having, in the courſe of ten years [47], enlarged and adorned the temple of Olympian Jupiter, and erected the celebrated ſtatue of that divinity; a

The temple of Olympian Jupiter.

[45] Pauſanias, l. vi. c. xxii. [46] Strabo, l. viii. p. 545.
[47] Between the years 456 and 446, A. C.

work

work which no ſubſequent age could ever rival, and whoſe ſublimity is ſaid to have increaſed and *fortified the popular ſuperſtition* [48]. This famous temple was of the Doric order, encircled with a colonnade, and built of the ſtone of the country reſembling Parian marble. From the area, or ground, to the decoration over the gate, it reached ſixty-eight feet in height; it was ninety-five feet broad, and two hundred and thirty long: thus falling ſhort of the greateſt modern temples in magnitude, as much as it exceeded them in beauty and richneſs of material. It was covered with Pentelican marble, cut in the form of brick tiles. At each extremity of the roof ſtood a gilded vaſe; in the middle a golden victory; below which was a ſhield embоſſed with a Meduſa's head, likewiſe of gold. Pelops and Oenomaus were repreſented, on the pediment, ready to begin the chariot-race before very illuſtrious ſpectators, ſince Jupiter himſelf was of the number. The vault was adorned with the battle of the Centaurs and Lapithæ. The labours of Hercules diſtinguiſhed the principal entrance [49]. CHAP. XII.

After paſſing the braſs gates, you diſcovered Iphitus crowned by his ſpouſe [50] Echecheiria; from thence you proceeded, through a noble portico, to the majeſtic creation of Phidias the Athenian, which formed the principal ornament of the tem- Phidias's ſtatue of that divinity.

[48] Aliquid receptæ religioni adjeciſſe fertur. PLIN.

[49] Pauſan. in Eliac. p. 303, & ſeqq.

[50] Γυνη means a married woman: perhaps Echecheiria, *quar-ceaſing*, was an allegorical perſonage: but Greek names denoting qualities or functions, were often impoſed: as we have ſeen, on real perſons.

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ple, and of Greece. The god was ſitting on a throne, and being ſixty feet high, touched the roof with his head; and threatened, if he raiſed himſelf, to ſhake in pieces that noble edifice, which, lofty and ſpacious as it was, ſtill appeared unworthy to contain him. This vaſt coloſſus was compoſed of gold, taken in the ſack of Piſa, and of ivory, then almoſt as precious as gold, which was brought from the Eaſt by Athenian merchantmen. The god had an enamelled crown of olive on his head, an image of victory in his right hand, a burniſhed ſceptre in his left. His robes and ſandals were variegated with golden flowers and animals. The throne was made of ivory and ebony, inlaid with precious ſtones. The feet which ſupported it as well as the fillets which joined them, were adorned with innumerable figures; among which you perceived the Theban children torn by ſphinxes, together with Apollo and Diana wreaking revenge on the beautiful and once flouriſhing family of Niobé. Upon the moſt conſpicuous part of the throne which met the eye in entering, you beheld eight ſtatues, repreſenting the gymnaſtic exerciſes; and the beautiful figure, whoſe head was encircled with a wreath, reſembled young Pantarces, the favourite ſcholar of Phidias, who, in the conteſt of boys, had recently gained the Olympic prize. Beſides the four feet, mentioned above, the throne was ſupported by four pillars, placed between them, and painted by Panænus, the brother of Phidias. There that admirable artiſt had delineated the Heſperides guarding the golden apples: Atlas painfully ſuſtaining

the

the heavens, with Hercules ready to aſſiſt him; Salamine with naval ornaments in her hand; and Achilles ſupporting the beautiful expiring Pentheſilea. CHAP. XII.

It would be tedious to deſcribe the remaining ornaments of this celebrated ſtatue, and ſtill more of the ſacred edifice itſelf: yet the temple of Olympia was much inferior in ſize to that of Ceres and Proſerpine, at Eleuſis, in Attica. The latter was built by Ictinus, the contemporary and rival of Phidias; and ſufficiently capacious, we are told, to contain thirty thouſand perſons[50]. This edifice was alſo of the Doric order; that of Diana at Epheſus, and of Apollo at Miletus, were both of the Ionic; and the celebrated temple of Jupiter at Athens, begun by Piſiſtratus, and enlarged by Pericles, was finiſhed in the Corinthian ſtyle, by Antiochus Epiphanes, King of Syria. Theſe four temples were the richeſt and moſt beautiful in the world, and long regarded as models of the three Grecian orders of architecture[51]. The Olympic temple compared with other ſacred edifices in Greece.

While the earthquake and the ſervile war confined within a domeſtic ſphere the activity of Sparta, Argos, the ſecond republic of the Peloponneſus, and long the moſt conſiderable principality in that peninſula, underwent ſuch revolutions and misfortunes, as left her neither inclination nor power to oppoſe the Athenian greatneſs. Ever rivals and enemies of Sparta, the Argives had jealouſly declined Inteſtine diſſenſions in Argolis. Olymp. lxxviii. 1. A. C. 468.

[50] Strabo, l. ix. p. 395.

[51] Vitruvius, l. vii.

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clined the danger and glory of the Perſian war, to the ſucceſs of which their adverſaries had ſo eminently contributed. This ungenerous dereliction paſſed not unpuniſhed. As deſerters of the common cauſe, the Argives incurred the hatred and contempt of their public-ſpirited neighbours. Mycnæa, once the proud reſidence of royal Agamemnon, Epidaurus and Træzené, which formed reſpectively the greateſt ſtrength and brighteſt ornament of the Argive territory, threw off the yoke of a capital, whoſe folly or baſeneſs rendered her unworthy to govern them. Sicyon, Nauplia, Heliæa, and other towns of leſs note, which were ſcattered at ſmall diſtances over the face of that delightful province, obeyed the ſummons to liberty, and aſſumed independence. The rebels (for as ſuch they were treated by the indignant magiſtrates of Argos) ſtrengthened themſelves by foreign alliance, and continued thenceforth to diſdain the authority of their ancient metropolis and ſovereign. At the commencement of the Peloponneſian war, they formed a reſpectable portion of the Lacedæmonian confederacy; while Argos alone, of all the cities in the Peloponneſus, openly eſpouſed the cauſe of the Athenians.

Deſtruction of Mycenæ.

The ancient city of Mycenæ, which had firſt ſounded the trumpet of ſedition, was the only victim of Argive reſentment. The Argives ſeized a favourable opportunity, while the allies and adherents of Mycenæ were occupied with their domeſtic concerns, to lead their whole forces againſt the place; and having taken it by ſtorm, they decimated

mated the inhabitants, and demoliſhed not only the walls, but the town[51] itſelf, which was never afterwards rebuilt. CHAP. XII.

The deſultory tranſactions of ſo many ſtates and cities as compoſed the name and nation of Greece, muſt appear a continual maze of perplexity and confuſion, unleſs we carefully follow the threads which ſhould direct us in this intricate, yet not inextricable, labyrinth. But if we ſeriouſly apply ourſelves to inveſtigate the hidden cauſes of events, and to trace revolutions to their ſource, we ſhall be ſurpriſed by the agreeable diſcovery, that the hiſtory of this celebrated people is not entirely that maſs of diſorder which it appears on a ſuperficial ſurvey. The ſame cauſes which repreſſed the activity, and humbled the pride of Argos, operated alike fatally on Thebes, the ſecond republic beyond the iſthmus, and the only one that ever aſpired to rival the power of Athens. The Thebans, for ſimilar, or more odious reaſons, than thoſe which had reſtrained the Argives, had alſo withheld their aſſiſtance in the Perſian war; and by this mean ſelfiſhneſs or treachery had juſtly provoked the indignation of the ſubordinate cities of Bœotia. Not only Theſpiæ and Platæa, which had ever borne with impatience the Theban yoke, but the ſea-ports of Aulis, Anthemon, and Larymna; Aſchra, the beloved habitation of old Heſiod; Coronea, overſhadowed by mount Helicon, a favourite ſeat of the muſes; Lebadea, famous for its oracle of Tro-

The inferior cities in Bœotia reject the authority of Thebes.

[51] Diodor. l. xi. p. 276.

phonius;

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phonius; Delium and Alalkomené, reſpectively ſacred to Apollo and Minerva, together with Leuctra and Chæronæa, the deſtined ſcenes of immortal victories; all theſe cities ſucceſſively rejected the juriſdiction and ſovereignty of Thebes, which, during the invaſion of Xerxes, had ſo ſhamefully betrayed the common intereſt and thwarted the general impulſe of the nation [51].

The Thebans obtain aſſiſtance from Sparta. Olymp. lxxx. 2. A. C. 459.

During ſeveral years, the Thebans patiently yielded to a ſtorm, which they found it impoſſible to reſiſt. But when the Spartans began to breathe after the recovery of Ithomé, and had made a ſucceſsful expedition againſt the Phocians, in defence of their kinſmen in Doris, the Thebans warmly ſolicited them to take part in their domeſtic quarrels, and to enable them to regain their aſcendant in Bœotia; with aſſurance that they would employ the firſt moments of returning vigour to oppoſe the growing pretenſions of the Athenians. This propoſal was accepted, not only by the reſentment, but by the policy of the Spartan ſenate, who perceived that it equally concerned their intereſt, that the neighbouring city of Argos ſhould loſe her juriſdiction over Argolis; and that Thebes, the neighbour and rival of Athens, ſhould recover her authority in Bœotia.

Wiſe policy of that ſtate.

Athens enables the Bœotians to maintain their independence.

They were applying themſelves with vigour and ſucceſs to effect this ſalutary purpoſe, when the active vigilance of Athens diſpatched an army, fifteen thouſand ſtrong, to maintain the independ-

[51] Diodor. l. xi. p. 283, & ſeqq. & Thucyd. l. i. p. 473.

ence of Bœotia. The valour and conduct of Myronides, the Athenian general, obtained a decisive victory near the walls of Tanagra, one of the few places in the province which had preserved its fidelity to the capital. This memorable battle, which no ancient writer has thought proper to describe, although it is compared to the glorious trophies of Marathon and Platæa [54], confirmed the liberty of Bœotia; nor could the Thebans, notwithstanding their partial success against several of the revolted cities, recover their authority in that province, until, about fourscore years afterwards, they emerged into sudden splendour under the conduct of their heroic Epaminondas. CHAP. XII. A. C. 458—456.

The ambitious policy of Pericles, which will be fully explained in the sequel, was eager to profit by every favourable turn of fortune. He took care to place Athenian garrisons in several Bœotian fortresses; he made the neighbouring republics of Corinth and Megara feel and acknowledge the supremacy of Athens; and after sending Tolmidas, a commander endued rather with an impetuous than well-regulated courage, to ravage the coast of the Peloponnesus, he sailed thither next year in person, and made the Lacedæmonians and their allies deeply regret, that they had too soon discovered their animosity against a republic, alike able to protect its friends and take vengeance on its enemies. The measures of this daring leader were actually uncontrouled by any opposition, since his eloquence Ambitious measures of Athens. A. C. 455. A. C. 454.

[54] Diodor. l. xi. p. 284.

had

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had prevailed over the innocence and merit of Cimon, and procured the baniſhment of that illuſtrious commander. But Cimon was recalled in two years; and his return was ſignaliſed by a ſuſpenſion of arms in Greece, which that real patriot had been as zealous to promote, as he was ambitious to purſue his Aſiatic triumphs. This treaty however, was ſoon broken; but an ill-concerted and unfortunate enterpriſe againſt Thebes (diſapproved by Pericles himſelf), in which the raſh Tolmidas loſt his army and his life, made the Athenians again liſten to terms of accommodation. They agreed to withdraw their garriſons from Bœotia; to diſavow all pretenſions againſt Corinth and Megara, pretenſions which had no other effect than to exaſperate thoſe little republics againſt their uſurping neighbour; and, on complying with theſe conditions, the Athenians recovered their citizens made captive in Bœotia, through the miſconduct of Tolmidas [55].

A. C. 447.

A. C. 445.

The truce of thirty years. Olymp. lxxxiii. 4. A. C. 445.

This was the famous truce of thirty years concluded in the fourteenth year preceding the Peloponneſian war. The former treaty had been limited to a much ſhorter period; for it is worthy of obſervation, that even in their agreements of peace, the Greeks diſcovered that perpetual propenſity to war, which was the unhappy effect of their political inſtitutions [56].

Motives of the Athenians for granting it.

The terms of this accommodation, ſeemingly little favourable to the intereſt of Athens, were

[55] Diodor. l. xii. p. 293. Thucydid. l. i. p. 71, & ſeqq.

[56] Idem, p. 74.

dictated,

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dictated, however, rather by the ambition than the equity of that republic; a concluſion that evidently reſults from examining the third ſeries of events, which (as obſerved above) completes the hiſtory of this memorable period. Amidſt the foreign expeditions of Cimon, and the domeſtic diſſenſions of Greece, the Athenian arms and policy had been gradually, during thirty years, eſtabliſhing the ſovereignty of the republic over her diſtant colonies and confederates. This bold undertaking was finally accompliſhed by Pericles, whoſe character contributed, more than that of any one man, to the glory and greatneſs, as well as to the calamities and ruin, of his country.

Between the years 470 and 440, A. C.

His father Xanthippus, who gained the illuſtrious victory at Mycale, rejoiced in a ſon endued with the happieſt natural talents, and an innate love of glory. His youth was entruſted to the learned and virtuous Damon, who concealed, under the uninvidious title of maſter of rhetoric, the art of animating his pupil with an ambition to deſerve the firſt rank in the republic, as well as of adorning him with the accompliſhments moſt neceſſary to attain it. From Ariſtagoras of Clazomene, denominated the philoſopher of mind, on account of his continual ſolicitude to confirm the moſt important and moſt pleaſing of all doctrines, that a benevolent intelligence preſides over the operations of nature, and the events of human life, Pericles early learned to controul the tempeſt of youthful paſſions, which ſo often blaſt the promiſing hopes of manhood; to preſerve an unſhaken conſtancy in

Character of Pericles;

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all the viciſſitudes of fortune, ſince all are the varied[57] diſpenſations of the ſame wiſe providence, and to trample, with generous contempt, on the grovelling ſuperſtition of the vulgar. Thus qualified by nature and education, he ſoon diſplayed, in the Athenian aſſembly, an eloquence, nouriſhed by the copious ſpring of philoſophy, and ennobled by the manly elevation of his character. His ſpeeches conſiſted not in the unpremeditated effuſions of a temporary enthuſiaſm; he was the firſt of his countrymen, who, before pronouncing his diſcourſes, committed them to writing[5] : they were ſtudied and compoſed with the moſt laborious and patient care; and being poliſhed by repeated touches of improving art, they roſe in admiration in proportion as they were more cloſely examined by the piercing eye of criticiſm; and acquired the epithet of Olympian, to expreſs that permanent and ſteady luſtre which they reflected[58].

he is ſuſpected of uſurpation;

But the ſuperior talents of Pericles, which, in a well regulated government, would have increaſed his influence, had well nigh occaſioned his ruin in a turbulent and ſuſpicious democracy. The memory of the oldeſt citizens faithfully recollected, and the envy or fears of the younger readily believed, that the figure, the countenance, and the voice of the young orator, ſtrongly reſembled thoſe of the ambitious and artful Piſiſtratus, whoſe ſpecious virtues had ſubverted the liberty of his country. The alarmed jealouſy of freedom, which often

[57] Suidas. [58] Plut. in Pericl.

deſtroyed.

deſtroyed, in an hour, the authority eſtabliſhed ſlowly, and with much labour, during many meritorious years, might be tempted to puniſh the anticipated tyranny of Pericles; who, to eſcape the diſgrace of the oſtraciſm, ſhunned the dangerous admiration of the aſſembly. CHAP. XII.

The active vigour of his mind thus withdrawn from politics, was totally directed to war; and his abilities, alike fitted to excel in every honourable purſuit, and gradually opening with every occaſion to diſplay them, carried off the palm of military renown from the moſt illuſtrious captains of the age. Cimon alone ſurpaſſed him in the object of his victories gained over Barbarians; but Pericles equalled Cimon in valour and conduct. A rivality in warlike fame was followed by a competition for civil honours. Cimon, who had been introduced on the theatre of public life by the virtuous Ariſtides, regarded, like that great man, a moderate ariſtocracy, as the government moſt conducive to public happineſs. The contrary opinion was warmly maintained by Pericles, who found an oſtentatious admiration of democracy the beſt expedient for removing the prejudice excited againſt him, by his reſemblance to Piſiſtratus, of aſpiring, or at leaſt of being worthy to aſpire, at royal power. On every occaſion, he defended the privileges of the people againſt the pretenſions of the rich and noble: he embraced not only the intereſts, but adopted the capricious paſſions, of the multitude; cheriſhing their preſumption, flattering their vanity, indulging their rapacity, gratify- he courts and corrupts the Athenian populace;

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ing their taſte for pleaſure without expence, and fomenting their natural antipathy to the Spartans, who, as the patrons of rigid ariſtocracy, were peculiarly obnoxious to their reſentment.

encouragers their ambitious pretenſions.

The condition of the times powerfully conſpired with the views and meaſures of Pericles, ſince the glory and wealth acquired in the Perſian war, procured not only allies and power to the ſtate, but induſtry and independence to the populace. The ſon of Xanthippus impelled this natural current, which ran ſo ſtrongly in his favour when he maintained, that the citizens of Athens were entitled to enjoy equal advantages at home, to challenge a juſt pre-eminence in Greece, and to aſſume a legal dominion over their diſtant colonies and confederates.

Means by which he ſubdued the Athenian colonies and allies. A. C. 450—449

Theſe unfortunate communities had unwarily forged their own chains, when they conſented to raiſe an annual ſubſidy to maintain the guardian navy of Athens. They perceived not, that this temporary benevolence would be ſoon converted into a perpetual tribute, ſince in proportion as they became unaccuſtomed to war, they laid themſelves at the mercy of that republic, to which they had tamely entruſted the care of their defence. When the rigorous exactions of Athens ſpeedily warned them of their error, the wide intervals at which they were ſeparated from each other, rendered it impoſſible for them to afford mutual aſſiſtance, and to act with united vigour. Naxos, Thaſos, Ægina, Eubœa, Samos, and other iſlands or cities of leſs importance, boldly ſtruggled to repel

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repel uſurpation; but fighting ſingly, were ſucceſſively ſubdued; while new, and more grievous, burdens were cruelly impoſed on them. The leaſt patient again murmured, petitioned, rebelled, and taking arms to reſiſt oppreſſion, were treated with the ſeverity due to unprovoked ſedition. The puniſhment inflicted on them was uniformly rigorous. They were compelled to deliver up the authors of the revolt, to ſurrender their ſhipping, to demoliſh their walls, or receive an Athenian garriſon, to pay the expences of the war, and give hoſtages for their future obedience[59]. It is not the buſineſs of general hiſtory to deſcribe more minutely the events of this ſocial war, which was carried on chiefly by Pericles, and finiſhed in the courſe of thirty years, with every ſucceſs that the moſt preſumptuous ambition of Athens could either expect or deſire. Samos, the capital of the iſland of that name, made the moſt vigorous reſiſtance; but at length ſurrendered to Pericles, after a ſiege of nine months, in the ninth year before the war of Peloponneſus[60].

Spirit of the Athenian government;

Hiſtorians, partial or credulous, have handed down ſome atrocious cruelties committed after the taking of Samos, which may be confidently rejected as fictions, injurious to the fame of Pericles, who, though he approved and animated the aſpiring genius of his country, and vainly flattered himſelf that he could juſtify, by reaſons of ſtate, its moſt ambitious uſurpations, uniformly ſhewed himſelf inca-

[59] Thucydid. & Diodor. loc. citat.
[60] Thucydid. l. i. p. 75.

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pable of any deliberate wickedneſs. It may be obſerved, however, that, as the moderate peace with Sparta had been concluded chiefly with a view to allow the Athenians to apply their undivided attention to the affairs of their tributaries, the ſeverities exerciſed over theſe unfortunate ſtates were in conſequence of that treaty rather increaſed than mitigated. Athenian magiſtrates and garriſons were ſent to govern and command them. They were burdened with new impoſitions, and diſhonoured by new badges of ſervitude. The lands, which the labour of their anceſtors had cultivated, were ſeized and appropriated by ſtrangers, who enjoyed the diſtinction of Athenian colonies; and all theſe once independent and flouriſhing republics were thenceforth compelled to ſubmit their mutual conteſts, their domeſtic differences, and even their private litigations, to the cogniſance and deciſion of Athenian aſſemblies and tribunals[61]. By drawing thus cloſely the reins of government, Pericles, in the courſe of ten years, brought into the treaſury of Athens the ſum of near two millions ſterling[62]. His vigilance ſeaſonably diſplayed the terrors of the Athenian navy before the moſt diſtant enemies or allies of the republic; by alternate pliancy and firmneſs, by ſucceſſive promiſes, bribes, and threats, he repreſſed the jealous hoſtility of neighbouring powers; and while his ambition and magnificence fortified and adorned the capital with

its exceſſive ſeverity towards its dependencies.

[61] Iſocrates de Pace; & Xenoph. de Repub. Athen.
[62] Thucydid. Diodor. Iſocrat. Plut. &c.

external

external ſtrength and ſplendour, they alſo laid the foundations of thoſe internal diſorders, which rendered his long adminiſtration glorious for his contemporaries, fatal to the ſucceeding generation, and ever memorable with poſterity. CHAP XII.

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Tranſition to the internal State of Athens.—Laws of Draco—Solon—Piſiſtratus—Cliſthenes—Ariſtides—Pericles.—Final Settlement of the Athenian Government.—View of the Athenian Empire.—The combined Effect of external Proſperity and democratic Government on Manners—Arts—Luxury.—Hiſtory of Grecian Literature and Philoſophy.—Singular Contraſt and Balance of Virtues and Vices.—The ſublime Philoſophy of Anaxagoras and Socrates.—The unprincipled Captiouſneſs of the Sophiſts.—The moral Tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides.—The licentious Buffoonery of Ariſtophanes.—The imitative Arts employed to the nobleſt Purpoſes—and abuſed to the moſt infamous.—Magnificence of public Feſtivals.—Simplicity in private Life.—Modeſt Reſerve of Athenian Women.—Voluptuouſneſs, Impudence, and Artifices of the School of Aſpaſia.

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Tranſition to the internal ſtate of Athens

THE taking of Samos cloſed the long ſeries of Athenian conqueſts. During the nine ſubſequent years, that once fortunate people enjoyed and abuſed the bleſſings of peace and proſperity. Their oſtentatious diſplay of power increaſed the envy and terror of Greeks and Barbarians, and excited the obſtinate and bloody war of twenty-ſeven years, during which the force of the whole

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whole Grecian nation was exerted to demoliſh or uphold the ſtately edifice of empire that had been reared, by the ambitious patriotiſm of Pericles. Aſſiſted by feeble or reluctant allies, Athens long ſtruggled againſt the combined ſtrength of Peloponneſus, Bœotia, Macedon, Sicily, and Perſia; and our curioſity muſt deſervedly be attracted towards the internal reſources and moral condition of a people, who, with few natural advantages, could make ſuch memorable and pertinacious efforts, and who, amidſt the din of arms, ſtill cultivating and improving their favourite arts, produced thoſe immortal monuments of taſte and genius, which, ſurviving the deſtruction of their walls, navy, and harbours, have ever atteſted the glory of Athens, and the impotent vengeance of her enemies. In an inquiry of this kind, the ſcience of government and laws, which gives ſecurity to all other ſciences, merits the firſt place in our attention; nor, at this diſtance of time, will the enlightened reader contemplate with indifference the laws of Athens, which having been incorporated [1] into the Roman juriſ-

[1] The Romans ſent deputies to Athens, to obtain a copy of Solon's laws, four hundred and fifty four years before Chriſt. The benefits derived from theſe ſalutary inſtitutions were gratefully acknowledged by the liberal candour of a people, who knew how to appreciate the merit of enemies and ſubjects. Hear the language of Pliny (l. viii. ep. 24.) to Maximus, who in the reign of Trajan was appointed governor of the province Achaia or Greece: "Remember that you go to a country, where letters, politeneſs, and agriculture itſelf (if we believe common report), were invented . . . , Revere the gods and heroes, the ancient virtue and glory of the nation. Reſpect even its fables and its vanity; remembering that from Greece we derived our *laws*. The right of conqueſt, indeed, hath

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jurisprudence about the middle of the fifth century before Christ, served, after an interval of above sixteen hundred years, to abolish the barbarous practices of the Gothic nations, and to introduce justice, security, and refinement among the modern inhabitants of Europe[2].

Laws and government.

The admirable institutions of the heroic ages were built on religion; which, as we have fully

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enabled us to impose our laws on the Greeks: but that people had first given to us their laws, at our solicitation, and when they had nothing to fear from our arms. It would be inhuman and barbarous to deprive them of the small remnant of liberty which they still possess."

[2] Justinian's Pandects, it is well known, were discovered at Amalfi, in Italy, A. D. 1130. In less than half a century afterwards, the civil law was studied and understood in all the great provinces of Europe; and this study (as Mr. Hume observes, Reign of Richard the Third) tended to sharpen the wits of men, to give solidity to their judgment, to improve their taste, and to abolish the barbarous jurisprudence which universally prevailed among the Gothic nations. To this law we owe the abolition of the mode of proof by the ordeal, the corsnet, the duel, and other methods equally ridiculous and absurd. Pecuniary commutations ceased to be admitted for crimes; private revenge was no longer authorised by the magistrate; and the community was made to feel its interest in maintaining the rights, and avenging the wrongs, of all its members. See more in the admirable discourse annexed to the Reign of Richard the Third. I shall add but one observation in Mr. Hume's own words: "The sensible utility of the Roman law, both to public and private interest, recommended the study of it, at a time when the more exalted and speculative sciences carried no charms with them; and thus the last branch of ancient literature which remained uncorrupted, was happily the first transmitted to the modern world; for it is remarkable, that in the decline of Roman learning, when the philosophers were universally infected with superstition and sophistry, and the poets and historians with barbarism, the lawyers, who, in other countries, are seldom models of science or politeness, were yet able, by the constant study and close imitation of their predecessors, to maintain the same good sense in their decisions and reasonings, and the same purity in their language and expression." Hume's Hist. 3d vol. 8vo. p. 300.

explained

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explained above, aſcertained and enforced the rights and obligations of public and private life. But the abuſed authority of prieſts and oracles, and the natural depravity of man, ever ſolicitous to obtain the partial favour of his heavenly protectors on eaſier terms than the faithful diſcharge of his duty, gradually ſevered, by fraud or violence, the natural and moſt ſalutary union between religion and morality; in conſequence of which ſeparation, the former degenerated into an illiberal ſuperſtition, and the latter relaxed into licentiouſneſs, or ſtiffened into pedantry. The ſtriking compariſon, or rather contraſt, between the genius and character, the virtues and vices, of the Greeks, as variouſly deſcribed by Homer and by Solon, and which is ſo much to the advantage of the earlier period, muſt, in the progreſs of this diſcourſe, naturally preſent itſelf to the reflection of the attentive reader, and will ſet in the cleareſt point of view the unhappy revolution of manners, which time and accident had produced in the wide interval between the poet and the legiſlator.

The very imperfect legiſlation of Draco [3], who flouriſhed thirty years before Solon [4], proved that the Athenians felt the want of a ſcience, which they knew not how to acquire or cultivate. The auſtere gravity of that magiſtrate ſeems to have impoſed on the eaſy credulity of the multitude; for his ignorance or ſeverity were alike unworthy of the important office with which he was entruſted.

Legiſlation of Draco, Olymp. xxxix. 1. A. C. 624.

[3] Suidas in voce Draco. Pollux, l. viii. c. vi.

[4] Meurſius, Solon.

He

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He gave laws, which, according to the lively expreſſion of an orator, ſeemed to be written [5], not with ink, but with blood; ſince death or baniſhment were his ordinary penalties for the moſt trivial offences, as well as for the moſt dangerous crimes: and he juſtified this rigour, by abſurdly obſerving, that the ſmalleſt diſorders deſerved death, and no ſeverer puniſhment could be inflicted on the greateſt. The laws of Draco, therefore, tended only to increaſe the evils which they were deſigned to remedy [6]; and no people ever preſented a ſcene of greater confuſion and miſery, than did the unhappy Athenians, when the abilities and virtues of Solon were ſeaſonably called to their relief.

of Solon. Olymp. xlvi. 3. A. C. 594.

In relating the general revolutions of Greece, we had occaſion to deſcribe the important ſervices, and illuſtrious merit of this extraordinary man, whoſe diſintereſtedneſs, patriotiſm, and humanity equalled his military conduct and ſucceſs. His royal extraction (for he ſprang from the race of the Codridæ), his experienced abilities, above all, his approved wiſdom and equity, pointed him out for the nobleſt and moſt ſublime employment of humanity, that of regulating the laws and government of a free people. Such, at leaſt, the Athenians may be conſidered, when their unanimous ſuffrage rendered Solon the abſolute umpire of their whole conſtitution and policy; although, prior

State of Athens in the time of Solon.

[5] The orator Demades, of whom more hereafter. The obſervation has been always repeated in ſpeaking of Draco, though his laws were certainly *written* neither with blood nor ink. Even thoſe of Solon were only *engraved* on tables kept in the citadel.

[6] Ariſtot. Politic. l. ii. & Plut. in Solon.

to

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to this period, they ſuffered the combined evils of anarchy and oppreſſion [7]. The magiſtrates plundered the treaſury and the temples; and often betrayed, for bribes, the intereſts of their country. The rich tyranniſed over the poor, the poor continually alarmed the ſafety of the rich. The rapacity of creditors knew no bounds. They compelled the inſolvent debtors to cultivate their lands like cattle; to perform the ſervice of beaſts of burden; and to tranſfer to them their ſons and daughters, whom they exported as ſlaves to foreign countries. Solon, with a laudable vanity, boaſts of having recovered and reſtored to their native rights many of thoſe unhappy men, whoſe ſentiments had been debaſed, and language corrupted, by the infamy of Barbarian ſervitude [8]. The wretched populace deriving courage from deſpair, had determined no longer to ſubmit to ſuch multiplied rigours; and before the wiſdom of the lawgiver interpoſed, they had taken the reſolution to elect and follow ſome warlike leader, to attack and butcher their oppreſſors, to eſtabliſh an equal partition of lands, and to inſtitute a new form of government [9]. But the numerous clients and retainers, who, in a country little acquainted with arts and manufactures, depended on the wealthy proprietors of the lands and mines of Attica, muſt have rendered this undertaking alike dangerous to both parties; ſo that both became willing rather to ſubmit their differences to law, than to decide them by the ſword.

[7] Fragm. Solonis apud Demoſth. p. 234. edit. Wol.

[8] Idem, Ibid.

[9] Plut. in Solon.

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His regulations concerning property.

The impartiality of Solon merited the unlimited confidence of his country. He maintained the ancient diviſion of property, but aboliſhed debts. He eſtabliſhed the rate of intereſt at 12 per cent. at which it afterwards remained; but forbade, that the inſolvent debtor ſhould become the ſlave of his creditor, or be compelled to ſell his children into ſervitude. After theſe preliminary regulations, which ſeemed immediately neceſſary to the public peace, Solon proceeded, with an impartial and ſteady hand, to new-model the government [10], on this generous, but equitable principle, that the few ought not, as hitherto, to command, and the many to obey; but that the collective body of the people, legally convened in a national aſſembly, were entitled to decide, by a plurality of voices, the alternatives of peace and war; to contract or diſſolve alliances with foreign ſtates; to enjoy

New-models the government.

[10] The moſt correct information concerning the ancient republic of Athens, and the laws of Solon, is contained in Ariſtot. Fragm. de Civit. Athen. and in various parts of his ſecond, fourth, and ſixth books of Politics. 2. In Isocrat. Areopagit. Panathen. & Panegyr. And 3. In Plut. in Vit. Solon. Xenophon's Treatiſe concerning the Athenian republic, relates to later times, when many corruptions had crept in, as will be afterwards explained. It is remarkable, that Polybius, l. vi. has confounded the moderate inſtitutions of Solon with the democratical licentiouſneſs and tyranny introduced by Pericles and his ſucceſſors in the adminiſtration. The palpable errors of ſo judicious an author prove how little accurate knowledge the Greeks poſſeſſed on the ſubject of their own hiſtory; and how impoſſible it is for a modern writer, who blindly follows ſuch guides, not to fall into innumerable errors and contradictions. The treatiſe of Ariſtotle (de Civitate) above mentioned, deſerves particular attention from thoſe who write or ſtudy the hiſtory of republics. In it we ſee the germ, and often more than the germ, of the political works of Machiavel, which Monteſquieu has ſo often copied, without once acknowledging his obligation.

all

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all the branches of legiſlative or *ſovereign* power [11]; and to elect, approve, and judge the magiſtrates or miniſters entruſted, for a limited time, with the *executive* authority.

His inſtitution ſuited the condition of the times.

In the actual ſtate of moſt countries of Europe, ſuch a form of government, as only takes place in ſome ſmall cantons of Switzerland, would be attended with the inconvenience of withdrawing the citizens too much from their private affairs. But in ancient Greece, and particularly in Attica, the ſlaves were four times more numerous than the freemen [12]; and of the latter we may compute that little more than one half were entitled to any ſhare in the ſovereignty. Strangers, and all thoſe who could not aſcertain their Athenian deſcent, both in the male and female line, were totally excluded from the aſſembly and courts of juſtice. The regulations of Solon marked the utmoſt attention to preſerve the pure blood of Athens unmixed and uncorrupted; nor could any foreigner, whatever merit he might claim with the public, be admitted to the rank of citizen, unleſs he abandoned for ever his native country, profeſſed the knowledge of ſome highly uſeful or ingenious art, and, in both

[11] The election contained a mixture of chance, ſince thoſe who were named by the people caſt lots to decide on whom the office ſhould be conferred. The ſame practice prevails in chooſing the ſenators of the republic of Berne. But Solon enacted, that the fortunate candidate ſhould undergo what is called a probation; his character and merits were thus expoſed to a ſecond ſcrutiny, in conſequence of which, it ſeemed ſcarcely poſſible that any man ſhould attain power, who was altogether unworthy of public confidence.

[12] See my Introductory Diſcourſe to the Orations of Lyſias and Iſocrates, p. 5, & ſeqq.

caſes,

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cases, had been chosen by ballot, in a full assembly of six thousand Athenians. These circumstances (especially as the Athenian people were usually convened only four times in thirty-five days) prevented their assemblies from being either so inconvenient and burdensome, or so numerous and tumultuary as might at first sight be supposed. Yet their numbers and still more their impetuosity and ignorance, must have proved inconsistent with good government, if Solon had not secured the vessel of the republic from the waves of popular frenzy, by the two firm anchors of the Senate and the Areopagus, tribunals originally of great dignity and of very extensive power, into which men of a certain description only could be received as members.

The division of the citizens.

Solon divided the Athenians into four classes, according to the produce of their estates. The first class consisted of those whose lands annually yielded five hundred measures of liquid, as well as dry commodities, and a commodium of whose yearly income may be calculated at sixty pounds sterling, which is equivalent, if we estimate the relative value of money by the price of labour, and of the three most necessary to life, to about six hundred pounds sterling in the present age[1]. The second class consisted of those whose estates produced three hundred measures, the third, of those whose estates produced two hundred; the fourth, and by far the most numerous class of Athenians, either possessed no landed property, or at least

[1] See Introduction to Lysias, &c. p. 14.

enjoyed

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enjoyed not a revenue in land equal to twenty-four pounds ſterling, or, agreeably to the above proportion, two hundred and forty pounds of our preſent currency.

Prerogatives of the firſt claſſes.

All ranks of citizens were alike admitted to vote in the public aſſembly, and to judge in the courts of juſtice, whether civil or criminal, which were properly ſo many committees of the aſſembly[14]. But the three firſt claſſes were excluſively entitled to ſit in the ſenate, to decide in the Areopagus, or to hold any other office of magiſtracy. To theſe dignities they were elected by the free ſuffrages of the people, to whom they were accountable for their adminiſtration, and by whom they might be puniſhed for malverſation or negligence, although they derived no emolument from the diligent diſcharge of their duty.

Of the ſenate of the 500.

The ſenate of four hundred, which, eighty-ſix years after its inſtitution, was augmented to five hundred by Cliſthenes, enjoyed the important prerogatives of convoking the popular aſſembly; of previouſly examining all matters before they came to be decided by the people, which gave to it a negative before debate in all public reſolutions; and of making laws by its ſole authority, which had force during a year. Beſides this general

[14] In my introductory diſcourſes to the Orations of Lyſias, &c. I had occaſion to explain the nature of the Athenian tribunals. Since the publication of that work, the ſame ſubject, and particularly the form of civil proceſs, has been accurately explained by Sir William Jones, in the Diſſertations annexed to his tranſlation of Iſæus. Mr. Pettingal's learned work upon the uſe and practice of *juries* among the ancients, lately fell into my hands. Wherein my ideas and his differ, will eaſily appear from the text, and needs not to be pointed out.

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ſuperintendence the ſenate was excluſively inveſted with many particular branches of the executive power. The preſident of this board or council had the cuſtody of the public archives and treaſury. The ſenate alone built ſhips; equipped fleets and armies; ſeized and confined ſtate criminals; examined and puniſhed ſeveral offences, which were not expreſsly forbidden by any poſitive law. The weight of ſuch a council, which aſſembled every day, except feſtivals, infuſed a large mixture of ariſtocracy into the Athenian conſtitution. This, as we ſhall immediately explain, was ſtill farther increaſed by the authority of the Areopagus, a court ſo named from the place where it was held; a hill ſacred to Mars, adjoining to the citadel.

The nine archons.

The principal magiſtrates in Athens were the nine archons, the firſt of whom gave his name to the year, and preſided in the civil courts of juſtice, where a committee of the people, choſen promiſcuouſly from all claſſes by lot [15], ſat as judges and jury; but where it belonged to the archon and his aſſeſſors, men appointed by ſuffrage, and acquainted with forms, to take what in Scotland is called a precognition, to preſcribe the form of action, to give the ballot [15], and to receive and declare the

[15] The eſſential difference between the Roman and Athenian government, conſiſted in the different conſtitution of the judicial power: which at Rome remained 300 years in the hands of the ſenate. The ſeditions of the Gracchi, and moſt of the civil diſſenſions which happened before the time of Auguſtus, had for their object or pretence, the altering of this order of things, and bringing the Roman conſtitution nearer the Athenian.

[15] Ὁι τιθεντες τον αγωνα και την ψηφον διδοντες, are the words of Lyſias. The ſame writer mentions the παρεδροι, συνδικοι, aſſeſſors, ſyndics

verdict

verdict and ſentence of the court. The archon next in dignity, who had the appellation of king, preſided in cauſes reſpecting religion and things ſacred, which formed the object of an important and dangerous branch of Athenian juriſprudence. The archon, third in dignity, with his aſſeſſors the generals [17], preſided in military matters; and the ſix remaining, who were known by the general appellation of theſmothetæ, heard criminal pleas of various kinds, or rather directed the proceedings of the ſix courts where criminal cauſes were examined and determined. Theſe nine archons, or preſidents of the ſeveral courts of juſtice, like all other Athenian magiſtrates, were, at the expiration of their annual office, accountable to the people; and when their conduct, after a ſevere ſcrutiny, appeared to merit public approbation and gratitude, they were received, and remained for life, members of the Areopagus, a ſenate inveſted with a general inſpection over the laws and religion, as well as over the lives and manners of the citizens; and which, in dangerous emergencies, was even entitled to aſſume a ſort of dictatorial power [18].

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The Areopagus.

Such is the great outline of the conſtitution eſtabliſhed by Solon, according to which every Athenian citizen enjoyed the ineſtimable privilege of being judged by his peers, and tried by laws to

Happy tendency of Solon's plan of government.

[17] Lyſias, in the ſecond oration againſt Alcibiades (a military cauſe), not only mentions the στρατηγοι, or generals, but addreſſes them ſeparately from the ανδρες δικασται, or judges.

[18] Iſocrat. Oratio Areopagit.

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which he himſelf had conſented. Although the legiſlative and judicial powers were thus lodged with the people, men of property and ability were alone entruſted with the adminiſtration of government; and as power in ſome meaſure followed property, the ſame expedient which ſerved to maintain a due diſtinction of ranks in ſociety, tended alſo to promote the induſtry and frugality of the multitude, that they might thereby become entitled to ſhare thoſe honours and offices, to which perſons of a certain eſtate only could aſpire.

Extenſive nature of his laws.

The laws of Solon were of the moſt extenſive nature, comprehending not only rules of right, but maxims of morality, regulations of commerce, and precepts of agriculture. To deſcribe his inſtitutions reſpecting ſuch matters as are properly the objects of legiſlation, would be explaining thoſe great, but familiar principles, concerning marriage, ſucceſſion, teſtaments, the rights of *perſons* and of *things*, which, through the medium of the Roman law, have been conveyed into the juriſprudence of all the civiliſed nations of Europe. His laws concerning education and manners prove that drunkenneſs and unnatural love were the predominant vices of that early age. It was a particular duty of the archons, to prevent or puniſh offences, committed in conſequence of intoxication; and the regulations concerning ſchools[a], which were not to be opened till ſunriſe, which were ordered to be ſhut before night, and into which none but ſuch relations of

[a] Æſchin. in Timarchum.

the

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the maſter, as were particularly ſpecified by law could on any pretence be admitted, marked the utmoſt ſolicitude to root out an evil which already infected and diſgraced the manners of Greece.

His ſyſtem of education.

The education recommended by Solon nearly reſembled that above deſcribed, which prevailed generally through Greece [20]. The children of Athenian citizens, when taken from the hands of the women, were delivered to two maſters, of whom the one formed the body and the other the mind. Swimming, and the eaſier exerciſes, prepared them for the harder toils of the gymnaſtic. Reading and learning by heart the precepts and examples of the poets, made way for the ſeverer ſtudies of eloquence and philoſophy. In proceſs of time, muſic, geometry, and drawing, ſeem to have entered into the plan of a liberal education [21]. At the age of twenty, the youth of all ranks took an oath in the temple of Agraulos (an appellation of Minerva), to obey and to maintain the laws of their country; to uſe their beſt endeavours to promote its proſperity; to follow the ſtandard of whatever commanders might be appointed to conduct them; to ſail to every part of the world, when ſummoned by the public ſervice; to fight to death for their native land; and to regard wheat, barley, vines, and olives, as the only boundaries of Attica [22]; a prepoſterous arrogance in that little republic, which already betrayed an ambition to conquer and appropriate all

Duties and employments of the youth.

[20] See chapters V. and VI.

[21] Ariſt. Polit. l. vii. c. iii.

[22] See Introduction to Lyſias, &c. p. 16.

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the cultivated parts of the world. When the Athenian youth were not, in conſequence of this oath, engaged in military ſervice, they were obliged by law to follow ſuch employments as ſuited their reſpective fortunes. Agriculture, commerce, and mechanic arts, fell to the ſhare of the poor; the rich ſtill continued their application to gymnaſtic and philoſophy, carefully ſtudied the laws of the republic, examined the ancient and actual condition of their own and neighbouring ſtates; and, at the age of thirty, appeared as candidates in the aſſembly for ſuch offices of truſt and honour as their regular manners, inoffenſive and dutiful behaviour in all the relations of private life, temperance, œconomy, public ſpirit, and abilities[23], might obtain from the voluntary ſuffrage of the people.

Uſurpation of Piſiſtratus. A. C. 578.

The uſurpation of Piſiſtratus, though it deſtroyed for a time the political liberty of Athens, gave ſtability to moſt of the laws and forms introduced by Solon. That extraordinary *tyrant*, for ſo the Greeks ſtyled him, was not more diſtinguiſhed by the loftineſs of his genius than the humanity of his diſpoſition; and had not the violence of contending factions, and the fury of his enemies, inflamed his natural love of power, the name of Piſiſtratus would ſtand the foremoſt in the liſt of Grecian patriots and heroes. His valour and conduct were ſignaliſed in the conquſt of Niſæa, Salamis, Naxos, Delos, and Sigæum; and if he diſplayed boldneſs and addreſs in acquiring ſovereignty he diſplayed

[23] Lyſias, paſſim.

ſtill

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His moderate and wife adminiſtration;

ſtill more moderation and virtue in adminiſtering it. He aſſumed, indeed, the royal dignities of prieſt and general, and took care that the chief offices of magiſtracy ſhould be filled by his partiſans. But he maintained the regular courſe of law and juſtice, not only by his authority, but by his example; having appeared in perſon to anſwer an accuſation in the Areopagus. He not only enforced the laws of Solon againſt idleneſs, but endeavoured to give them more efficacy by introducing new arts and manufactures into Attica. He was the firſt who brought into that country the complete collection of Homer's poems, which he commanded to be ſung at the Panathenæan feſtival; nor can we ſuppoſe that he ſhould have been zealous to diffuſe the liberal and manly ſentiments of that divine poet, if his government had not reſembled the moderation and equity of the heroic ages, rather than the deſpotiſm of tyrants.

ſurpaſſed by that of his ſon Hipparchus.

His ſon Hipparchus imitated and ſurpaſſed the mild virtues of his father; and, amidſt the turbulence of the latter democracy, it was acknowledged with a ſigh by the Athenians, that their anceſtors were indeed happy under Solon and Piſiſtratus, but that the reign of the tyrant Hipparchus brought back on earth the golden days of Saturn. The father had required a tenth part of the produce of Attica, to ſupport his guards and the other appendages of royalty; his more generous ſon remitted one half of this impoſition. While he alleviated the burdens, yet encouraged the induſtry of his ſubjects, by building the temple of Olympian

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Jupiter, he was ſolicitous to diſpel their ignorance and barbarity by erecting pillars in every part of the city, engraved with elegiac verſes, containing leſſons of wiſdom and precepts of morality. He collected the firſt library in Athens; and his liberal rewards, and ſtill more his agreeable manners and winning affability, attracted to that city the moſt diſtinguiſhed poets of the age.

His murder exaſperates Hippias.

The murder of Hipparchus exaſperated the temper of his brother and ſucceſſor Hippias; but notwithſtanding the calamities which the latter inflicted and ſuffered, it muſt be allowed that the government of Piſiſtratus and his family, which, with various interruptions, laſted ſixty-eight years [24], increaſed the ſtrength, and promoted the refinement of Athens [25].

The government changed by Cliſthenes. Olymp. lxvii. 3. A. C. 510.

Yet in nothing was that uſurpation more advantageous than in the animating ſenſe of liberty which the memory of paſt ſervitude, under Hippias, excited and kept alive in Athens, after the popular government had been reſtored by Cliſthenes. We have already had occaſion to relate the foreign victories of the republic, which immediately followed that event; but at the ſame time the conſtitution of government underwent a conſiderable change: by admitting to the rank of citizens a promiſcuous crowd of ſtrangers, fugitives, Athenians of half blood, and perhaps ſlaves, the tribes were augmented from four to ten; and

[24] Between 578 and 510, B. C.

[25] See the treatiſe of Meurſius, entitled Piſiſtratus, one of the few ſatisfactory performances in the immenſe collection of Gronovius.

the

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the ſenators, from four to five hundred. The oſtraciſm was likewiſe eſtabliſhed; a law by which any citizen, whoſe influence or abilities ſeemed dangerous to liberty, might be baniſhed ten years, without the proof or allegation of any poſitive crime.

Important alteration made by Ariſtides. Olymp. lxxv. 2. A. C. 479.

In this condition the republic continued thirty years, until the glorious victories of Salamis, Platæa, and Mycalé, encouraged the loweſt but moſt numerous claſs of citizens, by whoſe valour thoſe memorable exploits had been atchieved, to make further invaſions on the prerogatives of their ſuperiors. The ſudden wealth, which the rich ſpoils of the Barbarians had diffuſed among all ranks of men, increaſed the *cenſus* of individuals, and deſtroyed the balance of the conſtitution. Ariſtides, who perceived it to be impoſſible to reſiſt the natural progreſs of democracy, ſeaſonably yielded to men who had arms in their hands, and firmneſs in their hearts; and propoſed, with apparent ſatisfaction, but much ſecret reluctance [26], a law by which the Athenian magiſtrates ſhould be thenceforth promiſcuouſly elected from the four claſſes of citizens. This innovation paved the way for the ſtill greater changes begun twenty years afterwards, and gradually completed by Pericles; a revolution of which the conſequences were not immediately felt, but which continually became more ſenſible, and finally terminated in the ruin of Athens and of Greece.

The democracy completed

The general reaſons which prevailed on the equity and diſcernment of Pericles to eſpouſe, with

[26] Ἑκων ακοντι δε θυμω is cited on this occaſion by Plutarch, to expreſs the forced generoſity of Ariſtides to the populace.

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undue warmth, the cauſe of the populace, have in the preceding chapter been ſufficiently explained. Yet whatever partial motives of intereſt and ambition[27] might warp the views of this illuſtrious ſtateſman, it muſt be acknowledged that the foreign tranſactions and ſucceſs of the republic, and particularly the new ſituation in which the Athenians found themſelves placed with regard to their diſtant allies and colonies, might naturally ſuggeſt and occaſion very important alterations in the Athenian conſtitution. The ancient and ſacred law, which obliged every citizen, without, fee or reward, to take arms in defence of his country, could not eaſily be extended to the obligation of protecting, without a proper recompence, the intereſt of foreign communities. The ſcanty population of Attica ſufficed not to anſwer the demands of ſo many diſtant expeditions. It became neceſſary to hire troops wherever they might be found; and as this neceſſity introduced pay into the Athenian armies, a ſimilar, though not equally cogent, reaſon eſtabliſhed fees and ſalaries for all the different orders of judges and magiſtrates. The ſame principle of duty and public ſpirit, which obliged every freeman to fight without pay, likewiſe engaged him

by Pericles. Olymp. lxxxii. 4. A.C. 446.

Introduction of pay to the troops.

[27] Plutarch (in Pericle) mentions a particular reaſon which engaged Pericles to counteract the ariſtocracy, and to abridge the power of the Areopagus. Although he had been often *named* for the office of archon, the *lot* had never fallen on him; ſo that he could not be received as a member of that reſpected court. If this obſervation be well founded, it ſhows how little real weight the annual magiſtracies had at Athens; ſince Pericles, though he never attained the dignity of archon, governed the republic many years with unrivalled authority.

gratu-

gratuitously to judge, conſult, and deliberate, for the benefit of his country. But when the conteſted intereſts of foreign, though dependent communities, were agitated and adjuſted in the tribunals of Athens, it was natural for thoſe who ſpent their time in an employment to which no ſocial obligation called them, to demand a proper reward for their uſeful ſervices. At firſt, therefore, a *ſmall* ſum, but which gradually increaſed with the power of the people, was regularly diſtributed among the citizens, for every deliberation which they held, and for every cauſe which they determined. CHAP. XIII.

The deſire of reaping this profit made the populace anxious to draw all cauſes and deliberations before their own tribunals and aſſemblies. This deſign was ſucceſsfully accompliſhed by Ephialtes [28], an artful and daring demagogue, whom Pericles employed as a proper inſtrument to effect ſuch invidious meaſures as were moſt obnoxious to the rich and noble. While his patron extended the renown of Athens by his foreign victories, and gradually reduced into ſubjection the colonies and allies of the republic, the obſequious Ephialtes zealouſly promoted his domeſtic meaſures; and by undermining the authority of the ſenate and of the Areopagus [29], the firmeſt bulwarks of the ariſtocracy,

These circumſtances totally unhinge the government eſtabliſhed by Solon.

[28] Plut. in Pericle.

[29] Authors have not deſcribed in what particular reſpects, or by what particular means, Ephialtes effected his purpoſe: yet we may collect, from obſcure hints on this ſubject, that he not only brought before the inferior tribunals cauſes hitherto confined to the Areopagus, but took from that court its general inſpection and ſuperintendence over the religion and laws; which offices he beſtowed on the popular court of the ἡλιαία and the νομοφυλακες, who were appointed, and

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cracy, obtained a ſignal victory over the laws of Solon. The aſſaſſination of Ephialtes proved only the weakneſs of his enemies; and we ſhall find, in the ſubſequent hiſtory of Athens, that moſt matters of deliberation came, thenceforth, in the firſt inſtance, before the popular aſſembly; that the wiſe inſtitutions of Solon were reduced to an empty form; and that the magnanimity of Pericles, the extravagance of his immediate ſucceſſors, the patriotiſm of Thraſybulus and Conon, the integrity of Phocion, the artificers of Æſchines, and the eloquence of Demoſthenes, ſucceſſively ſwayed, at will, a wild and capricious democracy.

External and domeſtic proſperity of the republic. Ol. inp. lxxv. 1. A. C. 440.

The revolution which immediately followed, in the manners, character, and conduct of the Athenians, was the natural conſequence of the change of government, combined with other circumſtances naturally reſulting from their domeſtic and external proſperity. In the courſe of a few years, the ſucceſs of Ariſtides, Cimon, and Pericles, had tripled the revenues, and increaſed, in a far greater proportion, the dominions of the republic. The Athenian gallies commanded the eaſtern coaſts of the Mediterranean; their merchantmen had engroſſed the traffic of the adjacent countries; the

and diſmiſſed, at the will of the people. He likewiſe rendered the *probation* for becoming an *Areopagite* leſs ſevere than formerly. Perſons crept into this order, whoſe character diſgraced it. The Areopagites became equally acceſſible to preſents and to beauty; and their deciſions fell into contempt. See the Diſcourſe of Iſocrates upon reforming the government of Athens, and Athenæus, l. ix. That Ephialtes, or Pericles himſelf, likewiſe weakened the authority of the ſenate (although it is not remarked by any ancient author), appears from all the ſubſequent hiſtory of Athens.

maga-

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magazines of Athens abounded with wood, metal, ebony, ivory, and all the materials of the uſeful as well as of the agreeable arts; they imported the luxuries of Italy, Sicily, Cyprus, Lydia, Pontus, and Peloponneſus; experience had improved their ſkill of working the ſilver mines of mount Laurium; they had lately opened the valuable marble veins in mount Pentelicus; the honey of Hymettus became important in domeſtic uſe and foreign traffic; the culture of their olives (oil being long their ſtaple commodity, and the only production of Attica which Solon allowed them to export) muſt have improved with the general improvement of the country in arts and agriculture, eſpecially under the active adminiſtration of Pericles, who liberally let looſe the public treaſure to encourage every ſpecies of induſtry [30].

Effect of this combined with the change of government, on manners and arts.

But if that miniſter promoted the love of action, he found it neceſſary at leaſt to comply with, if not to excite the extreme paſſion for pleaſure, which then began to diſtinguiſh his countrymen. The people of Athens, ſucceſsful in every enterprize againſt their foreign as well as domeſtic enemies, ſeemed entitled to reap the fruits of their dangers and victories. For the ſpace of at leaſt twelve years preceding the war of Peloponneſus, their city afforded a perpetual ſcene of triumph and feſtivity. Dramatic entertainments, to which they were paſſionately addicted, were no longer performed in

[30] Iſocrat. Areop. de Pace, & Panegyr. Xenoph. & Ariſtot. de Repub. Athen.

flight

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ſlight unadorned edifices, but in ſtone or marble theatres erected at great expence, and embelliſhed with the moſt precious productions of nature and of art. The treaſury was opened, not only to ſupply the decorations of this favourite amuſement, but to enable the poorer citizens to enjoy it, without incurring any private expence; and thus, at the coſt of the ſtate, or rather of its tributary allies and colonies, to feaſt and delight their ears and fancy with the combined charms of muſic and poetry. The pleaſure of the eye was peculiarly conſulted and gratified in the architecture of theatres and other ornamental buildings; for as Themiſtocles had ſtrengthened, Pericles adorned his native city; and unleſs the concurring teſtimony of antiquity was illuſtrated in the Parthenon, or temple of Minerva, and other exiſting remains worthy to be immortal, it would be difficult to believe that in the ſpace of a few years, there could have been created thoſe numerous, yet ineſtimable wonders of art, thoſe temples, theatres, ſtatues, altars, baths, gymnaſia, and porticoes, which, in the language of ancient panegyric, rendered Athens the eye and light of Greece [31].

Luxury and vices of Athens.

Pericles was blamed for thus decking one favourite city, like a vain voluptuous harlot, at the expence of plundered provinces [32]; but it would have been fortunate for the Athenians if their extorted wealth had not been employed in more periſhing, as well as more criminal, luxury. The

[31] Iſocrat. & Ariſtid. in Panegyr. [32] Plutarch in Pericle.

pomp

pomp of religious ſolemnities, which were twice as CHAP. XIII.
numerous and coſtly in Athens as in any other city of Greece; the extravagance of entertainments and banquets, which on ſuch occaſions always followed the ſacrifices; the increaſe of private luxury, which naturally accompanied this public profuſion, exhauſted the reſources, without augmenting the glory, of the republic. Inſtead of the bread, herbs, and ſimple fare recommended by the laws of Solon, the Athenians, ſoon after the eightieth Olympiad, availed themſelves of their extenſive commerce to import the delicacies of diſtant countries, which were prepared with all the refinements of cookery [33]. The wines of Cyprus were cooled with ſnow in ſummer; in winter [34] the moſt delightful flowers adorned the tables and perſons of the wealthy Athenians. Nor was it ſufficient to be crowned with roſes, unleſs they were likewiſe anointed with the moſt precious perfumes [35]. Paraſites, dancers, and buffoons, were an uſual appendage of every entertainment [36]. Among the weaker ſex, the paſſion for delicate birds, diſtinguiſhed by their voice or plumage, was carried to ſuch exceſs as merited the name of madneſs [37]. The bodies of ſuch youths as were not peculiarly addicted to hunting and horſes, which began to be a prevailing taſte [38], were corrupted

[33] Ariſtoph. Nubes, ver. 50. & Lyſiſtrat. paſſim.
[34] Athen. l. xi. 3. & Xenoph. Memorabilia, l. ii.
[35] Xenoph. ibid. [36] Athenæus, l. i. & Xenoph. Symp.
[37] Ορνιθομανια, Athen. l. xi. 3. [38] Ariſtoph. Nubes, paſſim.

by

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by the commerce of harlots, who had reduced their profeſſion into ſyſtem [39]; while their minds were ſtill more polluted by the licentious philoſophy of the ſophiſts. It is unneceſſary to crowd the picture, ſince it may be obſerved, in one word, that the vices and extravagancies, which are ſuppoſed to characteriſe the declining ages of Greece and Rome, took root in Athens during the adminiſtration of Pericles, the moſt ſplendid and moſt proſperous in the Grecian annals.

Contraſt and balance of virtues and vices, advantages and diſadvantages.

This paradox, for ſuch it muſt appear, may be explained by conſidering the ſingular combination of circumſtances, which, in the time of that ſtateſman, gave every poiſon its antidote, and rendered the partial evils already deſcribed, only the thorn that ever accompanies the roſe. The Grecian hiſtory of thoſe times affords a more ſtriking contraſt than ever appeared in any other age or country, of wiſdom and folly, of magnanimity and meanneſs, of liberty and tyranny, of ſimplicity and refinement, of auſterity and voluptuouſneſs. The ſublime philoſophy of Anaxagoras and Socrates was accompanied as with a deadly ſhade, by the dark unprincipled captiouſneſs of the ſophiſts; the pathetic and moral ſtrains of Sophocles and Euripides were parodied by the licentious buffoonery of Ariſtophanes; painting and ſculpture, which, under geniuſes of the firſt order, like Phidias, ſerved as hand-maids to religion and virtue, degenerated under inferior artiſts into mean hirelings of vice and

[39] Alexis apud Athenæum, l. xiii.

diſorder;

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diſorder; the modeſty of Athenian matrons was ſet off as by a foil, when compared with the diſſoluteneſs of the ſchool of Aſpaſia; and the ſimple frugality of manners, which commonly prevailed in private families, even of the firſt diſtinction, was contraſted with the extravagant diſſipation of public entertainments and feſtivals. To examine the parallel links of this complicated chain will illuſtrate the character of a people whoſe ſubſequent tranſactions form one principal object of Grecian hiſtory.

Parallel links of this chain examined.

Philoſophy, which in Greece alone deſerves the peculiar attention of the hiſtorian, aroſe about the beginning of the ſixth century before Chriſt, and in an hundred and fifty years attained the higheſt degree of perfection, and ſunk into the loweſt degeneracy and corruption, to which the uſe or abuſe of the human intellect could raiſe or plunge it. Leſſer Aſia, to which Europe and America owe the ineſtimable benefits of their religion and letters, produced and nouriſhed the tender plant of philoſophy; and the flouriſhing Greek colonies on that delightful coaſt, communicated to their mother country this precious offſpring of their ſoil. Thales of Miletus, Pittacus of Mitylenè, Bias of Prienè, Cleobulus of Lyndus in the iſle of Rhodes, and the other wiſe men, as they were emphatically ſtyled, who lived in that age, not only gave advice and aſſiſtance to their countrymen on difficult emergencies, but reſtrained their vices by wholeſome laws, improved their manners by uſeful leſſons of morality, and extended their knowledge by im-

History of Greek philoſophy.

The ſeven Sages.

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portant researches and discoveries [40]. But the first attempt towards moral philosophy, as independent on, and unconnected with, religion, seems to have been the fables of Æsop, which, to men in an early period of society, must have appeared a very serious and useful species of composition. The sphere of history was narrow; the examples of the gods, amidst the continual corruptions of superstition, had become too flagitious for imitation; and men, whose rustic simplicity of life afforded them continual opportunities to observe the instinctive sagacity of certain animals, might derive many useful lessons from those humble instructors. In the early ages of Greece and Rome, and of all other nations whose history is recorded, fables were told, and in some degree believed, in the assembly and senate-house, on the most important occasions; for, in the infancy of society, men are children; and the delusion, which the belief of a fable supposes, is not more gross and improbable than many of those errors into which (as we have already proved [41]) their lively fancy had often plunged them. The same romantic cast of imagination which had animated woods and winds, mountains and rivers, which had changed heroes into gods, and gods into frail men, might endow animals with reason, and even speech.

Æsop the abulist.

The next step towards moral science was of a more refined and abstract kind, consisting of the

he gnomic ets.

[40] Plutarch. Sympos. & de Placit. Philosoph. Plato in Protagor. Diogen. Laert. passim.

[41] See above, Chap. II.

sentences

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ſentences of the gnomologic poets [42], *and in thoſe de*tached precepts or proverbs which, in all countries, have preceded any ſyſtematic account of morality. Each of the ſeven ſages, as they were called, had his favourite maxim [43], which he engraved in temples and other places of public reſort; but at this diſtance of time it is impoſſible, amidſt the differences of authors, to diſcover what belongs to each; nor is the ſearch important, ſince all their maxims or proverbs, whatever efforts of generalization they might coſt their inventors, now appear extremely ſimple and familiar.

Theſe reſpectable fathers of Grecian philoſophy, who ſilently diffuſed light through the gloom of a barbarous age, are ſaid to have maintained a correſpondence [44] with each other, as well as with Solon of Athens, Chilon of Sparta, and Periander of Corinth; men who, in imitation of their eaſtern brethren, chiefly cultivated ſuch practical knowledge as qualified them to be the legiſlators, magiſtrates, and generals of their reſpective countries.

The diſcoveries of Thales the Mileſian.

Thales the Mileſian, alone, quitted the ordinary purſuits of civil and military renown; and although he compoſed verſes, promulgated moral ſentences, and, on ſome particular emergencies, gave ſeaſonable advice to his countrymen, yet he eſtabliſhed his fame on a baſis more broad and

[42] See the Sentences of Theognis, which are evidently a collection, not the work of one man.

[43] Ariſtot. Rhet. ii. 21. Stobæus, Serm. p. 44, &c.

[44] Plut. Symp.

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permanent than the fluctuating intereſts of periſhing communities. Many of the elementary propoſitions of geometry, afterwards collected by Euclid, were firſt diſcovered[45] by Thales, who directed the acuteneſs of his mind with equal ſucceſs to aſtronomy. He divided the heavens into five zones; diſcovered the equinoxes and ſolſtices; remarked the Urſa Minor; obſerved, and nearly predicted, eclipſes. The diviſion of the year into three hundered and ſixty-five days was already known to the Egyptians; but although Thales might borrow this, and perhaps other diſcoveries, from that ancient people, among whom he ſometime reſided, it appears, even from thoſe authors who are ever prone to exaggerate the wiſdom of Egypt, that he owed much leſs to that country, than to the native ſagacity and penetration of his clear comprehenſive mind[46].

His ſchool and ſucceſſors,

Thales founded the Ionic ſchool, in which he was ſucceeded by Anaximander and Anaximenes, who were followed by Anaxagoras, the inſtructor of Pericles, and Archelaus, who is called by ancient writers the maſter of Socrates. About fifty years after Thales, the ſame ſpeculations which he had introduced were purſued by Xenophanes of Colophon, Leucippus and Parmenides of Elea, and Heraclitus of Epheſus. Theſe ingenious men diſcovered many uſeful truths; yet all of them, not

[45] Proclus in Euclid.

[46] Hieronym. apud Laert. l. i. c. xxvii. Plin. l. xxxviii. c. xvii.

except-

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excepting Thales himſelf, likewiſe buſied themſelves with ſubjects that will for ever excite and elude human curioſity. Their doctrines were equally liable to objection, whichever of the elements they aſſumed as the firſt principle of nature; they univerſally agreed in aſſerting the fallacy of the ſenſes, and the unworthineſs of the vulgar ſuperſtition; but their various opinions concerning the orgin and deſtruction of worlds, the magnitudes and diſtances of heavenly bodies, the eſſence of matter and ſpirit[47], deſerve only to be conſidered as the dreams of inquiſitive men, whoſe ambition of knowledge carried them beyond the ſphere of experience, and the clear deductions of reaſon. The ſyſtem of Leucippus, the moſt famous of them all, was improved by Democritus of Abdera[48], and afterwards adopted by Epicurus, whoſe philoſophy is ſufficiently explained in the extraordinary work of Lucretius, the boldeſt monument which the world is ever likely to behold, of learning, genius, and impiety.

degenerate into atheiſm.

But it is particularly worthy of obſervation, that while Democritus aſſailed the celeſtial manſions, and unveiled, with a daring hand, the feeble majeſty of Grecian ſuperſtition, Anaxagoras of Clazomenè, at preciſely the ſame period, revealed a new and infinitely more auguſt ſpectacle, by firſt announcing to the heathen world, a ſelf-exiſtent, all-perfect mind, as the great cauſe

The ſublime philoſophy of Anaxagoras.

[47] See Diogen. Laert. l. i. Ariſtot. Metaph. paſſim, & Plut. de Placit. Philoſoph.

[48] Laert. l. ix. Ariſtot. Phyſic. l. viii.

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and arranger of the material world. Thales and Pythagoras, with ſuch of their diſciples as faithfully adhered to their tenets, had indeed admitted ſpirit as a conſtituent principle of the univerſe; but they had ſo intimately blended mind and matter, that theſe diſſimilar ſubſtances ſeemed to make an indiſſoluble compound, as the ſoul and body conſtitute but one man. According to Anaxagoras, on the other hand, the creating and ſovereign intelligence was to be carefully diſtinguiſhed from the ſoul of the world, which he ſeems to have regarded merely as a poetical expreſſion for the laws which the Deity had impreſſed on his works. The great Ruler of the univerſe did not animate, but impel matter; he could not be included within its limited and periſhing terms; his nature was pure and ſpiritual, and totally incapable of pollution by any corporeal admixture [49].

The diſcovery and diffuſion of this luminous and ſublime principle which was naturally followed by an inveſtigation of the moral attributes of the Deity, and the deducing from thence the great duties of morality, might have produced a general and happy revolution in Greece, under the zealous and perſevering labours of Socrates and his followers, if the tendency of this divine philoſophy had not been counteracted, not only by the groſs prejudices of the vulgar, but by the more dangerous refinements of incredulous Sophiſts.

[49] Ariſtot. Metaphyſ. l. i. c. iii. Plato in Cratylo, & Plut. in Pericle.

The

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The ſame ſpirit of inquiry, which leads to the diſcovery of truth, will often promote the propagation of error; and unfortunately for Greece, in the middle of the fifth century before Chriſt, errors were propagated, ſo congenial to the condition of the times, that they could not fail to take deep root, and flouriſh in a ſoil which was peculiarly well prepared to receive them. The glorious victories over the Carthaginians and Perſians had increaſed the wealth and ſecurity, called forth the invention and induſtry, but, at the ſame time, multiplied the wants, and inflamed the paſſions, of the Greeks. The more powerful cities, and particularly Athens and Syracuſe, had attained a pitch of proſperity which exceeded their moſt ſanguine hopes: elated by the bloom of health and the pride of riches, they continually ſighed for new and unknown enjoyments, while both individuals and communities were ever ready to liſten to ſuch inſtructors as juſtified their vices, and taught them to abuſe the gifts of fortune.

Its tendency counteracted by the Sophiſts.

In this ſituation of affairs appeared the Sophiſts[50], whoſe appellative, ſtill familiar in the languages of Europe, pretty faithfully expreſſes their character. Hippias of Elis, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, Georgias of Leontium, with many inferior names, preſerved in the writings of Xenophon, Plato, and Iſocrates, ſtarted up about the ſame time, and exhibited a new phænomenon in Greece. The Olympic, and other public aſſem-

Hiſtory of the Sophiſts. Olymp. lxxxv. 1. A. C. 440.

[50] Vid. Philoſtrat. de Vit. Sophiſt.

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blies, furniſhed them with an opportunity to diſplay their ſpecious accompliſhments to the admiring ſpectators. They frequented the great cities, particularly Athens, and acquired the friendſhip of the rich, and the applauſe of the multitude. They profeſſed the knowledge of every ſcience, and of every art, which they taught publicly, for a ſtipulated price; and, as they really poſſeſſed the art of perſuaſion, their diſciples continually increaſed among the rich and the voluptuous, the idle and the vain.

Their character and views.

Their language was glowing and harmonious, their manners elegant, their life ſplendid. When it ſerved their intereſt, and pleaſed the taſte of their hearers, they could paint virtue in the faireſt and moſt engaging colours; but the capricious will of their ſcholars, whoſe paſſions they were ever careful to gratify, ſerved as the only ſtandard of their principles; and engaged them for the moſt part, to deck out the barren doctrines of Leucippus and Democritus with the meretricious arts of the rhetorician. Their morality ſupplied the ſprings from which Epicurus watered his gardens; and their captious logic furniſhed the arguments by which Pyrrho laboured to juſtify his ſcepticiſm [51]. It would be eaſy to trace up to the Sophiſts that quibbling metaphyſic, which being embodied in the Greek language, thenceforth adhered too cloſely to the philoſophical writings of that people, and

Their influence on philoſophy and manner

[51] See the note on the Sophiſts in my Tranſlation of Iſocrates's Panegyric of Athens, p. 1, & ſeqq.

which

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which totally disfigures many otherwise valuable compositions of antiquity. But our present business is only to remark the destructive effects immediately resultng from their tenets, which, while they undermined, without openly opposing, the ancient and popular superstition, boldly set at defiance all those useful maxims of conduct, and all those salutary discoveries of reason, which, amidst the insolence of the Greek democracies, fomented by prosperity, appeared essentially requisite to restrain the intemperance, injustice, and violence, of individuals and communities.

Opposed by Socrates.

In several republics of Greece, the Sophists enjoyed a free career to exert their talents, practise their artifices, and to promote their fame and fortune. But in Athens their frauds were detected, and their characters unmasked by Socrates[52], whose philosophy forms an important æra in the history of the human mind. The son of Sophroniscus was born at Athens, forty years before the commencement of the Peloponnesian war. The smallness of his patrimony, amounting only to three hundred pounds, and his original profession of a statuary[53], have encouraged an opinion of the obscurity of his birth, among writers who did not reflect on the narrowness of Athenian fortunes, and who forgot to consider, that as hereditary distinctions were little known or regarded in the Grecian republics,

[52] To avoid prolixity in the account of Socrates and his philosophy, I cite not particular passages, but give the general result of my reading in Plato and Xenophon.

[53] Laert. l. ii. art. Socrát.

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a ſolid and permanent luſtre was derived from the practice of ingenious arts, which could not be cultivated, as in ancient Rome, and ſometimes in modern Europe, by ſervile or mercenary hands, but only by the firſt claſs of freemen and citizens. Whatever reputation or advantage Socrates might have acquired by the exerciſe of a profeſſion, which was peculiarly encouraged by the taſte of the times, and the magnificent ſpirit of Pericles, he readily ſacrificed to the natural bent of his mind, which concealed, under an external form worthy to repreſent the voluptuous Silenus[54], the fruitful ſeeds of every amiable and manly ſentiment, and determined him, by an irreſiſtible impulſe, to the ſtudy of wiſdom and virtue.

His education and character.

In his early youth he heard the phyſics of Archelaus, and learned the geometry of Theodorus[55]; and from theſe, and other teachers, acquired ſuch an acquaintance with the faſhionable theories concerning the formation of the univerſe, the original principles of things, the hidden powers of matter, as enabled him to regard with juſt contempt, and occaſionally to deride with inimitable humour, the vanity of thoſe uſeleſs and ſhadowy ſpeculations. He acknowledged with the pious Anaxagoras, the ſuperintending mind, whoſe providence regulated the operations of nature, as well as the affairs of human life. He denied not the exiſtence of thoſe inferior intelligences, which formed the only ob-

[54] Plato & Xenoph. in Symp.

[55] Plato in Theætet. & in Menon.

jects

jects of popular adoration; he allowed the divine origin of dreams and omens; he was exemplary in all the religious duties of his country; and were we to judge the Athenian ſage by the ſtandard of ordinary men, we ſhould be inclined to believe that he had not entirely eſcaped the contagion of ſuperſtition; ſince he profeſſed to be accompanied by a dæmon, or inviſible conductor, who often reſtrained his paſſions, and influenced his behaviour[56]. If this aſſertion was not an effect of that refined *irony* familiar to Socrates, we muſt allow his temper to have been tinged with credulity: yet, whoever ſeriouſly reflects on a life of ſeventy years, ſpent in the ſervice of mankind, uniformly blameleſs, and terminated by a voluntary death, in obedience to the unjuſt laws of his country; whoever conſiders attentively the habitual temperance, the unſhaken probity, the active uſefulneſs, the diffuſive beneficence, the conſtant equanimity and cheerfulneſs of this ſingular man, will admit a degree of enthuſiaſm, rather as the ornament, than defect, of ſuch an extraordinary character. Men of learning and genius, who examining the matter ſtill more deeply, have obſerved the important revolution produced by the life and death of Socrates, on the principles and ſentiments of his contemporaries and of poſterity, are diſpoſed to believe that ſuch an extraordinary phænomenon could not have appeared in the moral world, without the particular interpoſition of heaven. The cheerful ſerenity of his laſt CHAP. XIII.

[56] Plut. de Genio Socratis.

moments,

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moments[57], and ſtill more, the undeviating tenor of his active virtue, juſtified the hardeſt maxims of Lycurgus and Pythagoras; while the main aim of his ſpeculations was to eſtabliſh the ſublime morality of thoſe ſages on the cleareſt deductions of reaſon and experience.

His philoſophy.

From the perfections of the ſupreme intelligence, he deduced his juſt government of the univerſe, which implied the immortality of the human ſoul. But the great object of his reſearch was to diſcover thoſe general laws by which, even in this life, the ſuperintending providence had variouſly diſpenſed to men, good and evil, happineſs and miſery. Theſe laws he regarded as the promulgated will of the God, with which, when clearly aſcertained, it became our duty invariably to comply; ſince nothing but the moſt ſhort-ſighted folly could riſk incurring the divine diſpleaſure, in order to avoid pain or poverty, ſickneſs or death; far leſs to enjoy periſhing gratifications, which leave a ſting behind them. Reaſoning on ſuch principles, and taking experience only for his guide, he deduced, with admirable perſpicuity, the intereſts and duties of nations and individuals, in all the complicated relations of ſociety. The actions of men furniſhed the materials, their inſtruction formed the object, their happineſs was the end of his diſcourſe. Wherever his leſſons might be moſt generally uſeful, there he was always to be found; frequenting, at an early hour, the Academy, Lyceum, and other

[57] This ſubject will be treated hereafter.

public

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public *Gymnaſia*; punctually attending the forum at mid-day, the hour of full aſſembly; and even at joining, without the affectation of auſterity, in the convivial entertainments of his friends, or accompanying them in the delightful walks which adorned the banks of the Ilyſſus. As a huſband, a father, a citizen, and a ſoldier, the ſteady practice of his duty continually illuſtrated his doctrines. The converſation and example of this truly practical philoſopher (and this is his higheſt panegyric) perſuaded many of his fellow-citizens ſincerely to embrace a virtuous courſe of life; and even thoſe who, like Critias and Alcibiades, allowed the current of their paſſions to prevail over the conviction of their ſober hours, were ſtill charmed with the wonderful extent, as well as the ſingular accuracy, of his various knowledge; with the acuteneſs and penetration of his arguments; the beauty, vivacity, and perſuaſiveneſs of his ſtyle; which, whether he aſſumed the tone of reaſon or of ridicule, ſurpaſſed whatever had been deemed moſt eloquent [58].

Its influence.

Yet, how great ſoever might be the perſonal influence of Socrates, the triumph of his philoſophy became more illuſtrious and complete, after his principles were embraced by thoſe who cultivated the imitative arts, and directed the public amuſements, which in all countries, but particularly in Greece, have ever produced immediate and powerful effects on the national opinions and character. In Greece alone, the theatre was regarded as an

Aſſiſted by the tragic poets.

[58] Xenoph. Memor. l. iv. c. xv. Laert. l. ii. c. xix. & ſeqq. & Cicero de Orat. iii. 16.

object

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object of the firſt importance and magnitude; it formed an eſſential, and by far the moſt ſplendid, part of religious worſhip; the expence of ſupporting it exceeded that of the army and navy together; and this celebrated entertainment, which united the tragedy and opera of the moderns, was carried to perfection by a favourite diſciple of Socrates, whoſe works were ſo univerſally admired in Greece, that (as we ſhall have occaſion to relate in the Sicilian war) the Syracuſans releaſed from captivity thoſe Athenians, and thoſe only, who had learned to repeat the verſes of Euripides. This admired poet rendered the Grecian tragedy complete, by perfecting the chorus[1], the principal diſtinction between the ancient and the modern drama, and which, when properly conducted, rendered the former more regular, yet more varied; more magnificent, and at the ſame time more affecting; above all, more intereſting and more inſtructive.

particularly Euripides

who perfected the chorus.

From the prevailing manners of the times, when the principal citizens lived together in crowds, and daily frequented the public halls, the *gymnaſia*, the

[1] In this part of the drama, the philoſophy of Euripides excels the loftineſs of Æſchylus, and the richneſs of Sophocles. It is ſufficient to compare the works of the three rivals, to perceive that the chorus in Euripides moſt faithfully anſwers the deſcription of Horace

> Ille bonis faveatque, & conſilietur amicis,
> Et regat iratos, & amet peccare timentes.
> Ille dapes laudet menſæ brevis, ille ſalubrem
> Juſtitiam, legeſque, & apertis otia portis;
> Ille tegat commiſſa; deoſque precetur & oret,
> Ut redeat miſeris, abeat fortuna ſuperbis.

forums,

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forums, and temples, it was natural to expect that the action of a Grecian tragedy, ſhould conſiſt in ſome great public event, which intereſted the whole body of the people. The ſcene was uſually the portico of a temple, the gate of a palace, the wide expanſe of a forum, or market-place. In ſuch places many ſpectators muſt be ſuppoſed preſent, who would naturally take part in an action which concerned the public intereſt and happineſs[60]. On this principle was introduced the ancient chorus, conſiſting of ſuch perſons as moſt properly ſuited the occaſion, and who, though not immediately or principally concerned in the cataſtrophe, had ſuch general and indirect intereſt, as kept them continually on the ſcene, and made them approve or condemn, promote or oppoſe, the ſentiments and meaſures of the actors. The chorus, never quitting the ſtage, neceſſarily introduced the unity of place; and as their ſongs and dances between the acts expreſſed the feelings excited by the repreſentation, they connected the preceding act with that which immediately followed it, and rendered the whole ſpectacle uninterrupted and continuous.

[60] In the Oedipus Tyrannus, the chorus is compoſed of prieſts, ſenators, Theban youths, &c. Creon ſays to Oedipus,

Τι τωνδε χρηζει, πλησιαζοντων κλυειν;
Ετοιμος ειπειν ειτε και σειχειν εσω.

The anſwer is,

Ε, παντας αυδα, τωνδε γαρ πλεον φερω
Πενθος η και της εμης ψυχης περι.

CREON. Shall I ſpeak in preſence of this numerous aſſembly? or ſhall we retire?

OEDIPUS. Speak before all preſent; for the public diſtreſs afflicts me more than my own danger.

The

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The muſic of the chorus was more rich and various, and the poetry more elevated and glowing, than what could be admitted into the acts, or ordinary dialogue, which was confined to the iambic meaſure; circumſtances which, together with the numbers, the dreſſes, the dances, and geſtures, of theſe ancied ſpectators, equally increaſed the magnificence and variety of the entertainment. They likewiſe rendered it more affecting; ſince nothing is more proper to intereſt us in any ſcene, than the beholding a great number of perſons deeply engaged by it, and expreſſing their feelings by natural tones and movements. But the principal advantage of the chorus was to furniſh the poet with an opportunity (without loading the dialogue, and rendering it too ſententious) of enforcing, by all the power of fancy and of numbers, that moral inſtruction, which was occaſionally attempted by Æſchylus and Sophocles, but which forms the continual end and aim of Euripides, who had a ſoul to feel, and a genius to expreſs, whatever is moſt lovely and moſt excellent in ſentiment and character. It is unneceſſary to mention the affecting delicacy of Admetus and his attendants towards their gueſt Hercules; the lively emotions of gratitude in that hero; the friendſhip of Pylades and Oreſtes; the amiable picture of conjugal affection in the character of Alceſtis, ſince the whole remains of that ineſtimable writer prove his unceaſing labours to warm his countrymen with all the virtues and charities that adorn private life, as well as to keep alive an ardent love of the republic, and a generous paſſion for its glory

and liberty; while, in ſeveral paſſages, he deſcribes and refutes the philoſophy of Epicurus[61] (which, as we have already obſerved, was chiefly borrowed from the licentious maxims of the Sophiſts) with ſuch fullneſs and accuracy as entitled him to the appellation of the Philoſophic Tragedian.

His views counteracted by the authors of the old comedy

That Euripides, though ten years older than Socrates, owed the characteriſtic excellencies of his works to the converſation and friendſhip of that unrivalled moraliſt, is univerſally acknowledged by antiquity[62]; though the character and intentions

[61] See particularly Alceſt. ver. 782, &c. and ver 960, &c.

Euripides flouriſhed near an hundred years before Epicurus and Zeno, the reſpective founders of the Epicurean and Stoical philoſophy. Yet we find the tenets of both ſects in the tragedian; which may be eaſily explained, by conſidering that thoſe oppoſite kinds of philoſophy aroſe from different aſpects of nature, which muſt often preſent themſelves to an obſerving eye; and, as the doctrines of the Sophiſts laid the foundation for the immoral ſyſtem of Epicurus, ſo the moderate doubt of Socrates, and the old academy, was corrupted into different degrees of ſcepticiſm, according to the fancy of their ſucceſſors; and his rational preference of virtue to all other objects, degenerated into a pretended contempt for theſe objects, as things totally indifferent, the inſenſibility and pedantry of the Stoics.

[62] Εδοκει συμποιειν Ευριπιδη. Diogen. Laert. in Vit. Socrat. The comic poets, who envied and hated Euripides, as the darling of the public, pretended that Socrates had even compoſed all the fineſt paſſages in his tragedies. Soon after the repreſentation of the Troes, Mneſilochus parodied it in a farce, which he called Φρυγες, Phrygians, probably to have an opportunity of playing on the word Φρυγανον, fuel.

Φρυγεις εστι καινον [illegible] τουτ' Ευριπιδου
Ὡ και Σωκρατης τα Φρυγανα υποτιθησι.

"The Phrygians is a new play of Euripides, to whom Socrates furniſhes the fuel." But the pun cannot be tranſlated. The ſame Mneſilochus calls Euripides a ſort of hammerman to Socrates.

Ευριπιδης Σωκρατογομφευς.

both

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both of the poet and the philoſopher were groſsly miſrepreſented by ſome of their contemporaries. Before the commencement, and during the continuance of the Peloponneſian war, there flouriſhed at Athens a claſs of men who were the declared enemies, not only of Socrates and his diſciples, but of all order and decency. The reader will eaſily perceive, that I allude to Ariſtophanes, and the other writers of the old licentious comedy; an entertainment which was never carried to the ſame vicious exceſs in any other age or country. Yet this hideous ſpectre was the ſiſter of tragedy, whoſe angelic ſweetneſs and dignity were long accompanied by this odious and diſguſting form; but to underſtand the natural connection between objects ſeemingly ſo different, it is neceſſary to remount to their ſource.

Hiſtory of that licentious entertainment.

Tragedy, the ſong of the goat [63], and Comedy, the ſong of the village, ſufficiently indicate, by the meanneſs of their ancient names, the humility of their firſt original. They aroſe amidſt the ſacrifices and joyous feſtivity of the vintage, in a country which ſeldom adopted the amuſements, any more than the arts and inſtitutions, of others, but which was deſtined to communicate her own to all

[63] A goat, as the particular enemy of the vine, was very properly ſacrificed to Bacchus, whoſe praiſes compoſed the ſong. In the Antigoné of Sophocles, v. 1127,

Πολυωνυμε Καδμειας
Νυμφας αγαλμα, και Διος
Βαρυδεξεμεται γενος, &c.

have a ſpecimen of what formed the firſt buſineſs of tragedy.

the

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the civilized portion of mankind. During the entertainments of a ſeaſon peculiarly dedicated to recreation and pleaſure, the ſuſceptible minds of the Greeks naturally yielded to two propenſities, congenial to men in ſuch circumſtances, a diſpoſition to exerciſe their ſenſibility, and a deſire to amuſe their fancy. Availing himſelf of the former, the ſublime genius of Æſchylus[64] improved the ſong of the goat into a regular dramatic poem, agreeing with the Iliad and Odyſſey in thoſe unalterable rules of deſign and execution which are eſſential to the perfection of every literary performance, yet differing from thoſe immortal archetypes of art, in a circumſtance naturally ſuggeſted by the occaſion for which tragedies were compoſed. It had been uſual with the Athenians, when they celebrated in the ſpring and autumn the great feſtivals of Bacchus, to perſonate the exploits and fables handed down by immemorial tradition concerning that bountiful divinity: this imitation was conſidered as a mark of gratitude due to the beneficence of the god, to whoſe honours they aſſociated the kindred worſhip of Pan, Silenus, and their attendant fawns and ſatyrs. When Æſchylus repre-

[64] Æſchylus is ſaid by Ariſtotle (de Arte Poetica) to have introduced interlocutors, dialogues &c. which is acknowledging him the father of tragedy. We know little of Theſpis, but from Horace:

Ignotum tragicæ genus inveniſſe camænæ
Dicitur, & plauſtris vexiſſe poëmata Theſpis.

The plauſtrum, however, has a more direct reference to comedy; ſince λαλειν ὡς ἐξ ἁμαξης, to ſpeak as from a cart, was a common Greek expreſſion for groſs indecent raillery.

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ſented, therefore, inſtead of ſimply reciting the real hiſtory or agreeable fictions, of antiquity, he only adopted a mode of imitation already practiſed in the religious ceremonies of his country; a mode of imitation more powerful than the epic, ſince, inſtead of barely deſcribing the deeds of gods and heroes, it ſhews thoſe diſtinguiſhed perſonages on the ſtage, makes them ſpeak and act for themſelves, and thus approaching nearer to reality, is ſtill more forcible and affecting.

Its characteriſtics, as diſtinguiſhed from tragedy,

As tragedy was introduced in imitation of the more ſerious ſcenes of the Dionyſian feſtival, ſo comedy, which ſoon followed it, was owing to the more light and ludicrous parts of that ſolemnity [95]. Tragedy is the imitation of an important and ſerious action, adapted to affect the ſenſibility of the ſpectators, and to gratify their natural propenſity to fear, to weep, and to wonder. Comedy is the imitation of a light and ludicrous action, calculated to amuſe the fancy, and to gratify the natural diſpoſition of men to laughter and merriment. Terror and pity have in all ages been regarded as the main ſprings of tragedy, becauſe the laws of ſen-

[95] Horace is authentic, and the moſt agreeable authority:

Agricolæ priſci, fortes, parvoque beati,
Condita poſt frumenta, levantes tempore feſto
Corpus, & ipſum animum ſpe finis dura ferentem,
Cum ſociis operum, pueris, & conjuge fidâ,
Tellurem porco, Silvanum lacte piabant,
Floribus & vino Genium, memorem brevis ævi.
Feſcennina per hunc invecta licentia morem
Verſibus alternis opprobria ruſtica fudit, &c. &c.

Epiſt. i. l. ii. v. 146; and ſtill more directly Art. Poet. v. 220.

ſibility,

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ſibility, founded ſolely in nature, are always the ſame. Comedy has been infinitely varied by the innumerable modes of wit, humour, and ridicule, which prevail in different ages and countries, and which agree ſcarcely in any one particular, unleſs it may be reckoned an agreement, that men have ſeldom indulged them, except at the expence of their good-nature, and often of their virtue. The Grecian comedy was uncommonly licentious; the profligate characters of Ariſtophanes and his contemporaries, Mneſilochus, Callias, Eupolis, and Cratinus, contributed, doubtleſs, to this deformity; yet theſe poets could not eaſily have rendered their new entertainment agreeable to the taſte[66] and prejudices of the public, without incorporating in them the ſubſtance of the *phallic* ſongs[67], which conſtituted an ancient and eſſential part of the amuſements of the vintage. The fond admirers of antiquity have defended the abominable ſtrains of theſe licentious poets, by pretending that their intention was to reform vice, not to recommend it; an apology which, if admitted, might tend to exculpate the writers, but could never juſtify their performances, ſince it is known by experience, that

[66] Horace has expreſſed, with his uſual felicity, the ſituation of the ſpectators, and the fatal neceſſity of humouring it:

———Aſper,
Incolumi gravitate, jocum tentavit; eo quod
Illecebris erat & grata novitate morandus
Spectator, functuſque ſacris, & potus & exlex.

[67] Φαλλος, Priapus; ξυλον επιμηκες εχων εν τω ακρω[illegible]αιδοιον, Suidas. This was carried in proceſſion, accompanie[illegible]th the Φαλλικα ασματα.

 lewd

CHAP. XIII. lewd descriptions prove a poison rather than a remedy; and instead of correcting manners, serve only to corrupt them.

and from modern comedy.

Besides the general licentiousness of the ancient comedy, its more particular characteristics resulted from the peculiar circumstances of the Athenians, during the time of its introduction and continuance. The people of all ranks at Athens were then too deeply engaged in the military and political transactions of their country, to enjoy any amusement which did not either directly flatter their passions, or bear an immediate relation to the great and important interests of the republic. It was during the confusion and calamities of the Peloponnesian war, that all the comic pieces which remain were originally represented; a period too disorderly and tumultuous to relish comedies, such as are now written, or such as were composed in Greece by Menander, in an age of greater moderation and tranquillity. The elegant and ingenious, the moral and instructive strains of Moliere or Menander, may amuse the idleness of wealth, and the security of peace. But amidst the fermentation of war and danger, amidst civil dissentions and foreign invasions, the minds of men are too little at ease to enjoy such refined and delicate beauties, which then appear lifeless and insipid. In such turbulent circumstances, the reluctant attention must be excited by real, instead of imaginary characters; by a true, instead of a fictitious event; by direct and particular advice concerning the actual state of their affairs, instead of vague or abstract lessons of wisdom

and

and virtue. Coarſe buffoonery may often force them to laugh; delicate ridicule will ſeldom perſuade them to ſmile; they may be affected by the ſharpneſs of perſonal invective, but will remain impenetrable to the ſhafts of general ſatire.

General notion of the pieces of Ariſtophanes.

By combining the different parts of this deſcription, we may form a tolerably exact notion of the writings of Ariſtophanes, which commonly conceal, under a thin allegorical veil, the recent hiſtory of ſome public tranſaction, or the principal features of ſome diſtinguiſhed character, repreſented in ſuch a ludicrous light, as reflects on thoſe concerned, unexpected, and often unmerited, but not therefore the leſs ſtriking, flaſhes of inſolent ridicule. Such was the nature, and ſuch the materials of the ancient comedy, which, in its form, agreed entirely with tragedy, having borrowed from this entertainment (which was already in poſſeſſion of the theatre) the deſign of the whole, as well as the configuration of the ſeveral parts; the muſic, the chorus, the dreſſes, decorations, and machinery; all of which were ſo modified and burleſqued as ſuited the purpoſes of the comic writer, and often rendered his pieces very exact parodies of the more faſhionable tragedies of the times.

He and his aſſociates encouraged at Athens by Pericles.

This ſingular ſpecies of drama, which, in its leſs perfect ſtate, had long ſtrolled the villages of Attica, was ſimply tolerated at Athens, until the profuſion of Pericles, and his complaiſance for the populace, firſt ſupplied from the exchequer the neceſſary expences for the repreſentation of comedies, and propoſed prizes for the comic, as well as for

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the tragic, poets and actors. But, by this injudicious encouragement, he unwarily cheriſhed a ſerpent in his boſom. Ariſtophanes and his licentious contemporaries having previouſly ridiculed virtue and genius, in the perſons of Socrates and Euripides, boldly proceeded to avail themſelves of the natural malignity of the vulgar, and their envy againſt whatever is elevated and illuſtrious, to traduce and caluminate Pericles himſelf; and though his ſucceſſors in the adminiſtration juſtly merited (as we ſhall have occaſion to relate) the ſevereſt laſhes of invective, yet, had their characters been more pure they would have been equally expoſed to the unprovoked ſatire of thoſe inſolent buffoons, who gratified the groſs appetites of the vulgar, by an undiſtinguiſhed maſs of ridicule, involving vice and virtue, things profane and ſacred, men and gods.

The Grecian feſtivals,

Dramatic entertainments formed an eſſential part of the feſtivals conſecrated to the bountiful author of the vine. Minerva, who had given not only the olive, but what was deemed far more valuable, her peculiar protection to the city of Athens, was rewarded with innumerable ſolemnities. Jupiter enjoyed his appropriate honours; but more commonly, as it is atteſted by Athenian medals, the worſhip of the father of the gods was aſſociated with that of his wife and warlike daughter. We ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more particularly of the feſtival and myſteries of Ceres, who taught the Athenians the important knowledge of agriculture, which they were ſuppoſed to have diffuſed over the

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ancient world. It would be endleſs to mention the inſtitutions in honour of the crowd of inferior or leſs propitious divinities, which rendered the feſtivals at Athens far more numerous than in any other Grecian city. Nor did their frequency abate any thing of the extenſive ſplendour which accompanied them. The ſhops and courts of juſtice were ſhut; the mechanic quitted his tools, the huſbandman ceaſed from his labours, the mourner intermitted his ſorrow. The whole city was diſſolved in feaſting and jollity; the intervals of which were filled up by pompous ſhows and proceſſions, by concerts of muſic, by exhibitions of painting; and at ſeveral feſtivals, particularly the Panathenæan, by hearing and judging the nobleſt productions of eloquence and poetry [68]. We ſhall have occaſion to mention ſome particular ceremonies of a more melancholy caſt; but the general character of the Grecian religion was as cheerful and attractive, as the ſuperſtition of the Egyptians, from whom they are ignorantly ſuppoſed to have borrowed it, was gloomy and forbidding. Even the Egyptian hymns conſiſted in diſmal complaints and lamentations [69]; the Grecian ſolemnities concluded with ſongs of joy and exultation. The feaſts which followed the ſacrifices were enriched by all the delicacies and luxuries of the ancient world; and, to uſe the words of Ariſtotle, many perſons thought it their duty, at thoſe religious entertainments, to get drunk in honour of the gods [70].

the ſplendour with which they were celebrated.

[68] Iſocrat Panegyr. & Panathen.
[69] Apuleius de Genio Socratis.
[70] Ariſtot. Ethic. ad Nicom. l. viii. c. iii.

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Manners of the Athenians in private life.

It ſeems extraordinary, that the revenues of Athens, notwithſtanding their improvement by Pericles, ſhould have ſufficed for this multitude of expences. But we muſt conſider that the general ſimplicity of manners in private life, formed a ſtriking contraſt with the extravagance of public feſtivals and amuſements. The houſes and tables of the moſt wealthy Athenians were little diſtinguiſhed above thoſe of their pooreſt neighbours. Pericles himſelf, though never ſuſpected of avarice, lived with the exacteſt œconomy; and the ſuperabundance of private wealth, which would have created envy and danger to the owner, if he had employed it for his particular convenience and pleaſure, procured him public gratitude and eſteem, when expended for the ſatisfaction of the multitude.

Condition of the female ſex.

For reaſons which will immediately appear, we have not hitherto found it neceſſary to deſcribe the manners and influence of the Grecian women; but the character and condition of the fair ſex will throw light on the preceding obſervations in this chapter, and preſent the moſt ſtriking contraſt of any to be met with in hiſtory. If we knew not the conſideration in which women were anciently held in Greece, and the advantage which they enjoyed at Sparta, after the laws of Lycurgus had revived the inſtitutions of the heroic ages[71], we ſhould be apt to ſuſpect that the ungenerous treatment of the feebler ſex, which afterwards ſo univerſally prevailed, had been derived from the

[71] Ariſtot. Politic. l. ii. p. 105.

Egyp-

Egyptian and Aſiatic colonies, which early ſettled in that part of Europe. Excluded from ſocial intercourſe, which nature had fitted them to adorn, the Grecian women were rigorouſly confined to the moſt retired apartments of the family, and employed in the meaneſt offices of domeſtic œconomy. It was thought indecent for them to venture abroad, unleſs to attend a proceſſion, to accompany a funeral [72], or to aſſiſt at certain other religious ſolemnities. Even on theſe occaſions, their behaviour was attentively watched, and often malignantly interpreted. The moſt innocent freedom was conſtrued into a breach of decorum; and their reputation, once ſullied by the ſlighteſt imprudence, could never afterwards be retrieved. If ſuch unreaſonable ſeverities had proceeded from that abſurd jealouſy which ſometimes accompanies a violent love, and of which a certain degree is nearly connected with the delicacy of paſſion between the ſexes, the condition of the Grecian women, though little leſs miſerable, would have been far leſs contemptible. But the Greeks were utter ſtrangers to that refinement of ſentiment [73], which, in the ages, of chivalry, and which ſtill, in ſome ſouthern countries of Europe, renders women the objects of a ſuſpicious, but reſpectful paſſion, and leads men to gratify their vanity at the expence of their freedom. Married or unmarried, the Grecian females were kept in equal reſtraint: no pains were taken to render them, at any one period of their lives, agreeable members of ſociety; and their education was

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[72] Lyſias, p. 420. [73] Idem, p. 435.

either

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either entirely neglected, or confined at leaſt to ſuch humble objects as, inſtead of elevating and enlarging the mind, tended only to narrow and to debaſe it[74]. Though neither qualified for holding an honourable rank in ſociety, nor permitted to enjoy the company even of their neareſt relations, they were thought capable of ſuperintending or performing the drudgery of domeſtic labour, of acting as ſtewards for their huſbands, and thus relieving men from a multiplicity of little cares, which ſeemed unworthy of their attention, and unſuitable to their dignity. The whole burden of ſuch mercenary cares being impoſed on the women, their firſt education and early habits were adapted to that lowly rank, beyond which they could never afterwards aſpire[75]. Nothing was allowed to divert their minds from thoſe ſervile occupations in which it was intended that their whole lives ſhould be ſpent; no liberal idea was preſented to their imagination, that might raiſe them above the ignoble arts in which they were ever deſtined to labour; the ſmalleſt familiarity with ſtrangers was deemed a dangerous offence; and any intimacy or acquaintance beyond the walls of their own family, a heinous crime; ſince it might engage them to embezzle the furniture and effects committed to their care and cuſtody. Even the laws of Athens confirmed this miſerable degradation of women, holding the ſecurity of the huſband's

[74] See Ariſtotle's character of women, Hiſt. Animal. l. ix. c. 1.

[75] Xenoph. Memorab. l. v. paſſim, particularly Socrates's Diſcourſe with Iſchomachus.

property

property a matter of greater importance than defending the wife's perſon from outrage, and protecting her character from infamy [76]. By ſuch illiberal inſtitutions were the moſt amiable part of the human ſpecies inſulted, among a people in other reſpects the moſt improved of all antiquity. They were totally debarred from thoſe refined arts and elegant entertainments, to which their agreeable qualities might have added a new charm. Inſtead of directing the taſte, and enlivening the pleaſures of ſociety, their value was eſtimated, like that of the ignobleſt objects, merely by profit or utility. Their chief virtue was reſerve, and their point of honour, œconomy.

Grecian courtezans,

The extreme depreſſion of women levelled the natural inequalities of their temper and diſpoſition; the prude, the coquette, with the various intermediate ſhades of female character, diſappeared; and all the modeſt and virtuous part of the ſex (if virtue and modeſty can ever be the effects of reſtraint) were reduced to humble imitation and inſipid uniformity. But, in the time, of Pericles there appeared and flouriſhed at Athens a bolder claſs of females, who diveſted themſelves of the natural modeſty, diſdained the artificial virtues, and avenged the violated privileges of their ſex. Aſia, the mother of voluptuouſneſs, produced this dangerous brood, whoſe meretricious arts and occupations met with no check or reſtraint from the laxity of Ionian morals, and were even promoted and encouraged

[76] See the laws, quoted by Lyſias, explained in my Introductory Diſcourſe to that orator, p. 100.

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couraged by the corruptions of Pagan ſuperſtition. In moſt of the Greek colonies of Aſia, temples were erected to the *earthly* Venus; where courtezans were not merely tolerated, but honoured as prieſteſſes of that condeſcending divinity [77]. The wealthy and commercial city of Corinth firſt imported this innovation from the Eaſt; and ſuch is the extravagance of the human mind, that after the repulſe of Xerxes, the magiſtrates of that republic aſcribed the ſafety of their country to the powerful interceſſion of the votaries of Venus, whoſe portraits they cauſed to be painted at the public expence, as the Athenians had done thoſe of the warriors who gained the battle of Marathon [78]. The fame of all thoſe accompliſhed, but mercenary beauties, though highly celebrated by the poets and hiſtorians of the times, was eclipſed by the ſplendour of Aſpaſia of Miletus, who ſettled at Athens under the adminiſtration of Pericles, and is ſaid to have embarked in the fleet, with which that fortunate commander ſubdued the powerful and wealthy iſland of Samos. The perſonal character of Aſpaſia gave temporary luſtre to a profeſſion, which, though exalted by the caſual caprices of ſuperſtition, muſt, from its native odiouſneſs, have fallen into diſgrace, ſince later writers among the Greeks [79] acknowledge, that though ſhe carried on a very diſhonourable commerce in female virtue, yet her wit and eloquence, ſtill more than her beauty, gained her extraordinary conſideration

their artifices and influence.

[77] Athenæus, l. xiii. & Plutarch, p. 637.

[78] Simonides apud Athen. l. xiii.

[79] Plutarch. in Pericle.

among

among all ranks in the republic. The ſuſceptible minds of the Athenians were delighted with what their abſurd inſtitutions rendered a novelty, the beholding the native graces of the ſex, embelliſhed by education. Aſpaſia is ſaid to have acquired a powerful aſcendant over Pericles himſelf; ſhe certainly acquired his protection and friendſhip; which is leſs extraordinary than that her converſation and company ſhould have pleaſed the diſcernment of the ſage Socrates. She is accuſed (as we ſhall afterwards have an opportunity to mention) of having excited, from motives of perſonal reſentment, the war of Peloponneſus; yet, calamitous as that long and obſtinate conflict proved to Greece, and particularly to Athens, it may be ſuſpected that Aſpaſia occaſioned ſtill more incurable evils to both. Her example, and ſtill more her inſtructions, formed a ſeminary at Athens, by which her dangerous profeſſion was reduced into method. The companions of Aſpaſia ſerved as models for painting and ſtatuary, and themes for poetry and panegyric. Nor were they merely the objects, but the authors of many literary works, in which they eſtabliſhed rules for the behaviour of their lovers, particularly at table; and explained the various arts for gaining the heart, and captivating the affections[80]; which would have been in them an imprudence, had they not conſidered, that the myſteries of *their* calling alone loſe little by diſcloſure, ſince men may often perceive the ſnare, without having courage to avoid it. The dreſs, behaviour, and artifices of

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[80] Athenæus, ibid.

this

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this claſs of women, became continually more ſeductive and dangerous; and Athens thenceforth remained the chief ſchool of vice and pleaſure as well as of literature and philoſophy.

It has been already hinted, that the fine arts, and particularly painting, were proſtituted to the honour of harlots, and the purpoſes of voluptuouſneſs. Licentious pictures are mentioned by ancient writers as a general ſource of corruption, and conſidered as the firſt ambuſh that beſet the ſafety of youth and innocence[8]. Yet this unhappy effect of the arts was only the vapour that accompanies the ſun; ſince painting, architecture, and above all, ſtatuary, attained their meridian ſplendour in the age of Pericles; and ſhed peculiar glory on this period of Athenian hiſtory, not only by the powers of genius which they diſplayed, but by the noble purpoſes to which they were directed. But the arts of deſign form ſo important a ſubject, that they merit to be examined apart in the following chapter.

[8] Euripid. in Hippolyt.

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History of the Arts of Design.—Superiority of the Greeks in those Arts.—Causes of that Superiority —Among the Asiatic Greeks—Who communicated their Inventions to Europe.—Bathycles the Magnesian—Dipenus and Scillis—Imitated in Greece, Italy and Sicily.—The Athenians surpass their Masters —Sublime Style of Art.—Works of Phidias, Polygnotus, &c.—Characteristic Excellence of Grecian Art.—Different Impressions made by Painters and Poets—Depended on the Nature of their respective Arts.

CHAP. XIV. History of the art of design.

THAT the history of arts has been less cultivated than that of arms and politics, is a general and just complaint, to which writers will seldom be inclined to pay regard, because they will always find it an easier task to relate wars and negociations, debates and battles, than to describe the gradual and almost imperceptible progress of genius and taste, in works of elegance and beauty.

The origin of the imitative[1] arts (so congenial is imitation to man) reaches beyond the limits of

[1] Concerning the arts of the Greeks, the most copious materials are furnished by Pausanias throughout; and by the 34th and 35th books of Pliny. The best modern guides are Winckelman and Lessing in German, and Caylus in French. Many important errors of Winckelman are detected by the learned professor Heyne, in his Antiquarische Abhandlungen.

profane

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profane hiſtory; and to diſpute who were their inventors, is only to examine what nation is the moſt ancient. In this reſpect, the Egyptians and Phœnicians merit, doubtleſs, the pre-eminence. From the earlieſt ages of Heathen antiquity, both theſe nations ſeem to have cultivated the arts of deſign. In the remoteſt periods of their hiſtory, the Egyptians engraved on precious ſtones, and ſtrove to render their public tranſactions immortal, by recording them in hieroglyphics, on the hardeſt bazaltes; nor can we ſufficiently admire the perfection to which the patience of that laborious people had carried the mechanical part of ſculpture, before the Perſian conqueſt, and the reign of Cambyſes. But beauty, the eſſence and the end of art, was never ſtudied by the natives of either Phœnicia or Egypt, who faithfully copied their national features, without attempting to improve them; until the traces of Grecian conqueſt and coloniza-tion appeared in the medals of the Ptolemies, particularly thoſe with the head of Jupiter Ammon.

Superiority of the Greeks in thoſe arts.

Allowance, doubtleſs, muſt be made for the prejudices of national vanity, when Euripides, Ariſtotle, and Epicurus, endeavour to perſuade us, that the clear ſkies, and happy temperature Greece, engendered a peculiar aptitude for a letters, and philoſophy. The teſtimony, howe of modern travellers confirms the evidence of antiquity, that the ſhores and iſlands of the Archipelago produce more elegant and liberal forms, and features more animated and expreſſive, with fewer individual imperfections, and more of general nature,

nature, than can be found in any other diviſions of the world [2]. Yet whatever the Greeks owed to their ſkies and climate, they were probably not leſs indebted to their laborious education and active mode of life, and to the manly ſpirit of their religious, civil, and military inſtitutions. Long before the invaſion of Xerxes, the Grecian ſculpture was diſtinguiſhed by an air of majeſty peculiar to itſelf [3]; and the awful images of the gods, as yet rudely finiſhed, diſplayed a grandeur and ſublimity of expreſſion, that delighted and aſtoniſhed the beſt judges, in the moſt refined ages of art [4]. CHAP. XIV.

This ſingularity might be expected from the deſcription already given of the religion and manners of Greece, and from the inimitable excellence of its poet-muſicians and poets. The divinities of Greece being imagined of the human form, though incomparably more noble and perfect, artiſts would naturally begin at a very early period [5], to exalt and generaliſe their conceptions. The bold enthuſiaſm of poetry ſerved to elevate and ſupport their flight, and the native country of Homer was the firſt ſcene of their ſucceſs, the happy climate of Ionia rendering frequent and *natural*, in that delightful region, Cauſes of that ſuperiority,

[2] Belon, Obſervat. l. ii. 34.

[3] Pauſan. Corinth. l. ii. 34. [4] Plato & Ariſtot. paſſim.

[5] We omit the fabulous account of Dedalus the Athenian, who is ſaid to have flouriſhed in the time of Hercules and Theſeus, and forty years before the Trojan war. It has been already proved that, during the heroic ages, the Greeks paid no adoration to ſtatues. Athenian writers, who lived a thouſand years after that period, might eaſily confound the ſuppoſed works of the ancient Dedalus with thoſe of Dedalus of Sicyon, eſpecially ſince the error was extremely flattering to their national vanity.

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those beautiful and lovely forms which are elsewhere merely *ideal*, while other circumstances concurred to accelerate the progress of invention and genius in that highly-favoured country.

among the Asiatic Greeks;

In the eighth century before the Christian æra, the Asiatic colonies, as we already had occasion to explain, far surpassed their mother country in splendour and prosperity. For this pre-eminence, they were indebted to the superior fertility of their soil, the number and convenience of their harbours, the advantages of their situation and climate, the vicinity of the most wealthy and refined nations in Asia; above all, to their persevering diligence and ingenuity, by which they not only improved and ennobled the arts derived from the Lydians and Phrygians, but invented others long peculiar to themselves, particularly painting, sculpture in marble, together with the Doric and Ionic orders of architecture.

who communicated their inventions to Europe.

In the seventh century before Christ, the magnificent presents which the far-famed oracle of Apollo received from the superstition or vanity of the Lydian kings, were the productions, not of Egyptian or Phœnician, but of Ionian artists; and, during both that and the following century, the Ionians diffused the elegant inventions of their country through the dominions of their ancestors in Europe. Alarmed by the inroads of the Cimmerians, and disturbed by the continual hostility of Lydia, many Eastern artists sought refuge in the commercial cities of Ægina, Sicyon, and Corinth, where the peaceful spirit of the inhabitants, com-

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paratively wealthy and luxurious, afforded thoſe ingenious ſtrangers both encouragement and ſecurity.

Bathycles, the Magneſian.

The Aſiatic fugitives, however, did not confine themſelves to thoſe ſecondary republics. Bathycles, a native of Ionian Magneſia, a place early celebrated for painting[6], fixed his abode in Sparta, the moſt conſiderable community in Greece. By order of the magiſtrates of that illuſtrious republic, he made the throne of Amyclæan Apollo, the ſtatue of Diana Leucophryné, the figures of the Graces and Horæ, and all the other gifts and ornaments incloſed within the conſecrated ground ſurrounding the temple of Amyclæ. The ſtatue of Apollo, thirty cubits high, ſeemed to be the work of an ignorant ſculptor, and probably was the production of a far earlier age than that of Bathycles. But whoever conſiders the coloſſean bulk of the principal figure, the baſe of which was formed into an altar containing the tomb of Hyacinth, muſt admire the proportional magnitude of his throne, both ſides of which were adorned with ſculpture[7]. Among theſe ornaments, many ſubjects of hiſtory

The throne of Amyclæan Apollo.

[6] Plin. l. xxxv. I call it Ionian Magneſia, to diſtinguiſh it from other places of the ſame name. Vid. Plin. edit. Berolin. tom. i. p. 167. & tom. iii. p. 136. 139. & 255.

[7] Winkleman, who ſcarcely mentions the throne of Amyclæan Apollo, though undoubtedly the greateſt ancient monument in Greece, confounds Bathycles the Magneſian with a later artiſt of the ſame name, who made the celebrated cup which the ſeven ſages modeſtly ſent one to the other, as moſt worthy of ſuch a preſent, and which was finally conſecrated to Delphian Apollo. Diogenes Laertius, ſpeaking on this ſubject, ſays, Βαθυκλεα τινα Αρκαδα; and that he was an Arcadian appears alſo from Plut. in Solon. & Caſaubon, ad Athenæum, l. xi. 4.

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or fable are mentioned by Pauſanias, which bear not any known relation to Apollo or Hyacinth, to Bathycles or the Spartans; but the top of the throne contained a chorus of Magneſians, ſuppoſed to repreſent the artiſts who aſſiſted in the execution of this ſtupendous work. The altar repreſented a celeſtial group; Minerva, Venus, Diana, and ſeveral other divinities, conveying Hyacinth to the ſkies. Its ſides were adorned with the combat of Tyndareus and Eurytus; the exploits of Caſtor and Pollux; and the extraordinary ſcene between Menelaus and the Egyptian Proteus, as deſcribed in the Odyſſey [8]. Nor was this the only ſubject copied from the divine bard. It was eaſy to diſtinguiſh his favourite Demodocus ſinging among a chorus of Phæatians; a circumſtance confirming our obſervations in a former part of this work, that the poems of Homer were generally known in Sparta long before they had been collected by the Athenian tyrant Piſiſtratus.

Dipenus and Scillus.

Nearly ſix centuries before the Chriſtian æra, the Cretans, Dipenus and Scillus, adorned many Grecian cities in Europe as well as in Aſia; and about fifty years afterwards, the Chians, Bupalus and Anthermus, diffuſed over Greece thoſe precious works in Parian marble, which were highly admired in the age of Auguſtus [9]. About the ſame time, Polydorus of Samos, who ſeems to have been much employed by Crœſus, the laſt king of Lydia, made the famous ring for the

[8] Pauſan. Lacon. p. 196, & ſeqq.
[9] Vid. Plin. l. xxxvi. § 4.

Samian

Samian tyrant Polycrates, which is extolled by Pliny [10] as a maſter-piece of art. CHAP. XIV.

The productions of thoſe Eaſtern artiſts were imitated with ſucceſsful emulation by their diſciples in ancient Greece, and likewiſe by the Grecian colonies in Italy and Sicily; as ſufficiently appears from the medals of theſe laſt-mentioned countries. Theſe more durable monuments, however, can afford but an imperfect idea of the innumerable ſtatues which were formed of tuf or gravel ſtone [11], and of various kinds of wood. The moſt eſteemed were made of ivory, which, like the teeth of other animals, calcines and grows ground; an unfortunate circumſtance for the arts, ſince, before the invaſion of Xerxes, Greece could boaſt an hundred ivory ſtatues of the gods, all of a coloſſean magnitude, and many of them covered with gold [12]. The white marbles of Paros, together with thoſe of Cyprus and Ægina, furniſhed the chief material for ſculpture, before the Athenians opened the hard ſparkling veins of mount Pentelicus. Ebony, cypreſs, and other kinds of wood, were gradually brought into uſe, in conſequence of the more general diffuſion of the art, which was deſtined not only to repreſent gods and heroes, but to commemorate the uſeful merit of illuſtrious citizens [13]. At the four ſacred feſtivals common to the Grecian name, the victors in the gymnaſtic exerciſes, as well as in the muſical and poetical entertainments, were frequently diſtinguiſhed by the honour of a

Their works imitated in Greece, Italy, and Sicily.

[10] L. xxxvii. § 4.
[11] Plut. in Vit. Andoc.
[12] Pauſanias.
[13] Lucian. Enagon.

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ſtatue. The ſcenes of thoſe admired ſolemnities, thus became the principal repoſitories of ſculpture; and the cities of Delphi and Olympia, in particular, long ſurpaſſed the reſt of Greece in the number and value of their ſtatues, as well as in the ſplendour and magnificence of all their other ornaments [14].

The Athenians ſupply their maſters.

But the time approached when theſe cities themſelves were to be eclipſed by the luſtre of Athens, which, in the courſe of forty years, became the ſeat not only of opulence, power, and politics, but of literature, philoſophy, and the fine arts, and thenceforth continued to be deemed the ſovereign of Greece, rather than the capital of the narrow and unfruitful territory of Attica. During that memorable period, the Athenians, whoſe circumſtances had hitherto proved little favourable to the progreſs of taſte and elegance, acquired unrivalled power and renown. Having defeated and diſgraced the arms, they plundered the wealth of Perſia. Their valour gave them poſſeſſion of thoſe maritime provinces of Lower Aſia, which were juſtly regarded as the cradle of the arts. Their magnanimity and firmneſs commanded reſpect abroad, and enſured pre-eminence in Greece; while, by a rare felicity, their republic, amidſt this uninterrupted flow of external proſperity, produced men qualified to improve the gifts of valour or fortune to the ſolid and permanent glory of their country.

Athenian artiſts,

It is difficult to determine whether the diſcerning encouragement of Pericles was more uſeful in

[14] Pauſanias Phocic. and Eliac.

ani-

animating the induſtry of Phidias, or the genius of Phidias in ſeconding the views of his illuſtrious protector. Their congenial minds ſeemed as happily formed for each other, as both were admirably adapted to the flouriſhing circumſtances of their country. In the language of Plutarch [15], this great *miniſter*, whoſe virtues gradually rendered him the *maſter* of the republic, found Athens well furniſhed with marble, braſs, ivory, gold, ebony, and cypreſs, together with all the other materials fitted to adorn a city, which, having raiſed to the glory of empire, he wiſhed farther to immortaliſe as the model of elegance. According to the popular principles which he profeſſed, he deemed it the duty of a ſtateſman to provide not merely for the army, the navy, the judges, and others immediately employed in the public ſervice: the great body of the people he regarded as the conſtant and moſt important object of his miniſterial care. The immenſe revenues of the ſtate, which had hitherto been chiefly ſquandered in ſhows and feſtivals, in gaudy oſtentation and periſhing luxury, he directed to objects more ſolid and durable, which, while they embelliſhed the city, might exerciſe the induſtry and diſplay the talents of the citizens. Guided by ſuch motives, he boldly opened the treaſury, and expended about four thouſand talents; a ſum which then might command as much labour as ſix or ſeven millions ſterling in the preſent age. By this liberal encouragement, he animated every art, excited every

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conſpire with the views of Pericles.

[15] Plut. in Pericle.

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hand, enlivened every exertion, and called forth into the public ſervice the whole dexterity, ſkill, and genius of his countrymen; while the motives of gain or glory which he propoſed, allured from all quarters the moſt ingenious ſtrangers, who readily tranſported their talents to Athens, as to the beſt market, and moſt conſpicuous theatre.

Sublime ſtyle of art,

But it was the peculiar felicity of Pericles, to find Athens provided not only with all the materials of art, but with artiſts capable of employing them to the beſt advantage. In the inaccurate, but often expreſſive, language of Pliny, ſculpture and painting then firſt aroſe, under the plaſtic hands of Phidias and his brother Panænus. Both arts, however, are known to have exiſted at an earlier date; but in the age of Pericles, they firſt aſſumed their proper elevation and due honours. The inventive genius of man tried a new and nobler flight. The ſuperiority of Phidias and his contemporaries obſcured, and almoſt obliterated, the memory of their predeceſſors, and produced that ſublime ſtyle of art, which, having flouriſhed about an hundred and fifty years, decayed with the glory of Greece, and diſappeared ſoon after the reign of Alexander.

Compared with that preceding it.

It appears from the gems and medals, and the few remains in marble, preceding the age of Pericles, that the mechanical part of engraving and ſculpture had already attained a high degree of perfection. In many of thoſe works, the minuteſt ornaments are finiſhed with care, the muſcles are boldly pronounced, the outline is faithful; but the deſign has more hardneſs than energy, the attitudes

are

are too conſtrained to be graceful, and the ſtrength of the expreſſion diſtorts, and for the moſt part deſtroys, beauty. The ſculptors Phidias, Polycletus, Scopas, Alcamenes, and Myron, together with the contemporary painters, Panænus, Zeuxis, and Parrhaſius, ſoftened the aſperities of their predeceſſors [16], rendered their contours more flowing and more natural, and by employing greater addreſs to conceal the mechaniſm of their art, diſplayed ſuperior ſkill to the judgment and afforded higher delight to the fancy, in proportion as leſs care and labour appeared viſible to the eye. In the works of theſe admired artiſts, the expreſſion was ſkilfully diffuſed through every part, without diſturbing the harmony of the whole. Pain and ſorrow were rather concentrated in the mind than diſplayed on the countenance; and even the more turbulent paſſions of indignation, anger, and reſentment, were ſo tempered and controlled, that the indications of them became conſiſtent with attractive grace and ſublime beauty. But the triumph of art conſiſted in repreſenting and recommending the ſocial affections; for ſetting aſide the unwarranted aſſertions of Pliny, in his pretended epochs of painting, it appears from much higher authority, that as early as the age of Socrates, painters had diſcerned and attained that admired excellence of ſtyle, which has been called in modern times the manner of Raphael; and had learned to expreſs, by the outward air, attitudes, and features, whatever (in the words of

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[16] Plut. in Pericl. & Quintilian, l. xii. c. x. p. 578.

Xeno-

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Xenophon [17]) is moſt engaging, affectionate, ſweet, attractive, and amiable, in the inward ſentiments and character. Of theſe Grecian paintings, indeed, which were chiefly on wood, and other periſhing materials, no veſtige remains; but the ſtatuary of that celebrated age, while it diſplays its own excellence, is ſufficient to redeem from oblivion (as far at leaſt as invention, expreſſion, and ideal beauty, are concerned) the obliterated charms of the ſiſter art.

The works of Phidias. Olymp. lxxxiii. 4. A. C. 445.

In ſtatuary, the ſuperior merit of Phidias was acknowledged by the unanimous admiration of independent and rival communities. Intruſted by Pericles with the ſuperintendence of the public works, his own hands added to them their laſt and moſt valuable ornaments. Before he was called to this honourable employment, his ſtatues had adorned the moſt celebrated temples of Greece. His Olympian Jupiter we had already occaſion to deſcribe. In the awful temple of Delphi, ſtrangers admired his bronze ſtatues of Apollo and Diana. He likewiſe made for the Delphians a group of twelve Grecian heroes, ſurrounding a figure of braſs, that repreſented the Trojan horſe. His admired ſtatue of the goddeſs Nemeſis, or Venegance, was formed from a block of marble, which the vain confidence of the Perſians tranſported to Marathon for a trophy of victory, but which their diſgraceful and precipitate flight left for a monument of their cowardice on the Marathonian ſhore. The grateful

[17] See the converſation of Socrates with the painter Parrhaſius, in Memorab. l. iii.

piety of Greece adored his Venus Urania, and Parthenopean Apollo. His three Minervas were reſpectively made for the Pallenians, Plateæans, and Lemnians; and all three were preſented by thoſe tributary ſtates to their Athenian protectors and ſovereigns. Theſe inimitable works ſilenced the voice of envy. The moſt diſtinguiſhed artiſts of Greece; ſculptors, painters, and architects, were ambitious to receive the directions, and to ſecond the labours, of Phidias, which were uninterruptedly employed, during fifteen years, in the embelliſhment of his native city. CHAP. XIV. A. C. 455—430.

The Odeum, Parthenon, and Propylæa.

During that ſhort period he completed the Odeum, or theatre of muſic; the Parthenon, or temple of Minerva; the Propylæa, or veſtibule, and porticoes belonging to the citadel, together with the ſculptured and pictureſque ornaments of theſe and other immortal works; which, when new (as Plutarch finely obſerves), expreſſed the mellowed beauties of time and maturity; and when old, ſtill preſerved the freſh charms and alluring graces of novelty. The Parthenon, which ſtill remains, atteſts the juſtice of this panegyric. It is two hundred and ſeventeen feet nine inches long, compoſed of beautiful white marble, and acknowledged by modern travellers[18] to be the nobleſt piece of antiquity exiſting in the world. It appears at firſt ſight extraordinary, that the expence of two thouſand talents ſhould have been beſtowed on the Propylæa[19]. But we muſt conſider, that this ex-

[18] Sir George Wheeler's Travels, &c.

[19] Plutarch. in Pericle, & Demoſth. p. 71.

tenſive

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tensive name comprehended the temple of Minerva, the treasury, and other public edifices.

Works of Panænus, tus, and Micon.

The Pœcile, or diversified portico, which was painted by Panænus, the brother of Phidias, assisted by Polygnotus and Micon, must have been a work of great time and expence. Its front and ceilings were of marble, like those of all the other porticoes leading to the citadel, which still remained in the time of Pausanias, and were regarded, both on account of the workmanship and materials, as superior to any thing extant. In the Pœcile, those great painters, whose merit Pliny [20] forgets in his inaccurate epochs of art, had represented the most illustrious events of Grecian history; the victory of Theseus over the Amazons, the sack[illegible] Troy, and particularly the recent exploits against the Persians. In the battle of Marathon, the Athenian and Platæan heroes were drawn from the life, or more probably from the innumerable statues which preserved the faithful lineaments of such admired patriots. The whole extent of the Acropolis, above six miles in circumference, was so diversified by works of painting and statuary, that it is described as exhibiting one continued scene of elegance and beauty.

The Minerva in the Acropolis.

But all these ornaments were surpassed by one production of Phidias, which probably was the last of that great master. His admired statue of Minerva, the erecting of which served to consecrate the Parthenon, was composed of gold and ivory, twenty-six cubits high, being of inferior dimensions

[20] He places the first epoch of great painters in the 90th Olymp. A. C. 420.

to

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to his Minerva Poliads of bronze, the ſpear and creſt of which was ſeen from the promontory of Sunium[1], at twenty-five miles diſtance. Parrhaſius had painted the ornaments of the latter[2]; Phidias himſelf adorned every part of the former; and the compliment which, in his favourite work, he took an opportunity of paying to the merit of Pericles, occaſioned (as we ſhall have occaſion to explain[3]) his own baniſhment, a diſgrace which he ſeems not to have long ſurvived. Cicero, Plutarch, Pliny, and Pauſanias, had ſeen and admired this invaluable monument of piety, as well as genius, ſince the Minerva of Phidias increaſed the devotion of Athens towards her protecting divinity. It belonged only to thoſe who had ſeen and ſtudied, to deſcribe ſuch maſter-pieces of art; and as they exiſt no more, it will better ſuit the deſign of this hiſtory to confine ourſelves to ſuch works as we ourſelves have ſeen, and which are generally acknowledged to bear the impreſſion of the Socratic age, when philoſophy gave law to painting and ſculpture, as well as to poetry and eloquence.

Were it allowed to make the melancholy ſuppoſition, that all the monuments of Grecian literature had periſhed in the general wreck of their nation and liberty, and that poſterity could collect nothing farther concerning this celebrated people, but what appeared from the Apollo Belvidere, the groupes of the Laocoon and Niobé, and other ſtatues, gems, or medals, now ſcattered over Italy and

Characteriſtic excellence of Grecian art.

[1] Pauſanias Attic. Idem, ibid.
[2] Plutarch in Peric. & Thucydid. l. ii.

Europe,

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Europe, what opinion would mankind form of the genius and character of the Greeks? would it correſpond with the impreſſions made by their poets, orators, and hiſtorians? which impreſſion would be moſt favourable? and what would be the preciſe difference between them? The ſolution of theſe queſtions will throw much light on the preſent ſubject.

Circumſtances in which it agreed with poetry and eloquence.

The firſt obſervation that occurs on the moſt ſuperficial, and that is ſtrongly confirmed by a more attentive, ſurvey of the ancient marbles, is, that their authors perfectly underſtood proportion, anatomy, the art of clothing without concealing, the naked figure, and whatever contributes to the juſtneſs and truth of deſign. The exact knowledge of form is as neceſſary to the painter or ſtatuary, whoſe buſineſs it is to repreſent *bodies*, as that of language to the poet or hiſtorian who undertakes to deſcribe *actions*. In this particular, it would be unneceſſary to inſtitute a compariſon between Grecian writers and Grecian artiſts, ſince they are both acknowledged as perfect in their reſpective kinds, as the condition of humanity renders poſſible.

The expreſſion of paſſions, ſentiments, and character, in the works of poets and orators;

But when we advance a ſtep farther, and conſider the expreſſion of paſſions, ſentiments, and character, we find an extraordinary difference, or rather contrariety. Homer, Sophocles, and Demoſthenes, are not only the moſt original, but the moſt animated and moſt glowing of all writers. Every ſentence is energetic; all the parts are in motion; the paſſions are deſcribed in their utmoſt fury, and expreſſed by the boldeſt words and geſtures.

To

To keep to the tragic poet, whoſe art approaches the neareſt to painting and ſculpture, the heroes, and even the gods of Sophocles, frequently diſplay the impetuoſity of the moſt ungoverned natures; and, what is ſtill more extraordinary, ſometimes betray a momentary weakneſs, extremely inconſiſtent with their general character. The rocks of Lemnos reſound with the cries of Philoctetes; Oedipus, yielding to deſpair, plucks out his eyes; even Hercules, the model of fortitude, ſinks under the impreſſions of pain or ſorrow.

in thoſe of painters and ſtatuaries;

Nothing can be more oppoſite to the conduct of Grecian artiſts. *They* likewiſe have repreſented Philoctetes; but inſtead of effeminate tears and degrading lamentations, have aſcribed to him the patient concentrated woe of a ſuffering hero. The furious Ajax of Timomachus was painted, not in the moment when he deſtroyed the harmleſs ſheep inſtead of the hoſtile Greeks, but after he had committed this mad deed, and when his rage having ſubſided, he remained, like the ſea after a ſtorm, ſurrounded with the ſcattered fragments of mangled carcaſes, and reflecting with the ſilent anguiſh of deſpair on his uſeleſs and frantic brutality. The revenge of Medea againſt her huſband was not repreſented, as in Euripides, butchering her innocent children, but while ſhe was ſtill wavering and irreſolute, agitated between reſentment and pity. Even Clytemneſtra, whoſe unnatural, intrepid cruelty, poets and hiſtorians had ſo indignantly deſcribed and arraigned, was not deemed a proper ſubject for the pencil, when embruing her hands in the blood

of

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of Agamemnon. And although this may be referred to a rule of Ariſtotle, "that the characters of women ſhould not be repreſented as too daring or too deciſive;" yet we ſhall find on examination, that it reſults from principles of nature, whoſe authority is ſtill more univerſal and more imperious. The conſideration of the Apollo, Niobé, and Laocoon, whoſe copies have been infinitely multiplied, and are familiarly known, will ſet this matter in the cleareſt point of view.

Illuſtrated by the Apollo Belvidere.

The Apollo Belvidere is univerſally felt and acknowledged to be the ſublimeſt figure that either ſkill can execute, or imagination conceive. That favourite divinity, whom ancient poets ſeem peculiarly fond of deſcribing in the warmeſt colours [24], is repreſented in the attitude of darting the fatal arrow againſt the ſerpent Pytho, or the giant Tityus. Animated by the boldeſt conception of heavenly powers, the artiſt has far outſtepped the perfections of humanity, and (if may ſpeak without irreverence) made the corrupt put on incorruption, and the mortal immortality. His ſtature is above the human, his attitude majeſtic; the Elyſian ſpring of youth ſoftens the manly graces of his perſon, and the bold ſtructure of his limbs. Diſdain ſits on his lips, and indignation ſwells his noſtrils; but an unalterable ſerenity inveſts his front, and the ſublime elevation of his aſpect aſpires at deeds of renown ſtill ſurpaſſing the preſent object of his victory.

[24] Horace, b. iii. ode 4. ver. 60.

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The irascible passions are not represented with more dignity in the Apollo, than are those of fear, terror, and consternation, in the Niobé. This group contained Niobé and her husband Amphion, with seven sons, and as many daughters. Their melancholy story, which is too well known [25] to be related here, required the deepest expression; and the genius of the artist has chosen the only moment when this expression could be rendered consistent with the highest beauty; a beauty not flattering the senses by images of pleasure, but transporting the fancy into regions of purity and virtue. The excess and suddenness of their disaster occasioned a degree of amazement and horror, which, suspending the faculties, involved them in that silence and insensibility, which neither breaks out into lamentable shrieks, nor distorts the countenance, but which leaves full play to the artist's skill in representing motion without disorder, or, in other words, in rendering expression graceful.

by the group of Niobé,

The Laocoon may be regarded as the triumph of Grecian sculpture; since bodily pain, the grossest and most ungovernable of all our passions, and that pain united with anguish and torture of mind, are yet expressed with such propriety and dignity, as afford lessons of fortitude more impressive than any taught in the schools of philosophy. The horrible shriek, which Virgil's Laocoon [26] emits, is a proper circumstance for poetry, which speaks to the fancy

and by that of the Laocoon.

[25] Ovid. Metamorph. l. vi. ver. 146, & seqq.
[26] Æneid. l. ii. ver. 222.

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by images and ideas borrowed from all the ſenſes, and has a thouſand ways of ennobling its object; but the expreſſion of this ſhriek would have totally degraded the ſtatue. It is ſoftened, therefore, into a patient ſigh, with eyes turned to heaven in ſearch of relief. The intolerable agony of ſuffering nature is repreſented in the lower part, and particularly in the extremities, of the body; but the manly breaſt ſtruggles againſt calamity. The contention is ſtill more plainly perceived in his furrowed forehead; and his languiſhing paternal eye demands aſſiſtance, leſs for himſelf, than for his miſerable children, who look up to him for help.

Different impreſſion made by the ſame objects, as exhibited by poets and painters,

If ſubjects of this affecting nature are expreſſed without appearing hideous, ſhocking, or diſguſtful, we may well ſuppoſe that more temperate paſſions are repreſented with the greateſt moderation and dignity. The remark is juſtified by examining the remains or faithful copies of Grecian art; and were we to deduce from theſe alone the character of the nation, it would ſeem at firſt ſight, that the contemporaries of Pericles muſt have been a very ſuperior people in point of fortitude, ſelf-command, and every branch of practical philoſophy, to the Athenians who are deſcribed by poets and hiſtorians.

founded in the different nature of their reſpective arts.

But when we conſider the matter more deeply, we ſhall find that it is the buſineſs of hiſtory to deſcribe men as they are; of poetry and painting, to repreſent them as may afford moſt pleaſure and inſtruction to the reader or ſpectator. The aim of theſe imitative arts is the ſame, but they differ widely in the mode, the object, and extent, of their imitation.

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imitation. The poet who deſcribes *actions* in *time*, may carry the reader through all the gradations of paſſion; and in exhibiting its moſt furious exceſs his genius is moſt powerfully diſplay. But the painter or ſtatuary, who repreſents *bodies* in *ſpace*, is confined to one moment, and muſt chooſe that which leaves the freeſt play to the imagination. This can ſeldom be the higheſt pitch of paſſion, which leaves nothing beyond it; and in contemplating which, the ſympathy of the ſpectator, after his firſt ſurpriſe ſubſides, can only deſcend into indifference. Every violent ſituation, moreover, is perceived not to be durable; and all extreme perturbation is inconſiſtent with beauty, without which no viſible object can long continue either powerfully attractive or highly pleaſing [77].

[77] This ſubject is admirably treated in Leſſing's Laocoon, in which he traces the *bounds* of painting and poetry; a work which, it is much to be regretted, that able critic did not finiſh.

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Cauſes of the Peloponneſian War.—Rupture between Corinth and its Colony Corcyra.—Sea Fight.—Inſolence and Cruelty of the Corcyreans.—They provoke the Reſentment of the Peloponneſians—Obtain the Protection of Athens—Are defeated by the Corinthians—Who dread the reſentment of Athens.—Their Scheme for rendering it impotent.—Deſcription of the Macedonian Coaſt.—It revolts from Athens.—Siege of Potidæa.—General Confederacy againſt Athens.—Peloponneſian Embaſſy.—Its Demands firmly anſwered by Pericles.—His Speech to the Athenians.—The Thebans ſurpriſe Platæa.—Preparations for war on both Sides.—Invaſion of Attica.—Operations of the Athenian Fleet.—Plague in Athens.—Calamitous Situation of that Republic.—Magnanimity of Pericles.—Firmneſs of his laſt Advice.—His Death and Character.

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Pericles ſummons to Athens deputies from all the Grecian republics.

BY the luſtre of elegant arts, the magnificence of Pericles had diſplayed and ennobled the military glory of his country; and the preeminence of Athens ſeemed immoveably eſtabliſhed on the ſolid foundation of internal ſtrength, adorned by external ſplendour. But this abundant meaſure of proſperity ſatisfied neither the active ambition of the republic, nor the enterpriſing genius of

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its miniſter. The Greeks beheld and admired, but had not yet formally acknowledged, the full extent of Athenian greatneſs. In order to extort this reluctant confeſſion, than which nothing could more firmly ſecure to him the affectionate gratitude of his fellow-citizens, Pericles diſpatched ambaſſadors to the republics and colonies in Europe and in Aſia, requiring the preſence of their deputies in Athens, to concert meaſures for rebuilding their ruined temples, and for performing the ſolemn vows and ſacrifices promiſed, with devout thankfulneſs to the immortal gods, who had wonderfully protected the Grecian arms, during their long and dangerous conflict with the Perſian empire. This propoſal, which tended to render Athens the common centre of deliberation and of union, was readily accepted in ſuch foreign parts as had already ſubmitted to the authority of that republic. But in neighbouring ſtates, the ambaſſadors of Pericles were received coldly, and treated diſreſpectfully; in moſt aſſemblies of the Peloponneſus they were heard with ſecret diſguſt, and the pride of the Spartan ſenate openly derided the inſolence of their demands. When, at their return home, they explained the behaviour of the Spartans, Pericles exclaimed, in his bold ſtyle of eloquence, that he "beheld war advancing with wide and rapid ſteps from the Peloponneſus[1]."

Such was the preparation of materials which the ſmalleſt ſpark might throw into combuſtion. But

Introduction to the hiſtory of

[1] Plut. in Pericle.

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the Peloponnesian war.

before we relate the events which immediately occasioned the memorable war of twenty-seven years, it is impossible (if the calamities of our own times have taught us to compassionate the miserable) not to drop a tear over the continual disasters which so long and so cruelly afflicted the most valuable and enlightened portion of mankind, and whose immortal genius was destined to enlighten the remotest ages of the world. When rude illiterate peasants are summoned to mutual hostility, and, unaffected by personal motives of interest or honour, expend their strength and blood to gratify the sordid ambition of their respective tyrants, we may lament the general stupidity and wretchedness of human nature; but we cannot heartily sympathise with men who have so little sensibility, nor very deeply and feelingly regret, that those should suffer pain, who seem both unwilling and unable to relish pleasure. Their heavy unmeaning aspect, their barbarous language, and more barbarous manners, together with their total indifference to the objects and pursuits which form the dignity and glory of man; these circumstances, interrupting the ordinary course of our sentiments, divert or repel the natural current of sympathy. Their victories or defeats are contemplated without emotion, coldly related, and carelessly read. But the war of Peloponnesus presents a different spectacle. The adverse parties took arms, not to support the unjust pretensions of a tyrant, whom they had reason to hate or to despise, but to vindicate their civil rights, and to maintain their political independence. The meanest

meaneſt Grecian ſoldier knew the duties of the citizen, the magiſtrate, and the general[2]. His life had been equally divided between the moſt agreeable amuſements of leiſure, and the moſt honourable employments of activity. Trained to thoſe exerciſes and accompliſhments which give ſtrength and agility to the limbs, beauty to the ſhape, and grace to the motions, the dignity of his external appearance announced the liberal greatneſs of his mind; and his language, the moſt harmonious and expreſſive ever ſpoken by man, comprehended all that variety of conception, and all thoſe ſhades of ſentiment, that characteriſe the moſt exalted perfection of human manners. CHAP. XV.

Ennobled by ſuch actors, the ſcene itſelf was highly important, involving not only the ſtates of Greece, but the greateſt of the neighbouring kingdoms; and, together with the extent of a foreign war, exhibited the intenſeneſs of domeſtic ſedition. As it exceeded the ordinary duration of human power or reſentment, it was accompanied with unuſual circumſtances of terror, which, to the pious credulity of an unfortunate age, naturally announced the wrath of heaven, juſtly provoked by human cruelty. While peſtilence and famine multiplied the actual ſufferings, eclipſes and earthquakes increaſed the conſternation and horror of that la- Magnitude and importance of the ſubject.

[2] Such is the teſtimony uniformly given of them in the panegyric of Athens by Iſocrates, and confirmed by the more impartial authority of Xenophon, in the expedition of Cyrus. Their exploits in that wonderful enterpriſe juſtify the higheſt praiſe; and yet the national character had rather degenerated than improved, in the long interval between the periods alluded to.

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mentable period[1]. Several warlike communities were expelled from their hereditary poſſeſſions; others were not only driven from Greece, but utterly extirpated from the earth; ſome fell a prey to party rage, others to the vengeance of foreign enemies; ſome were ſlowly exhauſted by the contagion of a malignant atmoſphere, others overwhelmed at once by ſudden violence; while the combined weight of calamity aſſailed the power of Athens, and precipitated the downfall of that republic from the pride of flowing proſperity, to the loweſt ebb of dejection and miſery.

Rupture between Corinth and its colony Corcyra. Olymp. lxxv. 2. A. C. 439.

The general, but latent hoſtility of the Greeks, of which we have already explained the cauſe, was firſt called into action by a rupture between the ancient republic of Corinth, and its flouriſhing colony Corcyra. The haughty diſdain of Corcyra, elated with the pride of wealth and naval greatneſs, had long denied and scorned thoſe marks of defer-

[1] Thucydid. l. i. p. 16, et ſeqq.

[2] For the Peloponneſian war we have not, indeed, a full ſtream of hiſtory, but a regular ſeries of annals in Thucydides and Xenophon: authors, of whom each might ſay,

Quæque ipſe miſerrima vidi,
Et quorum pars magna fui ———

Many material circumſtances may likewiſe be learned from the Greek orators, the writings of Plato and Ariſtotle, the comedies of Ariſtophanes, the twelfth and two following books of Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch's Lives of Pericles, Nicias, Alcibiades, Lyſander, and Ageſilaus. It is remarkable, that the heavy compiler, as well as the lively biographer, have both followed the long loſt works of Ephorus and Theopompus, in preference to thoſe of Thucydides and Xenophon; a circumſtance which ſtrongly marks their want of judgment, but which renders their information more intereſting to poſterity.

ence

ence and reſpect which the uniform practice of Greece exacted from colonies towards their mother-country. At the Olympic and other ſolemn feſtivals, they yielded not the place of honour to the Corinthians; they appointed not a Corinthian high-prieſt to preſide over their religion; and when they eſtabliſhed new ſettlements on diſtant coaſts, they requeſted not, as uſual with the Greeks, the auſpicious guidance of a Corinthian conductor[1].

The Corinthians protect Epidamnus.

While the ancient metropolis, incenſed by thoſe inſtances of contempt, longed for an opportunity to revenge them, the citizens of Epidamnus, the moſt conſiderable ſea-port on the coaſt of the Hadriatic, craved aſſiſtance at Corinth againſt the barbarous incurſions of the Taulantii, an Illyrian tribe, who having united with a powerful band of Epidamnian exiles, greatly infeſted that territory, and threatened to ſtorm the city. As Epidamnus was a colony of Corcyra, its diſtreſſed inhabitants had firſt ſought protection there; but, although their petition was preferred with reſpectful deference, and urged with the moſt affecting demonſtrations of abaſement and calamity, by ambaſſadors who long remained under the melancholy garb of ſupplicants in the temple of Corcyrean Juno, the proud inſenſibility of theſe intractable iſlanders ſhewed not the ſmalleſt inclination to relieve them; partly reſtrained, it is probable, by the ſecret practices of the Epidamnian exiles, conſiſting of ſome

[1] Schol. in Thucyd. ad locum. He mentions the other circumſtances which I have melted into the text, and which will afterwards be confirmed by more claſſic authority.

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of the principal and richeſt families of that maritime republic. The Corinthians readily embraced the cauſe of a people abandoned by *their* natural protectors, and *their* own inveterate enemies; and immediately ſupplied Epidamnus with a conſiderable body of troops, leſs with a view to defend its walls againſt the aſſaults of the Taulantii, than in order irrecoverably to detach and alienate its inhabitants from the intereſts of Corcyra.

Are defeated at ſea by the Corcyreans. Olymp. lxxxvi. 2. A. C. 435.

The indignation of the Corcyreans was inflamed into fury, when they underſtood that thoſe whom they had long affected to conſider as aliens and as rivals, had interfered in the affairs of their colony. They inſtantly launched a fleet of forty ſail, proceeded in hoſtile array to the harbour of Epidamnus, ſummoned the inhabitants to re-admit their exiles, and to expel the foreign troops. With ſuch unconditional and arbitrary demands, the weakeſt and moſt puſillanimous garriſon could ſcarcely be ſuppoſed to comply. The Epidamnians rejected them with ſcorn; in conſequence of which their city was inveſted and attacked with vigour, by land and ſea. The Corinthians were now doubly ſolicitous, both to defend the place, and to protect the troops already thrown into it, conſiſting partly of their Leucadian and Ambracian allies, but chiefly of Corinthian citizens. A proclamation, firſt publiſhed at Corinth, was induſtriouſly diſſeminated through Greece, inviting all who were unhappy at home, or who courted glory abroad, to undertake an expedition to Epidamnus, with aſſurance of enjoying the immunities and honours

nours of a republic whoſe ſafety they had ventured to defend. Many exiles and military adventurers, at all times profuſely ſcattered over Greece, obeyed the welcome ſummons. Public aſſiſtance, likewiſe, was obtained, not only from Thebes and Megara, but from ſeveral ſtates of the Peloponneſus. In this manner the Corinthians were ſpeedily enabled to fit out an armament of ſeventy-five ſail; which, directing its courſe towards Epidamnus, anchored in the Ambracian gulph, near the friendly harbour of Actium, where, in a future age, Auguſtus and Antony decided the empire of the Roman world. Near this celebrated ſcene of action, the impetuous Corcyreans haſtened to meet the enemy. Forty ſhips were employed in the ſiege of Epidamnus. Twice that number ſailed towards the Ambracian gulph. The hoſtile armaments fought with equal animoſity; but the Corcyreans far ſurpaſſed in bravery and ſkill. Fifteen Corinthian veſſels were deſtroyed; the reſt eſcaped in diſorder, and the deciſive battle was ſoon followed by the ſurrender of Epidamnus. By a clemency little expected from the victors, the ancient inhabitants of the place were allowed their lives and liberties; but the Corinthians were made priſoners of war, and their allies condemned to death.

Epidamnus ſurrenders to the conquerors.

The Corcyreans thanked their gods, and erected a conſpicuous trophy of victory on the promontory Leucimné, whoſe lofty ridges overlooked the diſtant ſcene of the engagement. During the two following years, they reigned undiſturbed maſters of the neighbouring ſeas; and though a principle

Their inſolence and cruelty, A. C. 434—433.

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of fear, or perhaps a faint remnant of reſpect towards their ancient metropolis, prevented them from invading the territory of Corinth, they determined to make the confederates of that republic feel the full weight of their vengeance. For this purpoſe, they ravaged the coaſt of Apollonia; plundered the city Ambracia; almoſt deſolated the peninſula, now the iſland of Leucas; and emboldened by ſucceſs, ventured to land in the Peloponneſus, and ſet fire to the harbour of Cyllené, becauſe, in the late ſea-fight, the Elians, to whom that place belonged, had ſupplied Corinth with a few gallies [6].

which provoke the Peloponneſians.

The ſouthern ſtates of Greece, highly provoked by this outrage to the peaceable Elians, whoſe religious character had long commanded general reſpect, were ſtill farther incenſed through the active reſentment of the Corinthians, who, exaſperated at the diſgrace of being vanquiſhed by one of their own colonies, had, ever ſince their defeat, bent their whole attention, and employed the greateſt part even of their private fortunes, to hire mercenaries, to gain allies, and eſpecially to equip a new fleet, that they might be enabled to chaſtiſe the impious audacity (as they called it) of their rebellious children [7].

The Corcyreans and Corinthians ſend ambaſſadors to Athens.

The magiſtrates of Corcyra ſaw and dreaded the tempeſt that threatened to burſt on them, and which the unaſſiſted ſtrength of their iſland was totally unable to repell. They had not taken part

[6] Thucydid. lib. i. p. 22, & ſeqq. [7] Idem, ibid.

in

in the late wars; they had not acceded to the laſt treaty of peace; they could not ſummon the aid of a ſingle confederate. In this difficulty they ſent ambaſſadors to Athens, well knowing the ſecret animoſity between that republic and the enemies by whom their own ſafety was endangered. The Corinthians likewiſe ſent ambaſſadors to defeat their purpoſe. Both were allowed a hearing in the Athenian aſſembly; but firſt the Corcyreans, who, in a ſtudied oration, acknowledged, "that having no previous claim of merit to urge, they expected not ſucceſs in their negociation, unleſs an alliance between Athens and Corcyra ſhould appear alike advantageous to thoſe who propoſed and to thoſe who accepted it. Of this the Athenians would immediately become ſenſible, if they reflected that the people of Peloponneſus being equally hoſtile to both (the open enemies of Corcyra, the ſecret and more dangerous enemies of Athens), their country muſt derive a vaſt acceſſion of ſtrength by receiving, without trouble or expence, a rich and warlike iſland, which, unaſſiſted and alone, had defeated a numerous confederacy; and whoſe naval force, augmenting the fleet of Athens, would for ever render that republic ſovereign of the ſeas. If the Corinthians complained of the injuſtice of receiving their colony, let them remember, that colonies are preſerved by moderation, and alienated by oppreſſion; that men ſettle in foreign parts to better their ſituation, not to ſubmit their liberties; to continue the equals, not to become the ſlaves of their leſs adventurous fellow-citizens. If they pretended, that the

Speech of the Corcyreans.

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demand of Corcyra was inconſiſtent with the laſt general treaty of peace, let the words of that treaty confound them, which expreſsly declare every Grecian city, not previouſly bound to follow the ſtandard of Athens or of Sparta, at full liberty to accede to the alliance of either of thoſe powers [8]. But it became the dignity of Athens to expect honour and ſafety, not from the punctilious obſervance of a ſlippery convention, but from the manly and prompt vigour of her councils. It ſuited the renowned wiſdom of a republic, which had ever anticipated her enemies, to prevent the fleet of Corcyra from falling a prey to that confederacy, with whoſe inveterate envy ſhe herſelf muſt be ſoon called to contend, and to merit the uſeful gratitude of an iſland poſſeſſing other valuable advantages, and moſt conveniently ſituate for intercepting the Sicilian and Italian ſupplies, which, in the approaching and inevitable war, would otherwiſe ſo powerfully aſſiſt their Doric anceſtors of Peloponneſus."

Speech of the Corinthians.

The Corinthians indirectly anſwered this diſcourſe by inveighing with great bitterneſs, againſt the unexampled inſolence and unnatural cruelty of Corcyra: "That infamous iſland had hitherto declined connection with every Grecian ſtate, that ſhe might carry on her piratical depredations unobſerved, and alone enjoy the ſpoil of the unwary mariners who approached her inhoſpitable ſhores.

[8] Ειρηται γαρ εν αυταις, των Ελληνιδων πολεων ητις μηδαμου ξυμμαχει, εξειναι παρ' οποτερους αν αφικηται ελθειν. The οποτερους juſtifies the paraphraſe in the text.

Rendered

Rendered at once wealthy and wicked through this inhuman practice, the Corcyreans had diveſted themſelves of all piety and gratitude towards their mother country, and embrued their parricidal hands in their parent's blood. Their audacity having provoked a late vengeance, which they were unable to elude or repel, they unſeaſonably ſought protection from Athens, deſiring thoſe who were not accomplices of their injuſtice to participate their danger, and deluding them through the vain terror of contingencies into certain and immediate evil; for ſuch muſt every war be regarded, its event being always doubtful, often fatal. The Corcyreans vainly chicaned as to *words*; Athens, it was clear, muſt violate the *ſenſe* and *ſpirit* of the laſt treaty of peace, if ſhe aſſiſted the enemies of any contracting power. Theſe fierce iſlanders acknowledged themſelves a colony of Corinth, but pretended that ſettlements abroad owe nothing to thoſe who eſtabliſhed them, to thoſe whoſe foſtering care reared their infancy, from whoſe blood they ſprung, by whoſe arms they had been defended. We affirm, on the contrary (and appeal to you, Athenians! who have planted ſo many colonies), that the mother-country is entitled to that authority which the Cocyreans have long ſpurned, to that reſpect which their inſolence now refuſes and diſdains; that it belongs to us, their metropolis to be their leaders in war, their magiſtrates in peace; nor can you, Athenians! oppoſe our juſt pretenſions, and protect our rebellious colony, without ſetting an example moſt dangerous to yourſelves."

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The Athenians enter into a treaty of defence with the Corcyreans.

These ſenſible obſervations made a deep impreſſion on the moderate portion of the aſſembly: but the ſpeech of the Corcyreans was more congenial to the ambitious views of the republic, and the daring ſpirit of Pericles. He wiſhed, however, to avoid the diſhonour of manifeſtly violating the peace, and therefore adviſed his countrymen to conclude with Corcyra, not a general or complete alliance, but only a treaty of defence, which, in caſe of invaſion, obliged the two ſtates reciprocally to aſſiſt each other.

Scond ſea-fight between the Corinthians and Corcyreans. Olymp. lxxxvii. 1. A. C. 432.

This agreement was no ſooner ratified than ten Athenian ſhips reinforced the fleet of Corcyra, ſtationed on the *caſtern* coaſt of the iſland; becauſe the Corinthians, with their numerous allies, already rendezvouſed on the oppoſite ſhore of Epirus. The hoſtile armaments met in line of battle, near the ſmall iſlands Sibota, which ſeem anciently to have been ſeparated from the continent by the impetuoſity of the deep and narrow ſea between Epirus and Corcyra. The bold iſlanders, with an hundred and ten ſail, furiouſly attacked the ſuperior fleet of the Corinthians, which was divided into three ſquadrons; the Megareans and Ambracians on the right, the Elians and other allies in the centre, their own ſhips on the left, which compoſed the principal ſtrength of their line. The narrowneſs of the ſtrait, and the immenſe numbers of ſhips (far greater than had ever aſſembled in former battles between the Greeks), ſoon rendered it impoſſible on either ſide, to diſplay any ſuperiority in ſailing, or any addreſs in manœuvre.

nœuvre. The action was irregular and tumultuous, and maintained with more firmneſs and vigour than naval ſkill. The numerous troops, both heavy and light armed, who were placed on the decks, advanced, engaged, grappled, and fought with obſtinate valour; while the ſhips, continuing motionleſs and inactive, made the ſea-fight reſemble a pitched battle. At length, twenty Corcyrean gallies, having broke the left wing of the enemy, and purſued them to the coaſt of Epirus, injudiciouſly landed there to burn or plunder the Corinthian camp.

The Corcyreans defeated.

This uneſſential ſervice too much weakened the ſmaller fleet, and rendered the inequality deciſive. The Corcyreans were defeated with great ſlaughter, their incenſed adverſaries diſregarding plunder and priſoners, and only thirſting for blood and revenge. In the blindneſs of their rage, they deſtroyed many of their fellow-citizens, who had been captured by the enemy in the beginning of the engagement. Nor was their loſs of ſhips inconſiderable; thirty were ſunk, and the reſt ſo much ſhattered, that when they endeavoured to purſue the feeble remains of the Corcyrean fleet which had loſt ſeventy gallies, they were effectually prevented from executing this deſign by the ſmall Athenian ſquadron, which, according to its inſtructions from the republic, had taken no ſhare in the battle, but, agreeably to the recent treaty between Athens and Corcyra, oppoſed the total deſtruction of their allies, firſt by hoſtile threats, at length by actual reſiſtance.

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Arrival of an Athenian squadron.

The Corinthians having dragged up their wreck, and recovered the bodies of their ſlain, refitted on the coaſt of Epirus, and haſtened to Corcyra; conſiderably off which they beheld the enemy reinforced, and drawn up in line of battle, in order to defend their coaſt. They advanced, however, with intrepidity, till, to their ſurpriſe and terror, they perceived an unknown fleet preſſing towards them. This new appearance ſhook their reſolution, and made them change their courſe. The Corcyreans, whoſe ſituation at firſt prevented them from ſeeing the advancing ſquadron, were aſtoniſhed at the ſudden retreat of the enemy; but when they diſcovered its cauſe, their uncertainty and fears, increaſed by their late afflicting calamity, made them prefer the ſafeſt meaſure. *They* alſo turned their prows; and, while the Corinthians retired to Epirus, preſſed in an oppoſite direction to Corcyra. There, to their inexpreſſible joy, not unmixed with ſhame, they were joined by the unknown fleet, conſiſting of twenty Athenian gallies; a reinforcement which enabled them, next morning, to brave the late victorious armament off the coaſt of Sibota, a deſerted harbour of Epirus, oppoſite to the ſmall iſlands of the ſame name.

The Corinthians remonſtrate againſt the proceedings of the Athenians.

The Corinthians, unwilling to contend with the unbroken vigour of their new opponents, diſpatched a brigantine with the following remonſtrance: "You act moſt unjuſtly, men of Athens! in breaking the peace, and commencing unprovoked hoſtilities. On what pretence do you hinder the Corinthians from taking vengeance on an inſolent foe?

foe? If you are determined to perſiſt in wrong, ſeize us who addreſs you, and treat us as enemies." The words were ſcarcely ended when the Corcyreans exclaimed, with a loud and unanimous voice, "Seize and kill them!" But the Athenians anſwered with moderation: "Men of Corinth, we neither break the peace, nor act unjuſtly. We come to defend our allies of Corcyra: ſail unmoleſted by us to whatever friendly port you deem moſt convenient; but if you purpoſe making a deſcent on Corcyra, or on any of the dependencies of that iſland, we will exert our utmoſt power to fruſtrate your attempt[9]." CHAP. XV. Their anſwer.

This menace, which prevented immediate hoſtility, did not deter the Corinthians from ſurpriſing, as they ſailed homeward, the town of Anactorium, on the Ambracian gulph, which, in the time of harmony between the colony and parent ſtate, had been built at the joint expence of Corinth and Corcyra. From this ſea-port, they carried off two hundred and fifty Corcyrean citizens, and eight hundred ſlaves. The former, added to the captives ſaved during the fury of the ſea-fight, by the clemency or the avarice of a few Corinthian captains, made the whole priſoners of war amount to twelve hundred and fifty; a capture which, as we ſhall have occaſion to relate, produced moſt important and lamentable conſequences on the future fortune of Corcyra. The Corinthians ſurpriſe Anactorium, and take many Corcyreans priſoners.

The Corinthians, having chaſtiſed the inſolence of their revolted colony, had reaſon to dread the Their ſcheme for defeating the ven-

[9] Thucydid. p. 37.

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gean e of Athens. Olymp. lxxxvii. 1. A. C. 432.

vengeance of its powerful ally. Impressed with this terror, they laboured with great activity and with unusual secrecy and address, to find for the Athenian arms an employment still more interesting than the Corcyrean war. The domestic strength of Athens defied assault; but a people who, on the basis of a diminitive territory and scanty population, had reared such an extensive fabric of empire, might easily be wounded in their foreign dependencies, which, for obvious causes, were ever prone to innovation and rebellion. The northern shores of the Ægæan sea, afterwards comprehended under the name of Macedon, and forming the most valuable portion of that kingdom, reluctantly acknowledged stern republican masters whom they obeyed and detested. This extensive coast, of which the subsequent history will demand our attention, composed, next to the Ægæan islands and colonies of Asia, the principal foreign dominions of the Athenian republic. The whole country (naturally divided by the Thermaic and Strymonic gulphs into the provinces of Pieria, Chalcis, and Pangæus) stretched in a direct line only an hundred and fifty miles; but the winding intricacies of the coast, indented by two great, and by two smaller bays, extended three times that length; and almost every convenient situation was occupied by a Grecian sea-port. But neither the extent of above four hundred miles, nor the extreme populousness of the maritime parts, formed the chief importance of this valuable possession. The middle division, called the region of Chalcis, because originally peopled by

Description of the Macedonian coast.

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by a city of that name in Eubœa, was equally fertile and delightful. The inland country, continually diverſified by lakes, rivers, and arms of the ſea, afforded an extreme facility of water carriage; Amphipolis, Acanthus, Potidæa, and many other towns, furniſhed conſiderable marts of commerce for the republics of Greece, as well as for the neighbouring kingdoms of Thrace and Macedon; and the conſtant demands of the merchant excited the patient induſtry of the huſbandman. This beautiful diſtrict had, on one ſide, the black mountains of Pangæus, and on the other, the green vales of Pieria. The former, extending ninety miles towards the eaſt and the river Neſtus, abounded neither in corn nor paſture, but produced variety of timber the fitteſt for building ſhips; and the ſouthern branches of the mountains contained rich veins of gold and ſilver, which were ſucceſſively wrought by the Thaſians and the Athenians, but of which the full value was firſt diſcovered by Philip of Macedon, who annually extracted from them the value of two hundred thouſand pounds ſterling [10]. The laſt and ſmalleſt diviſion, Pieria, extended fifty miles along the Thermaic gulph, to the confines of Theſſaly and Mount Pindus. The towns of Pydna and Methone enriched the ſhore with the benefits of arts and commerce. Nature had been peculiarly kind to the inland country, whoſe ſhady hills, ſequeſtered groves and fountains, lovely verdure, and tranquil ſolitude, rendered it, in the fanciful belief of antiquity, the favourite haunt of the Muſes;

[10] Diodorus, l. xvi. p. 514.

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who borrowed from this diſtrict their favourite appellation of *Pierides*. According to the ſame poetical creed, theſe goddeſſes might well *envy* the mortal inhabitants, who led a paſtoral life, enjoyed happineſs, and are ſcarcely mentioned in hiſtory.

That country revolts from Athens.

Such was the nature, and ſuch the diviſions of a territory, which the policy and reſentment of Corinth encouraged to ſucceſsful rebellion againſt the ſovereignty of Athens. Several maritime communities of the Chalcidicé [11] took refuge within the walls of Olynthus, a town which they had built and fortified, at the diſtance of five miles from the ſea, in a fertile and ſecure ſituation, between the rivers Olynthus and Amnius, which flow into the lake Bolyca, the innoſt receſs of the Toronaic gulph. The neighbouring city of Potidæa, a colony of Corinth, and governed by annual magiſtrates ſent from the mother-country, yet like moſt eſtabliſhments in the Chalcidicé, a tributary confederate [12] of Athens, likewiſe ſtrengthened its walls, and prepared to revolt. But the Athenians anticipated this deſign, by ſending a fleet of thirty ſail, which having entered the harbour of Potidæa, commanded the citizens to demoliſh their fortifications,

[11] In uſing the name of Chalcidicé I have followed the analogy of the Greek language rather than complied with cuſtom; yet that part of the Macedonian coaſt, uſually called the region of Chalcis, gave name to the province of Chalcidicé in Syria, as Strabo mentions in his ſixteenth book; wherein he explains how the principal diviſion of Syria came to be diſtinguiſhed, after the conqueſts of Alexander, by Grecian appellations, borrowed from the geography deſcribed in the text.

[12] Συμμαχος ὑποτελης. Thucydid.

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to give hoſtages as ſecurity for their good behaviour, and to diſmiſs the Corinthian magiſtrates. The Potidæans artfully requeſted, that the execution of theſe ſevere commands might be ſuſpended until they had time to ſend ambaſſadors to Athens, and to remove the unjuſt ſuſpicions of their fidelity.

The Athenians beſiege Potidæa. Olymp. lxxxvii. 2. A. C. 432.

The weakneſs or avarice of Ancheſtratus, the Athenian admiral, liſtened to this deceitful requeſt, and, leaving the coaſt of Potidæa, directed the operations of his ſquadrons againſt places of leſs importance, not ſparing the dependencies of Macedon. Meanwhile the Potidæans ſent a public but illuſive embaſſy to Athens, while one more effectual was ſecretly diſpatched to Corinth, and other cities of the Peloponneſus, from which they were ſupplied with two thouſand men, commanded by the Corinthian Ariſteus, a brave and enterpriſing general. Theſe troops were thrown into the place during the abſence of the Athenian fleet; and the Potidæans, thus reinforced, ſet their enemies at defiance. Incenſed at this intelligence, the Athenians fitted out a new fleet of forty ſail, with a large body of troops, under the command of Callias; who, arriving on the coaſt of Macedon, found the ſquadron of Ancheſtratus employed in the ſiege of Pydna. Callias judiciouſly exhorted him to deſiſt from that enterpriſe, comparatively of little importance, that the united ſquadrons might attack Potidæa by ſea, while an Athenian army of three thouſand citizens, with a due proportion of allies, aſſaulted it by land. This meaſure was adopted, but the ſpirit of the garriſon ſoon offered them

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battle almoſt on equal terms, though with unequal ſucceſs. Callias, however, was ſlain, and ſucceeded by Phormio; who conducting a freſh ſupply of troops, deſolated the hoſtile territory of Chalcis and Pieria; took ſeveral towns by ſtorm; and, having ravaged the adjoining diſtriſt, beſieged the city of Potidæa.

The Corinthians endeavour to exaſperate the Lacedæmonians againſt Athens.

While thoſe tranſactions were carrying on in the north, the centre of Greece was ſhaken by the murmurs and complaints of the Corinthians and their Peloponneſian confederates, who loſt all patience when their citizens were blocked up by an Athenian army. Accompanied by the deputies of ſeveral republics beyond the iſthmus, who had recently experienced the arrogance of their imperious neighbour, they had recourſe to Sparta, whoſe actual power and ancient renown juſtly merited the firſt rank in the confederacy, but whoſe meaſures [13] were rendered ſlow and cautious by the foreſight and peaceful counſels of the wary Archidamus. When introduced into the Spartan aſſembly, the repreſentatives of all the ſtates inveighed, with equal bitterneſs, againſt the injuſtice and cruelty of Athens, while each deſcribed and exaggerated the weight of its peculiar grievances. The Megareans com-

[13] Plutarch (in Pericl.) aſcribes the backwardneſs of the Spartans to engage in war to the advice of their principal magiſtrates, bribed by Pericles, who wiſhed to gain time for his military preparations; a report as improbable as another calumny, that they were bribed by their allies to take arms againſt Athens (Ariſtoph. in Pace). The cauſe of their irreſolution, aſſigned in the text, is confirmed by the ſubſequent behaviour of Archidamus.

plained

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plained that, by a recent decree of that ſtern unfeeling republic, they had been excluded from the ports and markets of Attica [14]; an excluſion which, conſidering the narrowneſs and poverty of their own rocky diſtrict, was to deprive them of the firſt neceſſaries of life. The inhabitants of Ægina explained and lamented that, in defiance of recent and ſolemn treaties, and diſregarding the liberal ſpirit of Grecian policy, the Athenians had reduced their unfortunate iſland into the moſt deplorable condition of ſervitude.

Speech of the Corinthians.

When other ſtates had deſcribed their particular ſufferings, the Corinthians laſt aroſe, and their ſpeaker thus addreſſed the Lacedæmonian aſſembly: "Had we come hither, men of Lacedæmon! to urge our private wrongs, it might be ſufficient barely to relate the tranſactions of the preceding, and preſent, years. The revolt of Corcyra, the ſiege of Potidæa, are facts which ſpeak for them-

[14] The Megarean's were accuſed of ploughing ſome conſecrated lands: they were accuſed of harbouring the Athenian ſlaves, fugitives, and exiles; other cauſes of complaint might eaſily have been diſcovered or invented by their powerful neighbours, who were provoked that ſuch a ſmall community on their frontier ſhould uniformly ſpurn their authority. But the malignity of comic writers aſcribed the ſevere decree againſt Megara to an event equally diſgraceful to the generals of Athens, and injurious to the honour of Pericles. The following verſes are tranſlated from the Acharnenſis of Ariſtophanes.

Juvenes profecti Megaram ebrij auferunt
Simætham ex ſcortatione nobilem:
Megarenſis hinc populus, dolore perictus,
Furatur Aſpaſiæ duo ſcorta, haud impiger:
Hinc initium belli prorupit
Univerſis Græcis, ob tres meritriculas.

ſelves;

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ſelves; but the attention of this aſſembly ſhould be directed to objects more important than particular injuries, however flagrant and enormous. The *general* oppreſſive ſyſtem of Athenian policy;—it is this which demands your moſt ſerious concern; a ſyſtem aiming at nothing leſs than the deſtruction of Grecian freedom, which is ready to periſh through your ſupine neglect. That moderation and probity, men of Sparta! for which your domeſtic councils are juſtly famous, render you the dupes of foreign artifice, and expoſe you to become the victims of foreign ambition; which, inſtead of oppoſing with prompt alacrity, you have nouriſhed by unſeaſonable delay; and, in conſequence of this fatal error, are now called to contend, not with the infant weakneſs, but with the matured vigour of your enemies, thoſe enemies, who, ever unſatisfied with their preſent meaſure of proſperity, are continually intent on ſome new project of aggrandizement. How different from *your* ſlow procraſtination is the ardent character of the Athenians! Fond of novely, and fertile in reſources, alike active and vigilant, the accompliſhment of one deſign leads them to another more daring. Deſire, hope, enterpriſe, ſucceſs, follow in rapid ſucceſſion. Already have they ſubdued half of Greece; their ambition graſps the whole. Rouſe, then, from your lethargy, defend your allies, invade Attica, maintain the glory of Peloponneſus, that ſacred depoſit, with which being entruſted by your anceſtors, you are bound to tranſmit unimpaired to poſterity."

Several

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Several Athenians, then reſiding on private buſineſs at Sparta, deſired to be heard in defence of their country. Equity could not deny the requeſt of theſe voluntary advocates, who ſpoke in a ſtyle well becoming the loftineſs of their republic [15]. With the pride of ſuperiority, rather than the indignation of accuſed innocence, they affected to deſpiſe the falſe aſperſions of their adverſaries; and, inſtead of anſwering directly the many and loud clamours againſt their preſumptuous abuſe of power, deſcribed, with ſwelling encomiums, "the illuſtrious and memorable exploits of their countrymen; exploits which had juſtly raiſed them to a pre-eminence, acknowledged by their allies, uncontеſted by Sparta, and felt by Perſia. When the dignity of Greece required of her to chaſtiſe the repeated inſults of that ambitious empire, the Spartans had declined the conduct of a diſtant war; Athens had aſſumed the abandoned helm, and, after demoliſhing the cruel dominion of Barbarians, had acquired a juſt and lawful ſway over the coaſts of Europe and of Aſia. The new ſubjects of the republic were long treated rather as fellow-citizens, than as tributaries and vaſſals. But it was the nature of man to revolt againſt the *ſuppoſed* injuſtice of his equals, rather than againſt the *real* tyranny of his maſters. This circumſtance, ſo honourable to Athenian lenity, had occaſioned ſeveral unproked rebellions, which the republic had been compelled to puniſh with an exemplary ſeverity. The apprehenſion of future

anſwered by the Athenians.

[15] Thucydid. l. xliii. & ſeqq.

com,

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commotions had lately obliged her to hold, with a firmer hand, the reins of government, and to maintain with armed power, an authority juſtly earned, and ſtrictly founded in nature, of which it is an unalterable law, that the ſtrong ſhould govern the weak. If the Spartans, in violation of the right of treaties, thought proper to oppoſe this immoveable purpoſe, Athens well knew how to redreſs her wrongs, and would, doubtleſs, uphold her empire with the ſame valour and activity by which it had been eſtabliſhed."

Pacific advice of King Archidamus;

Having heard both parties, the aſſembly adjourned, without forming any reſolution. But next day, it appeared to be the prevailing opinion, that the arrogance and uſurpation of Athens had already violated the peace, and that it became the prudence as well as the dignity of Sparta, no longer to defer hoſtilities. This popular current was vainly oppoſed by the experienced wiſdom of King Archidamus, who ſtill counſelled peace and moderation, though his courage had been conſpicuouſly diſtinguiſhed in every ſeaſon of danger. He exhorted his countrymen "not to ruſh blindly on war, without examining the reſources of the enemy and their own. The Athenians were powerful in ſhips, in money, in cavalry, and in arms; of all which the Lacedæmonians were deſtitute, or, at leaſt, but ſparingly provided. Whatever provocation, therefore, they had received, they ought in prudence to diſſemble their reſentment, until they could effectually exert their vengeance. The preſent criſis required negociation; if that failed, the ſilent preparation of

a few

a few years would enable them to take the field with well-founded hopes of redreſſing the grievances of their confederates." Had this moderate language made any impreſſion on ſuch an aſſembly, it would have been ſpeedily obliterated by the blunt boldneſs of Sthenelaides, one of the Ephori, who cloſed the debate. "Men of Sparta! Of the long ſpeeches of the Athenians I underſtand not the drift. While they dwell with ſtudied eloquence on their own praiſes, they deny not to have injured our allies. If they behaved *well* in the Perſian war, and now *otherwiſe*, their demerit is only the more apparent. Both then, and now, we are ſtill the ſame; and, if we would maintain our character, we muſt not overlook their injuſtice. *They* have ſhips, money, and horſes; but *we* have good allies, whoſe intereſts we muſt not abandon. Why do we deliberate, while our enemies are in arms? Let us take the field, with ſpeed, and fight with all our might." The acclamations of the people followed, and war was reſolved.

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oppoſed by Sthenelaides, one of the Ephors.

This reſolution was taken in the fourteenth year after the concluſion of the general peace; but near a twelvemonth elapſed before the propereſt meaſures for invading Attica could be finally adjuſted among the diſcordant members of ſo numerous a confederacy. It conſiſted of all the ſeven republics of the Peloponneſus, except Argos and Achaia, the firſt of which from ambition, and the ſecond perhaps from moderation [16], preſerved, in the be-

War determined. Olymp. lxxxvii. 2. A.C. 432

General confederacy againſt Athens,

[16] The ambition of Argos is confirmed by the ſubſequent meaſures of that republic; the moderation of Achaia is ſuſpected, from the nature of the Achæan laws, which have been already mentioned, and are particularly explained in my Hiſtory of the World, vol. 2. c. 13.

ginning

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ginning of the war, a ſuſpicious neutrality. Of the nine northern republics, Acarnania alone declined joining the allies, its coaſt being particularly expoſed to the ravages of the Corcyrean fleets. The cities of Naupactus and Platæa, for reaſons that will ſoon appear, were totally devoted to their Athenian protectors; whoſe cauſe was likewiſe embraced by ſeveral petty princes of Theſſaly. But all the other ſtates beyond the iſthmus longed to follow the ſtandard of Sparta, and to humble the aſpiring ambition of their too powerful neighbour.

ſends a menacing embaſſy to that republic;

The repreſentatives of theſe various communities having, according to the received practice of Greece, aſſembled in the principal city of the confederacy, were ſtimulated to action by the Corinthians, who, as their colony of Potidæa was ſtill cloſely beſieged, laboured to accelerate repriſals on Attica, by exhibiting the moſt advantageous proſpect of the approaching war. They obſerved, "That the army of the confederacy, exceeding ſixty thouſand men, far out-numbered the enemy, whom they excelled ſtill more in merit, than they ſurpaſſed in number. The one was compoſed of national troops, fighting for the independence of thoſe countries in whoſe government they had a ſhare; the other chiefly conſiſted in vile mercenaries, whoſe pay was their government and their country. If ſupplies of money were requiſite, the allied ſtates would doubtleſs be more liberal and forward to defend their intereſt and honour, than the reluctant tributaries of Athens to rivet their ſervitude and chains; and, if ſtill more money

ſhould

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ſhould be wanted, the Delphic and Olympic treaſures afforded an inexhauſtible reſource, which could not be better expended than in defending the ſacred cauſe of juſtice and of Grecian freedom." In order to gain full time, however, for ſettling all matters among themſelves, the confederates diſpatched to Athens various overtures of accommodation, which they well knew would be indignantly rejected. In each embaſſy they roſe in their demands, ſucceſſively requiring the Athenians to raiſe the ſiege of Potidæa; to repeal their prohibitory decree againſt Megara; to withdraw their garriſon from Ægina; in fine, to declare the independence of their colonies [17].

which alarms the Athenians.

Theſe laſt demands were heard at Athens with a mixture of rage and terror. The capricious multitude, who had hitherto approved and admired the aſpiring views of Pericles, now trembled on the brink of the precipice to which he had conducted them. They had hitherto puſhed the ſiege of Potidæa with great vigour, but without any near

[17] Beſides complying with the demands mentioned in the text, the Athenians were required "to expel the deſcendants of thoſe impious men who had profaned the temple of Minerva." This alluded to an event which happened the firſt year of the 45th Olympiad, or 598 years before Chriſt. Cylon, a powerful Athenian, having ſeized the citadel, and aſpiring at royalty, was defeated in his purpoſe by Megacles, a maternal anceſtor of Pericles, who, having decoyed the aſſociates of Cylon from the temple of Minerva, butchered them without mercy, and with too little reſpect for the privileges of that venerable ſanctuary. The whole tranſaction is particularly related by Plutarch in his life of Solon. The renewal of ſuch an antiquated complaint, at this juncture, pointed particularly at Pericles, and ſhewed the opinion which the Spartans entertained of his unrivalled influence and authority.

proſpect

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prospect of success. They must now contend with a numerous confederacy, expose their boasted grandeur to the doubtful chance of war, and exchange the amusements and pleasures of the city for the toils and hardships of a camp. Of these discontented murmurs, the rivals and enemies of Pericles greedily availed themselves to traduce the character and adminstration of that illustrious statesman. It was insinuated, that, sacrificing to private passion the interest of his country, he had procured the imperious decree, of which the allies so justly complained, to resent the personal injury of his beloved Aspasia, whose family had been insulted by some licentious youths of Megara [18]. Diopeithes, Dracontides, and other demagogues, derided the folly of taking arms on such a frivolous pretence; and, as preparatory to the impeachment of Pericles himself, the courts of justice were fatigued with prosecutions of his valuable friends.

Clamour excited against Pericles.

Persecution of his friends.

The philosopher Anaxagoras, and Phidias the statuary, reflected more lustre than they could derive from the protection of any patron. The character of Aspasia was of a mixed and doubtful kind. To the natural and sprightly graces of Ionia, her native country, she added extraordinary accomplishments of mind and body; and having acquired in high perfection the talents and excellencies of the other sex, was accused of being too indifferent to the honour of her own. Scarcely superior in modesty to Phryné, Thais, or Erigoné [19], her wit, her learning, and her eloquence,

[18] See above, p. 201. [19] See above, p. 115.

excited

excited univerſal admiration or envy [20], while the beauty of her fancy and of her perſon inſpired more tender ſentiments into the ſuſceptible breaſt of Pericles. She was reproached, not with entertaining free votaries of pleaſure in her family (which in that age was regarded as a very allowable commerce), but of ſeducing the virtue of Athenian matrons; a crime ſeverely puniſhed by the laws of every Grecian republic. But we have reaſon to infer innocence in this particular, ſince ſhe was ſaved by Pericles from the fury of an enraged populace, at a criſis when his moſt ſtrenuous exertions could not prevent the baniſhment of Anaxagoras and Phidias.

Baniſhment of Anaxagoras and Phidias.

The former was accuſed of propagating doctrines inconſiſtent with the eſtabliſhed religion; the latter, of having indulged the very pardonable vanity (as it ſhould ſeem) of repreſenting himſelf and his patron on the ſhield of his admired ſtatue of Minerva. There, with inimitable art, Phidias had engraved the renowned victory of the Athenians over the warlike daughters of the Thermodon [21]; he had depicted himſelf under the figure of a bald old man raiſing a heavy ſtone (an alluſion to his ſkill in architecture), while the features of Pericles were diſtinguiſhed in the countenance of an Athenian chief, bravely combating the Queen of the Amazons, though his elevated arm hid part of the face, and in ſome meaſure concealed the reſemblance [22]. For this fictitious crime, Phidias was

[20] Plato in Menex. [21] Lyſias Orat. Funeb.
[22] Plut. in Pericl. & Ariſtot. de Mund.

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driven from a city which had been adorned by the unwearied labours of his long life, and debarred beholding thoſe wonders of art which his ſublime genius had created.

Accuſation of Pericles.

The accuſation of the principal friends of Pericles paved the way for his own. He was reproached with embezzling the public treaſure; but, on this occaſion, plain facts confounded the artifices of his enemies. It was proved, that his private expences were juſtly proportioned to the meaſure of his patrimony; many inſtances were brought of his generous contempt of wealth in the ſervice of his country; and it appeared, after the ſtricteſt examination, that his fortune had not increaſed ſince he was intruſted with the exchequer. This honourable diſplay of unſhaken probity, which had ever formed the baſis of the authority [23] of Pericles, again reconciled to him the unſteady affections of his countrymen, and gave reſiſtleſs force to that famous and fatal ſpeech, which unalterably determined the war of Peloponneſus.

[23] This teſtimony, which is given by the impartiality of Thucydides, deſtroys at once the numerous aſperſions of the comic poets of the times which have been copied by Plutarch, and from him tranſcribed by modern compilers. Pericles, it is ſaid, raiſed the war of Peloponneſus, merely for his own convenience and ſafety; and was encouraged to this meaſure by the advice of his kinſman Alcibiades, then a boy; who, calling one day at his houſe, was refuſed admittance, "becauſe Pericles was occupied in conſidering how he might beſt ſtate his accounts." "Let him rather conſider," ſaid the ſagacious ſtripling, "how to give no account at all." Pericles took the hint, and involved his country in a war, which allowed no time for examining the public expenditure. Such anecdotes may amuſe thoſe who can believe them.

"Often

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He juſtifies his meaſures and maintains the neceſſity of the war;

"Often have I declared, Athenians! that we muſt not obey the unjuſt commands of our enemies. I am ſtill firmly of that mind, convinced as I am of the dangerous viciſſitudes of war and fortune; and that human hopes, deſigns, and purſuits, are all fleeting and fallacious. Yet, in the preſent criſis, neceſſity and glory ſhould alike fix us to this immovable reſolution. The decree againſt Megara, which the firſt embaſſy required us to repeal, is not the cauſe of that hoſtile jealouſy which has long ſecretly envied our greatneſs, and which has now more openly conſpired our deſtruction. Yet that decree, of which ſome men have ſpoken ſo lightly, involved the honour of our councils and the ſtability of our empire. By puſillanimouſly repealing it, we ſhould have emboldened our enemies, who, notwithſtanding our proper firmneſs in the firſt inſtance, have yet ſucceſſively riſen to higher and more arbitrary demands; demands which merit to be anſwered, not by embaſſies, but by arms.

explains the ſtrength and reſources of the republic;

"The flouriſhing reſources, and actual ſtrength, of the republic, affords us the moſt flattering proſpect of military ſucceſs. Impregnably fortified by land, our ſhores are defended by three hundred gallies; beſides a body of cavalry, to the number of twelve hundred, together with two thouſand archers, we can immediately take the field with thirteen thouſand pikemen, without draining our foreign garriſons, or diminiſhing the complete number of ſixteen thouſand men who defend the walls and fortreſſes in Attica. The wealthy ſea-

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ports of Thrace and Macedon; the flouriſhing colonies of Ionia, Eolia, and Doria; in a word, the whole extenſive coaſt of the Aſiatic peninſula, acknowledge, by annual contributions, the ſovereignty of our guardian navy, whoſe ſtrength is increaſed by the ſhips of Chios, Leſbos, and Corcyra, while the ſmaller iſlands furniſh us, according to their ability, with money and troops. Athens thus reigns queen of a thouſand [24] tributary republics, and notwithſtanding the expences incurred by the ſiege of Potidæa, and the architectural ornaments of the city, ſhe poſſeſſes ſix thouſand talents in her treaſury.

which he contraſts with the weakneſs of the enemy;

"The ſituation of our enemies is totally the reverſe. Animated by rage, and emboldened by numbers, they may be rouſed to a tranſient, deſultory aſſault; but deſtitute of reſources, and divided in intereſts, they are totally incapable of any ſteady, perſevering exertion. With ſixty thouſand men they may enter Attica; and if our unſeaſonable courage gives them an opportunity, may win a battle; but unleſs our raſh imprudence aſſiſts and enables them, they cannot poſſibly proſecute a ſucceſsful war. Indeed, Athenians! I dread leſs the power of the enemy, than your own ungovernable ſpirit. Inſtead of being ſeduced from your ſecurity, by a vain deſire to defend, againſt ſuperior numbers, your plantations and villas in the

[24] Ariſtoph. Veſp. He ſays, that twenty thouſand Athenians might live as in the Elyſian fields, if each tributary city undertook to provide for twenty citizens. V. 705, &c.

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open country, you ought to deſtroy thoſe ſuperfluous poſſeſſions with your own hands. To you, who receive the conveniences of life from ſo many diſtant dependencies, the devaſtation of Attica is a matter of ſmall moment; but how can your enemies repair, how can they ſurvive the devaſtation of the Peloponneſus? How can they prevent, or remedy, this fatal, this intolerable calamity, while the ſquadrons of Athens command the ſurrounding ſeas? If theſe conſiderations be allowed their full weight; if reaſon, not paſſion, conducts the war; it ſeems ſcarcely in the power of fortune to rob you of victory. Yet let us anſwer the Peloponneſians with moderation, "that we will not forbid the Megareans our ports and markets, if the Spartans, and other ſtates of Greece, aboliſh their excluſive and inhoſpitable laws: that we will reſtore independent governments to ſuch cities as were free at the laſt treaty of Peace, provided the Spartans engage to imitate this example: that we are ready to ſubmit all differences to the impartial deciſion of any equitable tribunal; and that, although theſe condeſcending overtures be rejected, we will not commence hoſtilities, but are prepared to repel them with our uſual vigour [25]." The aſſembly murmured applauſe; a decree was propoſed and

dictates a reply to the Peloponneſians,

which is taken for declaration of war.

[25] In examining the ſpeech aſcribed to Pericles, on this occaſion, by Thucydides, the attentive reader will perceive that it ſuppoſes the knowledge of ſeveral events omitted in the preceding narrative of that hiſtorian, but which I have related in the text. The Engliſh ſpeech is ſhorter than the Greek, but contains more information, collected from Plutarch, Diodorus, Ariſtophanes, and the 2d book of Thucydides himſelf.

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ratified; the ambaſſadors returned home with the reply dictated by Pericles; which, moderate as it ſeemed to the Atheniſian ſtateſman, ſounded like an immediate declaration of war to the Spartans and their allies.

The Thebans ſurpriſe Platæa. Olymp. lxxxvii. 2. A. C. 431. May the 7th.

Six months after the battle of Potidæa, the Thebans, who were the moſt powerful and the moſt daring of theſe allies, undertook a military enterpriſe againſt the ſmall but magnanimous republic of Platæa. Though ſituate in the heart of Bœotia, amidſt numerous and warlike enemies, the Platæans ſtill preſerved an unſhaken fidelity to Athens, whoſe toils and triumphs they had ſhared in the Perſian war. Yet even this feeble community, ſurrounded on every ſide by hoſtile Bœotians, was not exempted from domeſtic diſcord. Nauclides, the perfidious and bloody leader of an ariſtocratical faction, engaged to betray the Platæan gates to a body of foreign troops, provided they enabled him to overturn the democracy, and to take vengeance on his political adverſaries, whom he regarded as his perſonal foes. Eurymachus, a noble and wealthy Theban, with whom, in the name of his aſſociates, this ſanguinary agreement had been contracted, entered Platæa with three hundred of his countrymen, at the firſt watch of the night; but, regardleſs of their promiſe to Nauclides, who expected that they would break tumultuouſly into the houſes, and butcher his enemies, the Thebans formed regularly in arms, and remained quietly in the market-place, having iſſued a proclamation to invite all the citizens indiſcriminately

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minately to become allies to Thebes. The Plataeans readily accepted a propoſal which delivered them from the terror of immediate death. But while they ſucceſſively ratified the agreement, they obſerved, with mixed ſhame and joy, that darkneſs and ſurpriſe had greatly augmented the number of the invaders. Encouraged by this diſcovery, they ſecretly diſpatched a meſſenger to Athens; and, while they expected the aſſiſtance of their diſtant protector, determined to leave nothing untried for their own deliverance.

Daring enterpriſe of the Plataeans.

The night was ſpent in an operation not leſs daring than extraordinary. As they could not aſſemble in the ſtreets without alarming ſuſpicion, they dug through the interior walls of their houſes, and fortified the outward in the beſt manner the time would allow, with their ploughs, carts, and other inſtruments of huſbandry. Before day-break, the work was complete; when, with one conſent, they ruſhed furiouſly againſt the enemy, the women and children animating with horrid ſhrieks and geſtures the efforts of their rage. It was night, and a ſtorm of rain and thunder augmented the gloomy terrors of the battle. The Thebans were unacquainted with the ground; above an hundred fell; near two hundred fled in trepidation to a lofty and ſpacious tower adjoining the walls, which they miſtook for one of the gates of the city. In the firſt movements of reſentment, the Plataeans prepared to burn them alive; but a moment's reflection deterred them from this dangerous cruelty. Meanwhile a conſiderable body of The-

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bans advanced towards Platæa, to co-operate with their countrymen. Their progreſs would have been haſtened by a fugitive who met them, and related the miſcarriage of the enterpriſe, had not the heavy rain ſo much ſwelled the Aſopus, that an unuſual time was ſpent in croſſing that river. They had ſcarcely entered the Platæan territory, when a ſecond meſſenger informed them, that their unfortunate companions were all killed or taken priſoners. Upon this intelligence they pauſed to conſider, whether, inſtead of proceeding to the Platæan walls, where they could not perform any immediate ſervice, they ought not, as an eaſier enterpriſe, to ſeize the citizens of that place, who were diſperſed over their villages in the open country.

Their ſtratagem for deſtroying the Thebans without danger to themſelves.

But while they deliberate on this meaſure, a Platæan herald arrived, complaining of the unjuſt and moſt unexpected infraction of the peace, by a daring and atrocious conſpiracy; commanding the Thebans immediately to leave the territory of Platæa, if they hoped to deliver their fellow-citizens from captivity; and denouncing, if they refuſed compliance, that their countrymen would inevitably be puniſhed with a cruel death. This ſtratagem, no leſs audacious than artful, prevailed on the enemy to repaſs the Aſopus, while the Platæans loſt not a moment to aſſemble within their walls the ſcattered inhabitants of their fields and villas; and braving the Theban reſentment, the immediate effects of which they had rendered impotent, maſſacred the unhappy priſoners, to the number of an hundred

hundred and eighty, among whom was Eurymachus, the chief promoter of the expedition. After this ſignal act of vengeance, they ſtrengthened the works of the place; tranſported their wives and children to the tributary iſlands of Athens; and, that they might more ſecurely ſuſtain the expected ſiege, required and received from that republic a plentiful ſupply of proviſions, and a conſiderable reinforcement of troops. CHAP. XV.

Preparations for war on both ſides. A.C. 431.

The ſword was now drawn, and both parties ſeemed eager to exert their utmoſt ſtrength. The Spartans ſummoned their confederates to the Iſthmus; demanded money and ſhips from their Italian and Sicilian colonies; and ſolicited aſſiſtance from the Perſian monarch Artaxerxes, and from Perdiccas King of Macedon; both of whom naturally regarded the Athenians as dangerous neighbours, and ambitious invaders of their coaſts. The people of Athens alſo condeſcended to crave the aid of Barbarians, and actually contracted an alliance with Sitalces, the warlike chief of the Odryſians, who formed the moſt powerful tribe in Upper Thrace. They required at the ſame time an immediate ſupply of cavalry from their Theſſalian allies, while their fleet already cruiſed on the coaſt of Peloponneſus, to confirm the fidelity of the ſurrounding iſlands; an object deemed eſſential to the ſucceſsful invaſion of that territory. The unexperienced youth, extremely numerous in moſt republics of Greece, rejoiced at the proſpect of war. The aged ſaw and dreaded the general commotion, darkly foretold, as they thought, by ancient

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ancient oracles and prophecies, but clearly and recently announced, by an earthquake in the ſacred, and hitherto immovable iſland of Delos. Such was the ardour of preparation, that only a few weeks after the ſurpriſe of Platæa, the Lacedæmonian confederates, to the number of ſixty thouſand, aſſembled from the north and ſouth, at the Corinthian Iſthmus. The ſeveral communities were reſpectively commanded by leaders of their own appointment; but the general conduct of the war was intruſted to Archidamus, the Spartan King.

Archidamus addreſſes the confederates.

In a council of the chiefs, that prince warmly approved their alacrity in taking the field, and extolled the greatneſs and bravery of an army, the moſt numerous and beſt provided that had ever followed the ſtandard of any Grecian general. Yet their preparations, he ſaid, however extraordinary, were not greater than their enterpriſe required. They waged war with a people not leſs powerful, than active and daring; who had diſcernment to perceive, and ability to improve, every opportunity of advantage; and whoſe reſentment would be as much inflamed, as their pride would be wounded, by the approach of invading enemies. It ſeemed probable, that the Athenians would not allow their lands to be waſted, without attempting to defend them. The confederates, therefore, muſt be always on their guard; their diſcipline muſt be ſtrict, regular, and uniform; to elude the ſkill, and to oppoſe the ſtrength of Athens, demanded their utmoſt vigilance and activity.

Archi-

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Archidamus, after leading his army into Attica, ſeems blameable for allowing their martial ardour to evaporate in the fruitleſs ſiege of Oenoé, the ſtrongeſt Athenian town towards the ſouthern frontier of Bœotia. This tedious and unſucceſsful operation enabled the Athenians, to complete, without interruption, the ſingular plan of defence ſo ably traced by the bold genius of Pericles. They haſtened the deſolation of their own fields; demoliſhed their delightful gardens and villas, which it had been their pride to adorn; and tranſported, either to Athens or the iſles, their valuable effects, their cattle, furniture, and even the frames of their houſes. The numerous inhabitants of the country towns and villages, where the more opulent Athenians commonly ſpent the greater part of their time, flocked to the capital which was well furniſhed with the means of ſubſiſtence, though not of accommodation, for ſuch a promiſcuous crowd of ſtrangers, with their families, ſlaves, or ſervants. Many people of lower rank, deſtitute of private dwellings, were obliged to occupy the public halls, the groves and temples, the walls and battlements. Even perſons of diſtinction were narrowly and meanly lodged; an inconvenience ſeverely felt by men accuſtomed to live at large in the country, in rural eaſe and elegance. But reſentment againſt the public enemy blunted the ſenſe of perſonal hardſhip, and ſilenced every murmur of private complaint.

Leads them to Attica.

Meanwhile the confederate army, having raiſed the ſiege of Oenoé, advanced along the eaſtern frontier

The confederates ravage Attica.

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frontier of Attica; and within eighty days after the ſurpriſe of Platæa, invaded the Thraſian plain, the richeſt ornament of the Athenian territory. Having waſted that valuable diſtrict with fire and ſword, they proceeded to Eleuſis, and from thence to Acharnæ, the largeſt borough in the commonwealth, and only eight miles diſtant from the capital. There they continued an unuſual length of time, gradually demoliſhing the houſes and plantations, and daily exerciſing every act of rapacious cruelty, with a view either to draw the enemy to a battle, or to diſcover whether they were unalterably determined to keep within their walls; a reſolution, which, if clearly aſcertained, would enable the invaders to proceed with more boldneſs and effect, and to carry on their ravages with ſecurity, even to the gates of Athens.

Olymp. lxxxvii. 2. A. C. 431.

The Athenians retort their injuries.

The Athenians, hitherto intent on their naval preparations, had exerted an uncommon degree of patience and ſelf-command. But their unruly paſſions could no longer be reſtrained, when they learned the proceedings in Acharnæ. The proprietors of that rich and extenſive diſtrict boaſted that they alone could ſend three thouſand brave ſpearmen into the field, and lamented, that they ſhould remain cooped up in diſhonourable confinement, while their poſſeſſions fell a prey to an hoſtile invader. Their animated complaints inflamed the kindred ardour of the Athenian youth. It appeared unworthy of thoſe who had ſo often ravaged with impunity the territories of their neighbours, patiently to behold the deſolation of their own. Intereſted

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tereſted prieſts announced approaching calamity; ſeditious orators clamoured againſt the timid councils of Pericles; the impetuous youth required their general to lead them to battle. Amidſt this popular commotion, the accompliſhed general and ſtateſman remained unmoved, bravely reſiſting the ſtorm, or dexterouſly eluding its force. Though determined not to riſk an engagement with the confederates, he ſeaſonably employed the Athenian and Theſſalian cavalry to beat up their quarters, to intercept their convoys, to haraſs, ſurpriſe, or cut off their advanced parties. While theſe enterpriſes tended to divert or appeaſe the tumult, a fleet of an hundred and fifty ſail ravaged the defenceleſs coaſt of Peloponneſus. A ſquadron, leſs numerous, made a deſcent on Locris. The rebellious inhabitants of Ægina were driven from their poſſeſſions, and an Athenian colony was ſettled in that iſland. The wretched fugitives, whoſe country had long rivalled Athens itſelf in wealth, commerce, and naval power, received the maritime diſtrict of Thyrea[26] from the bounty of their Spartan protectors.

The confederates evacuate Attica.

Intelligence of theſe proceedings, and ſtill more the ſcarcity of proviſions, engaged the confederates to return to their reſpective republics. Having advanced by the eaſtern, they retired along the weſtern, frontier of Attica; every place in their line

[26] This diſtrict lay on the frontier of the Argive and Lacedæmonian territory, and had long formed an object of contention between thoſe republics. See vol. i. pp. 322, 323.

of

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of march experiencing the fatal effects of their reſentment or rapacity. Soon after their retreat, Pericles, towards the beginning of autumn, led out the Athenians to ravage the neighbouring and hoſtile territory of Megara. The invading army was accidentally obſerved by the fleet, while it returned from the coaſt of Peloponneſus. The ſailors haſtened to ſhare the danger and plunder. The whole Athenian force thus amounted to nearly twenty thouſand men; a number far more than ſufficient to deprive the induſtrious Megareans of the hopes of a ſcanty harveſt, earned with infinite toil and care, in their narrow mountainous diſtrict.

Pericles invades Megara.

The winter was not diſtinguiſhed by any important expedition on either ſide. The Corinthians, long inured to the ſea in all ſeaſons, carried on indeciſive hoſtilities againſt the Athenian allies in Acarnania. During this inactive portion of the year, the Athenians, as well as their enemies, were employed in celebrating the memory of the ſlain, with much funeral pomp, and high encomiums on their valour[27]; in diſtributing the prizes of merit among

[27] This mournful ſolemnity as practiſed by the Athenians, is deſcribed by Thucydides, l. ii. p. 120, & ſeqq. The bones of the deceaſed were brought to a tabernacle previouſly erected for receiving them. On the day appointed for the funeral, they were conveyed from thence in cypreſs coffins, drawn on carriages, one for each tribe, to the public ſepulchre in the Ceramicus, the moſt beautiful ſuburb of the city. The relations of the dead decked out the remains of their friends as they judged moſt proper (See Lyſias againſt Agoratus). One empty bier was drawn along in honour of thoſe whoſe bodies had not been recovered. Perſons of every age, and of either ſex, citizens and ſtrangers, attended this ſolemnity. When the bones were depoſited in the earth, ſome citizen of dignity and merit,

among the ſurviving warriors; in confirming their reſpective alliances; and in fortifying ſuch places on their frontier as ſeemed moſt expoſed to military excurſions, or naval deſcents. CHAP. XV.

The return of ſummer brought back into Attica the Peloponneſian invaders; but it likewiſe introduced a far more dreadful calamity. A deſtructive peſtilence, engendered in Ethiopia, infected Egypt, and ſpread over great part of the dominions of the King of Perſia. Hiſtory does not explain by what means this fatal diſorder was communicated to Greece. The year had been in other reſpects remarkably healthful. As the diſeaſe firſt appeared in the Piræus, the principal Athenian harbour, we may be allowed to conjecture, that it was imported from the eaſt, either by the Athenian merchantmen, or by the ſhips of war, which annually ſailed to that quarter, in order to levy money on the tributary cities. When its miſerable ſymptoms broke out in the Piræus, the inhabitants ſuſpected that the enemy had poiſoned their wells. But it ſoon extended over the adjoining diſtricts, and raged

The plague breaks out in Athens. A. C. 330.

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merit, named by the ſtate, mounted a loſty pulpit, and pronounced the panegyric of the deceaſed, of their anceſtors, and the Athenian republic. On this occaſion, Pericles himſelf had been appointed to that ſolemn office. He performed it with great dignity. His ſpeech, containing almoſt as many ideas as words, is incapable of abridgment; nor does its nature admit the inſertion of it intire in the preſent hiſtory, in which eloquence is conſidered merely as an engine of government, and ſuch ſpeeches only introduced as influenced public reſolutions and meaſures. It is, however, worthy of obſervation, that his magnificent diſplay of the advantages, the ſecurity, and the glory of Athens, forms a ſtriking contraſt with the unexpected calamities which ſoon overwhelmed his unhappy country.

with

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with peculiar violence in the populous ſtreets which ſurrounded the citadel.

Deſcription of that malady.

The malady appeared under various forms, in different conſtitutions; but its ſpecific ſymptoms were invariably the ſame. It began with a burning heat in the head; the eyes were red and inflamed; the tongue and mouth had the colour of blood. The pain and inflammation deſcended to the breaſt with inexpreſſible anguiſh; the ſkin was covered with ulcers; the body of a livid red; the external heat not ſenſible to the touch, but the internal ſo violent, that the ſlighteſt covering could not be indured. An inſatiable thirſt was an univerſal ſymptom; and, when indulged, increaſed the diſorder. When the bowels were attacked, the patient ſoon periſhed through debility. Some lived ſeven or nine days, and died of a fever, with apparent remains of ſtrength. The life was ſaved when the internal vigour diverted the courſe of the diſeaſe towards the extremities. Thoſe who once recovered were never dangerouſly attacked a ſecond time, from which they conceived a vain hope of proving thenceforth ſuperior to every bodily infirmity.

Its effects on the mind.

The diſorder, which was always accompanied with an extreme dejection of ſpirits, often impaired the judgment as well as the memory. All remedies, human and divine, were employed in vain to ſtop the progreſs of this fatal contagion. The miſerable crowds expired in the temples, preferring unavailing prayers to the gods. A ſhocking ſpectacle was ſeen round the ſacred fountains, where multitudes lay dead, or periſhed in agoniſing

niſing torture. At length all medical aſſiſtance was deſpiſed[28], and all religious ceremonies neglected. Continually ſuffering or apprehending the moſt dreadful calamities, the Athenians became equally regardleſs of laws human and divine. The fleeting moment only was theirs. About the future they felt no concern, nor did they believe it of concern to the gods, ſince all, good or bad, alike periſhed. Decency no longer impoſing reſpect, the only purſuit was that of preſent pleaſure. To beings of an hour, the dread of puniſhment formed no reſtraint; to victims of miſery, conſcience preſented no terrors. Athens thus exhibited at once whatever is moſt afflicting in wretchedneſs, and moſt miſerable in vice, uniting to the rage of diſeaſe the more deſtructive fury of unbridled paſſions.

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on morals.

While the city fell a prey to theſe accumulated evils, the country was laid waſte by an implacable enemy. On the preſent occaſion, the confederates advanced beyond Athens; they deſtroyed the works of the miners on mount Laurium; and, having

Devaſtation of Attica. Olymp. lxxxvii. 3. A. C. 430.

[28] The ſuppoſed decree of the Athenians in favour of Hippocrates, ſays, that his ſcholars ſhewed the means both of preventing and curing the plague. Ταις χρη θεραπευσι ασφαλως διαφευξασθαι τον λοιμον; and again, Οπως τε ιατρικη δοθισα ασφαλως σωζει τους καμνοντας. Hippocrates, p. 1290. This decree, therefore, as well as the letters of Hippocrates, mentioning the plague at Athens, are unqueſtionably ſpurious. The malady is minutely deſcribed by Thucydides, l. ii. c. xlvii.; by Lucretius, l. vi. ver. 1136. & ſeqq. Diodorus, l. xii. differs widely from them both, probably having copied from Ephorus and Theopompus. Hippocrates has ſeveral caſes of the plague from Thaſos, Abdera, &c. but not one from Athens. See Hippocrat. de Morbis Epidem.

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ravaged all that ſouthern diſtrict, as well as the coaſt oppoſite to Eubœa and Naxos, they traced a line of devaſtation along the Marathonian ſhore, the glorious ſcene of an immortal victory, obtained by the valour of Athens, in defence of thoſe very ſtates by which her own territories were now ſo cruelly deſolated.

Magnanimity of Pericles.

If conſcious wiſdom and rectitude were not ſuperior to every aſſault of fortune, the manly ſoul of Pericles muſt have ſunk under the weight of ſuch multiplied calamities. But his fortitude ſtill ſupported him amidſt the flood of public and domeſtic woe. With decent and magnanimous compoſure, he beheld the unhapy fate of his numerous and flouriſhing family, ſucceſſively ſnatched away by the rapacious peſtilence. At the funeral of the laſt of his ſons, he dropped, indeed, a few reluctant tears of paternal tenderneſs; but aſhamed of this momentary weakneſs, he bent his undejected mind to the defence of the republic. Having collected an hundred Athenian, together with fifty Chian or Leſbian veſſels, he ſailed through the Saronic gulph, and ravaged the unprotected coaſts of Elis, Argos, and Laconia. While this armament weighed anchor in the Piræus, there happened an eclipſe of the ſun [29], which terrified the ſuperſtitious mariners, whoſe minds were already clouded by calamity. The pilot of the admiral galley betrayed the moſt unmanly cowardice, when Pericles,

[29] Plutarch. in Pericl. But as Thucydides mentions no ſuch eclipſe that ſummer, although extremely attentive in recording ſuch phænomena, we may ſuſpect the chronology of Plutarch.

throwing

throwing a cloak before his eyes, aſked, "whether the obſcurity ſurpriſed him?" the pilot anſwering him in the negative, "Neither," rejoined Pericles, ought an eclipſe of the ſun, occaſioned by the intervention of a revolving planet, which intercepts its light." CHAP. XV.

His unfortunate expedition to the Peloponneſus. Olymp. lxxxvii. 3. A. C. 430.

Having arrived on the Argolic coaſt, the Athenians laid ſiege to the ſacred city Epidaurus, whoſe inhabitants gloried in the peculiar favour of Æſculapius. The plague again breaking out in the fleet, was naturally aſcribed to the vengeance of that offended divinity. They raiſed the ſiege of Epidaurus; nor were their operations more ſucceſsful againſt Trœzené, Hermioné, and other Peloponneſian cities. They took only the ſmall fortreſs of Praſiæ, a ſea-port of Laconia; after which they returned to the Piræus, afflicted with the peſtilence, and without having performed any thing ſuitable to the greatneſs of the armament, or the public expectation.

Athenians more unfortunate in Thrace.

The Athenian expedition into Thrace was ſtill more unfortunate. Into that country Agnon conducted a body of four thouſand men, to co-operate with Phormio in the ſiege of Potidæa. But in the ſpace of forty days, he loſt one thouſand and fifty ſoldiers in the plague; and the only conſequence of his expedition was, to infect the northern army with that melancholy diſorder.

Pericles traduced.

Theſe multiplied diſaſters reduced the Athenians to deſpair. Their ſufferings exceeded example and belief, while they were deprived of the only expected conſolation, the pleaſure of revenge. The

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bulk of the people desired peace on any terms. Ambassadors were sent to Sparta, but not admitted to an audience. The orators clamoured and traduced Pericles. The undiscerning populace ascribed their misfortunes to the unhappy effect of his councils: but his magnanimity did not yet forsake him; and, for the last time, he addressed the assembly:

The magnanimous firmness of his last advice to the Athenians.

"Your anger, Athenians! occasions no surprise, because it comes not unexpected. Your complaints excite no resentment, because to complain is the right of the miserable. Yet, as you mistake both the cause and the measure of your present calamity, I will venture to expose such dangerous, and, if not speedily corrected, such fatal errors. The justice and necessity of the war I have often had occasion to explain: it is just, that you, who have protected and saved, should govern Greece; it is necessary, if you would assert your pre-eminence, that you should now resist the Peloponnesians. On maintaining this resolution, not your honour only, but your safety, depends. The sovereignty of Greece cannot, like an empty pageant of grandeur, be taken up with indifference, or without danger laid down. That well-earned dominion, which you have sometimes exercised tyrannically, must be upheld and defended, otherwise you must submit, without resource, to the resentment of your injured allies, and the animosity of your inveterate enemies. The hardships, to which you were exposed from the latter, I foresaw and foretold; the pestilence, that sudden and improbable calamity, it was impossible for human prudence to conjecture; yet great and

unexpected

unexpected as our misfortunes have been, and continue, they are ſtill accidental and tranſitory, while the advantages of this neceſſary war are permanent, and its glory will be immortal. The greatneſs of that empire which we ſtrive to uphold, extends beyond the territories of our moſt diſtant allies. Of the two elements, deſtined for the uſe of men, the ſea and the land, we abſolutely command the one, nor is there any kingdom or republic, or confederacy, in a condition to diſpute our dominion. Let this conſideration elevate our hopes; and perſonal afflictions will be drowned in the tide of public proſperity. Let us bear, with reſignation, the ſtrokes of Providence; and we ſhall repel, with vigour, the aſſaults of your enemies. It is the hereditary and glorious diſtinction of our republic, never to yield to adverſity. We have defied danger, expended treaſure and blood; and, amidſt obſtinate and formidable wars, augmented the power, and extended the fame, of a city unrivalled in wealth, populouſneſs, and ſplendour, and governed by laws and inſtitutions worthy of its magnificence and renown. If Athens muſt periſh, (as what human grandeur is not ſubject to decay?) let her never fall, at leaſt, through *our* puſillanimity, a fall that would cancel the merit of our former virtue, and deſtroy at once that edifice of glory which it has been the work of ages to rear. When our walls and harbours are no more; when the terror of our navy ſhall have ceaſed, and our external magnificence have fallen to decay, the glory of Athens ſhall remain: this is the prize which I have hitherto exhorted, and ſtill

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exhort you to defend, regardleſs of the clamours of ſloth, the ſuſpicions of cowardice, or the perſecution of envy."

Death and character of Pericles. Olymp. lxxxvii. 4. A. C. 429.

Such were the ſentiments of Pericles, who, on this occaſion, declared to his aſſembled countrymen, with the freedom of conſcious merit, that he felt himſelf inferior to none in wiſdom to diſcover, and abilities to explain and promote, the meaſures moſt honourable and uſeful; that he was a ſincere and ardent lover of the republic, unbiaſſed by the dictates of ſelfiſhneſs, unſeduced by the allurements of partiality. The anger of the Athenians evaporated in impoſing on him a ſmall fine, and ſhortly afterwards, they re-elected him general. The integrity and manly firmneſs of his mind reſtored the fainting courage of the republic. They reſcued the dignity of Pericles from the rage of popular frenzy; but they could not defend his life againſt the infectious malignity of the peſtilence. He died two years and ſix months after the commencement of the war. The character which he draws of himſelf is confirmed by the impartial voice of hiſtory, which adds a few circumſtances fitted to confirm the texture of a virtuous and laſting fame. During the firſt invaſion of the Peloponneſians, he declared that he would convey his extenſive and valuable eſtate to the public, if it ſhould be excepted from the general devaſtation, by the policy or the gratitude of Archidamus, his hereditary gueſt and friend [30]. Yet this generous patriot lived with the moſt exemplary œconomy in his perſonal and domeſtic expence. His death-bed was

[30] Thucydid. p. 108.

ſurrounded

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ſurrounded by his numerous admirers, who dwelt with complacence on the illuſtrious exploits of his glorious life. While they recounted the wiſdom of his government, and enumerated the long ſeries of his victories by ſea and land, "You forget," ſaid the dying ſtateſman and ſage, "you forget the only valuable part of my character: none of my fellow-citizens was ever compelled through any action of mine, to aſſume a mourning robe[31]." He expired, teaching an invaluable leſſon to human kind, that in the laſt important hour, when all other objects diſappear, or totally loſe their value, the recollection of an innocent life is ſtill preſent to the mind, and ſtill affords conſolation, more valuable than Pericles could derive from his nine trophies erected over the enemies of his country, from his long and proſperous adminiſtration of forty years, the depth of his political wiſdom, the pre-eminence of his military and naval ſkill, and the immortal fame of his matchleſs eloquence.

[31] Plut. in Pericl.

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Subſequent Events of the War.—Platæa taken.—Revolt of Leſbos.—Deſcription and Hiſtory of that Iſland.—Nature of its political Connection with Athens.—Addreſs of Leſbos.—Its Capital beſieged by the Athenians.—Meaſures of the Peloponneſians for relieving it.—Mitylené ſurrenders.—Deliberations in Athens concerning the Treatment of the Priſoners.—Reſettlement of the Affairs of Leſbos.—The Corinthians foment Factions in Corcyra.—Sedition in that Iſland.—The contending Factions reſpectively ſupported by the Athenians and Peloponneſians.—Progreſs, Termination, and Conſequences of the Sedition.

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Events of the four following years of the war Olymp. lxxxvii. 4. A. C. 429—425.

THE dignity and vigour of the republic ſeemed to periſh with Pericles, and ſeveral years elapſed, ſcarcely diſtinguiſhed by any event that tended to vary the uniformity, much leſs to decide the fortune, of the war. While the Peloponneſians invaded Attica, the Athenian fleet annually ravaged the coaſt of Peloponneſus. In vain the inhabitants of that country, little accuſtomed to the ſea, collected ſhips and uſed their utmoſt endeavours to contend with the experienced ſkill of the Athenian mariners. They were always defeated, and often by an inferior force; one proof among many, that naval ſuperiority is ſlowly acquired,

and

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and ſlowly loſt. Neither the Athenians nor the Peloponneſians derived any effectual aſſiſtance from their reſpective alliances with Sitalces and Perdiccas. The former, reinforced by many independent tribes of Thrace, who were allured to his ſtandard by the hopes of plunder, poured down an hundred and fifty thouſand men on the Macedonian coaſt. But a haſty agreement between the two kings diſſipated that numerous and deſultory band with the ſame rapidity with which it had been collected[1].

One benefit, indeed, the Athenians received from Sitalces, if that can be reckoned a benefit, which enabled them to commit an action of enormous cruelty. He put into their hands Ariſtæus, the Corinthian, a bold and determined enemy of their republic; and actually travelling through Thrace into Perſia, to ſolicit money from Artaxerxes to ſupport the war againſt them. Both Ariſtæus and his colleagues in the embaſſy ſuffered an ignominious death.

Taking of Potidæa; Olymp. lxxxii. 4. A. C. 429.

The ſucceſs of the adverſe parties was equally balanced in the ſieges of Potidæa and Platæa. The former, having ſurrendered on capitulation, was occupied by new inhabitants. The expelled citizens retired to Olynthus and other places of the Chalcidicé, where they ſtrengthened and exaſperated the foes of Athens. Platæa alſo capitulated, after a long and ſpirited reſiſtance during five years. Notwithſtanding the warm and affecting remon-

Of Platæa. Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. A. C. 427.

[1] Thucydid. p. 167—170.

ſtrances

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ſtrances of the citizens who had acted ſuch an illuſtrious part in the Perſian war, when the Thebans behaved moſt diſgracefully, the capitulation was ſhamefully violated by the Spartans, who ſacrificed to the reſentment of Thebes, the eternal enemy of Platæa, two hundred brave men, whoſe courage and fidelity merited a better fate. But the youth of Platæa ſtill flouriſhed in the boſom of Athens, and were deſtined, in a future age, to reaſſume the dignity of independent government, which always formed the higheſt ambition of their ſmall but magnanimous community.

Revolt of Leſbos.

Among the tranſactions of this otherwiſe unimportant period, happened the revolt of Leſbos, and the ſedition of Corcyra. Both events deeply affected the intereſts of Athens; and the former is diſtinguiſhed by ſuch circumſtances as ſerve to illuſtrate the political arrangements of the times, while the latter exhibits a ſtriking but gloomy picture of Grecian manners.

Deſcription and hiſtory of that iſland.

The iſland of Leſbos, extending above an hundred and fifty miles in circumference, is the largeſt, except Eubœa, in the Ægæan ſea. Originally planted by Eolians, Leſbos was the mother of many Eolic colonies. They were eſtabliſhed on the oppoſite continent, and ſeparated from their metropolis by a ſtrait of ſeven miles, which expands itſelf into the gulf of Thebé, and is beautifully diverſified by the Hecatonneſian and Arginuſſian iſles, of old ſacred to Apollo. The happy temperature of the climate of Leſbos conſpired with the rich fertility of the ſoil to produce thoſe

delicious fruits and thoſe exquiſite wines, which CHAP. XVI.
are ſtill acknowledged by modern travellers to deſerve the encomiums ſo liberally beſtowed on them by ancient writers[a]. The convenience of its harbours furniſhed another ſource of wealth and advantage to this delightful iſland, which, as early as the age of Homer, was reckoned populous and powerful, and, like the reſt of Greece, at that time, governed by the moderate juriſdiction of hereditary princes. The abuſe of royal power occaſioned the diſſolution of monarchy in Leſbos, as well as in the neighbouring iſles. The rival cities of Mitylené and Methymna contended for republican pre-eminence. The former prevailed, and having reduced Methymna, as well as ſix cities of inferior note, began to extend its dominion beyond the narrow bounds of the iſland, and conquered a conſiderable part of Troas. Meanwhile the internal government of Mitylené was often diſturbed by ſedition, and ſometimes uſurped by tyrants. The wiſe Pittacus, contemporary and rival of Solon, endeavoured to remedy theſe evils by giving his countrymen a body of laws, compriſed in ſix hundred verſes, which adjuſted their political rights, and regulated their behaviour and manners. The Leſbians afterwards underwent thoſe general revolutions, to which both the iſlands and the continent of Aſia Minor were expoſed from the Lydian and Perſian power. Delivered from the yoke of Per-

[a] Monſ. de Guys, Tournefort, &c. agree with Horace (paſſim) and Strabo, l. xiii. p. 584—657. from whom the following particulars, in the text, concerning Leſbos, are extracted.

ſia

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ſia by the ſucceſsful valour of Athens and Sparta, the Leſbians, as well as all the Greek ſettlements around them, ſpurned the tyrannical authority of Sparta and Pauſanias, and ranged themſelves under the honourable colours of Athens, which they thenceforth continued to reſpect in peace, and to follow in war.

Nature of its political connection with Athens.

In the exerciſe of power, the Athenians diſplayed principles totally different from thoſe by which they had attained it. The confederacy between Athens and Leſbos was ſtill ſupported, however, by mutual fear, rather than by reciprocal affection. During peace, the Leſbians dreaded the navy of Athens; the Athenians feared to loſe the aſſiſtance of Leſbos in war. Beſides this, the Athenians were of the Ionic, the Leſbians of the Eolic, race; and the latter juſtly regretted that the allies of Athens ſhould be ſucceſſively reduced to the condition of ſubjects. They perceived the artful policy of that republic in allowing the Chians and Leſbians alone to retain the ſemblance of liberty. While the Chians and Leſbians, ſtill free in appearance, aſſiſted in ſubduing the other confederates of Athens, that ambitious republic was always furniſhed with a plauſible juſtification of her general oppreſſion and tyranny; ſince it was natural to imagine that men, left to the unreſtrained liberty of choice, ſhould, in matters indifferent to themſelves, prefer the cauſe of juſtice to that of uſurpation. But even the apparent freedom which the Leſbians enjoyed had become extremely precarious. They felt themſelves under a diſagreeable neceſſity

to

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to ſoothe, to bribe, and to flatter the Athenian demagogues, and in all their tranſactions with that imperious people, to teſtify mortifying deference or abject ſubmiſſion. Notwithſtanding their watchful attention never deſignedly to offend, they were continually endangered by the quarrelſome humour of a capricious multitude, and had reaſon to dread, leſt, in conſequence of ſome unexpected guſt of paſſion, they ſhould be compelled to demoliſh their walls, and to ſurrender their ſhipping; the puniſhments already inflicted on ſuch of the neighbouring iſlands as had incurred the diſpleaſure of Athens.

Meaſures of the Leſbians previous to their revolt.

This uneaſy ſituation naturally diſpoſed the Leſbians, amidſt the calamities of the ſecond Peloponneſian invaſion, heightened by the plague at Athens, to watch an opportunity for revolt. The following year was employed in aſſembling the ſcattered inhabitants of the iſland within the walls of Mitylené, in ſtrengthening theſe walls, in fortifying their harbours, in augmenting their fleet, and in collecting troops and proviſions from the fertile ſhores of the Euxine. But in the fourth year of the war, their deſign, yet unripe for execution, was made known to the Athenians by the inhabitants of Tenedos, the neighbours and enemies of Leſbos, as well as by the citizens of Methymna, the ancient rival of Mitylené, and by ſeveral malcontents in the Leſbian capital. Notwithſtanding the concurrence of ſuch powerful teſtimonies, the Athenian magiſtrates affected to diſbelieve intelligence which their diſtreſſed circumſtances rendered peculiarly

Olymp. lxxxviii. 1 A. C. 428

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peculiarly alarming. The Leſbians, it was ſaid, could never think of forſaking the alliance of a country which had always treated them with ſuch diſtinguiſhed favour, how powerfully ſoever they might be urged to that meaſure by the Thebans, their Eolian brethren, and the Spartans, their ancient confederates. Ambaſſadors, however, were ſent to Leſbos, deſiring an explanation of rumours ſo diſhonourable to the fidelity and gratitude of the iſland.

Activity of Athens.

The ambaſſadors having confirmed the report, Athens equipped a fleet of forty ſail, intending to attack the enemy by ſurpriſe, while they celebrated, with univerſal conſent, the anniverſary feſtival of Apollo, on the promontory of Malea. But this deſign was rendered abortive by the diligence of a Mitylenian traveller, who, paſſing from Athens to Eubœa, proceeded ſouthward to Geraiſtos, and, embarking in a merchant veſſel, reached Leſbos in leſs than three days from the time that he undertook this important ſervice. His ſeaſonable advice not only prevented the Mitylenians from leaving their city, but prepared them to appear, at the arrival of the enemy, in a tolerable poſture of defence. This ſtate of preparation enabled them to obtain from Cleippidas, the Athenian admiral, a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities, until they diſpatched an embaſſy to Athens, to remove, as they pretended, the groundleſs reſentment of the people, and to give ample ſatisfaction to the magiſtrates.

Addreſs of Leſbos

On the part of the Leſbians, this tranſaction was nothing more than a contrivance to gain time. They

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They expected no favour or forgiveneſs from the Athenian aſſembly; and while this illuſive negociation was carrying on at Athens, other ambaſſadors repaired ſecretly to Sparta, requeſting that the Leſbians might be admitted into the Peloponneſian confederacy, and thus entitled to the protection of that powerful league. The Spartans referred them to the general aſſembly, which was to be ſoon held at Olympia, to ſolemnize the moſt ſplendid of all the Grecian feſtivals. After the games were ended, and the Athenians, who little ſuſpected that ſuch matters were in agitation, had returned home, the Leſbian ambaſſadors were favourably heard in a general convention of the Peloponneſian repreſentatives or deputies, from whom they received aſſurance of immediate and effectual aſſiſtance.

Olymp. lxxxviii. 1. A.C. 428.

Mitylené beſieged.

This promiſe, however, was not punctually performed. The eyes of the Athenians opened to their danger; and, while the Peloponneſians prepared or deliberated, their more active enemies had already taken the field. Various ſkirmiſhes, in which the iſlanders ſhewed little vigour in their own defence, engaged the neigbouring ſtates of Lemnos and Imbros to ſend, on the firſt ſummons, conſiderable ſupplies of troops to their Athenian confederates; but, as the combined forces were ſtill inſufficient completely to inveſt Mitylené, a powerful reinforcement was ſent from Athens; and before the beginning of winter, the place was blocked up by land, while an Athenian fleet occupied the harbour.

Meaſures of the Peloponneſians.

The unfavourable ſeaſon, and ſtill more, that dilatorineſs which ſo often obſtructed the meaſures of

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neſians for relieving it.

of the confederates, prevented timely aid from arriving at Mitylené. But, in order to make a diverſion in favour of their new allies, the Peloponneſians aſſembled a conſiderable armament at the iſthmus, intending to convey their ſhips over land from Corinth to the ſea of Athens, that they might thus infeſt the Athenian ſhores with their fleet, while the army carried on its uſual ravages in the central parts of Attica. The activity of the Athenians defeated this deſign. Notwithſtanding their numerous ſquadrons on the coaſts of Peloponneſus, Thrace, and Leſbos, they immediately fitted out an hundred ſail to defend their own ſhores. The Peloponneſian ſailors, who had been haſtily collected from the maritime towns, ſoon became diſguſted with an expedition attended with unforeſeen difficulties; and, as autumn advanced, the militia from the inland country grew impatient to return to their fields and vineyards. During winter, the Mitylenians were ſtill diſappointed in their hope of relief. They were encouraged, however, to perſevere in reſiſtance, by the arrival of Salæthus, a Spartan general of conſiderable merit, who having landed in an obſcure harbour of the iſland, travelled by land towards Mitylené; and, during the obſcurity of night, paſſed the Athenian wall of circumvallation, through favour of a breach made by a torrent. Salæthus gave the beſieged freſh aſſurances that a powerful fleet would be ſent to their aſſiſtance early in the ſpring; and that, at the ſame time, the Athenians ſhould be haraſſed

by

by an invaſion more terrible and deſtructive than any which they had yet experienced. CHAP. XVI.

The latter part of the promiſe was indeed performed. The Peloponneſians invaded Attica. Whatever had been ſpared in former incurſions, now fell a prey to their fury. But after ſpring had conſiderably advanced, the long-expected fleet was looked for in vain. The ſame procraſtination and difficulties ſtill retarded the preparations of the confederates; and when at length forty ſail were collected, the command was beſtowed on the Spartan Alcidas, a man totally devoid of that ſpirit and judgment eſſential to the character of a naval commander. Inſtead of ſailing directly to the relief of Mitylené, he waſted much precious time in purſuing the Athenian merchantmen, in haraſſing the unfortified iſlands, and in alarming the defenceleſs and unwarlike inhabitants of Ionia, who could ſcarcely recover from their aſtoniſhment, on ſeeing a Peloponneſian fleet in thoſe ſeas. Many trading veſſels, that ſailed between the numerous iſlands and harbours on that extenſive coaſt, fell into the hands of Alcidas; for when they deſcried his ſquadron, they attempted not to avoid it; many fearleſsly approached it, as certainly Athenian. In conſequence of this imprudence, Alcidas took a great number of priſoners, whom he butchered in cold blood at Myonneſus.

Imprudent conduct of Alcidas. Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. A. C. 427.

This barbarity only diſgraced himſelf, and injured the Spartan cauſe in Aſia, many cities of which were previouſly ripe for revolt. Before he attempted to accompliſh the main object

Mitylené ſurrenders. Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. A. C. 427.

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of his expedition, the opportunity was forever loſt by the ſurrender of Mitylené. Deſpair of aſſiſtance, and ſcarcity of proviſions, had obliged Salæthus, who began himſelf by this time to ſuſpect that the Peloponneſians had laid aſide all thoughts of ſuccouring the place, to arm [3] the populace, in order to make a vigorous aſſault on the Athenian lines. But the lower ranks of men, who in Leſbos, as well as in all the Grecian iſles, naturally favoured the cauſe of Athens, the avowed patron of democracy, no ſooner received their armour, than they refuſed to obey their ſuperiors, and threatened, that unleſs the corn were ſpeedily brought into the market-place, and equally divided among all the citizens, they would inſtantly ſubmit to the beſiegers. The ariſtocratical party prudently yielded to the torrent of popular fury, which they had not ſtrength to reſiſt; and juſtly apprehenſive, leſt a more obſtinate defence might totally exclude them from the benefit of capitulation, they ſurrendered to Paches, the Athenian commander, on condition that none of the priſoners ſhould be enſlaved or put to death, until their agents, who were immediately ſent to implore the clemency of Athens, ſhould return with the ſentence of that republic.

Terror of the Leſbian captives.

The terms were accepted and ratified; but ſuch were the furious reſentments which prevailed in that age, ſuch the dark ſuſpicions, and ſuch the

[3] He gave the populace, who were before light armed, heavy armour. Thucydid. p. 188. Engliſh cannot imitate his expreſſion: ὁπλίζει τοὺς δήμους πρότερον ψιλοὺς ὄντας.

total

total diſregard to all laws of juſtice and humanity, that the Athenian army had no ſooner taken poſſeſſion of the place, than the chief authors and abettors of the revolt, judging it imprudent to truſt their ſafety to the faith of treaties, and the ſanctity of oaths, flew for protection to their temples and altars. This unſeaſonable diffidence (for Paches appears to have united uncommon humanity with a daring ſpirit, and great military abilities) betrayed conſcious guilt, and enabled the Athenians to diſtinguiſh between their friends and enemies. The latter were protected by Paches, and prevailed on to withdraw from their ſanctuaries. He afterwards ſent them to the iſle of Tenedos, until their fate, as well as that of their fellow citizens, ſhould be finally determined by the Athenian republic.

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They are doomed to death by an Athenian decree

Immediately after the arrival of the Mitylenian ambaſſadors, the people of Athens had aſſembled to deliberate on this important ſubject. Agitated by the giddy tranſports of triumph over the rebellious ingratitude and perfidy of a people, who, though diſtinguiſhed by peculiar favours, had deſerted their protectors in the ſeaſon of danger, the Athenians doomed to death all the Mitylenian citizens, and condemned the women and children to perpetual ſervitude. In one day the bill was propoſed, the decree paſſed, and the ſame evening a galley was diſpatched to Paches, conveying this cruel and bloody reſolution. But the night left room for reflection; and the feelings of humanity were awakened by the ſtings of remorſe. In the morning, having aſſembled, as

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uſual, in the public ſquare, men were ſurpriſed and pleaſed to find the ſentiments of their neighbours exactly correſponding with their own. Their dejected countenances met each other; they lamented, with one accord, the raſhneſs and ferocity of their paſſion, and bewailed the unhappy fate of Mitylené, the deſtined object of their miſguided frenzy. The Mitylenian ambaſſadors availed themſelves of this ſudden change of ſentiment: a new aſſembly was convened, and the queſtion ſubmitted to a ſecond deliberation.

Character of Cleon.

A turbulent impetuous eloquence had raiſed the audacious profligacy of Cleon, from the loweſt rank of life, to a high degree of authority in the Athenian aſſembly. The multitude were deceived by his artifices, and pleaſed with his frontleſs impudence, which they called honeſt boldneſs, and manly openneſs of character. His manners they approved in proportion as they reſembled their own; and the worſt of his vices found advocates among the dupes of his pretended patriotiſm. This violent demagogue, whoſe arrogant [4] preſumption ſo unworthily ſucceeded the enlightened magnanimity of Pericles, had, in the former aſſembly, propoſed and carried the ſanguinary decree againſt Mitylené. He ſtill perſevered in ſupporting that atrocious meaſure, and upbraided the weak and wavering

[4] The character of Cleon, ſketched in miniature by Thucydides, pp. 193 and 266. is painted at full length by Ariſtophanes, in his comedy of the Ἱππεῖς, "The Horſemen." Yet we could not ſafely truſt the deſcription of the angry ſatiriſt, who bore a perſonal grudge to Cleon, unleſs the principal ſtrokes were juſtified by the impartial narrative of Thucydides.

counſels

counſels of his countrymen, liable to be ſhaken by every guſt of paſſion, and totally incapable of that ſtability eſſential in the management, indeed, of all great affairs, but particularly indiſpenſable in the government of diſtant dependencies. CHAP. XVI.

" Such a temper of mind, (he had often ventured to declare, and would repeat the ſame diſagreeable truth as often as their folly obliged him) was alike unworthy, and incapable, of command. That a democracy was unfit for ſovereign rule, paſt experience convinced him, and the preſent inſtance now confirmed his opinion. The empire of Athens could not be maintained without an undivided attachment, an unalterable adherence, to the intereſt and honour of the republic. But the maſters of Greece were the ſlaves of their own capricious paſſions; excited at will by the perfidious voice of venal ſpeakers, bribed to betray them. Lulled to a fatal repoſe by the ſoftneſs of melodious words, they forgot the dignity of the ſtate, and reſtrained their perſonal reſentment againſt multiplied and unprovoked injuries. What was ſtill more dangerous, they invited, by an ill-judged lenity, the imitation and continuance of ſuch crimes as muſt terminate in public diſgrace and irreparable ruin. What elſe can be expected from pardoning the aggravated guilt of Mitylene? Encouraged by this weakneſs, muſt not the neighbouring cities and iſlands, whoſe reſources form the principal vigour of the republic, greedily ſeize the firſt opportunity of ſhaking off the yoke, which they have long reluctantly borne; and follow the example of a revolt, Cleon enforces that decree.

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which, without preſenting them with the fear of danger, promiſed them the hope of deliverance?"

Deodatus oppoſes it with equal addreſs and ſpirit.

This ſanguinary ſpeech was anſwered by Deodatus, a man endowed with a happy moderation of mind, joined to a profound knowledge of government, and a deep inſight into human nature. In the former aſſembly, this reſpectable orator had ventured, almoſt ſingle and alone, to plead the cauſe of the Mitylenians, and to aſſert the rights of humanity. He obſerved, "that aſſemblies were liable to be miſled by the fury of reſentment, as well as by the weakneſs of compaſſion; and that errors of the former kind were productive of conſequences not leſs deſtructive, and always followed by a far more bitter repentance. Againſt vague ſlanders and calumny no man is ſecure; but a true patriot muſt learn to deſpiſe ſuch unmanly reproaches. Undaunted by oppoſition, he will offer good counſel, to which there are not any greater enemies than haſte and anger. For my part, I ſtand up neither to defend the Mitylenians, nor to waſte time in fruitleſs accuſations. They have injured us moſt outrageouſly, yet I would not adviſe you to butcher them, unleſs *that* can be proved expedient; neither, were they objects of forgiveneſs, would I adviſe you to pardon them [5], unleſs that were conducive to the public intereſt, the only point on which our preſent deliberation turns. Guided by vulgar prejudices, Cleon has

[5] This is ſpeaking like an orator. It will appear in the ſequel, that Deodatus by no means conſidered the innocence or guilt of the Mitylenians as things indifferent.

loudly

loudly aſſerted, that the deſtruction of the Mity- CHAP. XVI.
lenians is neceſſary to deter neighbouring cities from rebellion. But diſtant ſubjects muſt be kept in obedience by the mildneſs of diſcretionary caution, not by the rigour of ſanguinary examples. What people were ever ſo mad as to revolt, without expecting, either through their domeſtic ſtrength, or the aſſiſtance of foreign powers, to make good their pretenſions? Men who have known liberty, how ſweet it is, ought not to be puniſhed too ſeverely for aſpiring at that inеſtimable enjoyment. But their growing diſaffection muſt be watched with care, and anticipated by diligence; they muſt be prevented from taking the firſt ſtep towards emancipation; and taught, if poſſible, to regard it as a thing altogether unattainable.

"Yet ſuch is the nature of man, conſidered either individually or collectively, that a law of infallible prevention will never be enacted. Of all crimes that any reaſonable creature can commit, Deſire is the fore-runner, and Hope the attendant. Theſe inviſible principles within, are too powerful for external terrors; nor has the increaſing ſeverity of laws rendered crimes leſs frequent in latter times, than during the mildneſs of the heroic ages, when few puniſhments were capital. While human nature remains the ſame, weakneſs will be diſtruſtful, neceſſity will be daring, poverty will beget fraud, power will excite injuſtice, miſery will ſink into meanneſs, and proſperity ſwell into preſumption. There are other

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contingencies, which ſtir up the mutiny of paſſions, too ſtubborn for controul. The authority of government can neither change the combination of events, nor interrupt the occaſions of fortune. Impelled by ſuch cauſes, the ſelfiſh deſires of men will hurry them into wickedneſs and vice, whatever penalties await them. The imagination becomes familiar with one ſcale of puniſhment, as well as with another; and, in every degree, hope renders it alike ineffectual and impotent; ſince neither individuals nor communities would commit wrong if they believed that it muſt infallibly ſubject them to puniſhment, ſmall or great. When individuals venture on crimes, they always expect to elude the vengeance of law. When communities rebel, they expect to render their revolt, not the occaſion of triumph to their enemies, but the means of their own deliverance and ſecurity.

"The ſevere puniſhment of Mitylene cannot, therefore, produce the good conſequences with which Cleon has flattered you. But this cruel meaſure will be attended with irreparable prejudice to your intereſt. It will eſtrange the affections of your allies; provoke the reſentment of Greece; excite the indignation of mankind; and, inſtead of preventing rebellion, render it more frequent and more dangerous. When all hopes of ſucceſs have vaniſhed, your rebellious ſubjects will never be perſuaded to return to their duty. They will ſeek death in the field, rather than await it from the hand of the executioner. Though reduced

to

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to the laſt extremity, they will ſpurn ſubmiſſion, and gathering courage from deſpair, either repel your aſſaults, or fall an uſeleſs prey, weak and exhauſted, incapable of indemnifying you for the expence of the war, or of raiſing thoſe ſubſidies and contributions, which rendered their ſubjugation a reaſonable object either of intereſt or ambition.

"The revolt of Mitylené was the work of an ariſtocratical faction, fomented by the Lacedæmonians and Thebans. The great body of the people had no ſooner provided themſelves with arms, than they diſcovered their affection for Athens. It would be moſt cruel and moſt ungrateful, to confound the innocent with the guilty, to involve friends and foes in undiſtinguiſhed ruin. Yet this odious meaſure would ſhew more weakneſs than cruelty, more folly than injuſtice. What benefit could the enemies of Athens more earneſtly deſire? What boon could the ariſtocratical factions, ſo profuſely ſcattered over Greece, more anxiouſly requeſt from Heaven? Furniſhed with your ſanguinary decree againſt Mitylené, they would for ever alienate from the republic the affections of her ſubjects and confederates; for having once ſeduced them to revolt, they might unanſwerably convince them, that ſafety could only be purchaſed by perſevering in rebellion, and that to return to duty was to ſubmit to death."

His opinion prevails.

The moderation and good ſenſe of Deodatus (ſuch was the influence of Cleon) were approved only by a ſmall majority of voices. Yet it remained uncertain, whether this late and reluctant repent-

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repentance would avail the Mitylenians, who, before any advice of it arrived, might be condemned and executed in conſequence of the former decree. A galley was inſtantly furniſhed with every thing that might promote expedition. The Mitylenian deputies promiſed invaluable rewards to the rowers. But the fate of a numerous, and lately flouriſhing community, ſtill depended on the uncertainty of winds and currents. The firſt advice-boat had ſailed, as the meſſenger of bad news, with a ſlow and melancholy progreſs. The ſecond advanced with the rapid movements of hope and joy. Not an adverſe blaſt oppoſed her courſe. The neceſſity of food and ſleep never reſtrained a moment the labour of the oar: and her diligence was rewarded by reaching Leſbos in time to check the cruel hand of the executioner.

Narrow eſcape of the Mitylenians.

The bloody ſentence had been juſt read, and orders were preparing for carrying it into effect, when the critical arrival of the Athenian galley converted the lamentable outcries, or gloomy deſpair of a whole republic, into expreſſions of admiration and gratitude.

Reſettlement of affairs in Leſbos. Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. A. C. 427.

The puniſhment, however, of Mitylené was ſtill ſufficiently ſevere, even according to the rigorous maxims of Grecian policy. The priſoners, who had been ſent to Tenedos, were tranſported to Athens. They exceeded a thouſand in number, and were indiſcriminately condemned to death.

Salæthus, the Spartan general, ſhared the ſame fate, after deſcending to many mean contrivances to ſave his life. The walls of Mitylené were demoliſhed,

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moliſhed, its ſhipping was ſent to Athens, and its territory divided into three thouſand portions, of which three hundred were conſecrated to the gods, and the reſt diſtributed by lot among the people of Athens. The Leſbians were ſtill allowed to cultivate, as tenants, their own fields, paying for each ſhare an annual rent amounting in value to ſix pounds nine ſhillings ſterling[6].

Merit and perſecution of Paches.

The activity and judgment of Paches thus effected an important conqueſt to his country. Though the affairs of Leſbos might have required his undivided attention, he no ſooner was appriſed of the appearance of the Peloponneſian fleet, than he immediately put to ſea, protected the allies of Athens, and chaſed the enemy from thoſe ſhores. During the whole time of his command, he behaved with firmneſs tempered by humanity. But, at his return to Athens, he met with the uſual reward of ſuperior merit. He was accuſed of miſconduct; and finding ſentence ready to be pronounced againſt him, his indignation roſe ſo high, that he ſlew himſelf in court[7].

Operations of the Spartan fleet.

The Spartan admiral, Alcidas, met, on the other hand, with a reception (ſuch is the blindneſs of popular prejudice!) far better than belonged to his behaviour. The Peloponneſian fleet of forty ſail, imprudently intruſted to his command, retired ingloriouſly, after an expenſive and fruitleſs expedition, to the protection of their friendly harbours. A northerly wind, however, drove them on the

[6] Thucydid. p. 173—206. [7] Plutarch in Nicia, & in Ariſtid.

ſhores

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ſhores of Crete: from whence they dropped in ſucceſſively to the port of Elian Cyllené, which had recovered the diſaſter inflicted on it by the Corcyreans at the beginning of the war, and become the ordinary rendezvous of the Peloponneſian fleet. In this place, Alcidas found thirteen gallies commanded by Braſidas, a Spartan of diſtinguiſhed valour and abilities, purpoſely choſen to aſſiſt the admiral with his counſels. This ſmall ſquadron had orders to join the principal armament; with which the confederates, as their deſign had miſcarried at Leſbos, purpoſed to undertake an expedition againſt Corcyra, then agitated by the tumult of a dangerous ſedition.

Intrigues of the Corinthians with the Corcyrean priſoners,

Among the hoſtilities already related between the republics of Corinth and Corcyra, we deſcribed the enterpriſes by which the Corinthians had poſſeſſed themſelves of twelve hundred Corcyrean priſoners. Many of theſe perſons were deſcended from the firſt families in the iſland; a circumſtance on which the policy of Corinth founded an extenſive plan of artifice and ambition. The Corcyreans, inſtead of feeling the rigours of captivity, or experiencing the ſtern ſeverity of republican reſentment, were treated with the liberal and endearing kindneſs of Grecian hoſpitality. Having acquired their confidence by good offices, the Corinthians inſinuated to them, in the unguarded hours of convivial merriment, the danger as well as the diſgrace of their connection with Athens, the imperious tyrant of her allies: and repreſented their ſhameful ingratitude in deſerting Corinth, to which the colony of Corcyra owed

owed not only its early happineſs and proſperity, but its original eſtabliſhment and exiſtence. Theſe arguments, ſeaſonably repeated, and urged with much addreſs, at length proved effectual. The Corcyreans recovered their freedom, and returned to their native country; and while they pretended to be collecting the ſum of eight hundred talents (about an hundred and fifty thouſand pounds ſterling) to pay their ranſom, they left nothing untried to detach Corcyra from the Athenian intereſt. CHAP. XVI.

excite dangerous factions in Corcyra.

Their firſt expedient for accompliſhing this purpoſe was, to traduce the popular leaders, all of them ſtedfaſt partizans to that republic. Accuſations, impeachments, all the artifices and chicane of legal proſecution, were directed and played off againſt them. The demagogues, who were not of a temper to brook ſuch injuries, retorted on their antagoniſts with equal ingenuity, and far ſuperior ſucceſs. Peithias, the moſt diſtinguiſhed advocate of the Athenian or democratic party, accuſed five ringleaders of the oppoſite faction of having deſtroyed the fence which incloſed the grove of Jupiter; a treſpaſs eſtimated by the Corcyrean law at a ſevere pecuniary puniſhment[8]. In vain the perſons accuſed denied the charge; in vain, after conviction before the ſenate, they fled as ſupplicants to the altars. They could obtain no mitigation of the amercement. The demagoue was in-

[8] The fine was for every pale, a ſtater (one pound and nine pence ſterling). Such cauſes were frequent in other parts of Greece, as we learn from the oration of Lyſias in defence of a citizen accuſed of cutting down a conſecrated olive. See my tranſlation of Lyſias and Iſocrates, p. 377

flexible;

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flexible; and his influence with his colleagues in the ſenate, of which he happened that year to be a member, determined them to execute the law in its utmoſt rigour.

Aſſaſſination of the demagogues.

Exaſperated by this ſeverity, and not doubting that during the adminiſtration of the preſent ſenate, many ſimilar proſecutions would be raiſed againſt them, the ariſtocratical party entered into a conſpiracy for defending themſelves and their country againſt the oppreſſive injuſtice of Athens and Athenian partizans. On this emergency they acted like men who knew the danger of delay. Having fortified their cauſe with a ſufficient number of adherents, they armed themſelves with concealed daggers, ſuddenly ruſhed into the ſenate-houſe, and aſſaſſinated Peithias, with ſixty of his friends. This boldneſs ſtruck their opponents with terror. Such perſons as felt themſelves moſt obnoxious to the conſpirators, immediately fled to the harbour, embarked, and ſailed to Athens.

Sedition in Corcyra. Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. A.C. 427.

The people of Corcyra, thus deprived of their leaders by an event equally unexpected and atrocious, were ſeized with ſuch aſtoniſhment as ſuſpended their power of action. Before they had ſufficiently recovered themſelves to take the proper meaſures for revenge, or even for defence, the arrival of a Corinthian veſſel, and a Lacedæmonian embaſſy, encouraged their bloody opponents to complete the deſtruction which they had begun. The attack was made at the hour of full aſſembly; the forum, or public ſquare, preſented a ſcene of horror; the ſtreets of Corcyra ſtreamed with blood. The unguarded

guarded citizens were incapable of making reſiſtance againſt ſuch ſudden and unforeſeen fury. They fled in trepidation from the forum, and the more ſpacious ſtreets. Some took poſſeſſion of the citadel; others, of the Hillæan harbour; and in general occupied, before the evening, the higher and more remote parts of the town. Their adverſaries kept poſſeſſion of the market-place, round which moſt of their houſes ſtood, or aſſembled in the principal harbour, that points towards Epirus, from which they expected ſuccour. The day following was ſpent in doubtful ſkirmiſhes, and in ſummoning from the country the aſſiſtance of the peaſants, or rather ſlaves, by whom chiefly the lands of the iſland were cultivated. Theſe naturally ranged themſelves on the ſide of the people: the Corcyrean women zealouſly embraced the ſame party, and ſuſtained the tumult with more than female courage. One inactive day intervened. The partizans of ariſtocracy were reinforced by eight hundred auxiliaries from the continent of Epirus. But in the ſucceeding engagement, the numbers and fury of the ſlaves, who ſeized the preſent opportunity to reſent the barbarous cruelty of their reſpective maſters; and the generous ardour of the women, rendered the friends of liberty completely victorious. The vanquiſhed fled towards the forum and the great harbour. Even theſe poſts they ſoon deſpaired of being able to maintain; and, to eſcape immediate death, ſet fire to the ſurrounding houſes, which being ſoon thrown into a blaze, preſented an impervious obſtacle to the rage of the aſſailants.

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The moſt beautiful part of Corcyra was thus deſtroyed in one night: the houſes, ſhops, magazines, and much valuable merchandiſe, were totally conſumed; and, had an eaſterly wind aided the conflagration, the whole city muſt in a ſhort time have been reduced to aſhes. Amidſt this ſcence of confuſion and horror, the Corinthian galley, together with the auxiliaries from Epirus, retired in conſternation from a place that ſeemed doomed to inevitable deſtruction.

An Athenian ſquadron arrives at Corcyra.

Next day twelve Athenian gallies arrived from Naupactus, containing, beſides their ordinary complement of men, five hundred heavy-armed Meſſenians. Nicoſtratus, who commanded this armament, had, upon the firſt intelligence of the ſedition, haſtened with the utmoſt celerity to ſupport the cauſe of Athens and democracy. He had the good fortune not only to anticipate the Peloponneſian ſquadron, which was ſo anxiouſly expected by the enemy, but to find his friends triumphant. They had obtained, however, a melancholy triumph over the ſplendour of their country, which, if its factions were not ſpeedily reconciled, was threatened with total ruin. Nicoſtratus omitted nothing that ſeemed proper to heal the wounds of that afflicted commonwealth. By authority, entreaties, and commands, he perſuaded the contending parties to accommodate matters between themſelves. and to renew their alliance with Athens. Having happily terminated this buſineſs, he was intent on immediate departure; but the managers for the people propoſed, that he ſhould leave five

of

of his ſhips with them, to deter the enemy from any freſh commotion, and take in exchange five of theirs, which ſhould be inſtantly manned to attend him on his ſtation. With this propoſal he complied; and the Corcyreans ſelected the mariners deſtined to ſail with Nicoſtratus. Thoſe named for this ſervice were, to a man, partizans of the oligarchy and Lacedæmon; a circumſtance which created in them juſt alarm, leſt they ſhould be tranſported to Athens, and notwithſtanding the faith of treaties, condemned to death. They took refuge in the temple of Caſtor and Pollux: the aſſurances of Nicoſtratus could ſcarcely remove them from this ſanctuary; and all his declarations and oaths were unable to prevail on them to embark. The oppoſite party aſſerted, that this want of confidence betrayed not only the conſciouſneſs of paſt, but the fixed purpoſe of future, guilt; and would have immediately diſpatched them with their daggers, had not Nicoſtratus interpoſed. Terrified at theſe proceedings, the unhappy victims of popular malice and ſuſpicion aſſembled, to the number of four hundred, and retired with one accord, as ſupplicants, into the temple of Juno. From this ſanctuary they were perſuaded to ariſe, and tranſported to a neighbouring iſland, or rather rock, ſmall, barren, and uninhabited. There they remained four days, ſupplied barely with the means of ſubſiſtence, and impatiently waiting their fate.

The Peloponneſian fleet appears off the coaſt.

In this poſture of affairs a numerous fleet was ſeen approaching from the ſouth. This was the long-expected ſquadron of fifty-three ſhips commanded

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manded by Alcidas and Braſidas. With the unfortunate ſlowneſs inherent in all the meaſures of the confederacy, this armament arrived too late to ſupport the ſinking cauſe of their friends. The Peloponneſian commanders, however, might ſtill expect to take an uſeleſs but agreeable vengeance on their enemies. To accompliſh this deſign they prepared to attack the harbour of Corcyra, while all was yet hurry and confuſion. The iſlanders had ſixty veſſels fit for ſea, in which they embarked with the utmoſt expedition, and ſucceſſively ſailed forth as each happened to be ready. Their ardour and impatience diſdained the judicious advice of Nicoſtratus, who alone, calm and unmoved amidſt a ſcene of unexpected danger, exhorted them to keep the harbour until they were all prepared to advance in line of battle, generouſly offering, with his twelve Athenian gallies, to ſuſtain the firſt aſſaults of the enemy.

A ſea fight, in which the Peloponneſians prevail.

The Peloponneſians, obſerving the hoſtile armament ſcattered and unſupported, divided their own fleet into two ſquadrons. The one, conſiſting of twenty gallies, attacked the Corcyreans; the other, amounting to thirty-three, endeavoured to ſurround the Athenians. But the addreſs of the Athenian mariners fruſtrated this attempt. Their front was extended with equal order and celerity. They aſſaulted, at once, the oppoſite wings of the Peloponneſian fleet, intercepted their motion, and ſkilfully encircled then around, hoping to drive their ſhips againſt each other, and to throw them into univerſal diſorder. Perceiving theſe manœuvres, the

the ſhips which followed the Corcyreans left off the purſuit, and ſteered to ſupport the main ſquadron: and now, with their whole embodied ſtrength, they prepared to pour on the Athenians. Theſe prudently declined the ſhock of ſuperior force: but the glory of their retreat was equal to a victory. They ſeaſonably ſhifted their helms, ſlowly and regularly gave way, and thus covered the retreat of their Corcyrean allies, who, having already loſt thirteen veſſels, were totally unable to renew the engagement. CHAP. XVI.

Having reached the harbour, the Corcyreans ſtill feared leſt the enemy, in purſuance of their victory, ſhould make a deſcent on the coaſt, and even aſſault the city. But the manly counſels of Braſidas, who ſtrongly recommended the latter meaſure, were defeated by the timidity and incapacity of Alcidas. The Corcyreans ſeized, therefore, the preſent opportunity to remove the ſupplicants from the uninhabited iſland to the temple of Juno, as leſs expoſed there, to be diſcovered and taken up by the Peloponneſian fleet. Next day they entered into accommodation with theſe unhappy men, and even admitted ſeveral of them to embark in thirty veſſels, which they haſtily equipped, as the laſt defence of the iſland. The Peloponneſians, meanwhile, ſtill prevented, by the daſtardly counſels of Alcidas, from attacking the capital, wreaked their reſentment on the adjacent territory. But before the dawn of the ſucceeding day, they were alarmed by lights on the northern ſhore of Leucadia, which by their number and The miſconduct of Alcidas ſaves Corcyra.

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disposition, signified the approach of an Athenian fleet of sixty sail.

The Athenians reinforced.

The situation of the invaders was now extremely dangerous. If they stretched out to sea, they might be obliged to encounter the unbroken vigour of the Athenians: if they cruised off the coast, they would be compelled to contend, not only with the power of Athens, but with the resentment of Corcyra. One measure alone promised the hope of safety: it was immediately adopted. Having crept along the shore to Leucadia, they carried their vessels across the isthmus [9], afterwards overflowed by the sea, but which then joined the peninsula, now the island of Leucas, to the adjacent coast of Acarnania. From thence sailing through the narrow seas, which separate the neighbouring isles from the continent, they escaped without discovery, and safely arrived in the harbour of Cyllené.

The Peloponnesians retire from Corcyra.

Massacre of the Lacedæmonian partizans.

The democratical party in Corcyra soon perceived the flight of the enemy, and descried the approach of the Athenian fleet, commanded by Eurymedon. These fortunate events, which ought in generous minds to have effaced the dark impressions of enmity and revenge, only enabled the Corcyreans to display the deep malignity of their character. They commanded the thirty gallies, recently manned, to pass in review, and in proportion as they discovered their enemies, punished them with immediate death. Fifty of the principal citizens, who still clung to the altars in the temple of Juno,

[9] D'Anville considers the ancient Leucadia as an island; Ptolemy speaks of it as a peninsula.

they

they ſeduced from their aſylum, and inſtantly butchered.

Malignant paſſions of the Corcyreans.

Politics and party formed the pretence for violence, while individuals gratified their private paſſions, and wreaked vengeance on their perſonal foes. The ſedition became every hour more fierce: the confuſion thickened; the whole city was filled with conſternation and horror. The altars and images of the gods were ſurrounded by votaries, whom even the terrors of a ſuperſtitious age could no longer protect. The miſerable victims were dragged from the moſt revered temples, whoſe walls and pavement were now firſt ſtained with civil blood. Many withdrew themſelves by a voluntary death from the fury of their enemies. In every houſe, and in every family, ſcenes were tranſacted too horrid for deſcription. Parents, children, brothers, and pretended friends, ſeized the deſired moment for gratifying their latent malignity, and perpetrating crimes without a name. The unfeeling Eurymedon (whoſe character, as will ſhortly appear, was a diſgrace to human nature) ſhewed neither ability nor inclination to ſtop the carnage. During the ſpace of ſix days that his fleet continued in the Corcyrean harbour, the actors in this lamentable tragedy continually aggravated the enormity of their guilt, and improved in the refinement of their cruelty. A dreadful calm ſucceeded this violent agitation. Five hundred partizans of ariſtocracy eſcaped to the coaſt of Epirus; and the Athenian fleet retired.

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The fugitives, inſtead of rejoicing in their ſafety, thought only of revenge. They ſent agents to Lacedæmon and Corinth. By deſcribing their ſufferings to the aſtoniſhed Epirots, they excited their compaſſion, and acquired their aſſiſtance. The ſeverity of the prevailing party in Corcyra increaſed the number of outlaws; who, at length, finding themſelves ſufficiently powerful to attack and conquer the iſland, which, from the moment of their baniſhment, they had infeſted by naval deſcents, ſailed with their whole ſtrength for that purpoſe in boats provided by the Barbarians. In landing at Corcyra, the rowers drove with ſuch violence againſt the ſhore, as broke many of their veſſels in pieces; the reſt they immediately burned, diſdaining ſafety unleſs purchaſed by victory. This deſperate meaſure deterred oppoſition: they advanced, ſeized, and fortified, Mount Iſtoné; a ſtrong poſt in the neighbourhood of the city, from which they ravaged the territory, and ſubjected their enemies to the multiplied evils of war and famine.

The ariſtocratical party receive aſſiſtance from Epirus.

An epidemical diſorder increaſed the meaſure of their calamities. The flames of civil diſcord, which had never been thoroughly extinguiſhed, again broke out within the walls. The miſery of the Corcyreans was verging to deſpair, when an Athenian fleet of forty ſail appeared off the coaſt. This armament was commanded by Eurymedon and Sophocles. It was principally deſtined againſt Sicily, as we ſhall have occaſion to relate, but ordered, in its voyage thither to touch at Corcyra, and regulate the affairs of that iſland. This unexpected aſſiſtance enabled the

The Athenians again arrive in the iſland. Olymp. lxxviii. 4. A. C. 425.

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the beſieged to become the beſiegers. The outworks and defences of Mount Iſtoné were ſucceſſively taken, and the parties who defended them gradually retired to the more elevated branches, and, at length, to the very ſummit, of the mountain. They were on the point of being driven from thence, and of falling into the hands of enemies exaſperated by innumerable injuries ſuffered and inflicted. Alarmed by this reflection, they called out to the Athenians for quarter, and ſurrendered to Eurymedon and Sophocles, on condition that their fate ſhould be decided by the people of Athens. They were ſent priſoners to the ſmall iſland of Ptychia, lying a little eaſtward of the city Corcyra, till it ſhould be found convenient to tranſport them to Athens, and commanded not to make any attempt to ſtir from thence, under pain of annulling the capitulation which had been granted them.

Perfidious cruelty of the Corcyreans;

If the malignity of the Corcyrean populace had not exceeded the ordinary ſtandard of human pravity, their reſentment muſt have been ſoftened by the ſudden tranſition wrought by accident in their favour. But their firſt concern was to intercept the precarious clemency of Athens, and to make ſure the deſtruction of their adverſaries. This atrocious deſign was executed by a ſtratagem equally detestable, uniting, by a ſingular combination, whatever is ſavage in ferocity, and baſe in perfidy. By means of proper agents diſpatched ſecretly to Ptychia, the leaders of the popular faction acquainted thoſe of the priſoners, with whom, in peaceable times, they had reſpectively lived in habits of

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intimacy, that the Athenians had determined to give them up indiſcriminately to the fury of the populace. Pretending much regret that perſons in whom they once had ſo tender a concern, ſhould ſhare the common calamity, they exhorted them, by all poſſible means, to contrive their eſcape, and offered to provide them with a bark for that purpoſe. The known cruelty of Eurymedon made the artifice ſucceed. The bark was already launched from the iſland; the terms of the capitulation were thus infringed; the deluded victims were apprehended in the very act of departure, ſeized, bound, and delivered into the hands of their inexorable enemies.

and of the Athenian commanders, Eurymedon and Sophocles.

The Athenian commanders, Eurymedon and Sophocles, favoured the deceit, becauſe as they were themſelves obliged to proceed towards Sicily, they envied the honour that would accrue to their ſucceſſors in conducting the captives to Athens. To gratify this meanneſs of ſoul without example, they permitted barbarities beyond belief.

Unexampled barbarities committed in Corcyra.

The unhappy priſoners were firſt confined in a dungeon. Dragged ſucceſſively from thence, in parties of twenty at a time, they were compelled to paſs in pairs, their hands tied behind their backs, between two ranks of their enemies, armed with whips, prongs, and every inſtrument of licentious and diſgraceful torture. The wretches left in priſon were long ignorant of the ignominious cruelty inflicted on their companions; but, as ſoon as they learned the abominable ſcenes tranſacted without, they refuſed to quit their confinement,

guarded

guarded the entrance, and invited, with one conſent, the Athenians to murder them. But the Athenians wanted either humanity or firmneſs to commit this kind cruelty. The Corcyrean populace ventured not to force a paſſage from deſpair. They mounted the priſon walls, uncovered the roof, and overwhelmed thoſe below with ſtones, darts, and arrows. Theſe weapons were deſtructive to many, and furniſhed others with the means of deſtroying themſelves or each other. They laid down their heads, opened their breaſts, expoſed their necks, mutually ſoliciting, in plaintive or frantic accents, the fatal ſtroke. The whole night (for night intervened) was ſpent in this horrid ſcene; and the morning preſented a ſpectacle too ſhocking for deſcription. The obdurate hearts of the Corcyreans were incapable of pity or remorſe; but their relenting eyes could not bear the ſight; and they commanded the bodies of their fellow-citizens, now breathleſs or expiring, to be thrown on carts, and conveyed without the walls.

The conſequences of the ſedition permanent.

Thus ended the ſedition of Corcyra[10]; but its conſequences were not ſoon to end. The contagion of that unhappy iſland engendered a political malady, which ſpread its baneful influence over Greece. The ariſtocratical, and ſtill more, the popular governments of that country, had ever been liable to faction, which occaſionally blazed into ſedition. But this morbid tendency, congenial to the conſtitution of republics, thenceforth aſſumed a more dangerous appearance, and be-

[10] Thucydid. p. 220—285.

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trayed more alarming ſymptoms. In every republic, and almoſt in every city, the intriguing and ambitious found the ready protection of Athens, or of Sparta, according as their ſelfiſh and guilty deſigns were ſcreened under the pretence of maintaining the prerogatives of the nobles, or aſſerting the privileges of the people. A virtuous and moderate ariſtocracy, an equal impartial freedom, theſe were the colourings which ſerved to juſtify violence and varniſh guilt. Sheltered by the ſpecious coverings of fair names, the prodigal aſſaſſin delivered himſelf from the importunity of his creditor. The father, with unnatural cruelty, puniſhed the licentious extravagance of his ſon: the ſon avenged by parricide, the ſtern ſeverity of his father. The debates of the public aſſembly were decided by the ſword. Not ſatisfied with victory, men thirſted for blood. This general diſorder overwhelmed laws human and divine. The ordinary courſe of events was reverſed: ſentiments loſt their natural force, and words their uſual meaning[11]. Dulneſs and ſtupidity triumphed over abilities and refinement; for while the crafty and ingenious were laying fine-ſpun ſnares for their enemies, men of blunter minds had immediate recourſe to the ſword and poignard. This ſucceſsful audacity was termed manly enterpriſe; ferocity aſſumed the name of courage; faction and ambition paſſed for patriotiſm and magnanimity; perfidy was called prudence; cunning, wiſdom; every vice was clothed in the garb of every virtue;

[11] Thucydid. p. 227. & ſeqq.

while

while juſtice, moderation, and candour, were branded as weakneſs, cowardice, meanneſs of ſoul, and indifference to the public intereſt. Such was the perverſion of ſentiment, and ſuch the corruption of language firſt engendered amidſt the turbulence of Grecian factions, and too faithfully imitated, as far as the ſoft effeminacy of modern manners will permit, by the diſcontented and ſeditious of later times.—Wretched and deteſtable deluſions, by which wicked men deceive and ruin the public and themſelves!

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Phyſical Calamities conſpire with the Evils of War. —Athenian Expedition into Ætolia.—Victories of Demoſthenes.— He fortifies Pylus.— Blocks up the Spartans in Sphacteria.— The Spartans ſolicit Peace.— Artifices and Imprudence of Cleon.— His unmerited Succeſs.— Ridiculed by Ariſtophanes.— Athenian Conqueſts.— Battle of Delium. —Commotions in Thrace.— Expedition of Braſidas.— Truce for a Year.— The War renewed.— Battle of Amphipolis.— Peace of Nicias.— Diſcontent of the Spartan Allies.

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Phyſical calamities conſpire with the evils of war. Olymp. lxxxviii. 2. A. C. 427.

IT would be agreeable to diverſify the dark and melancholy ſcenes of the Peloponneſian war, by introducing occurrences and tranſactions of a different and more pleaſing kind. But ſuch, unfortunately, is the ſettled gloom of our preſent ſubject, that the epiſodes commonly reflect the ſame colour with the principal action. The miſerable period now under our review, and already diſtinguiſhed by revolt and ſedition, was ſtill farther deformed by a return of the peſtilence, and by repeated earthquakes. The diſeaſe carried off five thouſand Athenian troops, and a great but uncertain number of other citizens. It raged, during a twelvemonth, with unabating violence; many remedies were employed, but all equally ineffectual. The poiſon at length ſpent its force,

and

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and the malady disappeared by a slow and insensible progress, similar to that observed in the Levant, and other parts of the world, which are still liable to be visited by this dreadful calamity [1]. The earthquakes alarmed Attica and Bœotia, but proved most destructive in the neighbouring isles. The dreadful concussions of the land were accompanied, or perhaps produced, by a violent agitation of the sea. The reflux of the waves overwhelmed the flourishing city of Orobia, on the western coast of Eubœa. Similar disasters happened in the small islands of Atalanta and Peperathus. Nor did these alarming events terminate the afflictions of the Greeks; for Nature, as if she had delighted to produce at one period every thing most awful, poured forth a torrent of fire from Mount Ætna, which demolished the industrious labours of the Cataneans. A dreadful eruption had happened fifty years before this period; and the present was the third, and most memorable, by which Sicily had been agitated and inflamed, since the coasts of that island were adorned by Grecian colonies [2].

Olymp. lxxxviii. 3. A. C. 426.

If the Peloponnesian war had not been carried on with an animosity unexampled and unimitated in every age but the present, the long sufferings of the contending parties would have disposed them eagerly to desire the blessings of tranquillity. But such virulent passions rankled in Athens and Sparta, that while calamities were equally balanced, and the

Expedition of Demosthenes to Ætolia. Olymp. lxxxviii. 4. A. C. 425.

[1] Voyage de Tournefort, vol. ii. Discourse on the Plague, in the Phil. Trans. vol. lxiv.

[2] Thucydid. p. 250.

capitals

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capitals of both republics were ſecure, no combination of adverſe circumſtances ſeemed ſufficient to determine either ſide to purchaſe peace by the ſmalleſt diminution of honour. Yet to this neceſſity, Sparta in the following year was reduced by a train of events, equally ſudden and ſingular. Demoſthenes, a general of merit and enterpriſe, commanded the Athenian forces at Naupactus. This town, as related above, had been beſtowed on the unfortunate Meſſenians; by whoſe aſſiſtance, together with that of the Athenian allies in Acarnania, Cephallenia, and Zacynthus, Demoſthenes undertook to reduce the hoſtile provinces of Ætolia, Ambracia, and Leucadia. But the operations neceſſary for this purpoſe were obſtructed by the jealouſies and diſſenſion which prevailed among the confederates; each ſtate inſiſting, that the whole force of the war ſhould be immediately directed againſt its particular enemies.

Miſunderſtanding among the Athenian allies.

The allied army, thus diſtracted by contrariety, and weakened by defection, performed nothing deciſive againſt Leucadia or Ambracia. In Ætolia they were extremely unfortunate. The Meſſenians, who were continually haraſſed by the natives of that barbarous province, perſuaded Demoſthenes that it would be eaſy to over-run their country, before the inhabitants, who lived in ſcattered villages widely ſeparated from each other, could collect their force, or attempt reſiſtance. In purſuance of this advice, Demoſthenes entered Ætolia, took and plundered the towns, and drove the inhabitants before him. During ſeveral days he

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marched unreſiſted; but having proceeded to Ægitium, the principal, or rather only city in the province, he found that his deſign had by no means eſcaped the notice of the enemy. Ægitium is ſituate among lofty mountains, and about ten miles diſtant from the Corinthian gulf. Among theſe intricate and almoſt inacceſſible heights, the flower of the Ætolian nation was poſted. Even the moſt diſtant tribes had come up, before the confederate army entered their borders.

Singular mode of battle.

Ægitium was ſtormed; but the inhabitants eſcaped to their countrymen concealed among the mountains. While the Athenians and their allies purſued them, the Ætolians ruſhed in ſeparate bodies, from different eminences, and checked the purſuers with their darts and javelins. Having diſcharged their miſſile weapons, they retired, being light-armed, and incapable of reſiſting the impreſſion of pikemen. New detachments continually poured forth from the mountains, and in all directions annoyed the confederates. The latter loſt no ground, as long as their archers had darts, and were able to uſe them. But when the greateſt part of their light troops were wounded or ſlain, the heavy-armed men began to give way. They ſtill, however, maintained their order; and the battle long continued, in alternate purſuits and retreats, the Ætolians always flying before the enemy as ſoon as they had diſcharged their javelins. But at length the confederates were exhauſted by ſo many repeated charges, and totally defeated by opponents who durſt not wait their approach.

Their

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Their conductors through this intricate country had all periſhed. They miſtook their road to the ſea. The enemy were light-armed and in their own territories. The purſuit, therefore, was unuſually deſtructive. Many fell into caverns, or tumbled headlong from precipices. A large party wandered into an impervious wood, which being ſet on fire by the enemy, conſumed them in its flames. A miſerable remnant returned to Naupactus afflicted by the loſs of their companions, and highly mortified at being defeated by Barbarians, alike ignorant of the rules of war, and of the laws of civil ſociety, who ſpoke an unknown dialect, and fed on raw fleſh [3].

Unfortunate iſſue of the expedition.

This diſaſter deterred Demoſthenes from returning to Athens, till fortune gave him an opportunity to retrieve the honour of his arms. The Ætolians and Ambraciots, the moſt formidable enemies of the republic on that weſtern coaſt of Greece, ſolicited and obtained aſſiſtance from Lacedæmon and Corinth, vigorouſly attacked the towns of Naupactus and Amphilochian Argos, and threatened to reduce the whole province of Acarnania, in which the latter was ſituated. The vigilance and activity of Demoſthenes not only ſaved theſe important cities, but obtained the moſt ſignal advantages over the aſſailants. With profound military ſkill he divided the ſtrength of the enemy, and, by a well-conducted ſtratagem, totally defeated the Ambraciots among the heights of Idomené. A ſtrong detachment of Ambraciots had ad-

Demoſthenes defends Naupactus, &c.

Defeats the Ætolians and Ambraciots.

[3] Thucydid. p. 237, & ſeqq.

vanced

vanced the preceding day to Olpæ, a place fortified by the Acarnanians, and the ſeat of their courts of juſtice. Demoſthenes obliged this detachment to retreat with conſiderable loſs, and intercepted its return homeward. Meanwhile the collected force of the Ambraciots marched to its ſupport, being totally unacquainted with its misfortune. Appriſed of this deſign, Demoſthenes beſet the paſſes, and ſeized the moſt advantageous poſts on their route. With the remainder of his force he advanced to attack them in front. They had already proceeded to Idomené, and encamped on the loweſt ridge of that mountain [4].

Surpriſes their camp.

Demoſthenes placed his Meſſenians in the van, and commanded them, as they marched along, to diſcourſe in their Doric dialect. This circumſtance, as the morning was yet in its dawn, effectually prevented the advanced guards from ſuſpecting them to be enemies. Demoſthenes then ruſhed forward with the Meſſenians and Acarnanians. The Ambraciots were yet in their beds. The camp was no ſooner aſſaulted than the rout began. Many were ſlain on the ſpot; the reſt fled amain; but the paſſes were beſet, and the purſuers light-armed. Some ran to the ſea, and beheld a new object of terror, a line of Athenian ſhips then cruiſing on the coaſt. Amidſt this complication of calamities, they plunged into the water, and ſwam to the hoſtile ſquadron, chooſing to be deſtroyed rather by the Athenians, than by the enemies from whom they had juſt ſeparated.

[4] Thucydid. p. 244, & ſeqq.

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Conſterna-tion of an Ambracian herald.

On the fo who remained
at recting their
arms into a ſent
on the part of the detachmen ſo much
ſuffered in its retreat from herald
knew nothing of the freſh diſaſter that had befallen
his countrymen. Obſerving the arms of the Am-
bracio iſhed at their number. The
victor his ſu
explained his commiſſion, "What he judged to be
the amount of the ſlain?" "Not more than two
hundred," replied the herald. The inquirer then
ſaid, "It ſhould ſeem otherwiſe, for there are the
arms of more than a thouſand men." The herald
rejoined, "They cannot then belong to our party."
The other replied, "They muſt, if you fought
yeſterday at Idomené." "We fought no where
yeſterday; we ſuffered the day before, in our re-
treat from Olpæ." "But *we* fought yeſterday
againſt theſe Ambraciots, who were marching to
your relief." When the herald heard this, he ut-
tered a deep groan, and departed abruptly, withou
further explaining his commiſſion [3].

Demoſthe-nes fails to the Pelo-ponnetus. Olymp. lxxxviii. 4. A. C. 425.

These important ſucceſſes enabled Demoſthene
to return with honour to Athens. The term o
y command had expired; but his min
could not brook inactivity. He therefore ſolici
ted permiſſion to accompany, as a volunteer, the ar
mament which ſailed to Corcyra, the ſucceſs c
which has already been related, with leave to em

[3] Thucydid. p. 244. & ſeqq.

plo

ploy the Meſſenians, whom he carried along with him, on the coaſt of Peloponneſus, ſhould any opportunity occur there, for promoting the public ſervice. While the fleet ſlowly coaſted along the ſouthern ſhores of that peninſula, the Meſſenians viewed, with mingled joy and ſorrow, the long loſt, but ſtill beloved, ſeats of their anceſtors. They regretted, in particular, the decay of ancient Pylus, the royal reſidence of their admired Neſtor, whoſe youth had been adorned by valour, and his age renowned for wiſdom. Their immortal reſentment againſt Sparta was inflamed by beholding the ruins of Meſſené. A thouſand ideas and ſentiments, which time had nearly obliterated, revived at the ſight of their native ſhores.

Emotions of the Meſſenians at the ſight of their native ſhores.

When the tumult of their emotions ſubſided, they explained their feelings to Demoſthenes, and to each other. He ſuggeſted, or at leaſt warmly approved, the deſign of landing, and rebuilding Pylus, which had been abandoned by the Spartans, though it enjoyed a convenient harbour, and was ſtrongly fortified by nature. Demoſthenes propoſed this meaſure to Eurymedon and Sophocles, who anſwered him with the inſolence congenial to their character, "That there were many barren capes on the coaſt of Peloponneſus, which *thoſe* might fortify who wiſhed to entail an uſeleſs expence on their country!" He next applied to the ſeveral captains of the fleet, and even to the inferior officers, but without better ſucceſs, although he aſſured them that the place abounded in wood and ſtone, with which a wall, ſufficient for defence, might

The Athenians and Meſſenians fortify Pylus.

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might ſpeedily be completed. He had deſiſted from farther entreaties, when a fortunate ſtorm drove the whole fleet towards the Pylian harbour. This circumſtance enabled him to renew his inſtances with greater force, alleging that the events of fortune confirmed the expediency of the undertaking. At length the ſailors and ſoldiers, weary of idleneſs (for the weather prevented them from putting to ſea), began the work of their own accord, and carried it on with ſuch vigour and activity, that in ſix days the place was ſtrongly fortified on every ſide [6]. The Athenian fleet then proceeded to Corcyra, Demoſthenes retaining only five ſhips to guard this new acquiſition.

The Spartans attempt to diſlodge them.

The Spartans were no ſooner informed of this daring meaſure, than they withdrew their army from its annual incurſion into Attica, and recalled their fleet from Corcyra. The citizens, reſiding at home, immediately flew to arms, and marched towards Pylus, which was only fifty miles diſtant from their capital. They found the new fortreſs ſo well prepared for defence, that nothing could be undertaken againſt it with any proſpect of ſucceſs, until their whole forces had aſſembled. This occaſioned but a ſhort delay; after which Pylus was vigorouſly aſſaulted by ſea and land. The walls were weakeſt towards the harbour; the entrance of which, however, was ſo narrow, that only two ſhips could ſail into it abreaſt. Here the attack was moſt furious, and the reſiſtance moſt obſtinate.

[6] Thucydid. p. 256, & ſeqq.

Demoſ-

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Gallantry of Braſidas.

Demoſthenes encouraged his troops by his voice and arm. The gallant Braſidas, a man deſtined to act ſuch an illuſtrious part in the following ſcenes of the war, called out to the Lacedemonian pilots to drive againſt the beach; and exhorted them, by the deſtruction of their ſhips, to ſave the honour of their country. He farther recommended this boldneſs by his example, but in performing it, received a wound which rendered him inſenſible. His body dropped into the ſea, ſeemingly deprived of life, but was recovered by the affectionate zeal of his attendants. When his ſenſes returned, he perceived the loſs of his ſhield, a matter highly puniſhable by the Spartan laws, if the ſhield of Braſidas had not been loſt with more glory than ever ſhield was defended [7].

About four hundred Spartans blocked up in Sphacteria.

During three days, Demoſthenes, with very unequal ſtrength, reſiſted the enemy; when the approach of the Athenian fleet from Corcyra, which he had appriſed of his danger, terminated the incredible labours of his exhauſted garriſon. A naval engagement enſued, in which the Lacedæmonians were defeated. But neither this defeat, nor the loſs of five ſhips, nor the total diſperſion of their fleet, nor the unexpected relief of Pylus, gave them ſo much uneaſineſs, as an event principally occaſioned by their own imprudence. The iſland Sphacteria, ſcarce two miles in circumference, barren, woody, and uninhabited, lies before the harbour of Pylus. In this iſland the Spartans had

[7] Thucydid. p. 258.

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poſted four hundred and twenty heavy-armed men, with a much greater proportion of Helots, not reflecting that the Athenians, as ſoon as they had reſumed the command of the neighbouring ſea, muſt have theſe forces at their devotion. This circumſtance occurred not to the Spartans till after their defeat; and then affected them the more deeply, becauſe the troops blocked up in the iſland belonged to the firſt families of the republic.

Conſternation in Sparta.

Advice of this misfortune was immediately ſent to the capital. The annual magiſtrates, attended by a deputation of the ſenate, haſtened to examine matters on the ſpot. The evil appeared to be incapable of remedy; and of ſuch importance was this body of Spartans to the community, that all preſent agreed in the neceſſity of ſoliciting a truce, until ambaſſadors were ſent to Athens to treat of a general peace. The Athenians granted a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities, on condition that the Spartans, as a pledge of their ſincerity, ſurrendered their whole fleet (conſiſting of about ſixty veſſels) into the harbour of Pylus. Even this mortifying propoſal was accepted. Twenty days were conſumed in the embaſſy; during which time the troops intercepted in Sphacteria were ſupplied with a ſtated proportion of meal, meat, and wine *, that of the free-

* Thucydides does not aſcertain the quantity of meat. He ſays, two chœnixes of meal, and two cotyls of wine; that is, two pints of meal, and one pint of wine, Engliſh meaſure, a very ſmall allowance; but the Athenians were afraid leſt the beſieged might hoard their proviſions, if allowed more for daily ſupport; which, if the negociation failed, might enable them long to hold out the place.

men

men amounting to double the quantity allowed to the ſlaves. CHAP. XVII.

The Spartans ſolicit peace.

When the Spartan ambaſſadors were admitted to an audience at Athens, they artfully apologized for the intended length of their diſcourſes. In all their tranſactions with the Greeks, they had hitherto affected the dignified brevity[9] inſpired by conſcious pre-eminence: "Yet on the preſent occaſion, they allowed that it was neceſſary to explain, copiouſly and clearly, the advantages which would reſult to all Greece, and particularly to Athens herſelf, if the latter accepted the treaty and alliance, the free gifts of unfeigned friendſhip, ſpontaneouſly offered by Sparta. They pretended not to conceal or extenuate the greatneſs of their misfortune; but the Athenians ought alſo to remember the viciſſitudes of war. It was full time to embrace a hearty reconcilement, and to terminate the calamities of their common country. Hitherto the war had been carried on with more emulation than hatred; neither party had been reduced to extremity, nor had any incurable evil been yet inflicted or ſuffered. Terms of agreement, if accepted in the moment of victory, would redound to the glory of Athens; if rejected, would aſcertain who were the real authors of the war, and to whom the public calamities ought thenceforth to be imputed; ſince it was well known, that if Athens and Sparta were unanimous, no power in Greece would venture to diſpute their commands[10]."

[9] Imperatoria brevitas. TACITUS.
[10] Thucydid. p. 262, & ſeqq.

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Arrogant demands of the Athenians.

The meek ſpirit of this diſcourſe only diſcovered to the Athenians the full extent of their good fortune, of which they determined completely to avail themſelves. Inſtigated by the violence of Cleon, they anſwered the ambaſſadors with great haughtineſs; demanding, as preliminaries to the treaty, that the Spartans in Sphacteria ſhould be ſent to Athens; and that ſeveral places of great importance, belonging to the Spartans or their allies, ſhould be delivered into their hands. Theſe lofty pretenſions, which were by no means juſtified by military ſucceſs, appeared totally inadmiſſible to the ambaſſadors, who returned in diſguſt to the Spartan camp.

The negociation fruitleſs.

Nothing, it was evident, could be expected from the moderation of Athens; but it was expected from her juſtice, that ſhe would reſtore the fleet, which had been ſurrendered as a pledge of the treaty. Even this was, on various pretences, denied[11]. Both parties, therefore, prepared for hoſtilities; the Athenians to maintain their arrogance, the Spartans to chaſtiſe it.

Obſtinate defence of Sphacteria.

The former employed the operation of famine, as the readieſt and leaſt dangerous mode of reducing the ſoldiers in Sphacteria. The Athenian fleet, now greatly augmented, carefully guarded the iſland night and day. But notwithſtanding its utmoſt vigilance, ſmall veſſels availed them-

[11] The Athenians objected, "an incurſion towards their fortreſs, during the ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities, και αλλα ουκ αξιολογα," and other matters of little moment, ſays Thucydides, with his uſual impartiality, p. 266.

ſelves

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ſelves of ſtorms and darkneſs to throw proviſions into the place; a ſervice undertaken by ſlaves from the promiſe of liberty; and by freemen, from the proſpect of great pecuniary rewards. The Athenians redoubled their diligence, and often intercepted thoſe victuallers; but they found it more difficult to interrupt the expert divers, who plunging deep under water, dragged after them bottles of leather, filled with honey and flour. The blockade was thus fruitleſsly protracted ſeveral weeks. Demoſthenes was averſe to attack an iſland difficult of acceſs, covered with wood, deſtitute of roads, and defended on the ſide of Pylus by a natural fortification, ſtrengthed by art. Meanwhile the Athenians began to ſuffer inconveniences in their turn. Their garriſon in Pylus was cloſely preſſed by the enemy; there was but one ſource of freſh water, and that ſcanty, in the place; proviſions grew ſcarce; the barrenneſs of the neighbouring coaſt afforded no ſupply: while they beſieged the Spartans, they themſelves experienced the hardſhips of a a ſiege.

Artifices and impudence of Cleon.

Their ſituation, when reported at Athens, threw the aſſembly into commotion: many clamoured againſt Demoſtenes; ſeveral accuſed Cleon. The artful demagogue, whoſe oppoſition had chiefly prevented an advantageous peace with Sparta, affected to diſbelieve the intelligence, and adviſed ſending men of approved confidence to Pylus, in order to detect the impoſture. The populace cried aloud, "that Cleon himſelf ſhould undertake this commiſſion." But the diſſembler dreaded

to

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to become the dupe of his own artifice. He perceived, that if he went to Pylus, he muſt, at his return, either acknowledge the truth of the report, and thus be ſubjected to immediate ſhame, or fabricate falſe intelligence, and thus be expoſed to future puniſhment. He therefore eluded his own propoſal, by declaring, "that it ill became the dignity of Athens to ſtoop to a formal and tedious examination; and that, whatever were the ſtate of the armament, if the commanders acted like men, they might take Sphacteria in a few days: that if *he* had the honour to be general, he would ſail to the iſland with a ſmall body of light infantry, and take it at the firſt onſet."

Character of Nicias.

Theſe ſarcaſtic obſervations were chiefly directed againſt Nicias, one of the generals actually preſent in the aſſembly; a man of virtuous, but timid diſpoſition: endowed with much prudence, and little enterpriſe; poſſeſſed of moderate abilities, and immoderate riches; a zealous partizan of ariſtocracy, and an avowed enemy to Cleon, whom he regarded as the worſt enemy of his country.

He cedes the command to Cleon.

A perſon of this character could not be much inclined to engage in the hazardous expedition to Sphacteria. When the Athenians, with the uſual licentiouſneſs that prevailed in their aſſemblies, called out to Cleon, "that if the enterpriſe appeared ſo eaſy, it would better ſuit the extent of his abilities;" Nicias roſe up, and immediately offered to cede to him the command. Cleon at firſt accepted it, thinking Nicias's propoſal merely feint; but when the latter appeared in earneſt, he

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adversary drew back, alleging, "that Nicias, not Cleon, was general." The Athenians, with the malicious pleasantry natural to the multitude, pressed Cleon the closer, the more eagerly he receded. He was at length overcome by their importunity, but not forsaken by his impudence[1]. Advancing to the middle of the assembly, he declared, "that he was not afraid of the Lacedæmonians; and engaged, in twenty days, to bring the Spartans as prisoners to Athens, or to die in the attempt[2]." This heroical language excited laughter among the multitude; the wise rejoiced in thinking, that they must obtain one of two advantages, either the destruction of a turbulent demagogue (which they rather hoped), or the capture of the Spartans in Sphacteria.

Boastful promise of the latter;

The latter event was hastened by an accident: while some soldiers were preparing their victuals, the wood was set on fire, and long burned unperceived, till a brisk gale arising, the conflagration raged with such violence, as threatened to consume the island. This unforeseen disaster disclosed the strength and position of the Spartans; and Demosthenes was actually preparing to attack them, when Cleon, with his light-armed troops, arrived in the camp. The island was invaded in the night; the advanced guards were taken or slain. At dawn, the Athenians made a descent from

which is performed by accident. Olymp. lxxxviii. 4. A.C. 425.

[1] Thucydid. p. 271.

[2] Η κατα κρατησειν, or, "kill them on the spot." A little alteration in the text will give the meaning which I preferred as most agreeable to what follows; but the other translation better suits the boastful character of Cleon.

seventy

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ſeventy ſhips. The main body of the enemy retired to the ſtrong poſt oppoſite to Pylus, haraſſed in their march by ſhowers of arrows, ſtones, and darts, involved in the aſhes of the burnt wood, which mounting widely into the air, on all ſides, intercepted their ſight, and increaſed the gloom of battle. The Spartans, cloſely embodied, and preſenting a dreadful front to the aſſailants, made good their retreat. Having occupied the deſtined poſt, they boldly defended it wherever the enemy approached, for the nature of the ground hindered it from being ſurrounded. The Athenians uſed their utmoſt efforts to repel and overcome them; and during the greateſt part of the day, both parties obſtinately perſevered in their purpoſe, under the painful preſſures of fatigue, thirſt, and a burning ſun. At length the Meſſenians, whoſe ardour had been ſignally diſtinguiſhed in every part of this enterpriſe, diſcovered an unknown path leading to the eminence which defended the Lacedæmonian rear. The Spartans were thus encompaſſed on all ſides, and reduced to a ſimilar ſituation to that of their illuſtrious countrymen who fell at Thermopylæ.

The Spartans in Sphacteria carried priſoners to Athens.

Their commanders diſgraced not the coun of Leonidas. Their general, Epitades, was ſlain. Hippagretes was dying of his wounds. Styphon, the third in command, ſtill exhorted them to perſevere. But D[illegible]thenes and Cleon, deſirous rather to carry them priſoners to Athens, than to put them to death, invited them, by the loud proclamation of a herald, to lay down their arms.

The

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The greater part dropped their ſhields, and waved their hands, in token of compliance. A conference followed between Demoſthenes and Cleon on one ſide, and Styphon on the other. Styphon deſired leave to ſend over to the Lacedæmonians on the continent for advice. Several meſſages paſſed between them; in the laſt of which it was ſaid, "the Lacedæmonians permit you to conſult your own intereſt, provided you ſubmit to nothing baſe:" in conſequence of which determination, they ſurrendered their arms and their perſons. They were conducted to Athens, within the time aſſigned by Cleon; having held out fifty-two days after the expiration of the truce, during which time they had been ſo ſparing of the proviſions conveyed to them by the extraordinary means above mentioned, that, when the place was taken, they had ſtill ſomething in reſerve [14].

Humiliation of Sparta.

The Athenians withdrew their fleet, leaving a ſtrong garriſon in Pylus, which was ſoon reinforced by an enterpriſing body of Meſſenians from Naupactus. The Meſſenians, though poſſeſſed of no more than one barren cape on their native and once happy coaſt, reſumed their inveterate hatred againſt Sparta, whoſe territories they continually infeſted by incurſions, or haraſſed by alarms. This ſpecies of war, deſtructive in itſelf, was rendered ſtill more dangerous by the revolts of the Helots, attracted by every motive of affection towards their ancient kinſmen, and animated by every principle of reſentment againſt their tyrannical maſters. Mean-

[14] Thucydid. p. 271—279.

while

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while the Athenian fleet renewed and multiplied its ravages on the coaſt of Peloponneſus. Reduced to extremity by ſuch proceedings, the Spartans ſent to Athens repeated overtures of accommodation. But the good fortune of the Athenians only fomented their ambition. At the inſtigation of Cleon, they diſmiſſed the Spartan ambaſſadors more inſolently than ever [15]. Such was their deference to the opinion of this arrogant demagogue; at the ſame time that, with the moſt inconſiſtent levity, they liſtened with pleaſure to the plays of Ariſtophanes, which laſhed the character and adminiſtration of Cleon with the boldeſt ſeverity of ſatire, ſharpened by the edge of the moſt poignant ridicule.

Authority and inſolence of Cleon.

Expoſed by Ariſtophanes.

The taking of Pylus, the triumphant return of Cleon, a notorious coward transformed by the caprice of fortune into a brave and ſucceſsful commander, were topics well ſuiting the comic vein of Ariſtophanes. The imperious demagogue had deſerved the perſonal reſentment of the poet, by denying the legitimacy of his birth [16], and thereby conteſting his title to vote in the aſſembly. On former occaſions, Ariſtophanes had ſtigmatiſed the incapacity and inſolence of Cleon, together with his perfidious ſelfiſhneſs in embroiling the affairs of the republic. In the comedy [17] firſt repreſented in the ſeventh year of the war, he attacks him in the moment of victory, when fortune had rendered him

[15] Ariſtoph. Equit. v. 794.

[16] Vit. anonym. Ariſtoph.

[17] The Knights.

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the idol of a licentious multitude, when no comedian was so daring as to play his character, and no painter so bold as to design his mask [18].

Account of his comedy, intitled, the Knights.

Aristophanes, therefore, appeared for the first time on the stage, only disguising his own face, the better to represent the part of Cleon. In this ludicrous piece, which seems to have been celebrated even beyond its merit, the people of Athens are described under the allegory of a capricious old dotard, whose credulity, abused by a malicious slave lately admitted into his house [19], persecutes and torments his faithful old servants. Demosthenes bitterly complains, that, intending to gratify the palate of the old man, he had brought a delicate morsel from Pylus; but that it had been stolen by Cleon, and by him served up to their common master. After lamenting, with his companion Nicias, the hardships of their condition, they hold counsel together, and contrive various expedients for putting an end to their common calamities. The desponding Nicias proposes drinking bull's blood, after the example of Themistocles; Demosthenes, with more courage, advises a hearty draught of wine. Finding Cleon asleep, they seize the opportunity not only to purloin this liquor, but to rifle his pockets, in which they discover some ancient oracles, typically representing the succession of Athenian magistrates. Towards the end of the prophecy, it was said, that the

[18] Ὑπο τȣ δεȣς γαρ αυτον ȣδεις ηθελε
Των σκευοποιων εικασαι. Equites, v. 231.

[19] Νεοντον κακον, "the new-bought mischief."

dragon

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dragon ſhould overcome the devouring vulture. The rapacious avarice of Cleon correſponded to the type of the vulture; and the dragon darkly ſhadowed out Agoracritus, an eminent maker of puddings and ſauſages, the ſhape and contents of which alluded to the figure and food of that terrible ſerpent. Nicias and Demoſthenes hail this favourite of fortune, as the deſtined maſter of the republic. Agoracritus alleges in vain, that he is totally unacquainted with political affairs, ignorant of every liberal art, and has hardly learned to read. They reply, by announcing to him the oracle, and by proving that his pretended imperfections better qualified him to conduct the government of Athens. This office required none of the talents, the want of which he lamented. He matched Cleon in impudence, and ſurpaſſed him in ſtrength of lungs. His profeſſion had taught him to ſqueeze, to amaſs, to mix, to bruiſe, and to embroil; and long experience had rendered him accompliſhed in all the frauds and chicane of the market [20]. He might therefore boldly enter the liſts with Cleon, being aſſured of aſſiſtance from the whole body of Athenian knights [21]. Agoracritus, thus encouraged, prepares for encountering his adverſary. The conteſt, long doubtful, is maintained in a ſtyle of the loweſt buffoonery, always ludicrous, often indecent. The old dotard, or rather the Athenians whom he repreſents,

[20] The ſame word in Greek denotes the market and the forum. Indeed the ſame place uſually ſerved for both.

[21] The ἱππεις, or Equites, the ſecond rank of citizens at Athens, who deteſted Cleon, and from whom the play takes its name.

finally acknowledge their paſt errors; and regret being ſo long deceived by an upſtart ſlave, through whoſe obſtinacy in continuing the war, they had been cooped up within the walls of an unwholeſome city, and hindered from enjoying their beautiful fields and happy rural amuſements. Agoracritus ſeizes this favourable moment to produce two ancient treaties with the Lacedæmonians, perſonified by two beautiful women, whom he had found cloſely mewed up in the houſe of Cleon. Of theſe females the old Athenian becomes ſuddenly enamoured, and they retire together to the country. CHAP. XVII.

The people of Athens permitted, and even approved, the licentious boldneſs of Ariſtophanes; but neither the ſtrength of reaſon, nor the ſharpneſs of ſatire, could check the dangerous career of their ambition. The war was rendered popular by ſucceſs; they prepared for carrying it on with redoubled vigour. The firſt operations of the enſuing ſummer gratified their utmoſt hopes. The principal diviſion of the fleet, conducted by the prudence of Nicias, conquered the fertile and populous iſland of Cythera, ſtretching from the ſouthern promontory of Laconia towards the Cretan ſea, and long enriched by the commerce of Egypt and Libya. The Lacedæmonian garriſon, as well as the Spartan magiſtrates in the iſland, ſurrendered priſoners of war. The more dangerous part of the inhabitants were removed to the Athenian iſles; the remainder were ſubjected to an annual tribute amounting in value to eight hundred pounds ſterling; an Athenian garriſon took poſſeſſion of the fortreſs. The Athenians take Cythera. Olymp. lxxxix. 1. A. C. 424.

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Reduce Nicæa, and ravage Peloponnesus.

Soon after this conquest, the arms of Demosthenes and Hippocrates reduced the town of Nicæa, the principal sea-port of the Megareans; and the Athenian fleet ravaged with impunity several maritime cities on the eastern coast of Peloponnesus. Thyrea was condemned to a harder fate. This city, together with the surrounding district, had been granted, by the compassion of Sparta, to the miserable natives of Ægina, who (as above-mentioned) had been driven from their once powerful island by the cruelty of Athens. The same cruelty still continued to pursue them. Their newly-raised walls were taken by assault; their houses burned; and the inhabitants, without distinction, put to the sword.

Endeavour to produce a revolution in Bœotia.

Hitherto all the enterprises of the Athenians were crowned with success. Fortune first deserted them in Bœotia. During several months their generals, Demosthenes and Hippocrates, availing themselves of the political factions of that country, had been carrying on secret intrigues with Chæronæa, Siphæ, and Orchomenus, places abounding in declared partizans of democracy, and eternally hostile to the ambition of Thebes. The insurgents had agreed to take arms, in order to betray the western parts of Bœotia to Demosthenes, who sailed with forty gallies from Naupactus; while Hippocrates, at the head of seven thousand heavy-armed Athenians, and a much greater proportion of light-armed auxiliaries, invaded the eastern frontier of that province. It was expected, that before the Thebans could bring a sufficient force into the

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the field, the invaders and insurgents, advancing from opposite extremities of the country, might unite in the centre, and perhaps subdue Thebes itself, the most powerful, as well as most zealous, ally of Sparta.

Their plan too complicated for execution.

This plan, though concerted with much ability, was found too complicated for execution. Demosthenes steered towards Siphæ, before his coadjutor was ready to take the field; some mistake, it is said, having happened about the time appointed for action; and the whole contrivance was betrayed by Nicomachus, a Phocian, to the Spartans, and by them communicated to the Bœotians. The cities which meditated revolt were thus secured, before Demosthenes appeared at Siphæ, and before Hippocrates had even marched from Attica.

They are defeated in the battle of Delium. Olymp. lxxxix. 1. A. C. 424.

The latter at length entered the eastern frontier of Bœotia; and, as the principal design had miscarried, contented himself with taking and fortifying Delium, a place sacred to Apollo. Having garrisoned this post, he prepared for returning home. But while his army still lay in the neighbourhood of Delium, the Thebans, encouraged by Pagondas, a brave and skilful leader, marched with great rapidity from Tanagra, in order to intercept his retreat. Their forces amounted to eighteen thousand; the Athenians were little less numerous. An engagement ensued, which national emulation rendered bloody and obstinate. Before the battle, Pagondas had detached a small squadron of horse, with orders to advance suddenly, as soon as the action had commenced. This stra-

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tagem was deciſive. The Athenians, terrified at the ſight of a reinforcement, which their fears magnified into a new army, were thrown into diſorder, and put to flight. Approaching darkneſs ſaved them from total deſtruction. They eſcaped diſgracefully into Attica, after leaving in the field of battle a thouſand pikemen, with their commander Hippocrates.

The Thebans take Delium by means of a machine invented for that purpoſe.

The victorious army immediately formed the ſiege of Delium, which was taken by means of an engine firſt contrived for that purpoſe. Several parts of the fortification, which had been raiſed in great haſte, conſiſted chiefly of wood. The beſiegers therefore, joining together a number of large beams, formed a huge maſt, perforated in the middle; to one of its extremities they appended a prodigious maſs of pitch and ſulphur; and to the other a bellows, which, when this unuſual inſtrument of deſtruction was raiſed above the wooden rampart, immediately threw the whole into flames. The Athenian garriſon, diminiſhed by death or deſertion to two hundred men, ſurrendered priſoners of war[22].

Commotions in Thrace.

The Athenians had ſcarcely time to lament their loſſes in Bœotia, when they received intelligence of events in another quarter, equally unexpected, but far more diſtreſsful. Theſe events are the more remarkable, becauſe they naturally aroſe out of the preceding proſperity of Athens, and the paſt misfortunes of Sparta. The uninterrupted

[22] Thucydid. p. 304—320.

train

train of ſucceſs which attended the arms of Nicias and Demoſthenes in the eighth year of the war, alarmed the citizens of Olynthus and other places of the Chalcidicé, which having embraced the earlieſt opportunity of revolting from the Athenians, juſtly dreaded the vengeance of an incenſed and victorious people. Every ſoutherly wind threatened them with the approach of an Athenian fleet. Their apprehenſions were not leſs painful on the ſide of Theſſaly. The ſlighteſt movement in that country terrified them with the apprehenſions of an Athenian army, which, victorious in the ſouth, ſhould advance to puniſh its northern enemies. But as none of theſe fearful ſuſpicions were realiſed, the inhabitants of the Chalcidicé gradually reſumed courage, put their towns in a poſture of defence, and craved aſſiſtance from their Peloponneſian allies. At the ſame time Perdiccas, king of Macedon, who regarded the Athenians as his ancient and natural enemies, and the rapacious invaders of his coaſt, ſent money into the ſouth of Greece, for the purpoſe of hiring ſoldiers, whom he intended to employ in reſiſting the encroachments of that ambitious people, as well as in ſubduing the Elymeans, Lynceſtæ, and other barbarous tribes, not yet incorporated in the Macedonian kingdom. CHAP. XVII.

Such were the enemies, whoſe activity the good fortune of Athens had roufed: while the calamities of Sparta prompted her to ſupply the reinforcement of troops, which both Perdiccas and the Chalcidians demanded. During the ſeventh and Fomented by the Spartans.

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eighth years of the war, that republic fatally experienced the truth of Pericles's maxim, "that thoſe who command the ſea, may alſo become maſters at land." The Athenian fleets domineered over the coaſt of Peloponneſus. It was impoſſible to foreſee what places would be the next objects of their continual deſcents. The maritime parts were ſucceſſively laid waſte, and finally abandoned by the inhabitants, who found reſiſtance ineffectual and uſeleſs. Theſe misfortunes were increaſed by the frequent deſertion of the Helots to the neighbouring garriſons in Pylus and Cythera, and by the dread of a general inſurrection among thoſe numerous and unhappy victims of Spartan tyranny. To prevent this evil, the Spartans had recourſe to ſuch expedients as excite aſtoniſhment and horror. They commanded the Helots to chooſe two thouſand of their braveſt and moſt meritorious youths, who, by the general conſent of their companions, deſerved the crown of liberty; and when inveſted with this perfidious ornament, the unſuſpecting freemen had paraded the ſtreets, and ſacrificed in the temples, exulting in their recent emancipation, theſe new members of the community gradually diſappeared from the ſight of men, nor was it ever known by what means they had been deſtroyed. But the veil of myſtery, which concealed that dark and bloody ſtratagem, prevented neither the reſentment of the ſlaves, nor the juſt ſuſpicion of their maſters. The latter were eager to embrace any meaſure that might deliver their country from its dangerous domeſtic foes. With much ſatisfaction,

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tion, therefore, they ſent ſeven hundred Helots to the ſtandard of Braſidas, whoſe merit had recommended him to Perdiccas and the Chalcidians, as the general beſt qualified to manage the Macedonian war. About a thouſand ſoldiers were levied in the neighbouring cities of Peloponneſus. Several Spartans cheerfully accompanied a leader whom they admired. With this inconſiderable force Braſidas, towards the beginning of autumn, undertook an expedition highly important in its conſequences, conducted with bold enterpriſe and conſummate prudence [33].

Braſidas's expedition to Thrace. Olymp. lxxxix. 1. A.C. 424.

Having traverſed the friendly countries of Bœotia and Phocis, he arrived at the foot of Mount Oëta, and penetrated through the narrow defiles confined between that ſteep and woody range of hills, and the boiſterous waves of the Malian gulf. The ſight of Thermopylæ animated the enthuſiaſm of the Spartans, and encouraged them to force their way through the hoſtile plains of Theſſaly; a country actually torn by domeſtic diſcord, but always friendly to the Athenians. The celerity of Braſidas anticipated the ſlow oppoſition of a divided enemy. Having reached the Macedonian town of Dium, he joined forces with Perdiccas, who propoſed directing the firſt operations of the combined army againſt Arribæus, the king or leader of the barbarous Lynceſtæ. But even this Barbarian knew the valour of the Spartans, and the equity of Braſidas. To the deciſion of the

[33] Thucydid. p. 304.

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Grecian general he offered to ſubmit the differences between Perdiccas and himſelf, and engaged to abide by the award, however unfavourable to his intereſt. The Spartan liſtened to a propoſal extremely reaſonable in itſelf, though altogether inconſiſtent with the ambitious views of Perdiccas, who diſdained to accept as a judge the man whom he paid as an auxiliary. Braſidas, on the other hand, declined in firm, but decent terms, to employ his valour againſt thoſe who implored his juſtice. The generals thus ſeparated in mutual diſguſt; and Perdiccas thenceforth reduced his contribution of ſubſidy from a moiety to a third; but even that was extorted from his fears, not beſtowed by his munificence.

His tranſactions with the Acanthians.

Braſidas haſtened to join the Chalcidians, by whom he was received with a degree of joy ſuitable to the impatience with which he had been expected. Amidſt the general defection of their neighbours, the towns of Acanthus and Stagirus ſtill maintained their allegiance to Athens. Braſidas appeared before the gates of Acanthus, while the peaceful inhabitants were preparing for the labours of the vintage. He ſent a meſſenger, craving leave to enter the place, and to addreſs the aſſembly. The Acanthians were divided in opinion; but the majority, fearing to expoſe their ripe fields and vineyards to the reſentment of his army, agreed to admit the general alone and unattended, and impartially to weigh whatever he propoſed for their deliberation. Braſidas, though a Spartan, was an able ſpeaker. He obſerved to the Acanthians, con-

convened in full aſſemby, "That, in compliance with the generous reſolution of Sparta, he had undertaken, and finally accompliſhed, a long and dangerous march, to deliver them from the tyranny of Athenian magiſtrates and garriſons, and to reſtore them, what the common oppreſſors of Greece had ſo long withheld, the independent government of their own equitable laws. This was the object, which, amidſt all the calamities of war, the Spartans had ever kept in view; this was the ſyſtem, which, before his departure from home, the principal magiſtrates had ſworn unanimouſly to maintain. *That* freedom and independence, which formed the domeſtic happineſs of Sparta, his countrymen were ambitious to communicate to all their allies. But if the Acanthians refuſed to ſhare the general benefit, they muſt not complain of experiencing the unhappy effects of their obſtinacy. The arms of Sparta would compel thoſe whom her arguments had failed to perſuade. Nor could this be blamed as injuſtice; firſt, becauſe the reſources with which the Acanthians furniſhed Athens, under the ignominious name of tribute, ſerved to rivet the chains of Greece: and ſecondly, becauſe the example of a people, ſo wealthy and flouriſhing, and long renowned for their penetration and ſagacity, might influence the reſolutions of neighbouring ſtates, and deter them from concurring with the meaſures neceſſary to promote the public welfare."

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This judicious diſcourſe, enforced by the terror of the Spartan army, engaged the Acanthians to accept

His merit and ſucceſs.

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accept the friendſhip of Braſidas. Stagirus, another city on the Strymonic gulf, readily followed the example, and opened its gates to the deliverer. During the enſuing winter, the meaſures of the Spartan general were conducted with equal ability and enterpriſe. His ſucceſsful operations againſt the inland towns facilitated the ſurrender of ſuch places, as, by their maritime or inſular ſituation, were moſt expoſed to the vengeance of Athens, and therefore moſt averſe to revolt. His moderate uſe of victory enſured the good-will of the vanquiſhed. The various parts of a plan, thus artfully combined, mutually aſſiſted each other; the ſucceſs of one undertaking contributed to that of the next which followed it; and, at length, without any conſiderable miſcarriage, he had rendered himſelf maſter of moſt places in the peninſulas of Acta, Sithonia, and Pallené.

Amphipolis revolts to Braſidas.

The loſs of Amphipolis was that which moſt deeply afflicted the Athenians; a rich and populous city, beautifully ſituate on a ſmall but well cultivated iſland, ſurrounded by the river Strymon, the banks of which ſupplied excellent timber, and other materials of naval ſtrength. By poſſeſſing this town, the Spartans now commanded both branches of the river, and might thus paſs, without interruption, to the Athenian colonies, or ſubjects on the coaſt of Thrace; ſeize, or plunder, the gold mines oppoſite to the iſle of Thaſos, and ravage the fertile fields of the Thracian Cherſoneſus. The conqueſt of a place ſo eſſential to the enemy, had exerciſed the courage, the eloquence,

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and the dexterity of Braſidas. He formed a conſpiracy with the malecontents in the place, ſkilfully diſpoſed his army before the walls, harangued the aſſembly of the people. A moſt ſeaſonable promptitude diſtinguiſhed all his meaſures; yet the Athenian Eucleus, who commanded the garriſon, found time to ſend a veſſel to Thaſos, requeſting immediate and effectual relief. CHAP. XVII.

notwithſtanding the activity of Thucydides the hiſtorian;

The Athenians had committed the government of that iſland, as well as the direction of the mines on the oppoſite continent, to the celebrated hiſtorian of a war, in which he was a meritorious, though unfortunate, actor. Without a moment's delay, Thucydides put to ſea with ſeven gallies, and arrived in the mouth of the Strymon the ſame day on which his aſſiſtance had been demanded. But it was already too late to ſave Amphipolis [24]. The Spartan general, who had exact information of all the meaſures of the beſieged, well knew the importance of anticipating the arrival of Thucydides, whoſe name was highly reſpected by the Greek colonies in Thrace, and whoſe influence was conſiderable among the native Barbarians. Braſidas, therefore, propoſed ſuch a capitulation to the Amphipolitans as it ſeemed imprudent to refuſe. They were to be releaſed from the tribute which they had hitherto paid the Athenians; to enjoy the utmoſt degree of political independence, not inconſiſtent with the alliance of Sparta; even the Athenian garriſon, if they continued in the place, were to be entitled to all the rights of citizens; and ſuch per-

[24] Thucydid. p. 322.

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ſons as choſe to leave it, were granted a reaſonable time to remove their families and their property. The laſt condition was embraced by the Athenians, and their more determined partizans. They retired to the neighbouring town of Eion, ſituate near the ſea, on the northern branch of the Strymon; a place ſecured againſt every hoſtile aſſault by the ſkill and activity of Thucydides.

which ſaves Lion.

Brafidas's ſucceſs occaſions clamours and impeachment in Athens.

Towards the end of winter, the full extent of Braſidas's ſucceſs was made known at Athens. The aſſembly was in commotion; and the populace were the more enraged at their loſſes, as it now appeared ſo eaſy to have prevented them, either by guarding the narrow defiles which led to their Macedonian poſſeſſions, or by ſending their fleet with a ſeaſonable reinforcement to their feeble garriſons in thoſe parts. Their own neglect had occaſioned the public diſgrace; but with the uſual injuſtice and abſurdity accompanying popular diſcontents, they exculpated themſelves, and baniſhed their generals. Thucydides was involved in this cruel ſentence. An armament was ſent to Macedon; and new commanders were named to oppoſe Braſidas.

The Spartans avail themſelves of it to obtain a truce for a year.

But the deſigns of that commander, who had begun to build veſſels on the Strymon, and aſpired at nothing leſs than ſucceeding to the authority, without exerciſing the oppreſſion, of Athens, over thoſe extenſive ſhores, were more ſucceſsfully oppoſed by the envy of the Spartan magiſtrates. The pride of the nobles was wounded by the glory of an expedition, in which they had no ſhare; and

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their ſelfiſhneſs, while it obſtinately prevented the ſupplies neceſſary to complete the plan of Braſidas, was eager to reap the profit of his paſt ſucceſs. The reſtoration of their kinſmen taken at Sphacteria formed the object of their fondeſt wiſh; and they expected that the Athenians might liſten to a propoſal for that purpoſe, in order to recover the places which they had loſt, and to check the fortunate career of a prudent and enterpriſing general. The Athenians readily entered into theſe views: it was determined that matters of ſuch importance ſhould be diſcuſſed with leiſure and impartiality; a truce was therefore agreed on for a year between the contending republics. CHAP. XVII.

This tranſaction was concluded in the ninth ſummer of the war. It was totally unexpected by Braſidas, who received the voluntary ſubmiſſion of Scioné and Menda, two places of conſiderable importance in the peninſula of Pallené; of the former, indeed, before he was acquainted with the ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities; but of the latter, even after he was appriſed of that treaty. Olymp. lxxxix. 2. A. C. 423.

While the active valour of Braſidas prevented the confirmation of peace, the conſcious worthleſſneſs of Cleon promoted the renewal, or rather the continuance, of war. The glory of Athens was the perpetual theme of his diſcourſe. He exhorted his countrymen to puniſh the perfidy of Sparta, in abetting the inſolent revolt of Menda and Scioné; and to employ his own ſkill and bravery, which had been ſo ſucceſsfully exerted on the coaſt of Peloponneſus, to repair their declining fortune in Mace- The war renewed. Olymp. lxxxix. 3. A. C. 422.

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Macedonia. The Athenians liſtened to the ſpecious advice of this turbulent declaimer, who, in the enſuing ſpring, ſailed to the Macedonian coaſt with a fleet of thirty Gallies, twelve hundred citizens heavy-armed, a ſquadron of three hundred horſe, and a powerful body of light-armed auxiliaries. The ſurrender of Menda and Torona, whoſe inhabitants were treated with every exceſs of cruelty, encouraged him to attack Amphipolis. With this deſign, having collected his forces at Eion, he waited the arrival of ſome Macedonian troops, promiſed by Perdiccas, who having quarrelled with the Spartan general, deceitfully flattered the hopes of his antagoniſt.

Battle of Amphipolis.

The army of Cleon contained the flower of the Athenian youth, whoſe ardent valour diſdained a precarious dependence on Barbarian aid. They accuſed the cowardice of their leader, which was only equalled by his incapacity, and lamented their own hard fate in being ſubjected to the authority of a man ſo unworthy to command them. The impatient temper of an arrogant demagogue was ill fitted to endure theſe ſeditious complaints. He haſtily led his troops before the place, without previouſly examining the ſtrength of the walls, the ſituation of the ground, the number or diſpoſition of the enemy. Braſidas, meanwhile, had taken proper meaſures to avail himſelf of the known imprudence of his adverſary. A conſiderable body of men had been concealed in the woody mountain Cerdylium, which overhangs Amphipolis. The greater part of the army was drawn up ready for action,

action, at the ſeveral gates of the city. Clearidas, who commanded there, had orders to ruſh forth at a given ſignal, while Braſidas in perſon, conducting a ſelect band of intrepid followers, watched the firſt opportunity for attack. The plan, contrived with ſo much ſkill, was executed with equal dexterity. Confounded with the rapidity and preciſion of ſuch an unexpected and complicated charge, the enemy fled amain, abandoning their ſhields, and expoſing their naked backs to the ſwords and ſpears of the purſuers. The forces on either ſide amounted to about three thouſand; ſix hundred Athenians fell victims to the folly of Cleon, who, though foremoſt in the flight, was arreſted by the hand of a Myrcinian targeteer. CHAP. XVII. Death of Cleon.

His death might appeaſe the manes of his unfortunate countrymen; but nothing could alleviate the ſorrow of the victors for the loſs of their admired Braſidas, who received a mortal wound while he advanced to the attack. He was conveyed alive to Amphipolis, and conſoled with the reſult of his laſt victory, in which only ſeven men had periſhed on the Spartan ſide. The ſolemn magnificence of his funeral was adorned by the ſplendour of military honours; but what was ſtill more honourable to Braſidas, he was ſincerely lamented by the grateful tears of numerous communities, who regarded his virtues and abilities as the ſureſt pledges of their own freedom and happineſs. The citizens of Amphipolis paid an extraordinary tribute to his memory. Having demoliſhed every monument of their ancient worthies, they erected Death and honours of Braſidas.

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the ſtatue of Braſidas in the moſt conſpicuous ſquare of the city, appointed annual games to be celebrated at his tomb, and ſacrificed to his revered ſhade, as to the great protecting hero and original founder of their community [25].

Peace of Nicias. Olymp. lxxxix. 4. A. C. 421

The battle of Amphipolis removed the principal obſtacles to peace. There was not any Spartan general qualified to accompliſh the deſigns of Braſidas. The Athenians, dejected by defeat, and humbled by diſgrace, wanted the bold impoſing eloquence of Cleon, to diſguiſe their weakneſs, and varniſh their misfortunes. With the diſheartened remains of an enfeebled armament, they deſpaired of recovering their Macedonian poſſeſſions; and the greater part returned home, well diſpoſed for an accommodation with the enemy. Theſe diſpoſitions were confirmed by the pacific temper of Nicias, who had ſucceeded to the influence of Cleon, and who fortunately experienced in the moderation of Pleiſtoanax, King of Sparta, a ready coadjutor in his meaſures. During winter, ſeveral friendly conferences were held between the commiſſioners of the two republics; and, towards the commencement of the enſuing ſpring, a treaty of peace, and ſoon afterwards a defenſive alliance, for fifty years, was ratified by the kings and ephori of Sparta on the one ſide, and by the archons and generals of Athens on the other. In conſequence of this negociation, which was intended to comprehend the reſpective allies of the contracting powers, all places and priſoners, taken in

[25] Thucydid. p. 307.

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the courſe of the war, were to be mutually reſtored: the revolted cities in Macedon were ſpecified by name: but it was regulated that the Athenians ſhould not exact from them any larger revenue than that formerly conſtituted by the juſtice of Ariſtide[illegible]

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tranſactions, the Greeks were ever promiſes, but backward in performance; and, amidſt the continual rotation of authority, magiſtrates eaſily found excuſes for violating the conditions granted by their predeceſſors. The known principles of republican inconſtancy, ever ready to vibrate between exceſſive animoſity and immoderate friendſhip, might likewiſe ſuggeſt a reaſon for converting a treaty of peace into a contract of alliance. But this meaſure, in the preſent caſe, was the effect of neceſſity. Athens and Sparta might make mutual reſtitution, becauſe their reſpective intereſts required it. But no motive of intereſt engaged the former power to reſtore Nicæa to the Megareans, or the towns of Solium and Anactorium to Corinth. The Thebans, ſhortly before the peace, had ſeized the Athenian fortreſs of Panactum, ſituate on the frontier of Bœotia. They were ſtill maſters of Platæa. Elated by their ſignal victory at Delium, they could not be ſuppoſed willing to abandon their conqueſts, or even heartily inclined to peace. It was ſtill leſs to be expected that the Macedonian cities ſhould, for the conveniency of Sparta, ſubmit to the ſevere yoke

Diſſatisfaction of the Lacedæmonian allies.

[16] Thucydid. p. 354. & ſeqq.

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of Athens, from which they had recently been delivered; nor could it be hoped that even the inferior ſtates of Peloponneſus ſhould tamely lay down their arms, without obtaining any of thoſe advantages with which they had been long flattered by their Spartan allies.

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Diſcontents fomented by the Corinthians.— The Argive Alliance.— To which Athens accedes.— Birth and Education of Alcibiades.— His Friendſhip with Socrates.— His Character— and Views —which are favoured by the State of Greece.— He deceives the Spartan Ambaſſadors.— Renewal of the Peloponneſian War.— Battle of Mantinæa. — Tumults in Argos.— Maſſacre of the Scioneans. — Cruel Conqueſt of Melos.

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Diſcontents fomented by the Corinthians.

THE voluptuous, yet turbulent citizens of Corinth, enjoy the odious diſtinction of renewing a war which their intrigues and animoſities had firſt kindled. Under pretence of having taken an oath never to abandon the Macedonian cities, they declined to become parties in the general treaty of peace. The alliance between Athens and Sparta, in which it was ſtipulated that theſe contracting powers ſhould be entitled to make ſuch alterations in the treaty as circumſtances might require, the Corinthians affected, with ſome reaſon, to conſider as a conſpiracy againſt the common liberties of Greece[1]. Fired with this idea, they haſtened to Argos, in order to animate that republic with the ſame paſſions which rankled in their own breaſts.

[1] The clauſe was worded in ſuch a manner as might naturally excite alarm; Προσθυναιχαι αφελειν ὁτι αν ΑΜΦΟΙΝ τοιν πολοιν δοκη. Thucydid. l. v. p. 482.

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Having roused the ambition of the *magistrates*, they artfully reminded the *people* of the glory of Agamemnon, recalled to the Argives their ancient and just pre-eminence in the Peloponnesus, and conjured them to maintain the honour of that illustrious peninsula, which had been so shamefully abandoned by the pusillanimity, or betrayed by the selfishness, of Sparta.

The Argive alliance. Olymp. lxxxix. 4. A. C. 421.

The Argives wanted neither power nor inclination to assume that important office. During the Peloponnesian war, they had observed the principles of a prudent neutrality, equally favourable to their populousness and their wealth. Their protection was courted by Mantinæa, the most powerful city in Arcadia, which had recently conquered some villages in its neighbourhood, to which Sparta laid claim. The Elians, long hostile to Sparta, eagerly promoted the Argive alliance, which was farther strengthened by the speedy accession of the Macedonian cities, whose inhabitants were not more flattered by the kind zeal of Corinth, than provoked by the cruel indifference of Sparta. Thebes and Megara were equally offended at the Lacedæmonians, and equally inclined to war. But a rigid aristocracy prevailed in those states, whose ambitious magistrates, trembling for their personal authority, and that of their families, declined entering into confederacy with free democratical republics[2].

To which Athens accedes.

But this democratical association soon acquired an accession still more important, and received into

[2] Thucydid. l. v. p. 371.

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its boſom the fountain of liberty itſelf, even the republic of Athens. This extraordinary event happened in the year following the negociation between Athens and Sparta. It was effected by means extremely remote from the experience of modern times; means which it is incumbent on us to explain, leſt the political tranſactions of Greece ſhould appear too fluctuating and capricious to afford a proper ſubject for hiſtory.

Olymp. xc. 1. A. C. 420.

Amidſt the factious turbulence of ſenates and aſſemblies, no meaſure could be adopted by one party, without being condemned by another. Many Athenians diſapproved the peace of Nicias[3]; but the general blaze of oppoſition was eclipſed by the ſplendour of one man, who, on this occaſion, firſt diſplayed thoſe ſingular but unhappy talents, which proved fatal to himſelf and to his country. Alcibiades had not reached his thirtieth year, the age required by the wiſdom of Solon for being entitled to ſpeak in the aſſembly. But every advantageous circumſtance of birth and fortune, talents natural and acquired, accompliſhments of mind and body, pleaded an exception in favour of this extraordinary character, which, producing at once flowers and fruit, united with the blooming vivacity and youth, the ripened wiſdom of experience[4]. His father, the rich and generous Clinias, derived his extraction from the heroic

Birth and education of Alcibiades.

[3] The Greeks ſometimes diſtinguiſhed treaties by the names of thoſe who made them: the peace of Cimon; the peace of Nicias; and, as we ſhall ſee hereafter, the peace of Antalcidas.

[4] Plut. & Nepos in Alcibiad.

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Ajax, and had diſtinguiſhed his own valour and patriotiſm in the glorious ſcenes of the Perſian war. In the female line, the ſon of Clinias was allied to the eloquence and magnanimity of Pericles, who, as his neareſt ſurviving kinſman, had been entruſted with the care of his minority. But the ſtateſman, who governed with undivided ſway the affairs of Athens and of Greece, could not beſtow much attention on this important domeſtic taſk. The tender years of Alcibiades were committed to the illiberal diſcipline of mercenary preceptors; his youth and inexperience were beſet by the deſtructive adulation of ſervile flatterers, until the young Athenian, having begun to reliſh the poems of Homer, the admiration of which is congenial to every great mind, learned from thence to deſpiſe the pedantry of the one, and to deteſt the meanneſs of the other [5].

attachment to Socrates.

From Homer Alcibiades early imbibed that ambition for excellence which is the great leſſon of the immortal bard. Having attained the verge of manhood, he readily diſtinguiſhed, among the crowd of rhetoricians and ſophiſts, the ſuperior merit of Socrates, who, rejecting all factitious and abſtruſe ſtudies, confined his ſpeculations to matters of real importance and utility; who, having never travelled into Egypt and the Eaſt in ſearch of *myſterious* knowledge, reaſoned with an Attic perſpicuity and freedom; and who, being unbiaſſed by the ſyſtem of any maſter, and always maſter of himſelf, thought,

[5] Plut. in Alcibiad.

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ſpoke, and acted with equal independence and dignity. An amiable and moſt inſtructive writer, the diſciple and friend of Socrates, has left an admirable panegyric of the uniform temperance, the unſhaken probity, the diffuſive benevolence, invariably diſplayed in his virtuous life of ſeventy years[6]. His diſtinguiſhing excellencies are juſtly appreciated by Xenophon, a ſcholar worthy of his maſter[7]; but the youthful levity of Alcibiades (for youth is ſeldom capable of eſtimating the higheſt of all merits, the undeviating tenor of an innocent and uſeful life) was chiefly delighted with the ſplendour of particular actions. The eloquence, rather than the innocence of Socrates, excited his admiration. He was charmed with that inimitable raillery, that clear comprehenſive logic, which baffled the moſt acute diſputants of the Athenian ſchools[8]; that erect independence of mind, which diſdained the inſolence of power, the pride of wealth, and the vanity of popular fame, was well fitted to attract the congenial eſteem of Alcibiades, who aſpired beyond the beaten paths of vulgar greatneſs; nor could the gallant youth be leſs affected by the invincible intrepidity of Socrates, when, quitting the ſhade of ſpeculation, and covered with the helm and cuiraſs, he graſped the maſſy ſpear, and juſtified, by his ſtrenuous exertion in the field of battle, the uſeful leſſons of his philoſophy[9].

Their mutual obligations and friendſhip.

Socrates in his turn (ſince it is eaſier for a wiſe man to correct the errors of reaſon than to con-

[6] Xenoph. Memorabil. Socrat.
[7] See particularly Xenoph. Apolog. Socrat. [8] Plato, paſſim.
[9] Xenoph. Memorab. Socrat. pp. 449. 804. 818.

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quer the deluſions of ſentiment), was deeply affected with the beauty of Alcibiades [10]; a beauty depending, not on the tranſient flower of youth, and the ſeductive delicacy of effeminate graces, but on the ineffable harmony of a form which realiſed the ſublime conceptions of Homer and Phidias concerning their fabulous divinities, and which ſhone in the autumn of life with undiminiſhed effulgence [11]. The affection of Socrates, though infinitely removed from impurity, reſembled rather the ardour of love than the calm moderation of friendſhip. The ſage, whoſe company was courted by his other diſciples, himſelf courted the company of Alcibiades; and when the ungrateful youth ſometimes eſcaped to his licentious companions, the philoſopher purſued him with the eagerneſs of a father or maſter anxious to recover a fugitive ſon or much valued ſlave [12]. At the battle of Potidæa he ſaved the life of his pupil, and in order to gratify the love of military glory, which already animated his youthful boſom, the ſage obtained for Alcibiades the prize of valour, which the univerſal conſent of the Athenians thought due to himſelf. At the fatal engagement of Delium, Alcibiades, it is ſaid, had an opportunity of returning the more ſubſtantial favour, by ſaving the precious life of Socrates [13]; and it may

[10] Vid. Xenoph. and Plato paſſim. Socrates often acknowledges the danger of beauty, and its power over himſelf; but loſes no opportunity to caution his diſciples againſt the ſhameful paſſions, and abominable vices, which flow from this fair ſource. Vid. Memorab. Socrat. l. iii. paſſim, & l. v. c. iii. Sympoſ. c. iv. p. 246.

[11] Plut. in Alcibiad. [12] Plut. ibid.

[13] Strabo, p. 330, & Plut. in Alcibiad.

well

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well be ſuppoſed that an interchange of ſuch important favours would ſtraiten the bands of their mutual friendſhip, during which the powers of reaſon and fancy were directed, with unabating diligence, to improve the underſtanding, and excite the virtue of Alcibiades.

Deceitful character of Alcibiades.

But this favourite youth laboured under a defect, which could not be compenſated by the higheſt birth, the moſt ſplendid fortune, the nobleſt endowments of mind and body, and even the ineſtimable friendſhip of Socrates. He wanted an honeſt [14] heart. This we are warranted to affirm on the authority of contemporary writers, who acknowledge, that firſt admiration, and then intereſt, was the foundation of his attachment to the illuſtrious ſage, by whoſe inſtruction he expected to become, not a good, but an able, man. Some inclination to virtue he might, in ſuch company, perhaps feel, but more probably feign; and the niceſt diſcernment might miſtake the real character of a man, who could adopt, at pleaſure, the moſt oppoſite manners; and who, as will appear from the ſubſequent events of his various life, could ſurpaſs the ſplendid magnificence of Athens, or the rigid frugality of Sparta; could conform, as intereſt required, to the laborious exerciſes of the Thebans, or to the voluptuous indolence of Ionia; aſſume the ſoft effeminacy of an Eaſtern prince, or rival the ſturdy vices of the drunken Thracians [15].

[14] Lyſias cont. Alcibiad. et Xenoph. Memorab. Socrat. l. i. p. 715.

[15] Nepos in Alcibiad.

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The first specimen of his political conduct discovered the extraordinary resources of his versatile mind. He opposed the peace of Nicias, as the work of a rival, whom he wished to supplant. His ambition longed for war, and the Spartans deserved his resentment, having, in all their transactions with Athens, testified the utmost respect for Nicias, while they were at no pains to conceal their want of regard for himself, though his family had been long connected with their republic by an intercourse of hospitality, and he had endeavoured to strengthen that connection by his personal good offices to the Lacedæmonians taken in Sphacteria. To gratify at once his resentment, his ambition, and his jealousy, he determined to renew the war with Sparta; a design by no means difficult at the present juncture.

His views

favoured by the state of Greece. Olymp. [illegible]. A.C. 420.

In compliance with the peace of Nicias, the Spartans withdrew their troops from Amphipolis; but they could restore neither that city, nor the neighbouring places in Macedon, to the dominion of Athens. The Athenians, agreeably to the treaty, allowed the captives taken in Sphacteria to meet the longing embraces of their kinsmen and friends; but good policy forbade their surrendering Pylus, until the enemy had prepared to perform the conditions stipulated in return. Mutual unwillingness, or inability, to comply with the articles of peace, sowed the seeds of animosity, which found a favourable soil in both republics. The authority of those magistrates, who supported the pacific measures of Nicias and Pleistoanax, had expired. The

Spartan

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Spartan youth wiſhed, by new hoſtilities, to cancel the memory of a war, which had been carried on without profit, and terminated with diſhonour. But the wiſer part perceived that better ſucceſs could not be expected while the Athenians poſſeſſed Pylus. In their eagerneſs to recover that fortreſs, they renewed their alliance with the Thebans, from whom they received Panactum, which they hoped to exchange for Pylus; forgetting, in this tranſaction, an important clauſe in their treaty with Athens, "that neither of the contracting powers ſhould, without mutual communication and conſent, conclude any new alliance." The Thebans rejoiced in the proſpect of embroiling the affairs of Athens and Sparta; and the Corinthians, guided by the ſame hoſtile views, readily concurred with the Thebans, and openly re-entered into the Lacedæmonian confederacy[6].

He outwits the Spartan ambaſſadors. Olymp. xc 1. A. C. 420.

Having concluded this negociation, the Spartans, who yielded to none in the art of diſſembling, diſpatched ambaſſadors to Athens, excuſing what they termed an apparent infringement of the treaty, and requeſting that ſtate to accept Panactum (which had been carefully diſmantled) in exchange for Pylus. The ſenate of Athens heard their propoſal without ſuſpicion, eſpecially as they declared themſelves inveſted with full powers to embrace every reaſonable plan of preſent accommodation and permanent friendſhip. It now remained for the ambaſſadors to propoſe their demand in the po-

[6] Thucydid. l. v. paſſim.

pular

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pular aſſembly, which they had reaſon to hope might be deceived ſtill more eaſily than the ſenate. But in this expectation they were diſappointed by a contrivance of Alcibiades, no leſs ſingular than audacious. Having invited the ambaſſadors to an entertainment, during which he talked of their republic with more than his wonted reſpect, and teſtified the utmoſt ſolicitude for the ſucceſs of their negociation, he obſerved to them, that one circumſtance gave him much concern, their having mentioned full powers. They muſt beware of repeating that error in the aſſembly, becauſe the natural rapacity of the populace, appriſed of that circumſtance, would not fail to inſiſt on ſuch conditions as the honour of Sparta could not poſſibly comply with. If they concealed the extent of their commiſſion, the declaring of which could only ſerve to indicate timidity on the one ſide, and to provoke inſolence on the other, he pledged himſelf to obtain the recovery of Pylus, and the gratification of their utmoſt hopes. On this occaſion the Spartans injudiciouſly confided in a man, who had been irritated by the former neglect and ingratitude of their republic. When they appeared next day in the aſſembly, Alcibiades demanded, with a loud voice, the object and extent of their commiſſion. According to the concerted plan, they denied their having full powers. The artful Athenian, affecting a tranſport of indignation, arraigned the audacity and baſeneſs of a people by whom his own unſuſpecting temper had been egregiouſly abuſed. "But yeſterday they declared their full powers in the ſenate; they

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they denied to-day what yeſterday they diſplayed with oſtentation. Such (I now perceive) is the uſual duplicity of their republic. It is thus, they have reſtored Amphipolis. It is thus, Athenians! they have reſtored the neighbouring towns in Macedon: it is thus they have, indeed, put you in poſſeſſion of Panactum, but with demoliſhed walls; and after concluding an alliance with Athens, ratified by ſolemn oath, moſt treacherouſly and daringly infringed it, by entering into a league with Thebes, your determined and inveterate enemy. Can you ſtill, men of Athens! tamely ſubmit to ſuch indignities? Do you not expel ſuch traitors (pointing to the ambaſſadors) from your preſence, and from your city?" This extraordinary harangue totally diſconcerted the Spartans. Had their confuſion allowed them to extenuate their fault by declaring the truth, the leaſt reflection muſt have ſuggeſted, that Alcibiades would repreſent their ſimple ſtory as a new turn of ingenious artifice. They retired abruptly from the aſſembly [17]; Nicias, and the other partizans of Sparta, ſhared their diſgrace; and the Athenians were ſoon afterwards perſuaded by Alcibiades to embrace the Argive alliance [18].

The Peloponneſian war renewed.

It might be expected, that the weight of ſuch a powerful confederacy ſhould have ſpeedily cruſhed the debility of Sparta, already exhauſted by the

[17] Thucydides mentions the ſhock of an earthquake, which occaſioned the diſſolution of that aſſembly, before coming to any concluſion.

[18] Thucydid. l. v. p. 374, & ſeqq. Plut. in Alcibiad.

former

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Olymp. xc. 2. A. C. 419.

former war. But the military operations of Greece depended leſs on the relative ſtrength of contending powers, than on the alternate preponderance of domeſtic factions. In the year following the treaty, the Athenians ſent a ſmall body of troops to aſſiſt their Peloponneſian allies in the reduction of Epidaurus, Tegea, and other hoſtile cities in Argolis and Arcadia. Yet in the enſuing year, when the Spartans, dreading the loſs of ſome cities, and the defection of others, made a vigorous effort to retrieve their authority in Peloponneſus, the Athenians alone diſcovered little inclination, and exerted no activity, to obſtruct their meaſures for that purpoſe. Pleiſtoanax being a partizan of the peace of Nicias, the Spartans entruſted the command to Agis, his more warlike colleague. All Lacedæmonians of the military age were ſummoned to the field. The dangerous expedient of arming the Helots was adopted on this important emergence. The Spartan allies ſhewed unuſual ardour in their cauſe. The Thebans ſent ten thouſand foot, and one thouſand horſeman [19]; the Corinthians two thouſand heavy-armed men; the Megarians almoſt an equal number; the ancient cities of Pallené and Sicyon in Achaia gave a powerful and ready aſſiſtance; while the ſmall, but generous republic of Phlius, whoſe territory, bordering on Argolis, was appointed for the rendez-

[19] They had, however, but five hundred horſes; ἱππεις πεντακοσιοι και ανιπποι ισοι. Perhaps the ανιπποι, thoſe not provided with horſes, ſerved as attendants on the horſemen. The mixing of light infantry with the cavalry was frequent in later times: but of this hereafter.

vous

vous of the confederates, took the field with the whole body of citizens and ſlaves capable of bearing arms[20]. CHAP. XVIII.

The Argives obſerved the approaching ſtorm, and prepared to reſiſt it. The Eleans and Mantineans joined them; and although the Athenians were long expected in vain, the Argives did not loſe courage, but boldly marched forth to oppoſe the invaſion. The ſkilful movements of King Agis intercepted their return to Argos; the high grounds above them were occupied by the Corinthians and Phliaſians; their retreat towards Nemea was cut off by the Bœotians and Megarians. A battle ſeemed inevitable in the winding vale of Argos; but it is eaſier to admire, than explain, the ſubſequent conduct of either army. Whether the Argive commanders[21] were diſconcerted by the judicious poſition of the enemy, or that compaſſion touched their minds on perceiving ſuch numerous bodies of men, chiefly natives of the ſame peninſula, ſprung from the ſame blood, and ſpeaking the ſame Doric tongue, prepared to embrue their parricidal hands in kindred blood; or that, being ſecretly partizans of ariſtocracy[22], they were unwilling to come to extremities with Sparta; it is certain that inſtead of joining battle, they entered

The Spartan and Argive armies face each other, but part without engaging. Olymp. xc. 3. A. C. 418.

[20] Thucyd. l. v. p. 384. & ſeqq.

[21] Or rather Thraſyllus, who was one of five generals, but who ſeems to have enjoyed ſome pre-eminence over his colleagues. Perhaps it was his turn to command.

[22] Alciphron, who, with Thraſyllus, was the principal agent in this affair, was the "προξενος Λακεδαιμονιων," the public hoſt of the Lacedæmonians. Thucyd. p. 386.

into

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into conference with the Lacedæmonian King. In conſequence of this unexpected meaſure, a truce was concluded between the chiefs, without the concurrence or knowledge of the officers or troops in either army. The Argives, Thraſyllus and Alciphron, engaged that their countrymen ſhould give complete ſatisfaction for the injuries of which they were accuſed; and King Agis, whoſe authority, by the Spartan laws, was abſolute in the field, led off his obſequious army.

Diſcontents hereby occaſioned in both ſtates.

Whatever might be the cauſe of this meaſure, it occaſioned (after the firſt pauſe of ſilent aſtoniſhment) univerſal diſcontent, followed by loud and licentious clamours. The Spartans complained, "That, after aſſembling ſuch a body of men as had ſcarcely ever been collected in Peloponneſus, whoſe attachment to their cauſe was ardent, whoſe numbers and courage were invincible, and after ſurrounding their enemies on every ſide, and depriving them of every reſource, the glorious hope, or rather certainty, of the moſt complete and important victory, ſhould have been ſacrificed, in one moment, by the caprice, the cowardice, or the corruption of their general." The Argives lamented, "That their numerous enemies, whom they had a fair opportunity of engaging to advantage in their own country, ſhould have been allowed to eſcape from their hands by a haſty and ill-judged compoſition." Nor did they confine their reſentment to vain complaints. The moſt daring or moſt ſeditious attacked the houſes of Thraſyllus and Alciphron. The reſt ſoon joined in the tumult. The effects

effects of the generals were plundered or confiscated; and their lives were saved, with difficulty, by the respected sanctuary of Argive Juno. CHAP. XVIII.

Though the Greeks, and indeed the ancients in general, seldom employed resident ambassadors in foreign states, Alcibiades was then invested with that character at Argos. His activity would not fail to promote the popular tumult, in which his own and the Athenian interest was concerned. On a future occasion he boasted, that, chiefly at his instigation, the Argives and their allies were persuaded to break the truce; a measure greatly facilitated by the long-expected arrival of the Athenian transports, conveying a reinforcement of twelve hundred soldiers, and a body of three hundred cavalry. Encouraged by this reinforcement, the Argives, regardless of the truce, attacked the ancient and wealthy city of Orchomenus in Arcadia, which, after a feeble resistance, submitted to their arms. They next proceeded to lay siege to the neighbouring town of Tegea, a design extremely contrary to the inclination of the Elians, who were eager to chastise the inhabitants of Lepreum, a district on their own frontier. The Argives, however, paid no regard to their demands; and the Elians, offended by this contumely, returned home in disgust.

Alcibiades persuades the Argives to break the truce. Olymp. xc. 3. A. C. 418.

The Lacedæmonians learned with indignation the submission of Orchomenus, the siege of Tegea, and the open infraction of the treaty. They had formerly murmured against the imprudent or perfidious measures of King Agis; but when they felt

The Spartans take the field.

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the full effects of his miſconduct, their reſentment became outrageous. In the firſt emotions of their animoſity, they determined to deſtroy his houſe, and to ſubject him to a fine in value ſeveral thouſand pounds ſterling, which, in all probability, he would have been unable to pay. But his eloquence and addreſs appeaſed the general clamour; and, as the anger of popular aſſemblies is eaſily converted into pity, he was again taken into favour. His known talents for war recommended him to the command of the army; and he aſſured his countrymen, that his future ſervices ſhould ſpeedily wipe off the undeſerved ſtain on his character. The Spartans, however, firſt elected on this occaſion ten counſellors to attend their kings in the field, to reſtrain their too precipate reſolves, and control their too abſolute authority.

Battle of Mantinæa.

Having taken this precaution, the neceſſity of which ſeemed juſtified by recent experience, they ſummoned the aſſiſtance of their allies, whoſe ardour to renew hoſtilities was equal to their own. They proceeded with a numerous army (though inferior to that formerly collected, as their confederates beyond the Iſthmus had not yet time to join them), and marched directly to the town of Mantinæa, expecting either to take that place, or to oblige the enemy to defend it, by withdrawing his troops from the ſiege of Tegea. The approach of the Argives prevented the ſurpriſe of Mantinæa; and both armies, whoſe ambition or reſentment had been ſo lately diſappointed of an opportunity to diſ-

play

play their valour or their fury, eagerly prepared for an engagement. CHAP. XVIII.

Military oration.

According to ancient cuſtom, the leaders of the ſeveral nations addreſſed their reſpective troops. The Mantinæans were animated "by the ſight of their city, for the defence of which, as well as for the ſafety of their wives and children, they were exhorted valiantly to contend. The event of the battle muſt determine the important alternative of dominion and ſervitude; dominion which they had lately aſſumed over various cities in Arcadia, and ſervitude, which they had already ſuffered under the cruel tyranny of Sparta." The Argives were reminded "of their ancient pre-eminence in Peloponneſus, which they had recently recovered, and which their honour was now called to maintain. They were reminded of the long and bloody wars which they had formerly carried on, in order to repel the uſurpation of a powerful and ambitious neighbour. This was the ſame enemy who actually provoked their arms, and gave them an opportunity of revenging in one day, the accumulated injuſtice of many centuries." The Athenians heard, and repeated, "That it was glorious to march at the head of gallant and faithful allies, and to ſhew themſelves deſerving of their hereditary renown. They yielded to none in bravery; their power was unrivalled; and when they had overcome the Lacedæmonians, even in the Peloponneſus, their dominion would be more extenſive and more ſecure."

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The Spartans victorious.

The Spartans briefly exhorted their followers, and each other, "to exert that innate valour which had ever animated their breaſts, and which could receive no additional force from a tedious diſplay of uſeleſs words." Thus ſaying, they marched with a ſlow and firm ſtep, regulated by the ſound of the flute, to meet the impetuous onſet [23] of the Argives and Athenians. Above a thouſand of the former, choſen from the flower of the nobleſt youth of Argos, had been employed, ſince the firſt diſſenſions occaſioned by the peace of Nicias, in the conſtant exerciſe of arms, in order to maintain the honourable pretenſions of their country. They behaved with ſignal bravery. The Athenians were not wanting to their ancient fame. The Mantinæans ſtrenuouſly defended every thing moſt dear to them. But the allied army had been conſiderably weakened by the deſertion of the Elians; and the martial enthuſiaſm of King Agis, ſeconded by the perſevering valour of the Spartans [24], decided the

[23] The admirable verſes of Milton, who was a diligent reader of Thucydides, are the beſt commentary on this battle.

Anon they move
In perfect phalanx, to the Dorian mood
Of flutes and ſoft recorders, ſuch as rais'd
To height of nobleſt temper heroes old,
Arming to battle; and inſtead of rage,
Deliberate valour breath'd firm and unmov'd, &c.

Par. Loſt, b. i.

[24] If the text is not corrupt, the words of Thucydides are very remarkable: Αλλα μαλιστα δη κατα παντα τη εμπειρια Λακεδαιμονιοι ελασσωθεντες, τη ανδρεια εδειξαν ουχ ησσον περιγενομενοι. p. 394. "That the Lacedæmonians, exceedingly inferior as they appeared on this occaſion to the enemy in military ſkill, ſhewed themſelves as much ſuperior to them in true manly courage." It appears from the deſcription

the fortune of the battle. The allies were repulſed, broken, thrown into diſorder, and put to flight. The Spartans, unwilling to irritate their deſpair, or ſuperſtitiouſly complying with an ancient maxim, which enjoined them "to make a bridge of gold for a flying enemy," did not continue the purſuit, but ſpeedily returned home to celebrate the Carnean feſtival, rejoicing in the reſtored luſtre of their arms, and at having recovered their authority in the Peloponneſus. CHAP. XVIII.

This, in fact, proved the immediate conſequence of a battle, which was not ſo bloody as might have been expected, the vanquiſhed having loſt *eleven*, and the victors only *three*, hundred. But the revolutions of Greece chiefly depended on the fluctuating politics of domeſtic factions. The Spartans had a numerous party in Argos itſelf, who, emboldened by the recent victory of their friends, immediately took arms, aboliſhed the popular government, deſtroyed the partiſans of Athens, abjured the league with that ſtate, and entered into a new confederacy with Sparta. This event hap- Tumults in Argos.

tion of the battle, that the Lacedæmonians were defective, not in ſkill, but in diſcipline. In approaching the enemy, their right wing extended too far, which frequently happened from the deſire of every ſoldier to cover his unarmed ſide by the ſhield of the next perſon on his right. In conſequence of this tendency, the Lacedæmonian left wing was over-reached by the enemy's right. Agis ordered the Skiritæ and Braſidians to wheel from their places on the right, and lengthen the front of the left wing: commanding the battalions of Hipponoidas and Ariſtocles to fill up the vacuity occaſioned by this movement. But theſe generals abſolutely refuſed to obey orders, and were afterwards baniſhed Sparta on that account. Thucydid. p. 393, & ſeqq.

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pened a few weeks after the engagement, and towards the close of the fourteenth winter of the Peloponnesian war. During the two following years, Argos paid dearly for a moment of transient splendour, having undergone three bloody revolutions, which renewed the atrocities of Corcyrean sedition. The contest ended, as in Corcyra, in favour of the Athenians and democracy.

Massacre of the Scioneans.

The affairs of the Peloponnesus had long occupied, without engrossing the attention of Athens. The year preceding her alliance with Argos, the Athenians reduced the rebellious city of Scioné, in the peninsula of Pallené, against which their resentment had been provoked to the utmost fury, because the Scioneans, though inhabiting a country almost surrounded by the sea, had defied the naval power of Athens, and, amidst the misfortunes of that state, revolted to her enemies. The citizens of Scioné became the victims of a revenge equally cruel and imprudent. The males, above the age of puberty, were put to the sword; the women and children dragged into servitude; the name and honours of the city extinguished for ever; and the territory planted with a new colony, consisting chiefly of Platæan exiles. These enormous cruelties alarmed the terror, exasperated the resentment, and invigorated the resistance, of the neighbouring republics. Their defence was undertaken by Perdiccas, King of Macedon, whom the Athenians therefore interdicted the use of the Grecian seas. But that ambitious people made so little progress in reducing the Macedonian coast,

that they finally deſiſted from this hopeleſs deſign, contenting themſelves with guarding thoſe places which ſtill avowed their allegiance, with re-eſtabliſhing domeſtic order, and with collecting the cuſtomary tribute from their numerous colonies and dependencies. CHAP. XVIII.

The productive induſtry diffuſed through all branches of the community, the equality of private fortune, the abſence of habitual luxury, together with the natural advantages of their ſoil and climate, enabled the Greeks to flouriſh amidſt furious and bloody wars. After a ſhort period of tranquillity, their exuberant population overflowed, and was obliged to diſcharge itſelf in foreign colonies or conqueſts. Such a period Athens enjoyed for five years after the peace of Nicias, as the Macedonian and Argive wars only employed her activity, without exhauſting her ſtrength. The neceſſity of exerting her ſuperfluous vigour in ſome uſeful and honourable deſign, was fatally experienced, in the year following, by the unfortunate iſland of Melos, one of the largeſt of the Cyclades, lying directly oppoſite to the Cape of Malea, the ſouthern promontory of Laconia. The Athenians attack Melos. Olymp. xc. 1. A. C. 416.

This beautiful iſland, ſixty miles in circumference, of a circular form, of an agreeable temperature, and affording, in peculiar perfection[25], the uſual productions of a fine climate, had early in- Deſcription of that iſland

[25] The iſland of Melos is every where impregnated with iron, bitumen, ſulphur, and other minerals. It is deſcribed by Tournefort as a great laboratory. Its ſubterranean fires are ſuppoſed to give peculiar force and flavour to its wines and fruits.

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vited the colonization of the Spartans; and the happy ſettlement had enjoyed political independence for ſeven hundred years. The ſtrength and importance of the capital, which had the ſame name with the iſland, may be underſtood by the armament of thirty ſhips, and nearly three thouſand ſoldiers, which the Athenians brought againſt it. Before they commenced hoſtilities, either by attacking the city, or by ravaging the country, they ſent ambaſſadors to the Melians, in order to perſuade them to ſurrender, without incurring the danger or the puniſhment of an unequal, and probably a fruitleſs, reſiſtance. The cautious iſlanders, well acquainted with the eloquence and addreſs of the enemy with whom they had to contend, denied them permiſſion to ſpeak before the public aſſembly, but appointed a deputation of the magiſtrates to hear and examine their demands. The Athenian ambaſſadors were received in the ſenate-houſe, where a moſt important and intereſting conference was held [26], which, while it engages our compaſſion for the unhappy victims of ambition, explains the prevailing ſentiments and opinions of the Greeks in matters of war and government, and illuſtrates the daring injuſtice of the Athenian republic. The ambaſſadors began the dialogue, by obſerving, "That ſince the diſtruſt of the Melians, probably ariſing from the conſcious weakneſs of their cauſe, had refuſed them the liberty of addreſſing, in a continued oration, the aſſembly of the people, they ſhould uſe that mode of conference which ſeemed

Conference between the commiſſioners of Athens and Melos.

[26] Thucydid. l. v. p. 400, & ſeqq.

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moſt agreeable to the inclinations of their adverſaries, and patiently liſten to the objections which might occur to any part of their diſcourſe." *Melians.* "The propoſal is juſt and reaſonable; but you have come hither with an armed force, which renders you judges in your own cauſe. Though vanquiſhed in debate, you may ſtill conquer by arms; but if *we* yield in argument, we muſt ſubmit to ſlavery." *Athenians.* "If you intend to talk of matters foreign to the ſubject, we have done." *M.* "It is ſurely excuſable for thoſe, whoſe all is at ſtake, to turn themſelves on every ſide, and to ſuggeſt their ſuſpicions and their doubts. But let the conference be carried on in the manner which you have propoſed." *A.* "And, on both ſides, let all ſuperfluous arguments be omitted; either that *we*, having repelled and conquered the Perſians, are entitled to govern the Greeks; or, that *you*, being a colony of Lacedæmon, are entitled to independence. Let us ſpeak like men of ſenſe and experience, who know that the equal rules of juſtice are obſerved only by men of an equal condition; but that it belongs to the ſtrong to command, and to the weak to obey; becauſe ſuch is the intereſt of both." *M.* "How can our intereſts and yours coincide?" *A.* "By ſubmiſſion, you will ſave your lives; and by preſerving you, we will increaſe our own power." *M.* "Conſider (for this alſo muſt be mentioned, ſince diſregarding *juſtice*, you hearken only to *utility*) that your unprovoked invaſion of the Melians will rouſe the reſentment of all Greece; will render all neutral ſtates your enemies; and, if ever your empire

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pire ſhould decline, (as what human grandeur is not ſubject to decay?) will expoſe you to a dreadful and juſt puniſhment." *A.* "The continuance of our empire is the care of fortune and the gods; the little that man can do to preſerve it, *we* will not neglect. The liberty of Melos offends the pride of the neighbouring iſles, and ſtirs them to rebellion. The intereſt of our preſent power muſt prevail over the apprehenſion of future danger." *M.* "While the Athenians are thus prepared to incur danger for the preſervation of empire, and their ſubject iſlands to defy death for the hope of freedom, would it not be baſe cowardice in us, who have long enjoyed liberty, to decline any toil or danger for maintaining the moſt valuable and the moſt glorious of all human poſſeſſions?" *A.* "We are not come hither to diſpute the prize of valour, but to offer terms of ſafety." *M.* "The event of war is uncertain; there is ſome hope in reſiſtance, none in ſubmiſſion." *A.* "Flattering hope often deceives the proſperous and the powerful, but always deſtroys the weak and unfortunate, who, diſregarding natural means of preſervation, have recourſe to idle dreams of the fancy, to omens, oracles, divination, and all the fallacious illuſions of vain ſuperſtition." *M.* "We know that it will be difficult for the Melians to contend with the ſtrength and fortune of Athens: yet we truſt that the gods will uphold the juſtice of our cauſe; and that the Lacedæmonians, from whom we are deſcended, moved by a ſenſe of honour, will defend their own blood." *A.* "Believe not that Athens will be forſaken by the gods. Ambition is implanted

implanted in man. The wiſdom of providence, not an Athenian decree, has eſtabliſhed the inevitable law, that the ſtrong ſhould command the weak. As to the aſſiſtance of the Lacedæmonians, we ſincerely congratulate your happy ignorance of their principles. Whatever equity prevails in their domeſtic inſtitutions, they have but one rule reſpecting their neighbours, which is, to regulate all their proceedings towards them by their own convenience." *M.* "It is chiefly this conſideration which affords us hope, that they will not forſake an iſland which they have planted, leſt they ſhould be regarded as traitors, than which nothing could be more unfavourable to their intereſt, eſpecially ſince Melos, lying in the neighbourhood of their own territories, would be a dangerous poſſeſſion in the hands of an enemy." *A.* "The timid caution of the Lacedæmonians ſeldom takes the field, even againſt their inveterate adverſaries in the Peloponneſus, unleſs when their ſtandard is crowded by numerous allies. It is not to be imagined that, for the ſafety of a colony, they will, unaſſiſted and alone, croſs the Cretan ſea, to contend with the ſuperior navy of Athens." *M.* "Should the Lacedæmonians be averſe to ſail, they can tranſport others in their ſtead; and the extent of the Cretan ſea may elude the vigilance of your ſhips; or, ſhould that probability fail, the Lacedæmonians may attack your ſubjects on the continent, and accompliſh the deſigns of the warlike Braſidas." *A.* "You are determined, it ſeems, to learn, by fatal experience, that fear never compelled the Athenians to deſiſt from

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their commenced undertakings; eſpecially never to raiſe the ſiege of any place which they had once inveſted. For during the whole of this long conference, you have not made a ſingle obſervation capable of affording any juſt ground of confidence. Dazzled by the ſplendour of words, you talk of honour and independence, rejecting the offers of a powerful ſtate, whoſe arms you are unable to reſiſt, and whoſe protection you might obtain at the expence of a moderate tribute. Leſt ſhame ſhould have any ſhare in this dangerous behaviour, we ſhall leave you to conſult privately, only reminding you once more, that your preſent deliberations involve the fate of your country.

Magnanimity of the Melians.

The Athenian ambaſſadors retired; and ſhortly afterwards, the Melians recalled them, and "declared their unanimous reſolution not to betray, in one unlucky hour, the liberty which they had maintained for ſeven hundred years; depending on the vigorous aſſiſtance of their Lacedæmonian kinſmen, and truſting eſpecially in that divine providence which had hitherto moſt wonderfully preſerved them amidſt the general convulſions of Greece. But they entreated the Athenians to accept their offers of neutrality, and to abſtain from unprovoked violence." The ambaſſadors prepared for returning to the camp, leaving the commiſſioners with a ſarcaſtic threat, "That of all men, in ſuch a delicate ſituation, the Melians alone thought the future more certain than the paſt, and would grievouſly ſuffer for their folly, in preferring to the propoſals of certain and immediate ſafety, the deceitfulneſs of

Conqueſt of Melos, and cruel treatment of the inhabitants.

hope,

hope, the inſtability of fortune, and the vain proſpect of Lacedæmonian aid." The Athenians, irritated by oppoſition, inveſted, without delay, the capital of Melos, which was blocked up for ſeveral months by ſea and land. The beſieged, after ſuffering cruelly by famine, made ſeveral deſperate ſallies, ſeized the Athenian magazines, and deſtroyed part of their works. But towards the end of winter, their reſiſtance was defeated by the vigorous efforts of the enemy, combined with domeſtic treaſon. The males above the age of fourteen ſhared the unhappy fate of the Scioneans. The women and children were ſubjected to perpetual ſervitude, and five hundred new inhabitants, drawn from the neighbouring colonies of Athens, were ſent to occupy the vacant lands, which had been cultivated and adorned for ſeven centuries by the labour of the exterminated Melians [27].

[27] Thucydid. l. v. p. 410. ad fin.

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Alcibiades promotes the Sicilian Expedition. — Revolutions in that Iſland. — Embaſſy to Athens. — Extravagant Views of Alcibiades. — Oppoſed by Nicias. — The Athenians prepare to invade Sicily. — Their Armament beheld with Suſpicion by the Italian States. — Deliberations concerning the Mode of carrying on the War. — Alcibiades takes Catana by Stratagem. — His Intrigues in Meſſené. — He is unſeaſonably recalled to Athens. — Charged with Treaſon and Impiety. — Eſcapes to Sparta. — Nicias determines to attack Syracuſe. — Deſcription of that City. — The Athenians prevail in a Battle. — Return to Catana and Naxos.

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Alcibiades promotes the expedition into Sicily.

THE inhuman maſſacre of the Melians has been aſcribed by an inſtructive, though often inaccurate biographer [1], to the unfeeling pride of Alcibiades. But more ancient and authentic writers [2], whoſe ſilence ſeems to exculpate the ſon of Clinias from this atrocious accuſation, repreſent him as the principal author of the expedition againſt Sicily; an expedition not more unjuſt in its principle, than fatal in its conſequences.

Revolutions in that iſland. A. C. 479. —468.

The ſalutary union between the princes of Syracuſe and Agrigentum triumphed, as we had occa-

[1] Plut. in Alcib.
[2] Thucydid. l. v. Lyſias Orat. cont. Alcib.

from

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sion to relate, over the ambition and resources of Carthage. Sicily flourished under the virtuous administration of Gelon and Theron [3]; but its tranquillity was disturbed by the dissensions of their immediate successors. Hieron King of Syracuse proved victorious in a long and bloody war, during which the incapacity and misfortunes of his rival Thrasideus emboldened the resentment of his subjects, already provoked by his injustice and cruelty [4]. He escaped the popular fury, but fell a victim to his own despair; and the Agrigentines, having expelled the family of an odious tyrant, instituted a republican form of policy.

Reign of Hieron II. Syracus.

The false, cruel, and avaricious Hieron, (for such he is described [5] in the first years of his reign,) was not likely to benefit under the dangerous influence of prosperity. But his mind was still capable of reflection; and in the course of a long sickness and confinement, he discovered the emptiness of such objects as kings are taught to admire, and had recourse to the solid pleasures of the mind. By conversing with Grecian philosophers, he learned the most important of all lessons, that of conversing with himself; a conversation which none but the most virtuous or the most vicious of men can long and frequently maintain, without deriving from it essential profit. With the improvement of his understanding, the sentiments of Hieron improved; his character and manners underwent a total change; and the latter

[3] See above, p. 36.
[4] Diodor. l. xi. c. lx. & seqq.
[5] Diodor. Sic. l. xi. c. lxvi.

years

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years of his reign adorn the hiſtory of Sicily, and the age in which he lived [6]. The poets Simonides, Æſchylus, and Bacchilides, frequented his court, and admired the greatneſs of his mind, rather than of his fortune. The ſublime genius of Pindar has celebrated the magnificent generoſity of his illuſtrious patron. And in an age when writing was the picture of converſation, becauſe men talked as they needed not have been aſhamed to write, the impartial diſciple of Socrates, who had nothing to hope or to fear from the aſhes of a king of Sicily, has repreſented Hieron, in the Dialogue entitled from his name [7], as a model of wiſdom and virtue.

The tyranny of Thraſybulus, and eſtabliſhment of democracy. Olymp. lxxviii. 3. A. C. 466.

It is a mortifying reflection, that the inimitable qualities of a virtuous prince ſhould naturally encourage the ſloth, or irritate the vices, of a degenerate ſucceſſor. The glorious reign of Hieron was followed by the bloody tyranny of Thraſybulus; a wretch who, diſgracing the throne and human nature, was expelled from Sicily by the juſt indignation of his ſubjects. Reſentment is more permanent than gratitude. The Syracuſans forgot the fame of Gelon; they forgot the recent merit of Hieron; and, that they might never be again ſubjected to a tyrant like Thraſybulus, exchanged the odious power of kings for the dangerous fury of democracy [8].

Effects of that revolution.

The inferior cities having ſucceſſively imitated the example of Agrigentum and Syracuſe, the

[6] Ælian. l. ix. c. vii.
[7] Xenophont. Hieron.
[8] Ariſtot. de Repub. l. v. c. xii.

Grecian

Grecian colonies in Sicily experienced the diſorders of that tumultuous liberty which had ſo long prevailed in the mother-country. Diſtracted by internal diſcord, and haraſſed by external hoſtility, they had neither leiſure nor inclination to take part in the politics of Greece. The republic of Syracuſe, which was alone capable of interpoſing with effect, in the quarrels of that country, imitated, inſtead of oppoſing, the ambition of Athens. Moſt of the Dorian ſettlements had become confederates, or rather tributaries, to the Syracuſans; and towards the commencement of the Peloponneſian war, that aſpiring people, though torn by domeſtic factions, ſtrenuouſly exerted their valour againſt the Ionic ſettlements of Leontium, Catana, and Naxos. CHAP XIX.

Diſſenſions in Sicily, in which the Athenians interfere. Olymp. lxxxviii. 3. A. C. 426.

While theſe unhappy iſlanders ſtruggled with the agitations of a government more turbulent than the whirlpools of Scylla and Charybdis, they likewiſe enjoyed, however, the peculiar advantages of democracy; which, of all political conſtitutions, preſents the wideſt ſcope to the exerciſe of ſuperior talents, and has always been the moſt productive in great men. The active fermentation of popular aſſemblies had given the eloquence of a Gorgias to Leontium, and the abilities of a Hermocrates to Syracuſe. In the ſixth year of the Peloponneſian war, the former came to Athens to ſolicit the protection of that republic againſt the unjuſt uſurpation of the Sicilian capital. His arguments convinced the judgment, and the brilliant harmony of his ſtyle tranſported the ſenſibility, of the Athenians.

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They immediately diſpatched twenty ſhips of war to the aſſiſtance of their Ionic brethren. Two years afterwards a ſimilar requeſt was made, and as readily complied with; and the Athenians ſeemed diſpoſed to engage with vigour in the war, when the foreſight of Hermocrates, alarmed by the intruſion of theſe ambitious ſtrangers, promoted a general congreſs of the ſtates of Sicily.

Appeaſed by Hermocrates. Olymp. lxxxix. 1. A.C. 424.

This convention was held at the central town of Gela; it was attended by the plenipotentiaries of all the Doric and Ionic cities. Hermocrates repreſented Syracuſe; and illuſtrious as that republic was, approved himſelf worthy of its higheſt honours. While the deputies of other ſtates dwelt on their particular grievances, and urged their ſeparate intereſts, Hermocrates regarded and enforced only the general intereſt of Sicily. His arguments finally prevailed, and all parties were engaged to terminate their domeſtic conteſts, leſt the whole iſland ſhould fall a prey to a foreign power [9].

New diſſenſions. Olymp. xci. 1. A.C. 416.

But a plan of union ſo ſeaſonable and ſalutary, depended on the tranſient influence of a ſingle man, while the principles of diſcord were innumerable and permanent. Within a few years after this event, Leontium was taken and deſtroyed, its inhabitants reduced to the wretched condition of exiles, and its confederates, the Ægeſteans, cloſely beſieged by the conjunct arms of Selinus and Syracuſe. The unfortunate communities again ſent an embaſſy to Athens, pleading the rights of

Demands

Leg. of the Ægeſteans;

[9] Thucydid. p. 290.

con-

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conſanguinity, and addreſſing not only the paſſions but the intereſt of their powerful allies. "The Athenians," they inſiſted, "were bound by every principle of ſound policy to repreſs the growing greatneſs of Syracuſe, which muſt otherwiſe become a formidable acceſſion to the Peloponneſian league; and now was the time for this meritorious undertaking, while their Ionian kinſmen in Sicily were ſtill capable of exerting ſome vigour in their own defence." In order to enforce theſe arguments, the ambaſſadors of Ægeſta gave an oſtentatious, and even a very falſe deſcription of the wealth of their republic; which, according to their account, was capable of defraying the whole expence of the war. Their fellow citizens at home carried on the deception by a moſt unjuſtifiable artifice, diſplaying to the Athenian commiſſioners ſent to confer with them, the borrowed riches of their neighbours, and raiſing, by extraordinary expedients, the ſum of ſixty talents of ſilver, to maintain, for a month, an Athenian fleet of ſixty ſail, as if they had purpoſed monthly to repeat this large ſubſidy, which at once exhauſted their faculties [10].

with which the Athenians imprudently comply.

The arguments of their Sicilian allies were doubtleſs entitled to conſiderable weight with the Athenians; yet various reaſons might have diſſuaded that ambitious people from undertaking, at the preſent conjuncture, an expedition againſt the powerful republic of Syracuſe. The cloud of war, which Pericles ſaw advancing with rapid motion from the

[10] Thucydid. p. 444.

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Peloponneſus, had been at length diſpelled by the valour and fortune of the Athenians; not, however, before the arms of Braſidas had ſhaken their empire to the foundation. The ſame ſtorm might be again collected, if the Athenians removed their armies from home, eſpecially if they were unfortunate abroad, ſince the wounded pride of Sparta would eagerly ſeize the firſt opportunity of revenge. The rebellion of the Macedonian cities was ſtill unſubdued, and it would be highly imprudent and dangerous, before recovering the allegiance of thoſe ancient poſſeſſions, to attempt the acquiſition of new territories. Should the Athenian expedition againſt Sicily be crowned with the moſt flattering ſucceſs, it would ſtill be difficult, nay, impoſſible to preſerve ſuch a diſtant and extenſive conqueſt; but ſhould this ambitious deſign fail in the execution, as there was too good reaſon to apprehend, the misfortunes of the Athenians, whoſe greatneſs was the object both of terror and of envy, would encourage the rebellious ſpirit of their ſubjects and allies, excite the latent animoſity of the Peloponneſians, and reinforce their ancient enemies by the reſentment and hoſtility of Syracuſe and her confederates, juſtly provoked by the daring invaſion of their iſland.

Extravagant views of Alcibiades.

Theſe prudential conſiderations were unable to cool the ardour of the Athenian aſſembly inflamed by the breath of their favourite Alcibiades. It is a juſt and profound obſervation of Machiavel, that the real powers of government are often contracted to a narrower point in republics than in monarchies:

narchies: an obſervation which that ſagacious ſtateſ- CHAP. XIX.
man had learned from the experience of his native city, and which he might have confirmed by the hiſtory of the Greeks, whoſe political meaſures, and even whoſe national character, depended on the tranſient influence of a few individuals. Under the direction of Ariſtides and Themiſtocles, the Athenians diſplayed the ſoundeſt policy, adorned by unſhaken probity and by heroic valour. Cimon inſpired the generous ambition which animated his own breaſt: a dignified grandeur and magnanimous firmneſs diſtinguiſhed the long adminiſtration, I had almoſt ſaid reign, of Pericles. The ſon of Clinias ſucceeded to the power and authority, without ſucceeding to the virtues of thoſe great men, whom his pride diſdained to imitate. Regardleſs of order and decency, with a licentious magnificence moſt offenſive to the ſpirit of republican equality, he blended a certain elegance of manners, which not only repelled cenſure, but attracted applauſe. Thus diſpenſed from obſerving the eſtabliſhed formalities of private life, he expected that the glory of his adminiſtration might ſoar above the ordinary dictates of political prudence [11]. Though he preferred what was uſeful to what was honeſt, he preferred what was brilliant to what was uſeful, and, diſdaining the common gifts of valour and fortune, aſpired at objects extraordinary and unattainable. The recovery of the Athenian poſſeſſions, and the re-eſtabliſhment of an empire, al-

[11] See Plut. in Alcibiad. Iſocrat. de Pace; above all the animated picture in Plato's Republic (l. viii. cap. cc. & ſeqq.), of which Alcibiades, doubtleſs, was the original.

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ready too extenſive, might have ſatisfied the ambition of a bold and active ſtateſman. But the extravagant hopes of Alcibiades expatiated in a wider field. The acquiſition of Sicily itſelf he regarded only as a neceſſary introduction to wider and more important conqueſts. The intermediate ſituation of that beautiful and fertile iſland opened, on the one hand, an eaſy communication with the eaſtern front of Italy, which, from Brunduſium to the Sicilian frith, was adorned by populous and flouriſhing cities; and, on the other, afforded a ſhort and ſafe paſſage to the northern ſhores of Africa, which, for many ages, had been cultivated and enriched by the united labours of the Greeks and Carthaginians. In his waking or ſleeping dreams, Alcibiades graſped the wide extent of thoſe diſtant poſſeſſions, by the reſources of which he expected finally to ſubdue the pertinacious ſpirit, and obſtinate reſiſtance, of the Peloponneſians. Thus ſecure at home, and ſovereign of the ſea, Athens might incorporate with her own force that of the conquered provinces, and maintain an unſhaken dominion over the moſt delightful portion of the earth, while her fortunate citizens, delivered from all laborious and mercenary cares, would be ſupported by the contributions of ſubject nations, and enabled to diſplay, in their full extent, that taſte for ſplendour and magnificence, that greatneſs of ſoul and ſuperiority of genius, which juſtly entitled them to the empire of the world [12].

[12] Iſocrat. de Pace. Andocid. Orat. iii. p. 269. & Ariſtoph. Veſp. ver. 656.

Allured

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The Sicilian expedition oppoſed by Nicias. Olymp. xci. 2. A. C. 415.

Allured by theſe extravagant, and flattering proſpects of grandeur, the Athenians, in two ſucceſſive aſſemblies, held at the ſhort interval of five days, agreed to the reſolution of making war againſt Sicily, and of raiſing ſuch naval and military force as ſeemed neceſſary for carrying it on with vigour and ſucceſs. While they ſtill deliberated on the latter object, the virtuous Nicias, who had been named with Alcibiades and Lamachus to the command of the projected armament, omitted nothing that prudence could ſuggeſt, and patriotiſm enforce, to deter his countrymen from ſuch a dangerous and fatal deſign. On this memorable occaſion, he threw aſide his uſual timidity, and diveſted himſelf of that rigid regard for eſtabliſhed forms, which was natural to his age and character. Though the aſſembly was convened to determine the proportion of ſupplies and troops, and the means of collecting them with the greateſt expedition and facility, he ventured, contrary to ancient cuſtom, to propoſe a different ſubject of debate; affirming, "That the intereſt of Athens was concerned, not in providing the preparations for the Sicilian invaſion, but in re-examining the expediency of the war. The aſſembly ought not to be moved by the arguments and entreaties of the perſecuted Ægeſteans, and fugitive Leontines, whom reſentment had taught to exaggerate, and miſery to deceive. Nor ought the vain phantom of glory and ambition to engage Athens in a deſign perhaps altogether impracticable, and in the preſent juncture, peculiarly unſeaſonable; ſince it would be

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madneſs to excite the flames of a new war, before the aſhes of the old were extinguiſhed. The pleas of danger and ſelf-defence were in the higheſt degree frivolous; for, ſhould the dreaded power of Syracuſe be extended over the whole of Sicily, the Athenians would have nothing to apprehend: this event would rather increaſe their ſecurity. In the actual ſtate of the iſland, particular cities might be perſuaded by fear, or intereſt, to court the protection of the Peloponneſian confederacy; but the victorious Syracuſe would diſdain to follow the ſtandard of Sparta. Should the former republic, by an effort of uncommon generoſity, ſubject the partial dictates of her pride to the general ſafety and honour of the Dorian name, ſound policy, however, would ſtill prevent her from endangering the precarious empire which ſhe had obtained over her neighbours, by ſtrengthening the confederacy of Peloponneſus, of which the avowed deſign was to give liberty and independence to all Grecian cities. Should every remote view of policy be diſregarded, yet immediate fear would deter the Syracuſans from provoking the reſentment of Athens, the effects of which they had not as yet experienced, but which, being unknown, muſt appear the more formidable. It was evident, therefore, that the Sicilian expedition might be omitted without danger; but if this enterpriſe, which had been haſtily reſolved on, were injudiciouſly executed, or if any of thoſe misfortunes ſhould happen, which are but too frequent in war, the Athenians would be expoſed not only to danger, but to diſgrace and ruin.

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ruin. The reſult of ſuch an important deliberation ought not to be committed to the raſh deciſion of youthful levity; which viewed the Sicilian war, as it did every other object, through the deluſive medium of hope, vanity, and ambition; and, totally diſregarding the expence and danger to be incurred by the republic, conſidered only the profits of military command, which might repair the wreck of exhauſted fortunes, and ſupply a new fund for the indulgence of extravagant and licentious pleaſures. He had in his eye a youth of that deſcription, the principal author of the expedition, who was ſurrounded by a numerous band of adherents, determined to applaud his diſcourſe and to promote his meaſures. It became the wiſdom and dignity of the aſſembly to reſiſt with firmneſs that juvenile conſpiracy. In ſuch a dangerous criſis, it was the duty of the preſident to diſpenſe with ordinary forms, and to act, not merely as the inſtrument, but as the phyſician of a diſeaſed republic. The queſtion ought to be debated a ſecond time; and the Athenians ought to reſcind the decree againſt Sicily, which had paſſed without ſufficient examination, in the abſence of ſeveral aged and reſpectable counſellors [13]."

His diſcourſe anſwered by Alcibiades.

This diſcourſe immediately called up Alcibiades, who, preſuming on his credit with the aſſembly, acknowledged, "That he had aſpired to the com-

[13] Thucydid. l. vi. p. 417, & ſeqq. The Sicilian expedition is uninterruptedly related through the remainder of the ſixth and ſeventh books of Thucydides. The collateral authority of Diodorus, Plutarch, and the orators, is of little importance.

mand

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mand in Sicily, and that he thought himſelf juſtly entitled to that honour. The extravagance of which he was accuſed, had redounded to the profit of his country; ſince his magnificence at the Olympic games, however it might be traduced by an abuſive epithet, had extended the glory of Athens, and deſerved the admiration of Greece. His youth and inexperience had effected what the policy of the wiſeſt ſtateſman had often attempted in vain. A powerful confederacy had been formed againſt Sparta, even in the boſom of the Peloponneſus; and the terror of a domeſtic foe would long prevent the enmity of that rival ſtate from interrupting the progreſs of Athenian grandeur. In an expedition, evidently directed to this glorious end, expence and danger ought not to be regarded, ſince wealth was uſefully ſacrificed to purchaſe victory and renown; and power was only to be preſerved by ſeizing favourable opportunities to increaſe and confirm it. To the undertaking which he adviſed, no reaſonable objection could be made; its expence would be furniſhed by the Ægeſteans, and other confederates; and the danger could not be great, as Sicily, however extenſive and populous, was inhabited by a promiſcuous crowd of various nations, without arms or diſcipline, devoid of patriotiſm, and incapable of union [14]."

Nicias explain the difficulties of the war.

The aſſembly murmured applauſe, confirmed their former decree, and teſtified for the war greater alacrity than before. Nicias perceived the violence

[14] Thucydid. p. 422—426.

of

of the popular current; ſtill, however, he made one ineffectual effort to reſiſt its force. "The ſucceſs of an invader," he obſerved, "commonly depended on the weight and rapidity of his firſt unexpected impreſſion, which confirmed the confidence of his friends, and excited diſmay and terror in his enemies. If the expedition into Sicily muſt be undertaken in defiance of every difficulty and danger, it ought therefore to be carried into execution with the utmoſt vigour. The Athenians might thus ſecure the aſſiſtance of Naxos and Catana, which were connected by affinity with the Ægeſteans and Leontines. But there remained ſeven cities, and thoſe far more powerful, with which they muſt prepare to contend; particularly Selinus and Syracuſe, places well provided with ſhips, magazines, cavalry, archers, heavy-armed troops, and every object and reſource moſt uſeful in defenſive war. An armament ſimply naval would not be ſufficient to cope with ſuch a ſtrength. Five thouſand pikemen, with a proportional number of archers and cavalry, could not render the invaſion ſucceſsful. After arriving in Sicily, the towns muſt be beſieged or ſtormed; workmen, with all ſorts of machines and implements, muſt be collected for thoſe purpoſes, and tranſported to an iſland from which, in the four winter months, a meſſenger could ſcarcely return to Athens. This neceſſary train, which would greatly encumber the fleet and army, muſt be ſubſiſted in a hoſtile country. Beſides an hundred gallies, a great number of tenders and victuallers would be required for

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the expedition. To collect ſuch an immenſe maſs of war, demanded, doubtleſs, aſtoniſhing ardour and perſeverance; but if the Athenians intended to employ a ſmaller force, he muſt, in juſtice to his country and himſelf, decline accepting the command, ſince nothing leſs than what he had deſcribed could promiſe a hope of victory, or prevent the certainty of defeat [15]."

The Athenians prepare for invading Sicily. Olymp. xci. 2. A.C. 415.

The laſt attempt of Nicias to diſſuade his countrymen from this fatal enterpriſe, by magnifying the difficulty of its execution, produced an oppoſite effect. The obſtacles, which were unable to conquer, only animated the courage of the aſſembly; and it was determined, that the generals ſhould be inveſted with full authority to raiſe ſuch ſums of money, and to levy ſuch a body of troops, as might enſure ſucceſs to their arms. The domeſtic ſtrength of the Athenians was unequal to the greatneſs of the undertaking: proper agents were diſpatched to demand an extraordinary contribution from their dependent tributaries, as well as to ſummon the reluctant aſſiſtance of their more warlike allies. Theſe auxiliary ſquadrons were ordered to ſail to Corcyra, in which rendezvous the Athenians, towards the middle of the ſummer, were ready to join their confederates.

The magnitude of their preparations.

The magnitude of the preparations increaſed the hopes and the ardour of all ranks of men in the republic. The old expected that nothing could reſiſt ſuch a numerous and well-equipped armament.

[15] Thucydid. p. 427—429.

The

The young eagerly ſeized an occaſion to gratify their curioſity and love of knowledge in a diſtant navigation, and to ſhare the honours of ſuch a glorious enterpriſe. The rich exulted in diſplaying their magnificence; the poor rejoiced in the immediate aſſurance of pay ſufficient to relieve their preſent wants [16], and in the proſpect of obtaining by their arms the materials of future eaſe and happineſs. Inſtead of finding any difficulty to complete the levies, the great difficulty conſiſted in deciding the preference of valour and merit among thoſe who ſolicited to ſerve; and the whole complement of forces, to be employed by ſea and land, conſiſted of choſen men [17].

The general alacrity to embark.

Amidſt the general alacrity felt, or at leaſt expreſſed, by people of all deſcriptions (for the dread of incurring public cenſure made ſeveral expreſs what they did not feel), Socrates [18] alone ventured openly and boldly to condemn the expedition, and to predict the future calamities of his country. But the authority of a ſage was unable to check the courſe of that enthuſiaſm, which had not been interrupted by the anniverſary

[16] The moſt expert and able ſeamen received a drachma (ſeven-pence three farthings) as daily pay, beſides donatives from their reſpective captains. Thucydid. & Plut.

[17] Thucydid. p. 430—433.

[18] Plutarch joins Meton the aſtrologer with Socrates. But the ſtory of Meton, who pretended madneſs, burned his houſe, and entreated the Athenians, that, amidſt his domeſtic misfortunes, he might not be deprived of the comfort of his only ſon, is inconſiſtent with the narrative of Thucydides, which proves, that inſtead of compelling reluctance, there was occaſion to repreſs forwardneſs, to embark.

feſtival

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festival of Adonis, an ancient and melancholy rite, which inauspiciously returned a few days preceding the embarkation. During this dreary ceremony, the streets of Athens were crowded with spectres clothed in funeral robes; the spacious domes and temples resounded with lugubrious cries; while the Grecian matrons, marching in slow procession, tore their dishevelled hair, beat their naked bosoms, and lamented in mournful strains the untimely death of the lover, and beloved favourite of Venus [19].

The armament sails from Athens;

When the appointed day arrived, the whole inhabitants of Athens, whether citizens or strangers, assembled early in the Piræus, to admire the greatest armament ever collected in a Grecian harbour. An hundred gallies were adorned with all the splendour of naval pomp: the troops destined to embark, vied with each other in the elegance of their dress and the brightness of their arms: the alacrity painted in every face, and the magnificence displayed with profusion in every part of the equipage, represented a triumphal show, rather than the stern image of war. But the solidity and greatness of the armament proved that it was intended for use, not for ostentation. Amidst this glare of external pageantry which accompanied the adventurous youth, their friends and kinsmen could not suppress a few parting tears, when they considered the length of the voyage, the various dangers by flood and field, and the uncertainty of beholding

[19] Plut. in Nic. & Alcibiad.

again

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again the deareſt pledges of their affections. But theſe partial expreſſions of grief were ſpeedily interrupted by the animating ſounds of the trumpet, which iſſued at once from an hundred ſhips, and provoked ſympathetic acclamations from the ſhore. The captains then offered ſolemn prayers to the gods, which were anſwered by correſponding vows from the ſpectators: the cuſtomary libations were poured out in goblets of gold and ſilver; and, after the triumphant Pæan had been ſung in full chorus, the whole fleet at once ſet ſail, and contended for the prize of naval ſkill and celerity, until they reached the lofty ſhores of Ægina, from whence they enjoyed a proſperous navigation to the rendezvous of their confederates at Corcyra [20].

is reviewed at Corcyra.

At Corcyra the commanders reviewed the ſtrength of the armament, which conſiſted of an hundred and thirty-four ſhips of war, with a proportional number of tranſports and tenders. The heavy-armed troops, exceeding five thouſand, were attended with a competent body of ſlingers and archers. The army, abundantly provided in every other article, was extremely deficient in horſes, which amounted to no more than thirty. But, at a moderate computation, we may eſtimate the whole military and naval ſtrength, including ſlaves and ſervants, at twenty thouſand men.

The Athenians ſail along the coaſt of Italy.

With this powerful hoſt, had the Athenians at once ſurpriſed and aſſailed the unprepared ſecurity of Syracuſe, the expedition, however adventurous

[20] Thucydid. l. vi. p. 432, & ſeqq. Plut. in Nicia. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 334.

and

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and imprudent, might, perhaps, have been crowned with ſucceſs. But the timid mariners of Greece would have trembled at the propoſal of truſting ſuch a numerous fleet on the broad expanſe of the Ionian ſea. They determined to croſs the narroweſt paſſage between Italy and Sicily, after coaſting along the eaſtern ſhores of the former, until they reached the Strait of Meſſina. That this deſign might be executed with the greater ſafety, they diſpatched three light veſſels to examine the diſpoſition of the Italian cities, and to ſolicit admiſſion into their harbours. The greateſt part of Magna Græcia had, indeed, been peopled by Dorians naturally hoſtile to Athens. But from one Italian city the Athenians had reaſon to expect a very favourable reception. The effeminate Sybaris had been demoliſhed, as related above [21], by the warlike inhabitants of Crotona, about the time that the Athenians, growing more powerful than their neighbours, began to ſeize every opportunity to extend their colonies and their dominion. Governed by ſuch principles, they could not long overlook the happy ſituation of Sybaris, near to which they early formed an eſtabliſhment that aſſumed the name of Thurium, from a ſalubrious fountain of freſh water [22]; and the colony was increaſed by a numerous ſupply of emigrants, who, under Athenian leaders, ſailed from Greece thirteen years before the Peloponneſian war [23].

[21] P. 53.

[22] Ονομασαν απο της κρηνης θουριον. Diodor. l. xii. p. 295.

[23] Suid. ad voc. Lyſias.

The

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The armament at Corcyra, whatever jealouſy its power might create in other cities, was entitled to the gratitude of Thurium; preſuming on which, the commanders, without waiting the return of the advice-boats, ordered the fleet to proceed, in three diviſions, to the Italian coaſt. But neither the ties of conſanguinity, nor the duties acknowledged by colonies towards their parent ſtate, could prevail on the ſuſpicious Thurians to open their gates to the Athenians, even to furniſh them with a market. The towns of Tarentum and Locris prohibited them the uſe of their harbours, and refuſed to ſupply them with water; and they coaſted the whole extent of the ſhore, from the promontory of Iapygium to that of Rhegium, before any one city would allow them to purchaſe the commodities of which they were in want. The magiſtrates of Rhegium granted this favour, but they granted nothing more; notwithſtanding the earneſt ſolicitations of Alcibiades and his colleagues, who exhorted them, as a colony of Eubœa, to aſſiſt their brethren of Leontium, whoſe republic the Athenians had determined to re-eſtabliſh and to defend [24].

Are regarded with ſuſpicion by the Italian cities.

Rhegium alone ſupplies them with a market.

While the armament continued at Rhegium, they were informed by veſſels which had been purpoſely diſpatched from Corcyra, that the Ægeſteans, notwithſtanding the boaſted accounts lately given of their riches, poſſeſſed only thirty talents in their treaſury. This diſagreeable intelligence, together

They are informed of the artifice of the Ægeſteans.

[24] Thucydid. p. 443.

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with the diſappointment of aſſiſtance from any Italian city, occaſioned a council of war, to conſider what meaſures ought to be purſued in the Sicilian expedition. It was the opinion of Nicias, "that the Ægeſteans ought to be furniſhed with that proportion of ſhips only, the charges of which they were able to defray; and that the Athenian fleet having ſettled, either by arms or by perſuaſion, the quarrels between them and their neighbours, ſhould return to their own harbours, after ſailing along the coaſt of Sicilly, and diſplaying to the inhabitants of that iſland both their inclination and their power to protect the weakneſs of their allies."

They deliberate on the mode of carrying on the war.

Alcibiades declared, "That it would be ſhameful and ignominious to diſſolve ſuch a powerful armament, without performing ſome exploit worthy the renown of the republic; that, by the proſpect of immediate and effectual ſupport, the inferior cities might eaſily be alienated from their reluctant confederacy with Selinus and Syracuſe; after which, the war ought to be carried on with the utmoſt vigour againſt thoſe republics, unleſs they re-eſtabliſhed the Leontines in their territory, and gave complete ſatisfaction to the injured Ægeſteans."

Lamachus not only approved the active counſels of Alcibiades, but propoſed a meaſure ſtill more enterpriſing. "The Athenians ought not to waſte time in unimportant objects. Inſtead of ſtriking at the extremities, they ought to aſſault at once the heart and ſtrength of the enemy. If they immediately attacked Syracuſe, it would not only be the

Judicious advice of Lamachus.

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the firſt, but the laſt city, which they would have occaſion to beſiege. Nor could the attempt fail, if undertaken without delay, before the Syracuſans had time to recollect themſelves, and to provide for their own defence; and while the Athenian troops, as yet undaunted by any check, enjoyed unbroken courage and blooming hopes."

This advice, which does equal honour to the ſpirit and good ſenſe of Lamachus, was rejected by the timidity of Nicias, and probably by the vanity of Alcibiades. The latter perceived a flattering opportunity of exhauſting all the reſources of his eloquence and intrigue to get poſſeſſion of the dependent cities, before he illuſtrated the glory of his arms in the ſiege of Syracuſe. The fleet ſailed from Rhegium to execute *his* plan, which was adopted by his colleagues, as forming the middle between the extremes of their reſpective opinions. A conſiderable detachment was ſent to examine the preparations and the ſtrength of Syracuſe, and to proclaim liberty, and offer protection, to all the captives and ſtrangers confined within its walls. is rejected.

With another detachment Alcibiades ſailed to Naxos, and perſuaded the inhabitants to accept the alliance of Athens. The remainder of the armament proceeded to Catana, which refuſed to admit the ſhips into the harbour, or the troops into the city. But on the arrival of Alcibiades, the Catanæans allowed him to addreſs the aſſembly, and propoſe his demands. The artful Athenian tranſported the populace, and even the magiſtrates Alcibiades takes Catana by ſtratagem.

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themſelves, by the harmony and force of his eloquence; the citizens flocked from every quarter, to hear a diſcourſe which was purpoſely protracted for ſeveral hours; the ſoldiers forſook their poſts; and the enemy, who had prepared to avail themſelves of this negligence, burſt through the unguarded gates, and became maſters of the city. Thoſe of the Cataneans who were moſt attached to the intereſts of Syracuſe, fortunately eſcaped death by the celerity of their flight. The reſt accepted the proffered friendſhip of the Athenians. This ſucceſs would probably have been followed by the ſurrender of Meſſené, which Alcibiades had filled with diſtruſt and ſedition. But when the plot was ripe for execution[25], the man who had contrived, and who alone could conduct it, was diſqualified from ſerving his country. The arrival of the Salaminian galley recalled Alcibiades to Athens, that he might ſtand trial for his life.

His intrigues in Meſſené.

He is unſeaſonably recalled to Athens.

It would be improper to ſuſpend the courſe of an intereſting narrative, by deſcribing the cauſes and circumſtances of this unexpected event, if they were not immediately connected with the ſubſequent hiſtory of the Sicilian expedition, and with the future fortune of the Athenians, who, after engaging, by the advice of one man, in the moſt

[25] Thucydides ſays, "When Alcibiades knew that he ſhould be baniſhed, he betrayed his accomplices, to the party favourable to Syracuſe, who immediately put them to death." Thucydid. p. 462. We ſhall ſee hereafter ſtill more fatal conſequences of his reſentment againſt his country. But nothing can more ſtrongly atteſt the turpitude of his character.

romantic

romantic ſchemes of conqueſt which the madneſs of ambition had ever dared to entertain, injudiciouſly arreſted the activity of that man in the execution of ſuch extraordinary deſigns, as offered no chance of ſucceſs but in the wonderful reſources of his ſingular and eccentric genius. It happened, that on the night preceding the intended navigation to Sicily, all the ſtatues of Mercury, which had been erected in the Athenian ſtreets, as the boundaries of different edifices and tenements, were thrown down, broken, and defaced. One only image of the god, of uncommon ſize and beauty, was ſaved from the general wreck; it was afterwards called the ſtatue of Andocides, as it ſtood before the houſe of the Athenian orator of that name. This daring inſult was firſt aſcribed to the wicked artifices of the Corinthians, who, it was ſuppoſed, might employ ſuch an abominable and ſacrilegious contrivance, to deter the Athenian armament from ſailing againſt their colony and kinſmen of Syracuſe. But the enemies of Alcibiades availed themſelves of the impious levity [26] of his character, to direct the popular ſtorm againſt the head of their deteſted foe. On the evidence of ſlaves, he

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The cauſe of his recal.

[26] Democritus, the chief promoter of the Atomic philoſophy, was younger than Anaxagoras, and elder than Socrates. His ſcholars, Diagoras and Protagoras, propagated his wild ſyſtem at Athens, towards the commencement of the Peloponneſian war. Whether Alcibiades embraced the barren doctrines of that miſerable ſect, or adhered to the divine philoſophy of his maſter Socrates, or, more probably, fluctuated between them, he muſt, in all caſes alike, have been obnoxious to the ſuſpicion of impiety. Comp. Strabo, l. lxv. p. 703. Sext. Empiric. l. lix. 11. Laert. l. ii. in Democrit. Socrat. & Protag.

CHAP. was accuſed of having treated, with rude familiarity, other adored images of the gods; and Theſſalus, the degenerate ſon of the magnanimous Cimon, impeached him of impiety towards the goddeſſes Ceres and Proſerpine, whoſe awful ceremonies he had polluted and profaned; aſſuming, though uninitiated, the names and robes of the high-prieſt, callying Polytion (in whoſe houſe this ſcandalous ſcene had been repreſented) the torch-bearer, Theodorus the herald, and treating his other licentious companions as ſacred brethren and holy miniſters of thoſe myſterious rites [27].

He is charged with impiety and treaſon. Olymp. xci. 2. A. C. 415.

Such an atrocious accuſation alarmed the terrors of the Athenians; one aſſembly was ſummoned after another; and the panic became the more general, when it was underſtood that, during the ſame night in which the ſtatues had been mutilated, a body of Peloponneſian troops had marched towards the iſthmus of Corinth. In the confuſed imagination of the vulgar, it was poſſible to unite the incompatible intereſts of ſuperſtition and of freedom; and they were perſuaded by Androcles, and other artful demagogues, that the profanation of the myſteries, the defacing of the ſtatues of Mercury, the movement of the Peloponneſian troops, all announced a conſpiracy to demoliſh the eſtabliſhed form of popular government, the ſafety of which had, ever ſince the expulſion of the Piſiſtratidæ, formed an object of univerſal and moſt anxious ſolicitude.

[97] Plutarch. in Alcibiad.

Alcibi-

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The artifices of his accuſers.

Alcibiades defended himſelf, with his uſual eloquence and addreſs, againſt the malignity of a charge, unſupported by any adequate evidence. The ſoldiers and ſailors, whoſe eagerneſs already graſped the conqueſt of Sicily, interceded for the deliverance of their commander, whom they regarded as the ſoul of that glorious enterpriſe. A thouſand Argives and Mantinæans, who had enliſted, on this occaſion, under the Athenian banners, declared their unwillingneſs to ſail, unleſs they were accompanied by Alcibiades, whoſe valour and abilities alone had determined them to engage in ſuch an important, but dangerous ſervice. This powerful combination in his favour diſappointed the preſent hopes, without diſconcerting the future meaſures of his enemies. They perceived that, were he brought to an immediate trial, it would be impoſſible to obtain ſentence againſt him; but that, were his perſon and influence removed to a diſtance from Athens, every thing might be hoped from the weakneſs, inconſtancy, and credulity of the populace. It was therefore determined by this perfidious cabal, that ſuch orators as had hitherto diſguiſed, under the mask of friendſhip or admiration, their envy and hatred of Alcibiades, ſhould declare in full aſſembly, "that it would be inconſiſtent with the cleareſt dictates of prudence and propriety, to involve in the tedious formalities of a judicial procedure, a citizen who had been elected general by the unanimous ſuffrage of his country, and whoſe preſence was eagerly demanded by the affectionate ardour

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of his troops. The charges againſt him deſerved, doubtleſs, to be ſeriouſly examined; but the preſent was not a proper time for ſuch an inveſtigation, which muſt blunt the courage of his followers, and interrupt the ſervice of the republic. Let him ſail, therefore, for Sicily, and at his return home he will either vindicate his innocence, or ſuffer the puniſhment of his guilt." Alcibiades perceived the poiſon concealed under this affected lenity, and teſtified his reluctance to leave behind him ſuch abundant materials for the malice of informers. But his petition for an immediate trial was rejected by the aſſembly. He therefore ſet ſail, probably flattering himſelf, that by the glory and ſucceſs of his arms, he would ſilence the clamours, at leaſt defeat the machinations of his accuſers.

Favoured by popular deluſion.

But this expectation was unfortunately diſappointed. In a republican government, it is not more eaſy to excite, than it is difficult to appeaſe, the fermentation of public diſcontents, eſpecially if occaſioned by any real or pretended diminution of freedom. The removal of Alcibiades gave full ſcope to the ebullitions of popular frenzy. The Athenians were continually aſſembled to enquire into the violation of the ſtatues. Many reſpectable citizens were ſeized on ſuſpicion, becauſe they had, on former occaſions, diſcovered principles hoſtile to the wild extravagance of democracy. Others were impriſoned on the evidence of Teucer, an obſcure ſtranger, and Diopeithes, a calumnious demagogue. The violence of the public diſorder opened a door to private vengeance. Every individual

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vidual was desirous to see his personal enemies among the number of state criminals: and his resentment was invited falsely to accuse them, by an injudicious decree of the assembly, offering high rewards to those who should denounce the guilty, and even to the guilty themselves, who should denounce their associates.

Alcibiades escapes to Sparta. Olymp. xci. 2. A. C. 415

Among the persons who had been seized on suspicion, was the crafty and intriguing Timæus, and the profligate and impious Andocides, the fame whose statue of Mercury had escaped the general mutilation. The known character of these men naturally marked them out as peculiar victims of popular fury. As they were confined in the same prison, they had an opportunity of communicating their apprehensions, and of contriving means of safety. Timæus persuaded his friend (for the ties of common danger create between knaves a temporary friendship), that it would be weakness to die by a false accusation, when he might save himself by a lie. Andocides turned informer. The prisoners whom he named were banished or put to death. The rest were set at liberty. The absent, among whom was Alcibiades, were recalled to stand trial. But they did not obey the summons sent them by the Salaminian galley. The wanderings and misfortunes of more obscure names are unknown. Alcibiades escaped to Thurium, and afterwards to Argos; and when he understood that the Athenians had set a price on his head, he finally took refuge in Sparta; where his active genius seized the

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the firſt opportunity to adviſe and promote thoſe fatal meaſures, which, while they gratified his private reſentment, occaſioned the ruin of his country [28].

Languid operations in Sicily.

The removal of Alcibiades ſoon appeared in the languid operations of the Athenian armament. The cautious timidity of Nicias, ſupported by wealth, eloquence and authority, gained an abſolute aſcendant over the more warlike and enterpriſing character of Lamachus, whoſe poverty expoſed him to contempt. Inſtead of making a bold impreſſion on Selinus or Syracuſe, Nicias contented himſelf with taking poſſeſſion of the unimportant colony of Hyccara. He ravaged, or laid under contribution ſome places of ſmaller note, and obtained thirty talents from the Ægeſteans, which, added to the ſale of the booty, furniſhed about thirty thouſand pounds ſterling [29], a ſum that might be uſefully employed in the proſecution of an expenſive war. But this advantage did not compenſate for the courage inſpired into the Syracuſans by delay, and for the diſhonour ſuſtained by the Athenian troops, in their unſucceſsful attempts againſt Hybla and Himera, as well as for their dejection at being confined, during the greateſt part

[28] Plut. in Alcibiad. & Iſocrates, and Lyſias, in the Orations for and againſt the ſon of Alcibiades. Several facts and circumſtances are differently repreſented in the orations of Andocides; but that orator was a party concerned, and his miſrepreſentation of the beſt atteſted facts leaves him no credit in thoſe that are more doubtful.

[29] Thirty talents from the Ægeſteans, amount to - £ 5,812
The ſale of ſlaves, &c. - - - - - 23,250
Sum £ 29,062

op

of

of the ſummer, in the inactive quarters of Naxos and Catana. CHAP. XIX.

The impatience of the Athenians murmured againſt theſe dilatory and ignoble proceedings, which appeared altogether unſuited to the greatneſs of their armament, the generous ſpirit with which they felt themſelves animated, and the ancient glory of the republic. Nicias, reſiſting the wary dictates of his own fear or foreſight, determined to gratify the inclination of his troops, by the vigour of his winter campaign. The conqueſt of Syracuſe, againſt which he intended to lead them, might well excite the emulation of the combatants, ſince that powerful city formed the main obſtacle to their ambition, and the principal bulwark not only of Sicily, but of the Italian and African ſhores. Nicias determines to attack Syracuſe.

Ancient Syracuſe, of which the ruined grandeur is ſtill worthy of regard, was ſituate on a ſpacious promontory, waſhed on three ſides by the ſea, and defended on the weſt by abrupt and almoſt inacceſſible mountains. The town was built in a triangular form, whoſe ſummit may be conceived at the lofty mountains Epipolé. Adjacent to theſe natural fortifications, the weſtern or inland diviſion of the city was diſtinguiſhed by the name of Tycha, or Fortune, being adorned by a magnificent temple of that flattering divinity. The triangle gradually widening towards the baſe, comprehended the vaſt extent of Achradina, reaching from the northern ſhore of the promontory to the ſouthern iſland Ortygia. This ſmall iſland, compoſing the whole of modern Syracuſe, formed but the Deſcription of the city.

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third and leaſt extenſive diviſion of the ancient; which was fortified by walls eighteen miles in circuit, enriched by a triple harbour, and peopled by above two hundred thouſand warlike citizens, or induſtrious ſlaves [30].

Temper of the Syracuſans.

When the Syracuſans heard the firſt rumours of the Athenian invaſion, they deſpiſed, or affected to deſpiſe them, as idle lies invented to amuſe the ignorance of the populace. The hoſtile armament had arrived at Rhegium before they could be perſuaded, by the wiſdom of Hermocrates, to provide againſt a danger which their preſumption painted as imaginary. But when they received undoubted intelligence that the enemy had reached the Italian coaſt; when they beheld his numerous fleet commanding the ſea of Sicily, and ready to make a deſcent on their defenceleſs iſland, they were ſeized with a degree of juſt terror and alarm proportional to their falſe ſecurity. They condemned their former incredulity and indifference, which had been nouriſhed by the intereſted adulation of the demagogue Athenagoras, who vainly aſſured them that the ſtrength of Syracuſe was ſufficient not only to defy the aſſaults, but to reſtrain the attempts, of any Grecian foe. From the heights of preſumption, they plunged into the depths of deſpair, and their ſpirits were, with difficulty, reſtored by the animating voice of Hermocrates, who was not more prudent in proſperity than intrepid in danger [31].

[30] Strabo, p. 266, & ſeqq. & Thucydid. paſſim. l. vi.

[31] Thucydid. p. 436, & ſeqq.

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By *his* exhortations they were encouraged to make ready their arms, to equip their fleet, to ſtrengthen their garriſons, and to ſummon the aſſiſtance of their allies. Theſe meaſures were undertaken with ardour, and carried on with unremitting activity; and the dilatory operations of the enemy not only removed the recent terror and trepidation of the Syracuſans, but inſpired them with unuſual firmneſs. They requeſted the generals, whom they had appointed to the number of fifteen, to lead them to Catana, that they might attack the hoſtile camp. Their cavalry haraſſed the Athenians by frequent incurſions, beat up their quarters, intercepted their convoys, deſtroyed their advanced poſts, and even proceeded ſo near to the main body, that they were diſtinctly heard demanding with loud inſults, Whether thoſe boaſted lords of Greece had left their native country, that they might form a precarious ſettlement at the foot of Mount Ætna[32]?

They inſult the Athenians.

Provoked by theſe indignities, and excited by the impatient reſentment of his own troops, Nicias was ſtill reſtrained from an open attack on Syracuſe by the difficulties attending that enterpriſe. The diſtance between Catana and the Sicilian capital was more than thirty miles; but, after the moſt proſperous voyage, the Athenians could not expect, without extreme danger, to make a

Stratagem of Nicias for getting poſſeſſion of Syracuſe.

[32] Plutarch. The ſneer is differently expreſſed in Thucydides; "Whether they had not come to gain a ſettlement for themſelves in a *foreign* country, rather than to replace the Leontines in *their own*?" Thucydid. p. 455.

deſcent

CHAP. XIX. deſcent on the fortified coaſt of a powerful and vigilant enemy. If they determined to march by land, they muſt be haraſſed by the numerous cavalry of Syracuſe, which actually watched their motions, and with whoſe activity, in a broken and intricate country, the ſtrength of heavy-armed troops was exceedingly ill-qualified to contend. To avoid both inconveniences, Nicias employed a ſtratagem. A citizen of Catana, whoſe ſubtle and daring genius, prepared alike to die or to deceive, ought to have preſerved his name from oblivion, appeared in Syracuſe as a deſerter from his native city; the unhappy fate of which, in being ſubjected to the imperious commands, or licentious diſorder of the Athenians, he lamented with perfidious tears, and with the plaintive accents of well-diſſembled ſorrow. "*He* was not the only man who bewailed, with filial compaſſion, the misfortunes and ignominy of his country. A numerous body of Cataneans, whoſe reſentment was repreſſed by fear, longed to take up arms, that they might deliver themſelves from a diſgraceful yoke, and puniſh the cruel tyranny of the invaders. Nor could the deſign fail of ſucceſs, if Syracuſe ſhould ſecond their generous ardour. The Athenians, ſo liberally endowed with courage and ambition, were deſtitute of wiſdom and of diſcipline. They ſpurned the reſtraints of a military life; their poſts were forſaken, their ſhips unguarded; they diſdained the duties of the camp, and indulged in the pleaſures of the city. On an appointed day it would be eaſy for the Syracuſans, aſſiſted by the con-

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conſpirators of Catana, to attack them unprepared, to mount their undefended ramparts, to demoliſh their encampment, and to burn their fleet." This daring propoſal well correſponded with the keen ſentiments of revenge which animated the inhabitants of Syracuſe. The day was named; the plan of the enterpriſe was concerted, and the treacherous Catanean returned home to revive the hopes, and to confirm the reſolution, of his pretended aſſociates.

Fails through the activity of the Syracuſans.

The ſucceſs of this intrigue gave the utmoſt ſatisfaction to Nicias, whoſe armament prepared to ſail for Syracuſe on the day appointed by the inhabitants of that city for aſſaulting, with their whole force, the Athenian camp. Already had they marched with this view, to the fertile plain of Leontium, when, after twelve hours ſail, the Athenian fleet arrived in the great harbour, diſembarked their troops, and fortified a camp without the weſtern wall, near to the celebrated temple of Olympian Jupiter; a ſituation which had been pointed out by ſome Syracuſan exiles, and which was well adapted to every purpoſe of accommodation and defence. Meanwhile the cavalry of Syracuſe, proceeding to the walls of Catana, had diſcovered, to their infinite regret, the departure of the Athenians. The unwelcome intelligence was conveyed, with the utmoſt expedition, to the infantry, who immediately marched back to protect Syracuſe. The rapid return of the warlike youth reſtored the courage of the aged Syracuſans. They were joined by the forces of Gela, Selinus,

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Selinus, and Camarina; and it was determined, without loſs of time, to attack the hoſtile encampment[33].

Nicias defeats the Syracuſans in a battle. Olymp. xci. 2. A. C. 415.

Only a few days elapſed before the Athenians gave them a fairer opportunity of revenge. The two armies prepared to engage, reſpectively inflamed by reſentment and ambition; the one formidable from courage and numbers, the other elated by ſuperior diſcipline and habitual victory. The Syracuſan generals drew up their troops, ſixteen, and the Athenians only eight, deep: but the latter had, in their camp, a body of reſerve, which was kept ready for action on the firſt ſignal. Nicias went round the ranks, exhorting his ſoldiers by a ſhort diſcourſe, in which he obſerved, "that the ſtrength of their preſent preparations was better fitted to inſpire confidence, than the moſt eloquent ſpeech with a weak army, eſpecially as they contended againſt the Syracuſans, a promiſcuous crowd, whoſe preſumption was founded on inexperience, and whoſe deſultorious ardour, however ſucceſsful in predatory incurſions, would yield to the firſt ſhock of regular war. They fought, indeed, in defence of their city; ſo did the Athenians and their allies, whom nothing but military valour and ſucceſs could reſtore in ſafety to their reſpective countries[34]." Having thus ſpoken, he led his troops to the enemy, who did not decline the engagement. The light-armed archers[35] ſkirmiſhed

[33] Thucydid. p. 445—457.

[34] Thucydid. p. 458 & 459.

[35] Thucydides mentions, beſides the archers (τοξοται), the λιθοβολοι and σφενδονηται, "the throwers of ſtones and ſlingers." P. 449. They were all ψιλοι, as he ſays immediately below.

in

in the van: the prieſts brought forth the accuſtomed ſacrifices: the trumpets ſummoned for a general charge. CHAP. XIX.

The attack was begun with fury, and continued with perſeverance for ſeveral hours. Both ſides were animated by every principle that can inſpire and urge the utmoſt vigour of exertion, and victory was ſtill doubtful, when a tempeſt ſuddenly aroſe, accompanied with unuſual peals of thunder. This event, which little affected the Athenians, confounded the unexperienced credulity of the enemy, who were broken and put to flight. Nicias reſtrained the eagerneſs of his men in the purſuit, leſt they ſhould be expoſed to danger from a body of twelve hundred Syracuſan cavalry, who had not engaged in the battle, but who impatiently watched an opportunity to aſſault the diſordered phalanx. The Syracuſans eſcaped to their city, and the Athenians returned to their camp. In ſuch an obſtinate conflict, the vanquiſhed loſt two hundred and ſixty, the victors only fifty men; numbers that might occaſion much ſurpriſe, if we reflected not that, to oppoſe the offenſive weapons uſed by antiquity, the warriors of Greece (in every circumſtance ſo unlike the miſerable and naked peaſants of modern Europe, whoſe lives are ſacrificed without defence, as without remorſe, to the ambition of men whom the Greeks would have ſtyled tyrants) being armed with the helmet and cuiraſs, the ample buckler, the firm corſelet, and the manly greaves, they often diſplayed their ſkill, their courage, and their love of liberty, at a very ſmall expence of human blood.

Cauſe of their defeat.

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The Athenians return to Catana and Naxos.

The voyage, the encampment, and the battle, employed the dangerous activity, and gratified the impetuous order of the Athenians, but did not facilitate the conqueſt of Syracuſe. Without more powerful preparations, Nicias deſpaired of taking the place, either by aſſault, or by a regular ſiege. Soon after his victory, he returned with the whole armament to Naxos and Catana; a meaſure which ſufficiently proves that the late enterpriſe had been undertaken, not in conſequence of any permanent ſyſtem of operations formed by the general, but in compliance with the ungovernable [36] temper of his troops, whoſe principles of military ſubordination were confined to the field of battle.

[36] Without attending to this circumſtance, the conduct of Grecian Generals muſt, on many occaſions, appear altogether unaccountable. The ſame obſervation applies to modern hiſtory preceding the peace of Munſter. The famous war of thirty years, which ended at that peace, laid the great foundation for the exact military ſubordination which diſtinguiſhes the preſent century. See Pere Bougeant, Hiſtoire de la Guerre de 30 Ans.

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Preparations for the enſuing Campaign.—The Athenians begin the Siege with Vigour.—Diſtreſs and Sedition in Syracuſe.—Arrival of Gylippus—who defeats the Athenians.—Tranſactions in Greece:—A ſecond Armament arrives at Syracuſe.—Its firſt Operations ſucceſsful.—The Athenians defeated:—Prepare to raiſe the Siege.—Naval Engagement in the Great Harbour.—Deſpondency of the Athenians.—Stratagem of Hermocrates.—The Athenians raiſe their camp.—Melancholy Firmneſs of Nicias.—Demoſthenes capitulates.—Nicias ſurrenders.—Cruel Treatment of the Athenian Captives.—Singular Exception.

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Nicias prepares for the enſuing campaign. An. 2. A. C. 416.

NICIAS had reaſon to hope that his victory over the Syracuſans would procure him reſpect and aſſiſtance from the inferior ſtates of Sicily. His emiſſaries were diffuſed over that iſland and the neighbouring coaſt of Italy. Meſſengers were ſent to Tuſcany, where Piſa and other cities had been founded by Greek colonies [1]. An embaſſy was diſpatched to Carthage, the rival and enemy of Syracuſe. Nicias gave orders to collect materials for circumvallation; iron, bricks, and all neceſſary ſtores. He demanded horſes

[1] Strabo, p. 243, & p. 285, & ſeqq.

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from the Ægeſteans; and required from Athens reinforcements, and a large pecuniary ſupply; neglecting nothing that might enable him to open the enſuing campaign with vigour and effect [2].

The Syracuſans prepare for defence.

While the Athenians thus prepared for the attack of Syracuſe, the citizens of that capital diſplayed equal activity in providing for their own defence. By the advice of Hermocrates, they appointed *himſelf*, Heraclides, and Sicanus; three. inſtead of fifteen generals. The commanders newly elected, both in civil and military affairs, were inveſted with unlimited power, which was uſefully employed to purchaſe or prepare arms, daily to exerciſe the troops, and to ſtrengthen and extend the fortifications of Syracuſe. They likewiſe diſpatched ambaſſadors to the numerous cities and republics with which they had been connected in peace, or allied in war, to ſolicit the continuance of their friendſhip, and to counteract the dangerous deſigns of the Athenians.

both parties court the friendſhip of the Camerineans. Olymp. xci. 2. A. C. 415.

The importance of the city Camerina, ſituate on the ſouthern coaſt of Sicily, demanded the preſence of Hermocrates himſelf. The Camerineans had given a very feeble and reluctant aſſiſtance to their allies of Syracuſe; and the orator Euphemus employed all the weight of his abilities to unite

[2] It is remarkable, that though Nicias, after the removal of Alcibiades, enjoyed the principal, or rather ſole command of the army, he acted quite contrary to the opinion which he had declared at the commencement of the expedition. The plan which he purſued was that of Alcibiades, not his own: the views of the baniſhed general ſtill actuated the army; but the ardent ſpirit was withdrawn, that could alone afford the hope of ſucceſs.

them

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them to the Athenian confederacy. An aſſembly being ſummoned, Hermocrates informed them, "That a deſire to prevent the deception of the Camerineans, not the dread of the Athenian power, had occaſioned his preſent journey. That reſtleſs and ambitious nation, which had ſo often kindled the flames of war on the continent of Greece, had lately failed to Sicily, under pretence of re-eſtabliſhing the affairs of the Leontines and Ægeſteans, but from motives far more ſelfiſh, which it was eaſy to conjecture and impoſſible to miſtake. Their real and principal deſign was to ſow diſſenſion and diſagreement among the Sicilian ſtates, which, fighting ſingly, might be ſucceſſively ſubdued. How could effrontery affirm, or ſimplicity believe, that the Athenians ſhould undertake a voyage to vindicate the freedom of Ægeſta; they who oppreſſed, with all the rigours of ſlavery, the unhappy iſlanders of Eubœa, by whom Ægeſta had been built, and from whom its inhabitants were deſcended! Under pretence of delivering from the tyranny of the Great King, the Greeks of Aſia, of the Helleſpont, of Thrace, and of the Ægæan, they had conquered and enſlaved thoſe various countries. They actually employed the ſame perfidious contrivance againſt the ſafety of the Sicilians; but he truſted that their preſent undertaking, though carried on with equal artifice, would be attended with very different ſucceſs; and that they would learn by fatal experience, to diſtinguiſh between the effeminate Ionians and Helleſpontines, whoſe minds had been enfeebled and debaſed by the Perſian yoke, and the magna-

Arguments of the Syracuſans.

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nimous Dorians of Sicily, the genuine offspring of Peloponneſus, the ſource of valour and of liberty [3]."

Of the Athenians.

Euphemus, the Athenian, repelled with force and ſpirit, theſe reproachful accuſations. "The colonies of Athens were kept in a dependence, not leſs advantageous to themſelves than honourable to the parent ſtate. The general intereſt of Greece required that the ſame republic which at firſt had ſo bravely eſtabliſhed, ſhould ſtill continue to maintain, the national independence. They who afford protection, muſt aſſume authority; but this authority the Athenians had exerted in a manner eſſential to their own and to the public ſafety. If they had ſubjected the neighbouring coaſts and iſlands, their *intereſt* might juſtify that odious but neceſſary meaſure; and the ſame dictates of ſound policy which induced them to conquer and to enſlave the Helleſpontine and Aſiatic Greeks, would engage them to emancipate and to deliver the oppreſſed Sicilians. To this office they were invited by the Leontines and Ægeſtæans; to this duty they were prompted by the ties of friendſhip and conſanguinity: to this enterpriſe they were determined by the ſtrongeſt of all motives, a well-grounded fear leſt the inhabitants of Sicily (whoſe numbers and diſtance rendered it impoſſible for Athens to ſubdue, far leſs to retain them in ſubjection) ſhould fall a prey to the watchful encroachments of Syracuſe, and thus become an acceſſion to the Peloponneſian confederacy." The Camerineans dreaded

3 Thucydid. l. vi. p. 463, & ſeqq.

the

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the diſtant ambition of Athens, but dreaded ſtill more the neighbouring hoſtility of Syracuſe. Their fears dictated a reply in friendly and reſpectful terms; but they craved leave to preſerve a neutrality between the contending powers, hoping by this expedient, to divert the reſentment of either, yet to defeat the deſigns of both.

The Camerineans determine to obſerve neutrality.

Meanwhile the expected reinforcements arrived from Athens. In addition to his original force, Nicias had likewiſe collected a body of ſix hundred cavalry, and the ſum of four hundred talents; and, in the eighteenth ſummer of the war, the activity of the troops and workmen had completed all neceſſary preparations for undertaking the ſiege of Syracuſe. The Athenian armament enjoyed a proſperous voyage to the northern harbour of Trogilé, and the troops were no ſooner diſembarked than they ſeized an opportunity for ſignaliſing their valour againſt a body of ſeven hundred men, who marched to reinforce the garriſon of Labdalus; an important fortreſs ſituate on the higheſt of the mountains which overlook and command the city. Three hundred Syracuſans were killed in the purſuit; the reſt took refuge behind their walls; the caſtle of Labdalus was taken, and ſtrongly guarded by the victors. The plan which Nicias embraced for conquering the city, was to draw a wall on either ſide from the neighbourhood of Labdalus, towards the port of Trogilé on the north, and towards a bay two leagues in circumference, juſtly called the Great Harbour, on the ſouth. When theſe circumvallations had ſurrounded the place

The Athenians are reinforced, and begin the ſiege with vigour. Olymp. xci. 3. A. C. 414.

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by land, he expected, by his numerous fleet, to block up the wide extent of the Syracuſan harbours. The whole ſtrength of the Athenian armament was vigorouſly directed to this ſervice; and, as all neceſſary materials had been provided with due attention, the works roſe with a rapidity which ſurpriſed and terrified the beſieged. Their former, as well as their recent defeat, deterred them from oppoſing the enemy in a general engagement; but the advice of Hermocrates perſuaded them to raiſe walls, which might traverſe and interrupt thoſe of the Athenians[4]. The imminent danger urged the activity of the workmen; the hoſtile bulwarks approached each other; frequent ſkirmiſhes enſued, in one of which the brave Lamachus unfortunately fell a victim to his raſh valour[5]; but the Athenian troops maintained their uſual ſuperiority.

Diſtreſs and ſedition in Syracuſe.

Encouraged by ſucceſs, Nicias puſhed the enemy with vigour. The Syracuſans loſt hopes of defending their new works, or of preventing the complete circumvallation of their city; and this deſpair was encreaſed by the abundant ſupplies which arrived from all quarters to the beſiegers, while the intereſt of Syracuſe ſeemed to be univerſally abandoned by the indifference or cowardice of her allies. In the turbulent democracies of Greece, the moment of public danger commonly gave the ſignal for domeſtic ſedition. The populace clamoured with their uſual licentiouſneſs, againſt the incapacity or perfidy of their leaders, to whom

[4] Thucydid. l. vi. p. 482, & ſeqq. [5] Plutarch. in Nicia.

alone

alone they aſcribed their miſfortunes. New generals were named in the room of Hermocrates and his colleagues; and this injudicious change increaſed the calamities of Syracuſe, which at length prepared to capitulate[6]. CHAP. XX.

The Syracuſans unexpectedly relieved by their Peloponneſian allies. Olymp. xci 3 A. C. 414.

While the aſſembly deliberated concerning the execution of a meaſure, which, however diſgraceful, was declared to be neceſſary, a Corinthian galley, commanded by Gongylus, entered the central harbour of Ortygia, which being ſtrongly fortified, and penetrating into the heart of the city, ſerved as the principal and moſt ſecure ſtation for the Syracuſan fleet. The news immediately reached the aſſembly, and all ranks of men eagerly crowded around Gongylus the Corinthian, that they might learn the cauſe of his voyage, and the intentions of their Peloponneſian allies. Gongylus announced a ſpeedy and effectual relief to the beſieged city[7]. He acquainted the Syracuſans, that the embaſſy, ſent the preceding year, to crave the aſſiſtance of Peloponneſus, had been crowned with ſucceſs. His own countrymen had warmly embraced the cauſe of their kinſmen, and moſt reſpectable colony. They had fitted out a conſiderable fleet, the arrival of which might be expected every hour. The Lacedæmonians, alſo, had ſent a ſmall ſquadron, and the whole armament was conducted by the Spartan Gylippus, an officer of tried valour and ability.

Arrival of the Spartan Gylippus.

While the deſponding citizens of Syracuſe liſtened to this intelligence with pleaſing aſtoniſh-

[6] Thucydid. p. 487. [7] Id. p. 490.

ment,

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ment, a meſſenger arrived by land from Gylippus himſelf. That experienced commander, inſtead of purſuing a direct courſe to Sicily, which might have been intercepted by the Athenian fleet, had landed with four gallies on the weſtern coaſt of the iſland. The name of a Spartan general determined the wavering irreſolution of the Sicilians. The troops of Himera, Selinus, and Gela, flocked to his ſtandard; and he approached Syracuſe on the ſide of Epipolé, where the line of contravallation was ſtill unfiniſhed, with a body of ſeveral thouſand men.

who defeats the Athenians.

The moſt courageous of the citizens ſallied forth to meet this generous and powerful protector. The junction was happily effected; the ardour of the troops kindled into enthuſiaſm; and they diſtinguiſhed that memorable day by ſurpriſing ſeveral important Athenian poſts. This firſt ſucceſs re-animated the activity of the ſoldiers and workmen. The traverſe wall was extended with the utmoſt diligence, and a vigorous ſally deprived the enemy of the ſtrong caſtle of Labdalus. Nicias perceiving that the intereſt of the Athenians in Sicily would be continually weakened by delay, wiſhed to bring the fortune of the war to the deciſion of a battle. Nor did Gylippus decline the engagement. The firſt action was unfavourable to the Syracuſans, who had been imprudently poſted in the defiles between their own and the enemy's walls, which rendered of no avail their ſuperiority in cavalry and archers. The magnanimity of Gylippus acknowledged this error, for which he

completely atoned by his judicious conduct in the immediately ſucceeding engagement. His forces were drawn up in a more ſpacious ground. The pikemen received the ſhock of the enemy's front. The horſes and light-armed troops aſſailed and haraſſed their undefended flanks. The Athenians were thrown into diſorder, repulſed, and purſued to their camp with conſiderable loſs, and with irreparable diſgrace. CHAP. XX.

Conſequences of the victory.

The important conſequences of this victory appeared in the ſubſequent events of the ſiege. The Syracuſans ſoon extended their works beyond the line of circumvallation, ſo that it was impoſſible to block up their city, without forcing their ramparts. The beſiegers, while they maintained the ſuperiority of their arms, had been abundantly ſupplied with neceſſaries from the neighbouring territory; but every place was alike hoſtile to them after their defeat. The ſoldiers, who went out in queſt of wood and water, were unexpectedly attacked and cut off by the enemy's cavalry, or by the reinforcements which arrived from every quarter to the aſſiſtance of Syracuſe; and they were at length reduced to depend, for every neceſſary ſupply, on the precarious bounty of the Italian ſhore.

Nicias demands a reinforcement from Athens.

Nicias, whoſe ſenſibility deeply felt the public diſtreſs, wrote a moſt deſponding letter to the Athenians. He honeſtly deſcribed, and lamented, the misfortunes and diſorders of his army. The ſlaves deſerted in great numbers; the mercenary troops, who fought only for pay and ſubſiſtence, preferred the

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the more ſecure and lucrative ſervice of Syracuſe; even the Athenian citizens, diſguſted with the unexpected length and intolerable hardſhips of the war, abandoned the care of the gallies to unexperienced hands; an abuſe too eaſily permitted by the captains, whoſe weakneſs and partiality had corrupted the diſcipline, and ruined the ſtrength, of the fleet. Nicias frankly acknowledged his inability to check the diſorder; obſerving, that he wrote to thoſe who knew the difficulty of governing the licentious ſpirit of their domeſtic troops. He therefore exhorted the aſſembly, either to call them home without delay, or to ſend immediately a ſecond armament, not leſs powerful than the firſt.

Naval operations. Olymp. xci. 4. A. C. 413.

Gylippus and Hermocrates (for the latter had again aſſumed the authority due to his abilities) were acquainted with the actual diſtreſs, as well as the future hopes of the beſiegers, who might derive, in conſequence of Nicias's letter, more effectual ſuccours from Attica than the beſieged city could expect from Peloponneſus. They were prompted by intereſt, therefore, as well as by inclination, to preſs the enemy on every ſide, and at once to aſſail them by ſea and land. Beſides the bad condition of the Athenian fleet, the abſence of a conſiderable number of gallies employed in conducting the convoys of proviſions, encouraged this reſolution. The Corinthian ſquadron of twelve ſail, long expected with anxiety, had eſcaped the dangers of a winter's voyage; and at the commencement of the enſuing ſpring, the harbours of

Syracuſe were crowded with the whole naval ſtrength of Sicily. Hermocrates perſuaded his countrymen, "that the advantages of ſkill and experience, which he honeſtly aſcribed to the Athenians, could not compenſate their terror and confuſion at being ſuddenly attacked by a ſuperior force, on an element which they affected to command. Athens had aſſumed this boaſted empire of the ſea in repelling the invaſion of Perſia. Syracuſe had a ſimilar, yet ſtronger motive; and as ſhe poſſeſſed greater power, was entitled to expect more diſtinguiſhed ſucceſs." CHAP. XX.

Alternate ſucceſs.

The principal ſquadrons of Syracuſe lay in the harbour of Ortygia, ſeparated, by the iſland of that name, from the ſtation of the Athenian fleet. While Hermocrates ſailed forth with eighty gallies, to venture a naval engagement, Gylippus attacked the hoſtile fortifications at Plemmyrium, a promontory oppoſite to Ortygia, which confined the entrance of the Great Harbour. The defeat of the Syracuſans at ſea, whereby they loſt fourteen veſſels, was balanced by their victory at land, in which they took three fortreſſes, containing a large quantity of military and naval ſtores, and a conſiderable ſum of money. In ſome ſubſequent actions, which ſcarcely deſerve the name of battles, their fleet was ſtill unſucceſsful; but as they engaged with great caution, and found every where a ſecure retreat on a friendly ſhore, their loſs was inconſiderable. Their want of ſucceſs, in their firſt attempt, did not abate their reſolution to gain the command at ſea. The hopes of defending their country

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country ſharpened their invention, and animated their activity. They could not, indeed, contend with the Athenians in the rapidity of naval evolution, or in the ſkill of ſeamenſhip; but in the deſtined ſcene of action, there was little opportunity for diſplaying thoſe advantages; and by ſtrengthening, with unremitting labour, the prows of their ſhips, they compenſated, by ſuperior weight, the defect of velocity. They provided alſo a great number of ſmall veſſels, which might approach ſo near the hoſtile fleet, that the light-armed troops with which they were filled could aim their darts againſt the Athenian mariners.

The Athenians defeated at ſea.

By unexampled aſſiduity in completing theſe preparations, the Syracuſans at length prevailed in a general engagement, which was fought in the Great Harbour. Seven Athenian ſhips were ſunk, many more were diſabled, and Nicias ſaved the remains of his ſhattered and diſhonoured armament, by retiring behind a line of merchantmen and tranſports, from the maſts of which had been ſuſpended huge maſſes of lead, named dolphins, from their form, ſufficient to cruſh, by their falling weight, the ſtouteſt gallies of antiquity. This unexpected obſtacle arreſted the progreſs of the victors; but their preceding advantages elevated them with the higheſt hopes, and reduced the vanquiſhed to deſpair.

Tranſactions in Greece. Olymp. xci. 3. A. C. 414.

The Athenian misfortunes in Sicily were attended by misfortunes at home ſtill more dreadful. In the eighteenth year of the war, Alcibiades accompanied to Sparta the ambaſſadors of Corinth and Syracuſe,

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Syracuſe, who had ſolicited and obtained aſſiſtance to the beſieged city. On that occaſion, the Athenian exile firſt acquired the confidence of the Spartans, by condemning, in the ſtrongeſt terms, the injuſtice and ambition of his ungrateful countrymen, "whoſe cruelty towards himſelf equalled their inveterate hoſtility to the Lacedæmonian republic; but this republic might, by following his advice, diſarm their reſentment. The town of Decelia was ſituate on the Attic frontier, at an equal diſtance of fifteen miles from Thebes and Athens. This place, which commanded an extenſive and fertile plain, might be ſurpriſed and fortified by the Spartans[8], who, inſtead of haraſſing their foes by annual excurſions, might thus inſeſt them by a continual war. The wiſdom of Sparta had too long neglected ſuch a ſalutary and deciſive meaſure, eſpecially as the exiſtence of a ſimilar deſign had often been ſuggeſted by the fears of the enemy, who trembled even at the apprehenſion of ſeeing a foreign garriſon in their territory.

The Peloponneſians raiſe a fortreſs in Attica. Olymp. xci. 4. A. C. 413.

This advice, firſt propoſed, and often urged, by Alcibiades, was adopted in the commencement of the enſuing ſpring, when the warlike Agis led a powerful army into Attica. The defenceleſs inhabitants of the frontier fled before his irreſiſtible arms; but inſtead of purſuing them, as uſual, into the heart of the country, he ſtopped ſhort at Decelia. As all

[8] The Athenians, with their uſual imprudence, facilitated the ſucceſs of Alcibiades's intrigues. At the time when they ought, if poſſible, to have ſoothed, they exaſperated the Spartans to the utmoſt, by frequent incurſions from Pylus, and by openly aſſiſting the Argives. Thucydid. l.vi. ſub fine.

neceſſary

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neceſſary materials had been provided in great abundance, the place was ſpeedily fortified on every ſide, and the walls of Decelia, which might be diſtinctly ſeen acroſs the intermediate plain, bid defiance to thoſe of Athens [9].

The miſerable ſtate of that country.

The latter city was kept in continual alarm by the watchful hoſtility of a neighbouring garriſon. The open country was entirely laid waſte, and the uſual communication was interrupted with the valuable iſland of Eubœa, from which, in ſeaſons of ſcarcity, or during the ravages of war, the Athenians commonly derived their ſupplies of corn, wine, and oil, and whatever is moſt neceſſary to life. Haraſſed by the fatigues of unremitting ſervice, and deprived of daily bread, the ſlaves murmured, complained, and revolted to the enemy; and their defection robbed the ſtate of twenty thouſand uſeful artiſans. Since the latter years of Pericles, the Athenians had not been involved in ſuch diſtreſs. But their preſent were far more grievous than their paſt ſufferings. Thoſe had been chiefly occaſioned by the temporary rage of the peſtilence, the abatement of which there was always reaſon to expect; but theſe were inflicted by the unextinguiſhable hatred of a cruel and unrelenting foe [10].

The Athenians exert great vigour in the midſt of their calamities.

The domeſtic calamities of the republic did not, however, prevent the moſt vigorous exertions abroad. Twenty gallies, ſtationed at Naupactus, watched the motions of the Peloponneſian fleet deſtined to the aſſiſtance of Syracuſe: thirty carried on the war in Macedonia, to reduce the rebellion

[9] Thucydid. p. 500, & ſeqq. [10] Id. ibid.

of

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of Amphipolis; a conſiderable ſquadron collected tribute, and levied ſoldiers, in the colonies of Aſia; another, ſtill more powerful, ravaged the coaſt of Peloponneſus. Never did any kingdom or republic equal the magnanimity of Athens; never, in ancient or modern times, did the courage of any ſtate entertain an ambition ſo far ſuperior to its power, or exert efforts ſo diſproportionate to its ſtrength. Amidſt the difficulties and dangers which encompaſſed them on every ſide, the Athenians perſiſted in the ſiege of Syracuſe, a city little inferior to their own; and, undaunted by the actual devaſtation of their country, unterrified by the menaced aſſault of their walls, they ſent, without delay, ſuch a reinforcement into Sicily, as afforded the moſt promiſing hopes of ſucceſs in their expedition againſt that iſland [a].

The Athenian armament, commanded by Demoſthenes, arrives at Syracuſe. Ol. 91. 4. A. C. 413.

The Syracuſans had ſcarcely time to rejoice at their victory, or Nicias to bewail his defeat, when a numerous and formidable armament appeared on the Sicilian coaſt. The foremoſt gallies, their prows adorned with gaudy ſtreamers, purſued a ſecure courſe towards the harbours of Syracuſe. The emulation of the rowers was animated by the mingled ſounds of the trumpet and clarion; and the regular decoration, the elegant ſplendour, which diſtinguiſhed every part of the equipment, exhibited a pompous ſpectacle of naval triumph. Their appearance, even at a diſtance, announced the country to which they belonged; and both the

[a] Thucydid. p. 501, & ſeqq.

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joy of the beſiegers, and the terror of the beſieged, acknowledged that Athens was the only city in the world capable of ſending to the ſea ſuch a beautiful and magnificent contribution. The Syracuſans employed not unavailing efforts to check the progreſs, or to hinder the approach, of the hoſtile armament; which, beſides innumerable foreign veſſels and tranſports, conſiſted of ſeventy-three Athenian gallies, commanded by the experienced valour of Demoſthenes and Eurymedon. The pikemen on board exceeded five thouſand; the light-armed troops were nearly as numerous; and, including the rowers, workmen, and attendants, the whole ſtrength may be reckoned ſuperior to that originally ſent with Nicias [12], which amounted to twenty thouſand men.

The combined forces aſſault Syracuſe.

The misfortunes hitherto attending the operations in Sicily had lowered the character of the general; and this circumſtance, as well as the ſuperior abilities of Demoſthenes, entitled him to aſſume the tone of authority in their conjunct deliberations. His advice, which Eurymedon highly approved, and in which the dilatory caution of Nicias finally acquieſced, was clear and ſimple. "They ought to avail themſelves of the alarm which the unexpected arrival of ſuch a powerful reinforcement had ſpread among the enemy; and inſtead of ſubmitting to the tedious formalities of a ſiege, at once aſſault the walls of Syracuſe. He truſted, by the valour of his troops, to obtain, in one day,

[12] Comp. Thucydid. ſupra citat. Diodor. l. xiii. p. 336. Plut. in Nic.

the valuable reward of long and ſevere labours. But if the gods had otherwiſe determined, it would be time to deſiſt from an enterpriſe, in which delay was equal to defeat, and to employ the bravery of the Athenian youth in repelling the invaders of their country [13]."

Their firſt operations ſucceſsful.

After ravaging the banks of the Anapus, and making ſome ineffectual attempts againſt the fortifications on that ſide, probably with a view to divert the attention of the enemy, Demoſthenes choſe the firſt hour of a moonſhine night, to proceed with the flower of the army to ſeize the fortreſſes in Epipolé. The march was performed with ſucceſsful celerity; the out-poſts were ſurpriſed; the guards, put to the ſword; and three ſeparate encampments, of the Syracuſans, the Sicilians, and allies, formed a feeble oppoſition to the Athenian ardour. As if their victory had already been complete, the aſſailants began to pull down the wooden battlements, or to urge the purſuit with a rapidity which diſordered their ranks.

A general engagement, in which the Athenians are defeated.

Meanwhile, the vigilant activity of Gylippus had aſſembled the whole force of Syracuſe. At the approach of the enemy his vanguard retired. The Athenians were decoyed within the intricate windings of the walls, and their irregular fury was firſt checked by the firmneſs of a Theban phalanx. A reſiſtance ſo ſudden and unexpected might alone have been deciſive; but other circumſtances were adverſe to the Athenians; their ignorance of the

[13] Thucydid. l. vii. p. 519.

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ground, the alternate obſcurity of night and the deceitful glare of the moon, which, ſhining in the front of the Thebans, illumined the ſplendour of their arms, and multiplied the terror of their numbers. The foremoſt ranks of the purſuers were repelled; and, as they retreated to the main body, encountered the advancing Argives and Corcyreans, who ſinging the Pœan in their Doric dialect and accent, were unfortunately taken for enemies. Fear, and then rage, ſeized the Athenians, who thinking themſelves encompaſſed on all ſides, determined to force their way, and committed much bloodſhed among their allies, before the miſtake could be diſcovered. To prevent the repetition of this dreadful error, their ſcattered bands were obliged at every moment to demand the watch-word, which was at length betrayed to their adverſaries. The conſequence of this was doubly fatal. At every rencounter the ſilent Athenians were ſlaughtered without mercy, while the enemy, who knew their watch-word, might at pleaſure join, or decline the battle, and eaſily oppreſs their weakneſs, or elude their ſtrength. The terror and confuſion increaſed; the rout became general. Gylippus purſued in good order with his victorious troops. The vanquiſhed could not defend in a body by the narrow paſſages through which they had mounted. Many abandoned their arms, and explored the unknown paths of the rocky Epipolæ. Others threw themſelves from precipices, rather than await the purſuers. Several thouſands were left dead or wounded on the ſcene of

of action; and, in the morning, the greater part of the ſtragglers were intercepted and cut off by the Syracuſan cavalry [14]. CHAP. XX.

This dreadful and unexpected diſaſter ſuſpended the operations of the ſiege. The Athenian generals ſpent the time in fruitleſs deliberations concerning their future meaſures, while the army lay encamped on the marſhy and unhealthy banks of the Anapus. The viciſſitudes of an autumnal atmoſphere, corrupted by the foul vapours of an unwholeſome ſoil, made a ſevere impreſſion on the irritable fibres of men, exhauſted by fatigue, dejected by diſgrace, and deprived of hope. A general ſickneſs broke out in the camp. Demoſthenes urged this calamity as a new reaſon for haſtening their departure, while it was yet poſſible to croſs the Ionian ſea, without riſking the danger of a winter's tempeſt. But Nicias diſſuaded the deſign of leaving Sicily until they ſhould be warranted to take this important ſtep by the poſitive authority of the republic. "Thoſe who were actually the moſt bent on ignominious flight, would, after their return, be the foremoſt to accuſe the weakneſs or the treachery of their commanders; and for his own part, he would rather die honourably in the field of battle, than periſh by the unjuſt ſentence of his country." Demoſthenes and Eurymedon knew, by fatal experience, the iraſcible temper of an Athenian aſſembly; they only inſiſted, that the armament ſhould at leaſt remove to

The ſalutary meaſures, propoſed by Demoſthenes, prevented by Nicias.

[14] Thucydid. p. 520, & ſeqq.

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a more convenient ſtation, from whence, after the troops had recovered their uſual health and ſpirits, they might haraſs the enemy by continual deſcents, until they obtained an opportunity of fighting the Syracuſan fleet on the open ſea.

His motives.

But even this reſolution was ſtrenuouſly oppoſed by Nicias, who knew by the ſecret correſpondence which he maintained with certain traitors in Syracuſe, that the treaſury of that city had been exhauſted by the enormous expence of two thouſand talents already incurred in the war, and that the magiſtrates had ſtretched their credit to its utmoſt bounds, in borrowing from their allies; and who therefore naturally flattered himſelf, that the vigour of their reſiſtance would abate with the decay of their reſources. The colleagues of Nicias were confounded with the firmneſs of an oppoſition ſo unlike the yielding timidity of his ordinary character, and ſo inconſiſtent with the ſentiments which he had often expreſſed concerning the Sicilian expedition. They imagined that he might rely on ſome more important ground of confidence, which his caution was unwilling to explain; they ſubmitted therefore to his opinion, an opinion equally fatal to himſelf and to them, and to the armament which they commanded [15].

The Syracuſans receive a reinforcement.

Meanwhile, the prudence of Gylippus profited of the fame of his victory, to draw a powerful reinforcement from the Sicilian cities; and the tranſports, ſo long expected from Peloponneſus, finally

[15] Comp. Thucydid. p. 524, & Plut. in Nicia.

arrived

arrived in the harbour of Ortygia. The Peloponnesian forces had sailed from Greece early in the spring; and it is not explained for what reason they touched on the coast of Cyrenaica. There, they continued for some months, that they might defend their Grecian brethren, actually endangered by the impetuous assaults of the Lybians; and having conquered that barbarous enemy, they augmented their fleet with a few Cyrenian gallies [16], and safely reached Syracuse, the place of their first destination. This squadron formed the last assistance sent to either of the contending parties, and nothing farther was required to complete the actors in the following dreadful scene; for by the accession of the Cyrenians, Syracuse was either attacked or defended by all the various divisions of the Grecian name, which formed, in that age, the most civilized portion of the inhabitants of Asia, Africa, and Europe. CHAP. XX.

The arrival of such powerful auxiliaries to the besieged, and the increasing force of the malady, totally disconcerted the Athenians. Even Nicias agreed to set sail. Every necessary preparation was made for this purpose, and the cover of night was chosen, as most proper for concealing their own disgrace, and for eluding the vengeance of the enemy. But the night appointed for their departure was distinguished by an inauspicious eclipse of the moon, for so at least it was judged by the superstitious fears of Nicias, and by the ignorance of The Athenians prepare to raise the siege.

[16] Thucydid. p. 527.

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his diviners [17], even in the vain art which they profeſſed. The voyage was deferred till the myſtical number of thrice nine days. But, before the expiration of that time, it was no longer practicable; for the deſign was ſoon betrayed to the Syracuſans, and this diſcovery, added to the encouragement derived from the circumſtances of which we heave already taken notice, increaſed their eagerneſs to attack the enemy by ſea and land. Their attempts failed to deſtroy, by fire-ſhips, the Athenian fleet. They were more ſucceſsful in employing ſuperior numbers to divide the ſtrength, and to weaken the reſiſtance, of an enfeebled and dejected foe. During three days, there was a perpetual ſucceſſion of battles military and naval. On the firſt day fortune hung in ſuſpenſe; the ſecond deprived the Athenians of a conſiderable ſquadron commanded by Eurymedon; and this misfortune was embittered, on the third, by the loſs of eighteen gallies, with their crews [18].

The purpoſe oppoſed by the enemy;

The Syracuſans celebrated their victory with triumphant enthuſiaſm; while their orators "extolled and magnified the glory of a city, which, by its native proweſs and ſingle danger, had not only maintained the independence of Sicily, but avenged the injuries of the whole Grecian name, too long diſhonoured and afflicted by the oppreſſive tyranny of Athens. This tyranny had been acquired and confirmed by the uſurped ſovereignty of

[17] The rules of divination, we are told, ſhould have taught them, that the obſcurity of an eclipſe betokened a ſucceſsful retreat. Plutarch. in Nicia.

[18] Thucydid. p. 528, & ſeqq.

the

the ſea; but even on that element, the courage of Syracuſe had defeated the experience of the enemy. Their renown would be immortal, if they accompliſhed the uſeful and meritorious work; and if, by intercepting the retreat, and deſtroying the armament of the Athenians, they cruſhed at once the power, and for ever humbled the pride, of that aſpiring people." CHAP. XX.

who throw a chain acroſs the Great Harbour.

This deſign, ſuggeſted by the wiſdom of Hermocrates, was eagerly adopted by the active zeal of his fellow-citizens, who ſtrove, with unremitting ardour to throw a chain of veſſels acroſs the mouth of the Great Harbour, about a mile in breadth. The labour was complete before Nicias, totally occupied by other objects, attempted to interrupt it. After repeated defeats, and although he was ſo miſerably tormented by the ſtone, that he had frequently ſolicited his recal, that virtuous commander, whoſe courage roſe in adverſity, uſed the utmoſt diligence to retrieve the affairs of his country. The ſhattered gallies were ſpeedily refitted, and again prepared to the number of an hundred and ten, to riſk the event of a battle. As they had ſuffered greatly, on former occaſions, by the hardneſs and heavineſs of the Syracuſan prows, Nicias provided them with grappling-irons, fitted to prevent the recoil of their opponents, and the repetition of the hoſtile ſtroke. The decks were crowded with armed men, and the contrivance to which the enemy had hitherto chiefly owed their ſucceſs, of introducing the firmneſs and ſtability of a military, into a naval engagement, was adopted in

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in its full extent by the Athenians. When the fleet was ready for ſea, Nicias recalled the troops from the various poſts and fortreſſes ſtill occupied by their arms, and formed them into one camp on the ſhore, where, on the day of battle, their ranks might be extended as widely as the vicinity of the Syracuſan ramparts could ſafely permit; that a ſpacious retreat might be ſecured to the Athenian ſhips, if perſecuted by their uſual bad fortune; in which fatal alternative, nothing remained but to retire by land with the miſerable remnant of the army. But Nicias did not yet deſpair, that the laſt efforts of his countrymen would break the enemy's chain at the mouth of the Great Harbour; and that they would return victorious, to tranſport their encamped companions to the friendly ports of Naxos and Catana.

Both ſides prepare for battle.

Elated by this hope, he forgot his bodily infirmities, and ſuppreſſed the anguiſh of his ſoul. With a ſerene and magnanimous firmneſs, he cheared the dejection of the Athenians, exhorting them, before they embarked, by an affecting and manly ſpeech, "to remember the viciſſitudes of war, and the inſtability of fortune[19]. Though hitherto unſucceſsful, they had every thing to expect from the ſtrength of their actual preparations; nor ought men, who had tried and ſurmounted ſo many dangers, to yield to the weak prejudices of unexperienced folly, and cloud the proſpect of future victory by the gloomy remembrance of paſt

[19] Thucydid. p. 535, & ſeqq.

defeat,

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defeat. They yet enjoyed an opportunity to defend their lives, their liberty, their friends, their country, and the mighty name of Athens; an opportunity which never could return, ſince the whole fortune of the republic was embarked in the preſent fleet." When Gylippus and the Syracuſan commanders were appriſed of the deſigns of the enemy, they haſtened to the defence of the bar which had been thrown acroſs the entrance of the harbour. It is uncertain for what reaſon they had left open one narrow paſſage[20], on either ſide of which they ſtationed a powerful ſquadron. Gylippus animated the ſailors with ſuch topics, as the occaſion naturally ſuggeſted, and returned to take the conduct of the land forces, leaving Sicanus, Agatharcus, and Pythen, the two firſt to command the wings, and the laſt, a citizen of Corinth, to command the centre, of the Syracuſan fleet, which fell ſhort of the Athenian by the number of twenty gallies. But the former was admirably provided with whatever ſeemed moſt neceſſary for attack or for defence; even the Athenian grappling-irons had not been overlooked; to elude the dangerous graſp of theſe inſtruments, the prows of the Syracuſan veſſels were covered with wet and ſlippery hides.

Naval engagement in the Great Harbour.

Before the Athenians ſet ſail, Nicias, that nothing might be neglected to obtain ſucceſs, went round the whole armament, addreſſing, in the moſt pathetic terms, the ſeveral commanders by name,

[20] Και τον καταλειφθεντα διεκπλειν. Thucydid. p. 451.

recalling

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recalling to them the objects moſt dear and moſt reſpectable, which they were engaged by every tie of honour and affection to defend, and conjuring them, by their families, their friends, and their paternal gods, to exert whatever ſkill or courage they collectively, or as individuals, poſſeſſed, on this ever memorable and moſt important occaſion. He then returned to the camp with an enfeebled body and an anxious mind, committing the laſt hope of the republic to the active valour of Demoſthenes, Eudemus, and Menander. The firſt impreſſion of the Athenians was irreſiſtible; they burſt through the paſſage of the bar, and repelled the ſquadrons on either ſide. As the entrance widened, the Syracuſans, in their turn, ruſhed into the harbour, which was more favourable than the open ſea to their mode of fighting. Thither the foremoſt of the Athenians returned, either compelled by ſuperior force, or that they might aſſiſt their companions. The engagement became general in the mouth of the harbour; and in this narrow ſpace two hundred gallies fought, during the greateſt part of the day, with an obſtinate and perſevering valour. It would require the expreſſive energy of Thucydides, and the imitative, though inimitable, ſounds and expreſſions of the Grecian tongue, to deſcribe the noiſe, the tumult, and the ardour of the contending ſquadrons. The battle was not long confined to the ſhock of adverſe prows, and to the diſtant hoſtility of darts and arrows. The neareſt veſſels grappled, and cloſed with each other, and their decks were ſoon converted

verted into a field of blood. While the heavy-armed troops boarded the enemy's ships, they left their own expoſed to a ſimilar misfortune; the fleets were divided into maſſive cluſters of adhering gallies; and the confuſion of their mingled ſhouts overpowered the voice of authority; the Athenians exhorting, not to abandon an element on which their republic had ever acquired victory and glory, for the dangerous protection of an hoſtile ſhore; and the Syracuſans encouraging each other not to fly from an enemy, whoſe weakneſs or cowardice had long meditated flight [21]. CHAP. XX.

The ſingular and tremendous ſpectacle of an engagement more fierce and obſtinate than any that had ever been beheld in the Grecian ſeas, reſtrained the activity, and totally ſuſpended the powers, of the numerous and adverſe battalions which encircled the coaſt. The ſpectators and the actors were equally intereſted in the important ſcene; but the former, the current of whoſe ſenſibility was undiverted by any exertion of mind or body, felt more deeply and expreſſed more forcibly, the various emotions by which they were agitated [22]. Hope, fear, the ſhouts of victory, the ſhrieks of deſpair, the anxious ſolicitude of doubtful ſucceſs, animated the countenances, the voice, and the geſture of the Athenians, whoſe whole reliance centered in their fleet. When at length their gallies evidently gave way on every ſide, the contraſt of alternate, and the rapid tumult of ſucceſſive, The Athenians defeated.

[21] Thucydid. p. 543, & ſeq. [22] Id. p. 544.

paſſions,

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paſſions, ſubſided in a melancholy calm. This dreadful pauſe of aſtoniſhment and terror was followed by the diſordered trepidation of flight and fear: many eſcaped to the camp: others ran, uncertain whither to direct their ſteps: while Nicias, with a ſmall, but undiſmayed band, remained on the ſhore, to protect the landing of their unfortunate gallies. But the retreat of the Athenians could not probably have been effected, had it not been favoured by the actual circumſtances of the enemy, as well as by the peculiar prejudices of ancient ſuperſtition. In this well-fought battle, the vanquiſhed had loſt fifty, and the victors forty, veſſels. It was incumbent on the latter to employ their immediate and moſt ſtrenuous efforts to recover the dead bodies of their friends, that they might be honoured with the ſacred and indiſpenſable rites of funeral. The day was far ſpent; the ſtrength of the ſailors had been exhauſted by a long continuance of unremitting labour; and both they, and their companions on ſhore, were more deſirous to return to Syracuſe to enjoy the fruits of victory, than to irritate the dangerous deſpair of the vanquiſhed Athenians [23].

Their extreme deſpondency.

It is obſerved by the Roman orator [24], with no leſs truth than elegance, that not only the navy of Athens, but the glory and the empire of that republic, ſuffered ſhipwreck in the fatal harbour of Syracuſe. The deſpondent degeneracy which immediately followed this ever memorable engagement was

[23] Thucydid. p. 545.

[24] Cic. in Verr. v. 37.

teſtified

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teſtified in the neglect of a duty which the Athenians had never neglected before, and in renouncing a part of their national character, which it had hitherto been their greateſt glory to maintain. They abandoned to inſult and indignity the bodies of the ſlain; and when it was propoſed to them by their commanders to prepare next day for a ſecond engagement, ſince their veſſels were ſtill more numerous than thoſe of the enemy, they, who had ſeldom avoided a ſuperior, and who had never declined the encounter of an equal force, declared that no motive could induce them to withſtand the weaker armament of Syracuſe. Their only deſire was to eſcape by land, under cover of the night, from a foe whom they had not courage to oppoſe, and from a place where every object was offenſive to their ſight, and moſt painful to their reflection [75].

The Syracuſans celebrate the feſtival of Hercules with licentious joy.

The behaviour of the Syracuſans promiſed complete ſucceſs to this deſign. The evening after the battle was the vigil of the feaſt of Hercules; and the ſtill agitated combatants awakened, after a ſhort and feveriſh repoſe, to celebrate the memory of their favourite hero, to whoſe propitious influence they probably aſcribed the merit of the moſt ſplendid trophy that ever adorned the fame of Syracuſe. From the triumph of victory, and grateful emotions of religious enthuſiaſm, there was an eaſy tranſition, in the creed and in the practice of the Greeks, to the extravagance of licentious joy, and the exceſſes of ſenſual indulgence.

[75] Thucydid. p. 545.

Sports

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Sports, proceſſions, muſic, dancing, the pleaſures of the table, of the elegant arts, and of unguarded converſation, were incorporated in the texture of their religious worſhip. But the coincidence of a feſtival and a victory demanded an accumulated profuſion of ſuch enjoyments as ſoothe the ſenſes and pleaſe the fancy. Amidſt theſe giddy tranſports, the Syracuſans loſt all remembrance of an enemy whom they deſpiſed; even the ſoldiers on guard joined the diſſolute or frivolous amuſements of their companions; and, during the greateſt part of the night, Syracuſe preſented a mixed ſcene of ſecure gaiety, of thoughtleſs jollity, and of mad and moſt dangerous licence [26].

Stratagem of Hermocrates to prevent the Athenian retreat.

The firm and vigilant mind of Hermocrates alone withſtood, but was unable to divert, the general current. It was impoſſible to rouſe to the fatigues of war men buried in wine and pleaſure, and intoxicated with victory; and, as he could not intercept by force, he determined to retard by ſtratagem, the intended retreat of the Athenians, whoſe numbers and reſentment would ſtill render them formidable to whatever part of Sicily they might remove their camp. A ſelect band of horſemen, aſſuming the character of traitors, fearleſsly approached the hoſtile ramparts, and warned the Athenians of the danger of departing that night, as many ambuſcades lurked in the way, and all the moſt important paſſes were occupied by the enemy. The frequency of treaſon gained credit to the per-

[26] Thucydid. p. 546.

fidious

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ſidious advice; and the Athenians, having changed their firſt reſolution, were perſuaded by Nicias to wait two days longer, that ſuch meaſures might be taken as ſeemed beſt adapted to promote the ſafety and celerity of their march [27].

The Athenians raiſe their camp.

The camp was raiſed on the third morning after the battle. Forty thouſand men, of whom many were afflicted with wounds and diſeaſe, and all exhauſted by fatigue, and dejected by calamity, exhibited the appearance, not of a flying army, but of a great and populous community, driven from their ancient habitations by the cruel vengeance of a conqueror. They had miſerably fallen from the lofty expectations with which they ſailed in triumph to the harbour of Syracuſe. They had abandoned their gallies, their tranſports, the hopes of victory, and the glory of the Athenian name; and theſe collective ſufferings were enhanced and exaſperated by the painful images which ſtruck the eyes and the fancy of each unfortunate individual. The mangled bodies of their companions and friends, deprived of the ſacred rites of funeral, affected them with a ſentiment of religious horror, on which the weakneſs of human nature was happily unable to dwell. Their minds recoiled from the dreadful thought, but they could not divert their compaſſion from the numerous crowds of ſick and wounded, who followed them with enfeebled and unequal ſteps, intreating, in the accent and attitude

Their dreadful afflictions

[27] Thucydid. p. 547.

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of unutterable anguiſh, to be delivered from the miſery of famine, or the rage of an exaſperated foe. Amidſt ſuch afflicting ſcenes, the heart of a ſtranger would have melted with tender ſympathy; but what muſt the Athenians have felt, to ſee in this hopeleſs ſtate, their parents, brothers, children, and friends! to hear, without the poſſibility of relieving, their lamentable complaints! and reluctantly to throw the clinging victims from their wearied necks and arms! Yet the care of perſonal ſafety prevailed over every other care; for the ſoldiers, either deſtitute of ſlaves, or diſtruſting their fidelity, were not only encumbered by their armour, but oppreſſed by the weight of their proviſions [28].

Melancholy firmneſs of Nicias.

The ſuperior rank of Nicias entitled him to a pre-eminence of toil and of woe: and he deſerves the regard of poſterity by his character and ſufferings, and ſtill more by the melancholy firmneſs of his conduct. The load of accumulated diſaſters did not ſink him into inactive deſpondency. He moved with a rapid pace around every part of the army, and the ardour of his mind re-animating the languor of his debilitated frame, he exclaimed, with a loud and diſtinct voice, "Athenians and allies! do not yet deſpair. Many have eſcaped from ſtill greater evils. As to myſelf, who, in bodily ſtrength, ſurpaſs not the weakeſt among you (for you ſee to what a miſerable condition my malady has reduced me), and

[28] Thucydid. p. 548.

who,

who, in the happineſs of private life, and the deceitful gifts of proſperity, had long been diſtinguiſhed above the moſt illuſtrious of my contemporaries, I am now confounded in affliction with the meaneſt and moſt worthleſs. Yet am I unconſcious of deſerving ſuch a fatal reverſe of fortune. My conduct towards men has been irreproachable; my piety towards the gods conſpicuous and ſincere. For this reaſon, I am ſtill animated with confidence; calamities, unmerited by guilt, are diſarmed of their terrors. If we have incurred the indignation of the gods by our ambitious deſigns againſt Sicily, our offence, ſurely, is ſufficiently expiated by paſt ſufferings, which now render us the objects of compaſſion. Other nations have attacked their neighbours with leſs provocation, and have yet eſcaped with a gentler puniſhment; nor will experience warrant the belief, that, for the errors of human frailty, Providence ſhould impoſe penalties too heavy to be borne. We have leſs reaſon to adopt an impious prejudice ſo diſhonourable to the gods, when we conſider the means of defence which their goodneſs has yet left us. Our numbers, our reſolution, and even our misfortunes, ſtill render us formidable. There is not any army in Sicily able to intercept our courſe; much leſs to expel us from the firſt friendly territory in which we may fix our camp. If we can ſecure, therefore, our preſent ſafety, by a prudent, ſpeedy, and courageous retreat, we may afterwards retrieve our loſt honour, and reſtore the fallen glory of

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Athens; ſince the chief ornament of a ſtate conſiſts in brave and virtuous men, not in empty ſhips and undefended walls [29]."

The retreat of the Athenians.

The actions of Nicias fully correſponded with his words. He neglected none of the duties of a great general. Inſtead of leading the army towards Naxos and Catana, in which direction there was reaſon to apprehend many ſecret ambuſhes of the enemy, he conducted them by the weſtern route towards Gela and Camerina; expecting, by this meaſure, to find proviſions in greater plenty, as well as to elude the latent ſnares of the Syracuſans. That nothing might be omitted which promiſed the hope of relief, meſſengers were immediately diſpatched to the neighbouring cities, which might poſſibly be tempted by their natural jealouſy of the growing proſperity of Syracuſe, to favour the retreat of the vanquiſhed. The troops were then divided into two ſquares, as the moſt ſecure and capacious arrangement. Nicias led the van; Demoſthenes conducted the rear; the baggage, and unarmed multitude, occupied the centre. In this order of march they paſſed the river Anapus, the ford of which was feebly diſputed by an inconſiderable guard; and, having proceeded the firſt day only five miles, they encamped in the evening on a riſing ground, after being much haraſſed during the latter part of their journey by the Syracuſan cavalry and archers, who galled them at a diſtance, intercepted the ſtragglers, and avoided, by a ſeaſonable retreat, to commit the ſecurity of their own

[29] Thucydid. p. 550.

fortune

fortune with the dangerous deſpair of the Athenians. Next day, having marched only twenty furlongs, they reached a ſpacious plain, the convenience of which invited them to repoſe; eſpecially as they needed a ſupply of water and proviſions, which might be eaſily obtained from the ſurrounding country [10]. CHAP. XX.

Before this time, the enemy were appriſed of their line of march; and, in order to interrupt it, they ſent a numerous detachment to fortify the mountain of Acræum. This mountain, which probably gave name to the ſmall town ſituate in its neighbourhood, interſected the direct road to Gela and Camerina. It was diſtant a few miles from the Athenian encampment, and a ſmall degree of art might render it impregnable, ſince it was of a ſteep and rapid aſcent, and encompaſſed on every ſide by the rocky channel of a loud and foaming torrent. In vain the Athenians attempted, on three ſucceſſive days, to force the paſſage. They were repelled with loſs in every new attack, which became more feeble than the preceding. In the firſt and moſt deſperate, an accidental ſtorm of thunder increaſed the courage of the Syracuſans, and the terror of the Athenians. A ſimilar event had, in the firſt engagement after the invaſion of Sicily, produced an oppoſite affect on the contending nations. But the hopes and the fears of men change with their fortune. Interrupted by the enemy.

In the evening after the laſt unſucceſsful conteſt, the condition of the Athenians was peculiarly deplorable. Change their line of march.

[10] Thucydid. p. 552, & ſeqq.

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plorable. The numbers of the wounded had been increaſed by the fruitleſs attempts to paſs the mountain; the enemy had continually galled and inſulted them as they retreated to their camp; the adjacent territory could no longer ſupply them with the neceſſaries of life; and they muſt be compelled, after all their hardſhips and fatigues, to make a long circuit by the ſea-ſhore, if they expected to reach, in ſafety, the places of their reſpective deſtination. Even this reſolution (for there was no alternative), however dreadful to men in their comfortleſs and exhauſted ſtate, was recommended by Nicias, who, to conceal his deſign from the enemy, cauſed innumerable fires to be lighted in every part of the camp [31]. The troops then marched out under cover of the night, and in the ſame order which they had hitherto obſerved. But they had not proceeded far in this nocturnal expedition, when the obſcurity of the ſkies, the deceitful tracks of an unknown and hoſtile country, filled the more timid or unfortunate with imaginary terrors. Their panic, as is uſual in great bodies of men, was ſpeedily communicated to thoſe around them; and Demoſthenes, with above one half of his diviſion, fatally miſtook the road, and quitted, never more to rejoin, the reſt of the army.

The diviſion commanded by Demoſthenes ſurrenders to Gylippus.

The ſcouts of Gylippus and the Syracuſans immediately brought intelligence of this important event, which furniſhed an opportunity to attack the divided ſtrength of the Athenians. His ſuperior knowledge of the country enabled Gylippus,

[31] Thucydid. p. 552, & ſeqq.

by the celerity of his march, to intercept the ſmaller diviſion, and to ſurround them on every ſide, in the difficult and intricate defiles which led to the ford of the river Erinois. There, he inflicted on them wounds and death, during a whole day, with darts, arrows, and javelins. When the meaſure of their ſufferings was complete, he proclaimed towards the evening, by the ſound of the trumpet, and with the loud voice of the herald, freedom, forgiveneſs, and protection to all who ſhould deſert and abandon the bad fortune of their leaders; an offer which was accepted by the troops of ſeveral Aſiatic iſlands, and other dependent and tributary countries. At length he entered into treaty with Demoſthenes himſelf, whoſe ſoldiers laid down their arms, and delivered their money (which filled the capacious hollow of four broad bucklers), on condition that they ſhould not ſuffer death, impriſonment, or famine [22]. Notwithſtanding the number of the deſerters and of the ſlain, the remainder ſtill amounted to ſix thouſand, who were ſent to Syracuſe with their captive general, under a powerful and vigilant eſcort, while the activity of Gylippus followed the flying battalions of the enemy, which had been conducted by Nicias to the diſtance of twenty miles, towards the fatal banks of the river Aſſinaros.

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The Syracuſans overtook the rear before the van could arrive at the lofty and abrupt margin of this rapid ſtream: and an herald was ſent to Nicias, exhorting

The diviſion under Nicias overtaken by the enemy.

[22] Thucydid. p. 553.

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exhorting him to imitate the example of his colleague, and to ſurrender, without farther blood-ſhed, to the irreſiſtible valour of his victorious purſuers. Nicias diſbelieved, or affected to diſbelieve, the report; but when a confidential meſſenger, whom he was allowed to diſpatch for information, brought certain intelligence of the ſurrender and diſgrace of Demoſthenes, he alſo condeſcended to propoſe terms, in the name of the Athenians, engaging, on the immediate ceſſation of hoſtilities, to reimburſe the magiſtrates of Syracuſe for the expence of the war, and to deliver Athenian hoſtages (a citizen for a talent) until the debt ſhould be liquidated [13].

Their melancholy defence.

Theſe terms were rejected by the Syracuſans with diſdain: and Gylippus having occupied the moſt advantageous poſts on every ſide, attacked the army of Nicias with the ſame mode of warfare, which, two days before, had proved ſo deſtructive to their unfortunate companions. During the whole day they bore, with extraordinary patience, the hoſtile aſſault, ſtill expecting, under cover of the night, to eſcape the cruel vigilance of the enemy. But that hope was vain: Gylippus perceived their departure; and although three hundred men of determined courage gallantly broke through the guards, and effected their eſcape, the reſt were no ſooner diſcovered than they returned to their former ſtation, and laid down their arms in ſilent deſpair. Yet the return of the morning brought back their courage. They again took up their arms, and marched towards

[13] Thucydid. p. 554.

the

the river, miſerably galled and afflicted by the hoſtile archers and cavalry. Their diſtreſs was moſt lamentable and incurable: yet hope did not totally forſake them; for like men in the oppreſſion and languor of a conſuming diſeaſe, they ſtill entertained a confuſed idea, that their ſufferings would end, could they but reach the oppoſite banks of the neighbouring river [34]. CHAP. XX.

Horrid ſcene on the banks of the Aſſinaros.

The deſire of aſſuaging their thirſt encouraged this daring deſign. They ruſhed with frantic diſorder into the rapid current; the purſuing Syracuſans, who had occupied the rocky banks, deſtroying them with innumerable volleys of miſſile weapons. In the Aſſinaros they had a new enemy to contend with. The depth and force of the waters triumphed over their ſingle, and ſhook their implicated ſtrength. Many were borne down the ſtream. At length the weight of their numbers reſiſted the violence of the torrent; but a new form of danger and of horror preſented itſelf to the eyes of Nicias. His ſoldiers turned their fury againſt each other, diſputing at the point of the ſword, the unwholeſome draughts of the agitated and turbid river. This ſpectacle melted the firmneſs of his manly ſoul. He ſurrendered to Gylippus, and aſked quarter for the miſerable remnant of his troops, who had not periſhed in the Aſſinaros, or been deſtroyed by the Syracuſan archers and cavalry [35]. Before the commands of the Lacedæmonian general could pervade the army, many of the ſoldiers had, according to the

[34] Thucydid. p. 554. [35] Ibid. p. 555.

bar-

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barous practice of the age, ſeized their priſoners and ſlaves; ſo that the Athenian captives were afterwards diſtributed among ſeveral communities of Sicily which had ſent aſſiſtance to Syracuſe. The reſt upon laying down their arms, were entitled to the pity and protection of Gylippus; who, after he had ſent proper detachments to intercept and collect the ſtragglers, returned in triumph to the capital with the ineſtimable trophies of his valour and conduct.

Death of the Athenian generals.

Nicias had little to expect from the *humanity* of a proud and victorious Spartan; but Demoſthenes might naturally flatter himſelf with the hope of *juſtice*. He urged with energy, but urged in vain, the obſervance of the capitulation which had been ratified with due forms, on the faith of which he had ſurrendered himſelf and the troops entruſted to his command. The public priſoners, conducted ſucceſſively to Syracuſe, and exceeding together the number of ſeven thouſand, were treated with the ſame inhuman cruelty. They were univerſally condemned to labour in the mines and quarries of Sicily [56]: their whole ſuſtenance was bread and water: they ſuffered alternately the ardours of a ſcorching ſun, and the chilling damps of autumn. For ſeventy days and nights they languiſhed in this dreadful captivity, during which, the diſeaſes incident to their manner of life were rendered infectious by the ſtench of the dead bodies, which corrupted the purity of the ſurrounding air. At length an eternal ſeparation was made between

Cruel treatment of the captives.

[56] Thucyd. p. 356.

thoſe

thoſe who *ſhould enjoy the happier lot of being* ſold as ſlaves into diſtant lands, and thoſe who ſhould for ever be confined to their terrible dungeons. The Athenians, with ſuch Italians and Sicilians as had unnaturally embraced their cauſe, were reſerved for the latter doom. Their generals, Nicias and Demoſthenes, had not lived to behold this melancholy hour. Gylippus would have ſpared their lives, not from any motives of humanity and eſteem, but that his joyous return to Sparta might have been graced by their preſence. But the reſentment of the Syracuſans, the fears of the Corinthians; above all, the ſupicious jealouſy of thoſe perfidious traitors who had maintained a ſecret correſpondence with Nicias, which they dreaded, leſt the accidents of his future life might diſcloſe, loudly demanded the immediate execution of the captive generals [37]. The Athenians of thoſe times juſtly regretted the loſs of Demoſthenes, a gallant and enterpriſing commander; but poſterity will for ever lament the fate of Nicias, the moſt pious, the moſt virtuous, and the moſt unfortunate man of the age in which he lived.

Amidſt this dark and dreadful ſcene of cruelty and revenge, we muſt not omit to mention one ſingular example of humanity, which broke forth like a meteor in the gloom of a nocturnal tempeſt. The Syracuſans, who could puniſh their helpleſs captives with ſuch relentleſs ſeverity, had often melted into tears at the affecting ſtrains of Euripides [38], an Athenian poet, who had learned in the Socratic ſchool

A ſingular exception to this general cruelty.

[37] Thucydid. l. vii. ad fin.

[38] See above, p. 140.

CHAP. XX.

ſchool to adorn the leſſons of philoſophy with the charms of fancy, and who was regarded by the taſte of his contemporaries, as he ſtill is by many enlightened judges, as the moſt tender and pathetic, the moſt philoſophical and inſtructive, of all tragic writers. The pleaſure which the Syracuſans had derived from his inimitable poetry, made them long to hear it rehearſed by the flexible voices and harmonious pronunciation of the Athenians, ſo unlike, and ſo ſuperior, to the rudeneſs and aſperity of their own Doric dialect. They deſired their captives to repeat the plaintive ſcenes of their favourite bard. The captives obeyed; and, affecting to repreſent the woes of ancient Kings and heroes, they too faithfully expreſſed their own. Their taſte and ſenſibility endeared them to the Syracuſans, who unlinked their bonds, received them with kindneſs into their families [39], and, after treating them with all the honourable diſtinctions of ancient hoſpitality, reſtored them to their longing and afflicted country, as a ſmall but precious wreck of the moſt formidable armament that had ever ſailed from a Grecian harbour. At their return to Athens, the grateful captives walked in ſolemn proceſſion to the houſe of Euripides, whom they hailed as their deliverer from ſlavery and death [40]. This acknowledgment, infinitely more honourable than

[39] Ητοι τεθνηκεν η διδασκει γραμματα, "he is either dead or rehearſing verſes:" an expreſſion firſt introduced at this time, was afterwards applied proverbially, in ſpeaking of travellers in foreign countries, whoſe fate was uncertain.

[40] Plutarch. in Nicia.

all the crowns and ſplendour that ever ſurrounded the perſon, and even than all the altars and temples that ever adorned the memory of a poet [41], muſt have tranſported Euripides with the *ſecond* triumph which the heart of man can feel. He would have enjoyed the *firſt*, if his countrymen had owed to his virtues the tribute which they paid to his talents; and if, inſtead of the beauty and elegance of his verſes, they had been ſaved by his probity, his courage, or his patriotiſm; qualities which, ſtill more than genius and fancy, conſtitute the real excellence and dignity of human nature. CHAP. XX.

[41] See above, Chapter VI.

THE END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

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